💥Heavy Metal💥
Desktop Metal Files. Gaming and Mass Tort BKs are back!
On July 28, 2025, Massachusetts-based Desktop Metal Inc. (“DM” or the “company”) and 15 affiliates (collectively with the company, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas (Judge Lopez). We discussed this sh*tco — a Nano Dimension Ltd. ($NNDM)-owned developer and provider of 3D printing systems — and its sordid history back on June 1, 2025 here:
You’ll recall that once upon a time NNDM had a swarm of activist investors but NNDM’s then-management didn’t give a f***********************ck and, in July ‘24, entered into an ill-advised $183mm merger with DM (with proceeds going to DM’s shareholders and, notably, not DM’s existing convertible noteholders). Thereafter, the activists successfully sh*tcanned NNDM’s management but ultimately couldn’t, despite their best efforts, litigate their way out of the DM merger. Immediately after closing the merger, NNDM was crystal clear it had no love for DM and immediately dove into a strategic review; it — well DM, really — also had to contend with payment of DM’s convertible notes; and NNDM wasted no time reconstituting DM’s board and engaging BK pros. In June we wrote:
“If you think [the activist investors] and the newly appointed board are going to sink significantly more cash into a business they didn’t even want to acquire in the first place, think again.”
Here is Daniel Gilligan, Executive Director in the RX group of Piper Sandler & Co. (“Piper”), the company’s investment banker, discussing attempts to get NNDM to tack on $12mm in incremental funding to a $12mm delayed draw term loan NNDM had already provided in April ‘25 (defined terms as used therein):
On May 9, 2025, the Company, through its counsel, submitted a request to the Nano Lender for an additional $12 million in incremental funding. On May 13, 2025, the Company met with certain members of the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group and its advisors and communicated the urgent need for additional funding. On May 15, 2025, Nano declined to provide additional financing while the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group provided the Company and the Advisors with a term sheet for a proposed financing, the terms of which, including the request for the Nano Lender to subordinate its loan position, were not attainable for the Company. Over the following two days, the Company, with the assistance of the Advisors, prepared a modified financing proposal, including potential terms for DIP financing, and, on May 17, 2025, at the direction of the Board, submitted in parallel its proposal to the Nano Lender, Ad Hoc Noteholder Group, and certain third parties that had signed NDAs. Neither the Nano Lender nor the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group accepted the proposal or provided a counterproposal at that time.
Hang on. So … *checks notes* … DM’s new parent company, NNDM, didn’t want to put more good money after bad … and … *checks notes* … an ad hoc noteholder group didn’t want to put more good money after bad … sooooooo … Piper then went out to other holders of prepetition convertible senior notes … and … *checks notes* … they didn’t want to put good money after bad …. sooooooo … Piper than went out to third-party capital providers, contacting 27 potential partners (including strategics and “well-known commercial banks and specialty institutions that routinely provide asset-based and cash flow-based financing” … even though, uh, there’s never been positive operating cash flow) … and … *checks notes* … they all saw a steaming pile of dung and didn’t want to get embroiled into a non-consensual priming sitch or loan into this disaster on a junior basis … soooooo … Piper then went back to NNDM …
… and NNDM be like …
Yup, bullseye indeed.
You’ll recall from our initial coverage that there was roughly $112mm in outstanding convertible senior notes — “was” being the operative word. After NNDM told the company to get f*cked, what was Piper to do? Well, go back to the ad hoc noteholder group again, obvi!
Back to Mr. Gilligan:
“Shortly thereafter, the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group submitted a proposal for a comprehensive transaction between the Company and certain members of the Ad Hoc Noteholder Group, which contemplated new-money bridge financing.
