🔥Video Killed the Radio?🔥
Aleon Metals LLC + Partners Pharmacy Services LLC File, Cumulus Continues to Suck & Shockingly, Kodak Still Exists.
We’ve reached the final stretch of summer (believe it or not) and the PETITION team is about to scatter for its much-needed-and-deserved summer break. Today we cover a couple of recent filings and circle back to two old faves that ain’t performing so well. Enjoy the rest of the summer y’all, be safe, and, as always, thank you for your support.
💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Aleon Metals LLC💥
On August 17, 2025, Freeport, TX-based Aleon Metals LLC (“Aleon Metals”) and two affiliates, Aleon Renewable Metals LLC (“ARM”) and Gladieux Metals Recycling LLC (“GMR” and together with Aleon Metals and ARM, the “debtors”), filed chapter 11 sale cases in the Southern District of Texas (Judge Lopez). The debtors “… own and operate the largest petroleum catalyst recycling facility of its kind in North America … which can process up to 55,000 tons of material per year,” extracting “… vanadium, molybdenum, and other valuable metals with a variety of chemical and industrial applications” along the way.
Here’s CRO Roy Gallagher (of Ankura Consulting Group, LLC) putting more meat on the bone:
“Under the Debtors’ model, refiners pay the Debtors to offtake spent catalyst for a fixed recycling fee. The Debtors then extract high-purity vanadium and molybdenum from the catalyst and sell them into specialty markets including battery manufacturing, steelmaking, and even the synthesis of new hydrocarbon refinement catalyst (completing the ‘circle of life’).[] In turn, the Debtors credit a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the extracted metals back to the original refiners.”
When metal prices are “normal,” the credit exceeds the fee, and vice versa when it’s low. Here’s a debtor-supplied illustration.
Take one guess which one played out on the ground. Back to Mr. Gallagher:
“The Debtors’ business, while strategically located and technologically advanced, has been subject to significant volatility in commodity prices, particularly for vanadium and molybdenum, which are the primary metals recovered from spent catalyst. Despite the partial hedge against metals prices inherent to the Debtors’ business model, this volatility nonetheless has resulted in unpredictable revenue streams and periods of negative cash flow.”
But it wasn’t solely that. The debtors also had operational disruptions, most notably the failure of their sulfur dioxide scrubber, which removes acid-rain-causing gas from the exhaust generated at their facilities and rendered ‘em unable to process “… any material amount …” of catalyst from February to June ‘25. Throughput dropped to an average of 2.3k tons per year in the TTM preceding the petition date, or ~3.9% of their permitted capacity.
Plus, the debtors “… faced challenges in securing reliable supply of … catalyst, which are essential feedstocks for their recycling operations.”* Why? Debtors, show us what’s in your pockets:
Or, as Mr. Gallagher so innocuously puts it:
“Relationships with key suppliers became strained because of past due payables and market uncertainty, further complicating efforts to maintain consistent plant utilization.”
Not ideal when your capital structure is this mangled, muni-debt-infested** mess …***
… which made an out-of-court “… impracticable” and includes ~$17.8mm bridge in bridge financing by a group of holders holding a supermajority of the debtors’ revenue bonds (the “bondholder group”).****
So the debtors are heading to bankruptcy court, which is fitting because GMR purchased its facility out of Gulf Chemical & Metallurgical Corporation’s (“Gulf Chemical”) chapter 11 back in ‘17. In chapter 11, the debtors are looking to do the same as Gulf Chemical: sell their assets to the highest bidder.
To kick off the next circle of life, the bondholder group is stepping up as the DIP provider and stalking horse purchaser “… via a credit bid of its claims under the DIP Facility, the assumption of liabilities, and the payment of cash.”
How much cash? Good question because the emergency bidding procedures motion has a total blank. For that and the actual amount being credit bid, 🤦. Although, notwithstanding the lack of clarity, the group’s looking for an up-to $2.5mm expense reimbursement for its service and the following proposed 45-day sale timeline:
The DIP itself is a headline ~$187.5mm term loan, composed of ~$62.5mm in new money ($17.5mm interim) and a 2:1, ~$125mm roll-up of the bondholder group’s revenue bonds ☝️. The DIP bears interest at one-month term SOFR + 10% (cash for the new money, PIK for the roll-up) and has a 3% OID commitment fee and a 3% exit fee.
