💥Flushed💥
United Site Services Inc's LME gets flushed into BK; Food52 Inc. Gets Swept in.
It’s a new week and a new year and PETITION is back baby, fresh off of peaceful and relaxing holidays where no one from the “team” got kidnapped in the middle of the night by Delta Force.
‘26 off to a literal bang, y’all.
On Monday, unrenditioned-and-relieved Johnny gave himself a pat on the back: he took advantage of the IRS’ non-existent tax rules vis-a-vis BTC and took his (limited) tax losses in the last trading week of ‘25, bought (way) back in over the weekend (no wash rule!), and watched as others belatedly plowed back in during market hours (BTC trades all of the time you noobs, not trading advice, DYOR!).
Not that BTC was the only thing back on the upswing (up ~5.2% as of the time of this writing). The equity markets seemed really impressed with the United States’ flex and soared — the Dow Jones Industrial Average was up 1.2%, the S&P 500 index up 0.6% and the Nasdaq Composite up ~.7% on Monday and enjoyed another pop of ~1%, 0.6%, and 0.65% on Tuesday, respectively.
Of course those gains pale in comparison to those enjoyed by the holders of defaulted Venezuela ‘27 notes (which defaulted in ‘17).
By the end of the day on Tuesday, the notes leapt to 43c on the dollar. 🇻🇪
The stock market gains flew in the face of the fact that US manufacturing activity shrank in December. The Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index fell from 48.2 to 47.9, continuing to show contraction – not that anyone … and we mean anyone … seems to give a flying f*ck. Demand down? 🤷♀️. Producers, therefore, drawing down on raw materials inventories at an astonishing clip? 🤷♀️. Why? Because there’s a lot of other data out there that strikes a more sanguine chord.
Still, all eyes will be on Friday’s jobs report: notably, the market is pricing in only a 17.2% chance of a 25 bps rate cut for the Fed’s January 28, 2026 meeting — meaning nobody expects any labor-related surprises.
It seems JPMorgan Chase & Co. ($JPM) doesn’t expect any big surprises in cap markets this year either. Note its projected default rates for ‘26 below …
… and note also, in case you missed it, this runs counter to what literally every single one of our survey respondents said in our end of year survey (part I here).
Third 🤷♀️’s the charm.
Of course, low default rates or high default rates … doesn’t matter … we all know there’ll be some juicy names to swirl around this year’s bankruptcy bowl — a saying we’ve used often over the years that has especially relevant application these days 👇😉.
It looks like luxury retailer Saks is rushing to swirl first. As you all undoubtedly already know by now, the retailer skipped its $100mm interest payment on December 30, 2025 and the clock is officially ticking on that 30-day grace period. As of Monday, January 5, 2026, the company’s first out notes were in the high 30s while the second out notes were … yikes … pricing around 6.5c on the dollar. The company is negotiating over a $1b DIP credit facility to power it through its seemingly inevitable bankruptcy.
As we eagerly await that sh*t show, there are a pair of situations from the waning days of ‘25 that warranted our attention. Today we’ll get those out of the way. Let’s dig in ⬇️.
🚽New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - United Site Services, Inc.🚽
A year ain’t …
… unless and until Milbank LLP’s (“Milbank”) Andy Leblanc and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP’s (“Quinn”) Ben Finestone square off in a chapter 11. ‘24 gave us Intrum AB, and just in the nick of time, on December 29, 2025, United Site Services, Inc. (“USS”) and twenty-one affiliates (collectively, together with USS, the “debtors”) delivered by filing “prepackaged” chapter 11 cases in the District of New Jersey (Judge Kaplan).
Before we dive into the beef, the debtors’ business … it’s, uh, a literal 💩-co.
The enterprise rents out porta-potties and related products to the Super Bowl, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, music festivals, homebuilders, and the construction market.
Indeed, the debtors are “… the United States’ largest provider of portable sanitation systems and related ‘site services’ …,’ with the construction market accounting for 70%+ of their revenue.* Their business was built through ~134 roll-up acquisitions of existing, local service providers dating back to 2010. In ‘17, Platinum Equity Advisors LLC (“Platinum”) stepped in as sponsor, and in November ‘21, a Platinum continuation vehicle, funded by Fortress Investment Group (“Fortress”), Ares Management Corp. ($ARES) and Blackstone Inc. ($BX), took it off the prior Platinum funds’ hands in a deal valuing the business at ~$4b.
Around the same time, the debtors entered into pertinent financing arrangements: (i) a $200mm ABL facility with Bank of America, N.A., (ii) a credit agreement now agented by UMB Bank, N.A. that provided a $200mm term loan (the “amended term loans”) and $100mm revolver, and (iii) the issuance of $500mm in senior unsecured notes due ‘29 (the “senior unsecured notes”). That set the stage for a whole bunch of ...