Ok. Promising.* He continued:
The Company and the Advisors, at the direction of the Board, extensively negotiated the terms of such proposal and, on June 5, 2025, entered into the First Lien AHG Secured Note and the Third Lien AHG Secured Roll-Up Note (collectively, such transaction, the “AHG Financing Transaction”). Pursuant to the Ad Hoc Financing Transaction, the AHG Lenders agreed to provide $10 million of new-money financing under the First Lien AHG Secured Note in exchange for certain terms, including that: (i) the First Lien AHG Secured Note would be super senior in priority and prime the Nano Secured Note, and (ii) an aggregate principal amount of approximately $31 million of the unsecured Convertible Senior Notes would be rolled up into the Third Lien AHG Secured Roll-Up Note. The AHG Lenders funded the additional $10 million in new-money financing to the Company on June 5, 2025. Importantly, the Company’s cash flow forecast at the time showed that more than $10 million would be needed to complete even an expedited sale process.” (emphasis added)
Ruh roh. That sounds … uh … insufficient … to say the least. Anyway, here’s what that whole transaction did to the company’s cap stack:
Due to the shortfall, Piper kickstarted a sale process even before the AHG Financing Transaction closed of all or substantially all of the company’s assets and businesses, formally launching the initiative on or around June 2, 2025; it then went out to around 140 potential financial and strategic buyers only to be told by literally everyone … well … this:
Like, seriously, folks. E.V.E.R.Y.O.N.E. Here’s a live shot of the ad hoc noteholder group, which “…indicated that they had no intention of participating as a potential bidder in any sale process”:
And here’s a live shot at NNDM — yes, they even went back to NNDM — when asked if it wanted to engage in the sale process:
Recognizing that the proceeds from the AHG Financing Transaction weren’t gonna get the company where it needed to go, Piper shot out a request to NNDM and the ad hoc noteholder group “…asking for a proposal for bridge or debtor-in-possession financing….” Want to guess what NNDM and the ad hoc noteholder group responded with? We’ll spare you the suspense … we’ve got our cameras everywhere … here’s another live shot:
And here’s a live shot of Mr. Gilligan in that moment (poor guy, 🥃):
This was followed by more (failed) sale efforts … yada yada yada … and even more (failed) sale efforts … yada yada yada … and yet even more (failed) sale efforts (and some failed DIP financing effort) until finally — ⚡️FINALLY⚡️— Piper re-engaged Anzu Special Acquisition Corp II (“Anzu”), which had previously shown some interest in some assets and continued to hang around the hoop, and got Anzu to agree “…to purchase certain of the Company’s foreign subsidiaries and related U.S. assets in a private sale for $10 million, plus the dollar equivalent of any excess cash held in the Debtors’ foreign subsidiaries, but which is expected to yield $0.” We’re guessing the ink wasn’t even dry yet on the term sheet before someone screamed “file this f*cker!”
And file it they did. In “crash” fashion: there’s, as of the time of this writing a day later, literally nothing on file other than material related to the proposed private sale to Anzu. This is basically a Sunnova-like sitch … but, like, WAY worse.
That’s right, the debtors requested an “emergency first day hearing” to effectuate the private sale to Anzu right out of the gate … or else! … they say.
No, seriously … orrrrrr else … the debtors’ non-debtor German subs would file a German insolvency proceeding and then, like dominos, other foreign subs would file their own proceedings (in Japan and Italy), the $10mm in value would be lost, and this thing would spiral into a chapter 7.
Did Judge Lopez bite on the “or else”? Not entirely. It turns out there was a wee bit more latitude than the debtors initially thought — a circumstance driven in part by Judge Lopez’s inability to schedule the hearing on the emergency motion before July 31, 2025 at 11am CT. Which … *checks calendar* … happens to be a day later than the debtors originally contemplated receipt of the first $4mm tranche of sale proceeds (followed by the second $6mm tranche no later than August 11, 2025). And so, in lieu of a “first day hearing,” the debtors and Judge Lopez participated in a late July 29, 2025 afternoon “status conference” wherein we learned, among other things, that (a) Richard Pachulski hates with all of his being a crash filing and the potential reputational harm it could do to his firm (PETITION Note: this is not, especially in this environment, a “thing” and Judge Lopez didn’t bat an eye), (b) the ad hoc noteholder group has grievances over the merger and wants to pursue potential causes of action against the estate (and NNDM) so they shouldn’t be sold to Anzu or anyone else and all proceeds from the Anzu sale ought to be contingent upon eventual agreement on the use of cash collateral, and (c) Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP has an attachment on the very same commercial tort claims the ad hoc noteholder group is threatening to assert (for fees incurred in connection with the merger litigation, lol).