The court held a one-hour-and-change first day hearing on August 18, 2025. Prior to the hearing, Mason Metals, LLC (“Mason Metals”), which is party to a repo agreement with GMR under which Mason Metals purchases calcine — an intermediate metal product containing nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, and vanadium — from GMR only to later sell it back (at a higher price), didn’t want to lose its valuables and objected to the debtors’ DIP and proposed bidding procedures. However, folks landed on position-protecting comfort language ahead of time and no fireworks went off, 😔.
Otherwise, the first-day went off without a hitch … except the bidding procedures. Judge Lopez wasn’t keen on approving bid protections — even ho-hum expense reimbursements – with zero notice. But day-one roll-ups be chill.
In any event, the court punted that motion to this Friday, August 22, 2025 at 10am CT and scheduled the second-day hearing for September 17, 2025 at 2pm CT.
The debtors are represented by Morrison Foerster LLP (Jennifer Marines, Benjamin Butterfield, Andrew Kissner, Ilayna Guevrekian, Joseph Murphy, Donghao “Helen” Yan) and Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner, Julie Harrison, Maria Mokrzycka) as legal counsel, Ankura Consulting LLC (Roy Gallagher) as financial advisor and CRO, and Jefferies Group LLC (Richard Morgner, Paul Shin) as investment banker. Tim Pohl is the debtors’ independent manager. The bondholder group and UMB Bank, N.A., as trustee under each series of revenue bonds and prepetition superpriority and DIP agent, are represented by Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Gryll, Owen Haney, Marjorie Carter, Christopher Odell). Mason Metals is represented by Haynes and Boone, LLP (Ken Kattner, David Staab).
*The debtors got interim relief to pay $2.5mm in critical vendor claims, including feedstock providers, with another $200k to follow in final approval.
**For those new to the game, the debtors’ revenue bonds are the municipal (aka “muni”) debt. Here, they are tax-exempt bonds issued by the Brazoria County Industrial Development Corporation (the “Municipal Issuer”), which in turn lent the proceeds to the debtors and are secured by (i) the Municipal Issuer’s rights under the proceeds-providing loan agreements, (ii) amounts held by UMB Bank, N.A., as indenture trustee under each series, (iii) the debtors’ applicable real estate and associated leases, rents, etc., and (iv) revenues generated by the debtors’ applicable projects, plus, in the case of ARM, substantially all of its assets, including an electric arc furnace.
***The Gladieux Metal Note Payable and the Gladieux Metal Subordinated Loan were provided by 72.6% equity holder Gladieux Metals, LLC, an affiliate of major-industrial-recycle-project-developer Jefferson Enterprise Management, while the FTAI loan was provided by an affiliate of 27.4% equity holder FTAI Infrastructure Inc. ($FIP).
****The members of the bondholder group have not yet been disclosed.
⚡Update: Cumulus Media Inc ($CMLS)⚡
We originally initiated on radio operator and former chapter 11 debtor Cumulus Media Inc ($CMLS) here, when the stock was sitting pretty … lol “pretty” … at $4.82/share:
We then wrote up some follow ups here, at which point the stock had dropped to $0.43/share:
Why are we revisiting? Take a wild guess. Or don’t, just take a look:
Pour one out for the shareholders.
If you searched up the stock, you also would’ve noticed that it’s now traded OTC! Because Nasdaq delisted the turd back in April ‘25, and CMLS didn’t appeal.
Other than the delisting, there are also two quarters worth of results to catch up on, so let’s go dumpster diving.
For 1Q’25, CMLS reported total revenues of $187.3mm, down 6.4% YoY, which consisted of a 10.6% YoY decline in broadcast radio revenue. Adjusted EBITDA was $3.5mm, compared to $8.4mm for 1Q’24.
For 2Q’25, CMLS reported total revenues of $186mm, down 9.2% YoY, which consisted of a 13% decline in broadcast radio. Adjusted EBITDA was $22.4mm, compared to $25.2mm for 2Q’24.
Let’s zoom out a bit just to see exactly how much of a sh*tshow the last 2+ years have been:
And then we can zoom in again just to show how lackluster the most recent half-year has been:
Which really ain’t surprising. Who the f*ck still listens to the radio?
