💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Lifescan Global Corp.💥
Another Platinum portco ends up in bankruptcy.
On July 15, 2025, Platinum Equity (“Platinum”)-owned* LifeScan Global Corporation and 8 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors” and together with their non-debtor affiliates, the “company”) filed prearranged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas (Judge Perez). The company is “… a leader in delivering personalized health, wellness, and digital solutions to individuals living with diabetes” and offers “… diabetes-related products and services includes blood glucose monitoring (‘BGM’) devices, blood glucose test strips, lancing devices, and digital applications.” It principally produces and sells BGM products for homes and hospitals under the brand OneTouch®.
BGM was a great business before, oh, about ‘23 when Medicare expanded coverage to include continuous glucose monitoring (“CGM”) technology.
The difference? BGM takes a snapshot of a single moment in time through a pinprick, while CGM “… provides a continuous stream of glucose data, typically measured every five to fifteen minutes, without the need for finger pricks … and offers a more comprehensive view of glucose data, including identification of trends and patterns over time, which can lead to better diabetes management.”
No doubt; the market agreed. Prior to ‘21, the company generated $1b+ in revenue, which dipped to $909mm in ‘22 and $750mm in ‘23, and it ain’t looking like it’ll get any better: the company expects the BGM market to decline 9% YoY through ‘30,** and, while it has worked with a partner to get into the CGM game, that ain’t happened yet. Here’s president, CEO, and first day declarant Valerie Asbury to dish the deets on that:
“LifeScan’s leadership was optimistic, based on the information they received from their CGM partner, that the Company could launch its first CGM product in late 2023 or early 2024 …
The LifeScan CGM product, however, did not launch in 2023 or 2024 due to delays in project development. LifeScan has come to learn, for example, that based on progress estimates from its partner, U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval may not be received until the first half of 2027 at the earliest.”
To buy time — before CGM delays got entirely out of hand — the company entered into a May ‘23 transaction with its lenders to push out maturities in exchange for consent fees, higher interest rates, and a partial repayment from a $50mm Platinum equity contribution. Under it, the “… vast majority …” of first lien obligations were exchanged into new first lien obligations, 100% of its second lien obligations were exchanged for new PIK second lien obligations, and non-participating first lien claims, which were apparently offered “… identical terms as all other lenders …,” dropped to third in line. Here’s the petition date cap stack,*** with the caveat that we’ll get into the rebate agreement claims in a bit.
But buying time didn’t end up mattering: as noted, the company’s CGM partner kept having delays, and in April ‘24, Moody’s and S&P downgraded the company. By September ‘24, the company had to figure out a path forward, so it engaged restructuring pros, kicked off discussions with an ad hoc group of a majority of its first and second lien term loans (the “ad hoc group”), and ducked out on a $27.4mm payment owed on the now-third lien debt, which led to a further ratings downgrade and a forbearance while folks got a deal ironed out.
One condition on that forbearance. The company has agreements with rebate counterparties – U.S. pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”), state Medicaid entities, and other managed care organizations – that facilitate patient access to and insurance coverage for the company’s products in exchange for hefty fees.
How hefty? The company typically pays fees in excess of 91% of the list price of its products to those counterparties, keeping only 9% for itself. That simply didn’t work for the lenders, so the company straight up stopped making payments and those (unsecured) rebate claims ☝️ piled up.
After a few months of talking it out, a deal emerged. In February ‘25, the company, Platinum, and the ad hoc group, which at the time held 84% and 73% of the first and second lien debt, executed a restructuring support agreement (the “original RSA”), which was then opened up to all lenders. “Nearly” 100% of the first and second lien debt signed on. Under it, the company held auctions and bought back $281mm in first lien debt at 55-60% of face in March ‘25 and started negotiations with rebate counterparties to get better terms. But those guys weren’t game to recut their contracts, so that fizzled. Plus a new issue popped up: all that cash the debtors hadn’t been paying the counterparties was piling up and creating big tax implications. The original RSA died on the vine.
But folks weren’t done, and the company, Platinum, and the ad hoc group got back to the table and negotiated an in-court, ~$1.4b-liability-reducing RSA (the “revised RSA”), which they executed on July 15, 2025 and is supported, as of the petition date, by holders of 99% of the first lien and second lien claims. In addition to addressing the company’s tax issues, it contemplates:
📍First Lien Repurchase. The company would repurchase ~$140mm in first lien claims for $119mm (85% of face), which happened the same day the revised RSA was signed.