The debtors hope to tackle the emergency motion on Thursday — followed by (hopefully) the consensual use of cash collateral and a to-be-filed wages motion so that employees are taken care of and these cases can live to see another day.
Expect a much fuller docket by then.
The debtors are represented by Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Richard Pachulski, Gregory Demo, Michael Warner, Maxim Litvak, Benjamin Wallen) as legal counsel,*** FTI Consulting Inc. ($FCN)(Andrew Hinkelman, Chas Harvick) as CRO, CTO and financial advisor, and Piper as investment banker. Independent board members Paul Aronzon and Robert Warshauer are represented by Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil”)(Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi, Gabriel Morgan).**** The Ad Hoc Group of Secured and Convertible Noteholders is represented by Paul Hastings LLP (Dan Fliman, Charles Persons, Ryan Montefusco, Isaac Sasson, Lanie Miliotes) and the buyer, Anzu is represented by Jones Day (Oliver Zeltner, Dan Moss, Ryan Sims). NNDM is represented by Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Kenneth Ziman, Lewis Clayton, Jeffrey Recher, Kyle Satterfield) and Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, M. Shane Johnson, Megan Young-John, Jordan Stevens).
*The ad hoc group of noteholders consists of 100% of the 1L, 100% of the 3L and 90% of the convertible senior notes.
**This company is leaving a trail of bodies and by “bodies” we mean unpaid professional services providers. Behind the funded debt, the company has approximately $40mm in unsecured claims on account of trade and other obligations — exclusive of amounts owed to (i) Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP for litigating on behalf of the company against NNDM in connection with enforcing the merger ($29.2mm!), (ii) Latham & Watkins LLP for $8.6mm and (iii) Stiferl Financial Corp. for $2.8mm. Other firms listed in the debtors’ consolidated list of top 30 creditors include Richards Layton & Finger PA and K&L Gates LLP.
***Recognizing a hard-to-get-paid case when it sees one, Vinson & Elkins LLP, which had been company counsel, triggered the “eject” button and slid over to special corporate counsel status.
****The Board retained Weil “…to investigate and assess potential claims arising out of (i) the governance and management of the Debtors and transactions between or among the Debtors, their affiliates, and/or any related parties, including requesting and reviewing documents from the Debtors and their advisors, interviewing witnesses and seeking cooperation of third parties and (ii) Nano’s conduct in connection with the Merger.” Yet, that “…investigation has … paused in light of the Company’s ongoing liquidity challenges.”
💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - RunItOneTime LLC (a/k/a Maverick Gaming)💥
On July 14, 2025, Seattle-area-based RunItOneTime LLC and 67 affiliates (collectively, the “debtors”) — better known as Maverick Gaming — filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas (Judge Perez).* Founded in ‘17, the debtors operate “… a portfolio of casinos, card rooms, hotels, and other gaming- and hospitality-related assets across Washington, Nevada, and Colorado” and focus “… on acquiring undervalued gaming assets and implementing operational changes to improve profitability.”
Oh heck yeah, do we have the soundtrack for this piece? Hey Siri, cue up Kenny Rogers’ The Gambler.