As of June 30, 2025, CMLS had $96.7mm in cash compared to $63.8mm at the end of FY’24. No, CMLS wasn’t cash flow positive for 1H’25, the increase is due to a $55mm draw on the revolver.
That brings us to the debt.
In our previous coverage, we also went over CMLS’ May ‘24 exchange offer in which holders of their 6.75% senior secured first-lien notes due ‘26 (the “old notes”) were offered new 8% senior secured first-lien notes due ‘29 (the “new notes”). Participants received $940 in new notes per $1,000 of old notes and, on the way out the door, provided a customary kick in the crotch to non-participants, agreeing to eliminate covenants and events of default and strip collateral.*
But it’s been over a year, so why not check in on how those new notes are doing …
According to FINRA, the new notes are currently trading at … oh f*ck … ~24.5c on the dollar.
As of 2Q’25, here’s what the debt stack looks like:
S&P Global now has CMLS rated CCC+ while Moody’s Ratings downgraded CMLS to Caa3 from Caa1 back in April ‘25.
The good news? The revolver has a borrowing base of ~$125mm (85% of A/R) so there’s still some more money that can be burned to maintain sh*tty radio stations! But really guys, c’mon. Net leverage is now >8x LTM EBITDA, the digital business has been lackluster AF, what the h*ll is the end game here?** Wait don’t tell us …
See y’all at the (eventual) first day.
*Contemporaneously, CMLS also consummated a term loan exchange where the old term loan was replaced with new five year paper. 99.6% of the old term loan participated in that exchange.
**CMLS recently announced a strategic partnership with content distribution platform, Rumble Inc. ($RUM), to bolster its podcast production arm, Westwood One. RUM’s entire schtick seems to be “freer” speech when compared to something like YouTube while being a literal fraction of the size (RUM has ~51mm users while YouTube has >2.5b).
⚡Update: Eastman Kodak Co. ($KODK)⚡
Here’s a fun one.
We last wrote about Eastman Kodak Co. ($KODK) all the way back in February ‘22 …*
… when the company engaged in a weird (and desperate) attempt to get into cryptocurrency (KodakCoin). Truthfully, we haven’t thought about it since.
Until now.
Of course, KODK as a company needs no introduction; it’s a storied brand that carries a >133 years-long history that started with merely a film roll camera. You should know how the rest of the story goes: film cameras got disrupted by digital cameras and KODK — despite attempts to compete in the digital camera space — became increasingly irrelevant to the point of filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy (in 2012).
KODK in its current iteration is now a far cry from its film camera roots; it has evolved into (i) a print segment (printing plates, inkjet presses, etc.), (ii) an advanced materials and chemicals segment (photographic film, pharmaceutical starting materials), and (iii) a brand segment (licenses out the “Kodak” name).
For the past few years, KODK’s financial performance has looked something like this:
For 1H’25, KODK generated revenues of $510mm, and EBITDA of $11mm while also burning through $30mmm in operating cash flow. But the real kicker was this tidbit from the 10-Q for 2Q’25:
In case you didn’t bring your glasses, that ladies and gents is a going concern warning.
And what are those aforementioned debt obligations? KODK is carrying a $477mm term loan extended by Kennedy Lewis Investment Management LLC (“KLIM”) back in February ‘21. Then there’s also 1mm shares of 4% series B convertible preferred stock (the “series B preferred stock”) that KODK must redeem at $100 per share if not converted by May ‘26. And finally there’s ~$24mm letters of credit outstanding.
Due to a February ‘25 amendment (the “‘25 term loan amendment”), the maturity date of the term loan would be accelerated five days prior to the mandatory redemption date of the series B preferred stock. And since KODK hasn’t extended that mandatory extension date date, the term loan is set to be due on May 22, 2026.**
Basically, add that all up and you get ~$600mm worth of obligations due within the next year … against $155mm in cash.
BUT … there’s some good news.
KODK has done well in managing its retirement plan contributions. So well in fact that KODK is planning to use the excess proceeds from its pension plan to pay off a very healthy portion of the $600mm.