The very next year, the debtors’ started facing challenges: inflation, supply costs …
… wages, a slow down in construction, 🥱, all impacted their bottom (line), eroded profitability, and culminated, in late ‘23, in ratings agencies downgrading the debtors to CCC/Caa2.
In early ‘24, the debtors realized the business was performing like …
… and they wouldn’t be able to service their debt and retained Milbank as counsel and PJT Partners LP ($PJT) as investment banker “… to explore options to address [their] financial issues and obtain new capital to support the ongoing operational turnaround.”
Over the following months, during which Platinum offered interim-and-now-repaid bridge financing, the debtors engaged with an ad hoc group (the “‘24 ad hoc group”) on the terms of a deal. In July ‘24, terms formed, and in August and September ‘24, the debtors pushed out an LME. Here’s the relief it provided, courtesy of first-day declarant and Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC-MD Chris Kelly:
“In the aggregate, the 2024 Recapitalization resulted in the following capital structure:
$300 million of new capital as First-Out Term Loans;
$1.90 billion of Amended Term Loans exchanged into $1,795 million of new Second-Out Term Loans (with $46 million in Amended Term Loans remaining);
$417 million of Amended Unsecured Notes exchanged into (a) $131 million of First-Out Term Loans and First-Out Notes and (b) $194 million of Third-Out Notes (with $133 million in Amended Unsecured Notes remaining);
Pre-transaction revolving loans, after a $25 million repayment, were exchanged into new First-Out Revolving Loans, with extended maturity; and
Pre-transaction revolving loans under an asset-based loan facility were
exchanged into the ABL Facility with extended maturity.”
Or to chart it for y’all as of the petition date:**
Naturally, though, the ‘24 ad hoc group had motivations aside from purely helping the company weather the storm and cut a better deal for itself. Its members only took a 5% discount on their amended term loans and a 21.9% discount on their amended unsecured notes. Meanwhile, everyone else swallowed discounts of, respectively, 18% and 22.9%.
Everyone other than CastleKnight Management LP (“CastleKnight”). CastleKnight held out, owns essentially all of the unexchanged debt, and argues the transaction violated its “sacred rights” under the amended term loan’s credit agreement because it subordinated or, more importantly, had the effect of subordinating its claims, liens, and the value of its guaranties and, therefore, the purported intercreditor agreement entered into in connection with the deal — and to which it is otherwise subject — was DOA. We’ll return to that.
Anyway, ⚡ shockingly ⚡, the LME’s “expert” projections, 😉, didn’t pan out:
“The economic challenges USS faced in 2022 and 2023 showed promise of abating around the time of the 2024 Recapitalization. In fact, the market outlook in mid-2024 suggested that total construction starts were expected to increase by approximately 10% in 2024, driven by strong residential and public works activity.
Unfortunately, the market projections did not materialize, and construction activity stalled at the end of 2024 and continued to decrease through 2025. Most significantly, residential construction activity declined steeply with multi-family completions down 29% year-over-year and privately owned housing units under construction down by 15% year-over-year in USS’s major markets. Non-residential construction activity was slightly more resilient, but also lower, with spending down 3% from January 2024 to October 2025, and spending related to a subset of non-residential construction including shopping centers, commercial stores, warehouses, and storage centers falling by 14% over the same period.”
Platinum and its continuation vehicle partners were all like:
So in ‘25, the debtors got back at it with a new ad hoc group (the “ad hoc group”), which includes the members of the ‘24 ad hoc group and is represented by Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (“Akin”) as counsel and Centerview Partners LLC (“Centerview”) as investment banker, and they negotiated themselves yet another deal, reflected in a December 28, 2025 (i.e., the petition date) restructuring support agreement (the “RSA”). The RSA provides:
📍DIP Facility. A $120mm DIP ($62.5mm interim), fully backstopped by members of the ad hoc group, to fund the cases. The DIP carries interest at term SOFR (2% floor) + 7.75% and features a 2% PIK upfront fee and a 7.5% PIK backstop fee.
📍Refinanced ABL and Revolving Facilities. A full paydown of the debtors’ ABL and revolving credit facilities through a new $195mm ABL and new $100mm revolver.
📍Restructuring. Under an ad hoc group-approved chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement, the first-out notes and first-out terms loans will be repaid in full, the second-out term loans will receive 98.2% of pre-dilution reorg equity and 98.2% of the subscription rights in the ERO, and the amended term loan claims (i.e., CastleKnight) will receive ~$10.5mm in cash, 1.8% of pre-dilution reorg equity, and 1.8% of the ERO subscription rights. For those last two, the debtors project the recovery at ~27%. Meanwhile, GUCs will split up $5mm for a 0.3% take-home.