🎶You got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em
Know when to walk away and know when to run 🎶
What a tune. Anyway, back to the debtors. Initially, holdin’ em was the call, and Lady Luck smiled on the debtors’ strategy. Here’s CFO, CRO, and “Liquidity Employee”** Jeff Seery with the deets:
“In Nevada, the Wendover properties used to consistently produce approximately $4 million in annual EBITDA prior to the Debtors’ acquisition of the properties. Under the Debtors’ ownership, these properties produce in excess of $17 million in annual EBITDA. The Company also doubled EBITDA at the Elko properties after the first year of ownership. The Company saw similar initial increases in Colorado.”
Until COVID turned that smile upside down. Here’s Mr. Seery again:
“Among other things, the COVID-19 epidemic forced facility closures and subsequent, restrictive re-opening regulations hampered the Company’s growth opportunities while it was in its nascent stages. In Washington, for example, card rooms were closed for multiple months following the imposition of the shelter-in-place mandates. When allowed to reopen, the Company was required to operate outdoors in parking lot tents and—once allowed back indoors, 25% of casino walls were required to remain open air for circulation, all of which took a substantial toll on customer traffic.”
Sh*tty luck — but the debtors didn’t fold ‘em. Instead, they leaned into some f*cking terrible business calls. Starting in ‘22, the debtors botched a slot system upgrade that “… derailed the Company’s slot machines in Colorado for weeks,” "inadvertently" rolled out too many free play offers under its loyalty rewards program “… which severely impacted profitability and devastated results for at least four to five months,” and lost almost a million bucks on sports betting until they folded the whole platform.
Sovereignty was a massive PITA too. Washington, where 17 of the debtors’ card rooms are located, regulates the sh*t out of the biz, prohibiting casino-style gaming (slots, roulette, craps, etc.), sports betting, and loan sharking easy targets “ … the provision of consumer credit[.]”
You know who ain’t subject to those regulations?
The debtors’ loyal, lol, customers packed their bags and headed for nearby tribal lands.
To generate cash and buy time, in September ‘21, the debtors sold the land under four casinos to Angelo, Gordon & Co., LP (“AG”) for $93mm and leased it right back,*** and doubled down on the same strategy between September ‘22 and July ‘23 with Blue Owl Capital, Inc. (“Blue Owl”), sale-lease-backing thirteen properties (including, of all things, a gas station) for an aggregate $205.1mm.****
But the culmination of bad circumstances and sus decision-making caused EBITDA to nosedive, from $52.1mm in ‘21 to $16.5mm in ‘23. Unfortunately for the debtors, they have about $306mm in funded debt, excluding capital leases.*****
And before you ask, yes, all that tranching is the product of yet another failed liability management exercise (“LME”) (🙌). Originally, a $55mm revolver and $310mm term loan B, in April ‘24, the company amended the prepetition credit facility to (i) term out the revolver, infuse $10mm in lender-provided fresh capital, and issue another $12mm in first out term loans to those lenders for their troubles, all of which went to the top of the stack, and (ii) exchange the original term loan Bs for the second out at a 15% discount (and a small piece for third out at a 10% discount), with a $13.9mm stub deciding to ride out their bet at the bottom of the pile.
None of it worked.
In January ‘25, management got serious about its debt and kicked off negotiations with the debtors’ prepetition lenders, which eventually formed an ad hoc group …
… while the debtors simultaneously “… pursu[ed] opportunities to raise new capital with third parties.” That continued for a while, with the ad hoc group delivering a term sheet in February ‘25 and both engaged “… to see if an out-of-court solution was possible.”
All the while, the business continued to deteriorate, and the prepetition agent delivered a notice of default in May ‘25. But folks hammered out a standstill and trucked along until they agreed on a deal — if you want to call it that — on June 25, 2025, which is embodied in a restructuring transaction support agreement (the “TSA”). Here’s what it entails:
📍Business Separation. The debtors will slice up their business into three parts: (i) PokerCo, composed of four of the debtors’ Washington card rooms,****** (ii) LeaseCo, composed of its properties subject to Blue Owl’s master lease, and (iii) MainCo, composed of the rest of the debtors’ assets, including a business called EGads! that specializes in designing, fabricating, and installing casino interiors, signage, lighting, and architectural treatments.