In January ‘25, KODK terminated its “Kodak Retirement Income Plan” (the “KRIP”) in January ‘25 and will replace it with a new retirement plan coined the “Kodak Cash Balance Plan” (the “replacement plan”). KODK estimates that after satisfaction of any KRIP liabilities, there will still be surplus assets of ~$850mm!
Yes! There are good allocators out there ladies and gents!
In order to lower the excise tax hit from 50% to 20%, KODK will be transferring 25% of the surplus assets to the replacement plan. After capitalizing the replacement plan and the 20% excise tax, KODK expects to receive proceeds of ~$500mm. KODK will receive ~$300mm of the ~$500mm in the form of cash by December ‘25 — the remainder is still illiquid and stuck with the hedge funds and will be collected over the next several quarters, beyond the term loan’s May ‘26 maturity. Which means even accounting for the pension proceeds, KODK estimates that there will still be ~$175mm outstanding on the term loan by maturity.***
The question now is whether KODK will be able to buy itself some more time via an extension of the series B preferred stock mandatory redemption date or find a way to refinance the remaining outstanding term loan at maturity (plus pay for the series B preferred stock redemption.
The company’s stock is down ~10% YTD — most of which hit in the past month — but in the wake of this GCW, investors appear optimistic. The stock is up over the past week 👇:
We’ll keep y’all updated.
*Also see our earlier coverage here and here.
**KODK was, however, able to address its series C convertible preferred stock by issuing 15.1mm shares of common stock. The carrying value of the series C preferred stock was $123mm.
***Per the ‘25 term loan amendment, KODK must use any proceeds from the KRIP reversion proceeds to reduce the term loan until $200mm and, thereafter, to use 50% of the KRIP reversion proceeds to prepay the term loan until the amount outstanding is reduced to $100mm.
💊New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Partners Pharmacy Services, LLC💊
On August 13, 2025, Partners Pharmacy Services, LLC and thirteen affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 sale cases in the Southern District of Texas (Judge Lopez). Founded in ‘98, the debtors serve “… the medication needs of residents at skilled nursing facilities, assisted-living communities, long-term care residences, long-term acute care facilities, and institutional facilities throughout the United States.”
Up until COVID, they were “… the third largest long-term care pharmacy company in the United States serving up to 48,000 residents at facilities in sixteen states and the District of Columbia,” although its largest customer was always its affiliate and senior care operator CareOne Management, LLC (“CareOne”).
But (i) pandemic fallout (🥱), (ii) a 19-to-54% demographic pivot of Medicare Part A and B beneficiaries to Medicare Part C plans, which provide a less predictable reimbursement structure to the debtors, and (iii) private equity sinking its teeth into the nursing home industry and shifting homes to alternative pharmacies did a number on the business.
From Q4’21 through the end of ‘22, the debtors lost 6.5k patients and accrued a $29mm balance owing to Cardinal Health 110, LLC and Cardinal Health 112, LLC (collectively, “Cardinal”), the supplier for 95% of their pharmaceutical needs … in addition to $37mm owed under a by-then-defaulted senior revolver with CIT Bank, N.A. (“CIT”).
In late ‘22, the debtors tried to right size by closing six locations, which reduced their daily pharma needs from $500k to $260k, but negative cash flow persisted.* In December ‘23, they onboarded Gibbins Advisors, LLC to assist with liquidity and figure out what the f*ck to do.
Apparently the solution was trying to sell the biz. A few times. In June ‘24, the debtors commenced negotiations with PharMerica, “… one of the largest institutional pharmacy companies in the United States,” and chose an “aggressive” target closing date for the end of ‘24.
We don’t mean the ‘24 closing date. After multiple delays, the whole deal fell apart and PharMerica walked in April ‘25.
Take two. The next month, in May ‘25, the debtors executed a term sheet with Speciality RX (“SRX”), another player in the space, and through June ‘24, SRX paid a total of $5mm in deposits while the parties worked to negotiate an asset purchase agreement. Guess what.
On August 5, 2025, SRX, just like PharMerica, walked and, naturally, “… demand[ed] immediate return of …” its $5mm. And, just as naturally, that too, uh, apparently never happened.