📍Equity and Debt Exit Financing. The deal also finances go-forward ops; specifically, (i) up to $480mm of cash through an equity rights offering (the “ERO”), backstopped by members of the ad hoc group for an 8% fee payable in dilutive reorg equity, and (ii) a $300mm exit term loan provided by the members of the ad hoc group.
📍Platinum Tax Structuring Cooperation. To prevent the deconsolidation of USS’s federal income tax group and corresponding taxes, the RSA contemplates the use of $5.5mm of the ERO to purchase Platinum’s equity interests in an affiliated, topco non-debtor.
📍Timeline. In a word, blazing fast. In a few more, 44 days from filing to confirmation. Here are the relevant dates:
So far, those dates have stuck. TBD on whether that’ll be the case come February because, on December 29, 2025, CastleKnight, represented by Quinn, objected to the debtors’ first-day relief to preview its forthcoming confirmation objections*** and tease an adversary proceeding to challenge the ‘24 LME and “… adjudicate [CastleKnight’s] first lien security interest in substantially all of the Debtors’ assets.”
That led directly to a 4.25-hour first-day hearing on December 30, 2025. Truthfully, though, aside from passing, testy jabs from Messrs. Leblanc and Finestone toward one another …
“Mr. Finestone: [Mr. Leblanc] says my — he can’t believe — he insulted me personally. He said he can’t even believe I’m making the arguments…
Mr. Leblanc: With all due respect to Mr. Finestone, we’ll obviously decide what we think. We’ll advise our client what we think is best for the debtor and the debtor in possession …”’
… and the US trustee (the “UST”) questioning whether the cases are even prepacks (spoiler alert: they ain’t) …
“This is a partially pre-negotiated case. It doesn’t seem like it’s a true prepack as there’s not an indication of how many creditors will vote to accept the plan. The debtors solicited acceptances of the plan pre-petition by only one day, December 28th…”
… most of the hearing was posturing, the previewing of upcoming arguments and litigation, and CastleKnight’s outrage that the debtors weren’t keen on funding its legal expenses to litigate against their own bankruptcy process.
Because it was the first-day, Judge Kaplan didn’t bite on the fee request, approved all requested relief after incorporating minor revisions from the UST, and scheduled the second-day hearing for February 3, 2026 at 10am ET, to be followed by the confirmation hearing on February 10, 2026 at 10am ET.
In the interim, CastleKnight will presumably get its complaint on file and the debtors will attempt to stay the litigation entirely. Or maybe not. The court practically begged for another outcome:
“I’m going to direct the parties because I think if we can avoid litigation and the filing of adversary complaints and the discovery that will be attendant to it and the motion practice and everything that we all see in every case – it just puts more dollars in everybody’s pockets rather than wasting it – I’m going to direct the parties to speak, meet, and confer as to whether or not they can agree to mediate and on a mediator. I’m thinking of a one-day mediation just to see if there can be a resolution … So what I will do is simply ask if by the middle of next week, close of business on Wednesday, just if the parties can advise the court – I’ll ask debtor counsel to report back to the court and chambers – just whether or not the parties have been able to agree on the process and on a mediator…
This court cannot stress its preference for the parties to undertake mediation in the short term, in the near term, and will follow up with the parties next week …”
That Wednesday deadline is today.
Anyway, regardless of what happens between the debtors and the ad hoc group, on the one hand, and CastleKnight, on the other, Fortress, ARES, and BX’s recoveries have been fully digested and flushed:
To the surprise of literally no one, X had a total field day.
Yes indeed:
The debtors are represented by Milbank (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Matthew Brod, Andrew Leblanc, Lauren Doyle, Benjamin Schak) and Cole Schotz P.C. (Michael Sirota, Felice Yudkin, Daniel Harris) as legal counsel, Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (Chris Kelly) as financial advisor, and PJT (Avram Robbins, Josh Abramson) as investment banker. The ad hoc group. The ad hoc group is represented by Akin (Dan Fisher, Scott Alberino, Zach Lanier, Amelia Danovitch) as legal counsel and Centerview as investment banker. CastleKnight is represented by Quinn (Ben Finestone, Kate Scherling, Ankitha Mandava) and Rolnick Kramer Sadighi LLP (Mark Kramer, Richard Bodnar, Nicole Castiglione) as legal counsel. Ad hoc group member Clearlake Capital Group is represented by Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Steven Serajeddini, Nicholas Adzima) as legal counsel. Certain (undisclosed) first-out lenders are represented by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Joshua Brody) as legal counsel. Bank of America, N.A., as prepetition ABL agent, is represented by Greenberg Traurig, LLP (Alan Brody, Charlie Liu) and Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Moss, Stu Downing, Elizabeth Yahl, Jordan Wishnew, Matthew Catone) as legal counsel and FTI Consulting, Inc. ($FCN) as financial advisor. Platinum is represented by Latham & Watkins LLP (Keith Simon) as legal counsel. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as DIP agent, is represented by ArentFox Schiff LLP (Jeffrey Gleit, Justin Kesselman, Matthew Bentley) as legal counsel. BOKF, NA, as successor notes trustee, is represented by Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Kristin Elliott) as legal counsel. UMB Bank, N.A., as successor agent under the amended term loan credit agreement, is represented by Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP (Seth Kleinman, Robin Evans, Kevin Capuzzi) as legal counsel.