PokerCo will pursue a section 363 sale, for which the debtors’ not-walking-away, 57.9%-owner Eric Persson will serve as the stalking horse bidder with a $13mm purchase price, which’ll include five years of sucker’s insurance in case Mr. Persson subsequently sells those assets for a profit.
LeaseCo will, and we quote here, “… negotiate in good faith for an amendment or modification to the Blue Owl Master Lease.”
MainCo. The debtors will either market MainCo, subject to a prepetition lender credit bid, or pursue a chapter 11 plan that converts the prepetition term loans into reorg equity. Or “… pursue such other alternative restructuring transactions as may be appropriate under the circumstances."
📍Licensing Agreement. Mr. Persson’s newco will enter into a non-exclusive license for the debtors’ IP in exchange for $100k plus 25% of the adjusted EBITDA generated using that IP for three years, and the IP will be transferred to the newco.*******
That’s, um, it. Apparently, the deal didn’t get more fleshed out before the debtors ran out of cash and needed to file.
You know what else didn’t get fully fleshed out? Case financing.
For now, all the debtors have is an ad hoc group-backstopped four-week DIP. Initially it was a $22.5mm term loan, composed of $7.5mm in interim new money and a $15mm roll-up of the first out term loans, with post-four-week amounts to be agreed, but at the July 15, 2025 first-day hearing, the debtors announced they’d just come to terms with Marnell Gaming Management (“Marnell”), the “… contemplated successor operator of the Debtors gaming facilities,” and asked, with the ad hoc group’s support, to up the funding by another mil (and the roll-up by another $2mm) notwithstanding the papers.********
Of course, Judge Perez had no issue with that, although he did due process the smallest of courtesies by requiring the debtors to file a Marnell retention app. The debtors filed that two days later, which the court approved the next day over the US trustee’s timing objection.
The second-day hearing will go forward on August 6, 2025 at 1pm CT, by which point, with any luck, the debtors will know how they intend to play their hand.
The debtors are represented by Latham & Watkins LLP (Ray Schrock, Jeff Bjork, Amy Quartarolo, Andrew Sorkin, Helena Tseregounis, Nicholas Messana, Anthony Joseph, Kevin Shang, Montana Licari, Davis Klabo) and Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Timothy “Tad” Davidson II, Ashley Harper, Philip Guffy) as legal counsel, Triple P TRS, LLC as financial advisor, and GLC Advisors & Co., LLC and GLC Securities, LLC (Michael Sellinger) as investment banker. The debtors’ special committee is composed of Lawrence Perkins, Tobias Keller, and Steve McCall.********* The ad hoc group is represented by Ropes & Gray LLP (Ryan Preston Dahl, Leonard Klingbaum, Dan Gwen, Margaret Alden) and Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, M. Shane Johnson, Megan Young-John, James Keefe) as legal counsel. Alter Domus (US) LLC is represented by Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (H. Stephen Castro, Bob Bruner) as legal counsel. Evergreen WA LLC and Project Evergreen NV Owner LLC are represented by Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Steven Serajeddini, Connor Casas) and Haynes and Boone, LLP (Charles Beckham, Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Re’Necia Sherald) as legal counsel.
*What’s the connection to Texas? Good question! Debtor RunItOneTime Texas LLC was registered on July 8, 2025, and the debtors never even bothered to make it an obligor on the prepetition debt before filing.
**The debtors’ business is broken up between two sets of debtors: the ones that own the gaming licenses and every other entity. The Liquidity Employee role sits at the former grouping and manages all cash receipts and disbursements.
***The AG casinos are the Wendover Nugget Hotel & Casino, the Red Garter Hotel & Casino, the Grand Z Casino Hotel, and Johnny Z’s Casino, for which the debtors pay ~$8.5mm per year in rent.