Which left CIT holding the bag. Except not really because it also peaced out in July ‘23 by assigning its then ~$37.6mm in debt to CS One, LLC (“CS One”), an entity owned by the debtors’ and CareOne’s 100% shareholder Daniel Straus.** And since that assignment, no amounts have been paid back, so the balance has grown to a tidy ~$44.5mm, including $1.5mm in early August ‘25-provided bridge financing. Here’s the full petition date debt stack:***
But Mr. Straus ain’t quite done digging holes.**** In bankruptcy, CS One is providing a $6.5mm multi-draw term loan (all approved at interim). The DIP bears interest at 12% PIK and, aside from reimbursement of prof expenses, doesn’t have any fees or a roll-up. Together with the prepetition revolver, the DIP will serve as the basis for CS One’s ~$51mm stalking horse credit subject to the following timeline:*****
Perhaps this one will stick. Although that is anyone’s guess because, while the court held a quickie 49-minute first-day hearing on August 14, 2025, at which all requested relief was granted, McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”), a stiffed supplier represented by Buchalter (Jeff Garfinkle), showed up to revisit the PharMerica sale and drop a truckload of shade on the debtors:
“That [PharMerica] transaction fell apart in April of this year after Mr. Straus’ daughter and several other parties filed a very, actually, mind-boggling federal court lawsuit against the debtor[s] alleging a lot of improprieties here on the part of management … It alleges very significant federal Medicare violations. It alleges improper conduct with members of management …
In addition, the debtor’s former interim CEO filed another lawsuit against the debtors and various affiliates. That lawsuit … apparently was settled on August 4. We don't know the terms of that settlement. Again, that lawsuit led to very serious allegations of intercompany wrongdoing …
We expect the committee counsel … will investigate these allegations that are set forth in two different federal court lawsuits.”
However, he stopped before objecting to anything, leaving us to wait for the committee to get up and going. But we’re a patient crew: the second day and bidding procedures hearings will go forward on September 10, 2025 at 1pm CT.
The debtors are represented by Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Patrick Potter, Dania Slim, James Dickinson, Amy West) as legal counsel, Gibbins (Ronald Winters, Tyler Brasher) as financial advisor and CRO, and SSG Capital Advisors, LLC (Mark Chesen, Matthew Karlson) as investment banker. Harvey Tepner is the debtors’ independent manager, and he and Mr. Winters compose their restructuring committee. CS One, LLC, as prepetition and DIP lender, is represented by Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP (Andrew Glenn, Malak Doss) and Kane Russell Coleman Logan PC (Michael Ridulfo, Mark Taylor). McKesson is represented by Buchalter (Jeff Garfinkle).
*Presumably a RIF or two along the way too. The debtors peaked at ~800 employees, but as of the petition date, they’re down ~65% to ~284.
**CS One and Mr. Straus provided “… [c]ertain guarantees …” of SRX’s $5mm deposit, although the terms aren’t disclosed.
***The GUC claims are primarily owed to vendors, but also include contingent litigation claims relating to prepetition lawsuits filed by McKesson Corporation, an affiliate, and “other parties” for breach of contract, which allege ~$11.7mm in claims.
****The debtors incurred net losses of $10.4mm in ‘22, $7.5mm in ‘23, and $6.7mm in ‘24.
*****The stalking horse bid doesn’t have any bid protections.
📚Resources📚
We have compiled a list of a$$-kicking resources on the topics of restructuring, tech, finance, investing, and disruption. 💥You can find it here💥.
📤 Notice📤
Anthony Greene (Associate) joined Togut Segal & Segal LLP from Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP.
Isaac Lee (Managing Director) joined Teneo from Ankura Consulting.
🍾Congratulations to…🍾
Berkeley Research Group, LLC (Evan Hengel) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Merit Street Media, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Emerald Capital Advisors Corp. (John Madden) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Higher Ground Education, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
M3 Advisory Partners, LP (Robert Winning) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Alachua Government Services, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
McDermott Will & Schulte, LLP (Darren Azman, Kristin Going, Stacy Lutkus) and Cole Schotz, P.C. (Seth Van Aalten, Sarah Carnes, Justin Alberto, Stacy Newman, Michael Fitzpatrick, Melissa Hartlipp) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Claire’s Holdings LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Province, LLC (Sanjuro Kietlinski) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Desktop Metal, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Stephen Zide on becoming Co-Chair of Dechert LLP’s Financial Restructuring group.