📍Rejection of Rebate Agreements. The debtors will reject “… substantially all PBM contracts and most state Medicaid rebate contracts,” including their agreements with Caremark, Express Scripts, and OptumRx, which the company believes will leave its business “… smaller but more profitable on an EBITDA margin basis.”
📍Chapter 11 Plan. A sale-toggle chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement (“DS”) that provide the company with a new $75mm revolver and (i) existing first lien term loans with new first lien term loans “… at a principal amount determined by the amount of cash available at emergence and the option to participate in a potential 20% equity allocation”; (ii) existing second lien term loans with 95% of the reorg equity (subject to dilution by the first lien allocation), and (iii) a $10 million cash pool for GUCs (including all third lien term loan claims and second lien term loan deficiency claims).**** That missing 5% of equity? That’s been earmarked for Platinum, for providing post-effective date operations and strategic advice.*****
📍Section 363 Sale. We said it’s a sale-toggle plan, so to ensure it’s the best deal for the estates, there’s also going to be a postpetition marketing process on the following timeline:
📍Milestones. The RSA requires the debtors to adhere to the following long-dated milestones:
With the plan-sale pivot ultimately turning on whether anyone shows up during the marketing process with a bid that pays off the first lien and second lien claims, as well as amounts owed under the cash collateral orders.
But if it nevertheless goes that way, the ad hoc group will direct the first lien and second lien agents to credit bid for the debtors’ assets.
And speaking of cash collateral, the debtors filed with ~$70.7mm in cash on hand, which apparently enough, so they’re going to live on cash collateral during their chapter 11 stay.
The court held a 1.75-hour first-day hearing on July 16, 2025, at which all requested relief was granted, although we can’t tell you exactly what happened because (Epiq-recreated) docket stripped the audio (again!).
In any event, the court scheduled the second-day hearing for August 4, 2025 at 8:30am CT, the DS hearing for August 18, 2025 at 8:30am CT, and the confirmation hearing for September 30, 2025 at 9am CT.
The debtors are represented by Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Samuel Khalil, Jaimie Fedell,, Melanie Yanez) and Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, M. Shane Johnson, Megan Young-John, James Keefe, Grecia Sarda) as legal counsel, Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (Brian Teets) as financial advisor, and PJT Partners LP ($PJT) (John Singh). The ad hoc group is represented by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Elliot Moskowitz, Michael Pera, Adam Greene) and Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Robert Bruner, Julie Harrison) as legal counsel and Houlihan Lokey Inc. ($HLI) as investment banker. Bank of America, N.A. ($BAC), as first lien agent, is represented by Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew) and Haynes and Boone, LLP (J. Frasher Murphy, Eli Columbus, Matthew Ferris) as legal counsel and RPA Advisors as financial advisor. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB ($WSFS), as second lien agent, is represented by Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP (Todd Meyers, Danielle Barav-Johnson, Mark Sherrill) as legal counsel. Platinum is represented by Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Christopher Greer, Joshua Deason, Laura Acker, James Burbage) as legal counsel.
*Platinum bought the company from Johnson & Johnson ($JNJ) in ‘18 for $2.1b.
**The company’s ‘24 EBITDA was $325mm, which wasn’t enough to invest in CGM, address working capital drag from its declining BGM biz,, and make ~$110mm in debt payments due that year.
***Well, mostly. The company had a $75mm revolver too, but paid it off entirely on July 14, 2025, the day before they filed for bankruptcy protection.
****If anyone wants to place a bet that those deficiency claims don’t wind up getting waived, let Johnny know.
*****203 N. LaSalle, anyone?
Company Professionals:
Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Samuel Khalil, Jaimie Fedell,, Melanie Yanez) and Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, M. Shane Johnson, Megan Young-John, James Keefe, Grecia Sarda)
Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (Brian Teets)
Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP ($PJT) (John Singh)
Claims Agent: Epiq (Click here for free docket access)
Other Parties in Interest:
Ad Hoc Group:
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Elliot Moskowitz, Michael Pera, Adam Greene) and Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Robert Bruner, Julie Harrison)
First Lien Agent: Bank of America, N.A. ($BAC)
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Moss, Jordan Wishnew) and Haynes and Boone, LLP (J. Frasher Murphy, Eli Columbus, Matthew Ferris)
Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB ($WSFS)
Legal: Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP (Todd Meyers, Danielle Barav-Johnson, Mark Sherrill)
Sponsor: Platinum Equity
Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Christopher Greer, Joshua Deason, Laura Acker, James Burbage)