****The Blue Owl ones are Coyote Bob’s Casino, Casino Caribbean, Crazy Moose Casino, Great American Casino Everett, Macau Casino Lakewood, Great American Casino Tukwila, Gold Country Inn & Casino, Maverick Casino Hotel Elko, Mobil Gas Station (🤷♀️), Riverside Casino, Chips Casino, Palace Casino, and All Star Casino, which cost $17.8mm per year in rent.
*****The debtors also have ~$14.7mm in prepetition trade debt.
******The PokerCo card rooms are Aces Poker Lakewood, Aces Poker Mountlake Terrance, Caribbean Casino, and Caribbean Cardroom.
*******Which makes zero sense. If the IP is being transferred to the newco, why does it need a license, 🤔?
********The DIP bears interest at term SOFR + 12.5% (all cash on the new money; 1% cash on the roll-up) and, because it’s a backstopped facility, there are a sh*tload of fees: a 3% PIK structuring fee payable to the backstop parties, a 4% PIK upfront fee payable to all DIP lenders, and a 3% PIK backstop fee payable to the backstop parties.
*********Mr. McCall is a lender-designated board member.
💥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Valves and Controls US, Inc.💥
On July 25, 2025, Fort Worth-based, Weir Group PLC ($WEGRY)-owned Valves and Controls US, Inc. (f/k/a Atwood & Morrill Co., Inc.) (the “debtor”) filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the District of Delaware (Judge Horan). The debtor is “… a non-operational subsidiary of the Weir Group PLC [], a global leader in mining technology headquartered in Glasgow, Scotland.”
Non-operational, huh? Quite the prize for debtor’s counsel, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil”).
But non-operational obvi ain’t the whole history. From 1900 until 2019, the debtor “… pioneered valve design engineering in power generation, oil and gas, and petrochemicals” and, after being acquired by Weir in ‘90, sat within its Flow Control Business.
One problem. To explain, let’s kick to CRO Scott Tandberg (of AlixPartners’ AP Services, LLC):
“Although Valves never manufactured an asbestos product, it allegedly incorporated asbestos-containing parts and materials procured from other manufacturers into its products until 1985.”
You can see where this is going. The lawsuits started in ‘00, and they’ve been an increasingly frequent problem ever since. 373 complaints were filed in ‘11, which popped to 892 in ‘24 (and 458 this year through July 24, 2025). The costs are way worse. Back to Mr. Tandberg:
“In 2011, settlements totaled $963,000 and defense costs totaled approximately $1.95 million, whereas in 2024, settlements totaled approximately $8.3 million and defense costs totaled approximately $4.5 million settlements totaled. The majority of payments to defend and resolve Asbestos Claims have historically been satisfied through Valves’ available insurance coverage.”
Which is the root cause of the bankruptcy: the insurance-well ran dry in May ‘25. Well, at least for all intents and purposes. Apparently the debtor has a handful of “missing policies” issued by Travelers that it’s hoping to settle for a cold, hard cash payment.
Other than that, the debtor’s assets are composed of $48mm in cash and any claims uncovered by special committee member Paul Aronzon, who joined the debtor’s board in April ‘24.
Why nothing else? Because in ‘19, Weir decided to “… focus on its more profitable industries …”
… and drop its Flow Control Business. Pursuant to a marketing process, First Reserve Corporation (“First Reserve”) emerged as the best option. It, however, wasn’t willing to take on asbestos liabilities. In fact – no surprise whatsoever – no one was.
So Weir and First Reserve structured the deal so that the debtor kept the asbestos liabilities, First Reserve paid $300mm for “… certain assets, including Valves’ line of products …,”* and $45mm was allocated “… to the value of Valves’ assets …”**
In chapter 11, the debtor aspires to cut a deal with an October-’24-formed, 65%-of-petition-date-claims-reppin’ ad hoc committee of plaintiffs’ firms (the “ad hoc committee”). To the debtor that means confirming a plan that creates a liquidation trust for claim resolution and distribution, settles any estate claims, and orderly winds down the debtor, which, because there ain’t much else to do, checks out.
More than anything, we’re certain that, in a world of liability management exercises and prepacks, Weil associates must really dig the opportunity to toil away on a vintage asbestos case in ‘25.
The court will hold the first-day hearing tomorrow, July 31, 2025 at 2pm ET, at which three whole motions — Kroll’s retention, cash management, and creditor matrix — will be heard and, because you can’t f*ck those up too much, granted. After that, those associates ☝️ will dive deep into the firm’s database for more on-point, Harvey-era precedent.
The debtor is represented by Weil (Matt Barr, Ronit Berkovich, Lauren Tauro, Alejandro Bascoy) and Cole Schotz P.C. (Patrick Reilley, Michael Fitzpatrick, Melissa Hartlipp) as legal counsel and AP Services, LLC (Scott Tandberg) as financial advisor and CRO. Paul Aronzon is the debtor’s independent director and sole member of its special committee and is represented by Paul Hastings LLP. Weir is represented by Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP as legal counsel. The ad hoc committee is represented by Robinson & Cole LLP as legal counsel, Cohen Ziffer Frenchman & McKenna as insurance counsel, and FTI Consulting, Inc. ($FTI) as financial advisor.
*The purchase also included a $75mm indemnity in favor of First Reserve just in case it inadvertently exposed itself to asbestos liability.
**The debtor lent the $45mm to an affiliate when the sale closed and was repaid, with interest, ahead of the petition date, giving us the petition-date, $48mm cash balance.
⚡️Correction⚡️
In Sunday’s a$$-kicking briefing, we doled out our first midseason award to our “Company-Side Law Firm MVP of the half year,” Kirkland & Ellis LLP. We made an itty bitty mistake in that segment: we noted that Zips Car Wash LLC liquidated when, in fact, it was a prearranged reorganization with the lenders taking over. Thank you to the reader who pointed this out.
Looking for our next award? Stop filing sh*tcos and we’ll have more bandwidth to write it up.
📚Resources📚
We have compiled a list of a$$-kicking resources on the topics of restructuring, tech, finance, investing, and disruption. 💥You can find it here💥.
📤 Notice📤
Omid Rahnama (Director) joined Barclays Investment Bank from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.
🍾Congratulations to…🍾
Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Jeffrey Jonas, Kenneth Aulet, Stephen Best, Stephen Palley) and Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Mark Franke, Brandon Batzel, Ryan Wooten) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Linqto Texas LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Gibbons PC (Robert Malone, Brett Theisen, Kyle McEvilly, Katharina Earle) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the America’s Gardening Resources Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP (Jeffrey Cohen, David Posner, Eric Chafetz, Kelly Moynihan) and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Ryan Wooten, Mark Franke, Brandon Batzel, Michael Trentin) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the IG Design Group Americas, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
MACCO Restructuring Group on its announced strategic alliance with the Algon Group, a Miami-based boutique financial advisory and restructuring firm.
Morrison & Foerster LLP (Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Oksana Lashko, Theresa Foudy, Raff Ferraioli, Darren Smolarski) and Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott, Connie Choe) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Del Monte Foods Corporation II Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Lou Strubeck Jr., Gregory Wilkes, Laura Smith, Julian Gurule) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Merit Street Media Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
Robinson & Cole LLP (Natalie Ramsey, Jamie Edmonson, Evan Lazerowitz) and Caplin & Drysdale Chartered (Kevn Maclay, Todd Phillips, Kevin Davis) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Mosaic Companies LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Robinson & Cole LLP (Natalie Ramsey, Mark Fink, Laurie Krepto, Evan Lazerowitz) and Goodwin Procter LLP (Alexander Nicas, Howard Steel, Barry Bazian, James Lathrop, Artem Skorostensky) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Alachua Government Services, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy case.