*The debtors never disclose their exact revenue figures, but the DIP’s 13-week cash flow forecasts projects $196.8mm in operating receipts – and net cash flow of ($47mm) – through the first thirteen weeks.
**The transaction also featured a “double dip” structure, but the debtors’ proposed chapter 11 plan ignores it to avoid a sh*t ton more litigation that would’ve precipitated, so we’ll gladly do the same. No doubt reverting to that structure will be used as a stick during negotiations with CastleKnight.
***Which will include an absolute priority violation on account of the sponsor paycheck and a gerry-mandering argument based on the amended term loans and amended unsecured notes being dumped into classes with LME debt.
🥗New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Food52 Inc.🥗
On December 29, 2025, Brooklyn-based Food52 Inc. (the “debtor” or the “company”) filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the District of Delaware (Judge Silverstein), no doubt ruining Christmas for the poor saps over at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (“YCST”)(Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle, Elizabeth Justison, S. Alexander Faris, Andrew Lee, Brynna Gaffney). But at least they’ll get paid. Well, maybe, 🤷♀️. But, f*cked up Christmas notwithstanding, we reckon they’ll be alright. It turns out that there are several other characters in this story you ought to reserve your pity for.
Like CEO Erika Bada$$ Badan. We’ve never seen a first day dec paragraph drip with regret like this one:
“Prior to joining the Company, I served as the first Chief Executive Officer of Barstool Sports from 2016 until January 2024. This was a period of explosive and unprecedented growth for the company. During this time, Barstool Sports grew from a regional blog to a national media and cultural powerhouse. Barstool Sports launched over 90 brands during my tenure and the company’s revenue grew over 5000% in an eight-year period. In 2023, we sold Barstool Sports to Penn Entertainment for $550 million. This was an intense, challenging, and entertaining chapter in my career which led me to write a business book and receive a myriad of recognitions, including Fast Company’s Most Creative Women in Business and Forbes’ Most Powerful Women in U.S. Sports. Prior to joining Barstool Sports, I served as the Chief Marketing Officer of AOL, and held leadership roles at Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Demand Media. I currently serve on the boards of AXON Enterprise (AXON), Vice Media, and the Premiere Lacrosse League.”
You impressed? You should be. We are. This woman had to put up with Dave Portnoy and a gigatonne of toxic masculinity for literally years, and nevertheless managed to secure a solid financial exit for that business anyway. After that “intense, challenging and entertaining chapter,” we reckon she figured she’d take on a decidedly less stressful venture in the world of cooking and food-based e-commerce — only to end up contending with the f*cking a$$holes over at Avidbank Holdings Inc. ($AVBH)(“Avid”) and ending up in a Delaware bankruptcy court.
And The Chernin Group (“TCG”). Yes, that’s right, we’re even suggesting that we should pity a private equity firm. TCG acquired a majority stake in the now-debtor back in ‘19 for $83mm in a deal that valued the company at more than $100mm on $30mm of revenue and zero profit (lol). TCG subsequently sank $100mm in additional funding into the biz, the use of proceeds being development of private label products and (ill-fated) acquisitions of home goods brands Schoolhouse and Dansk Designs.
Fine. Maybe not TCG. It turns out that TCG’s unmitigated desire for growth — especially after the company’s massive boom during the pandemic — left no room for PE-esque operational enhancements. Among many issues cited by Ms. Badan that led to the debtor’s demise, she cites the fact that Food52, Schoolhouse and Dansk Designs all continued to operate separately as three distinct brands and businesses (no synergies, c’mon!!) and the debtor was “…burdened by high fixed operational costs, unfavorable legacy contracts, outdated technology, and lack of scalable systems.” It seems she spent a tremendous amount of time contending with these issues, effectively coming in as a turnaround CEO from the word “go.” Sh*t was so bad that she felt the need to reiterate:
“Our mission was to put the Company on a path to profitability by late 2025 or early 2026, and the Company was making steady progress towards that goal, despite a host of external and internal challenges including tariffs, changes in warehousing and fulfillment partners, significant overhead costs, legacy technology and finance issues, burdensome contracts, challenges with alignment in culture and brands, and a limited amount of time and resources to do so.”
Bad tech and bad contracts … ok, got it.
Enter some advisors — some of which we should also feel sorry for. Powered by an incremental equity investment by TCG, the company embarked on a sale process this past summer. Core Advisors LLC (“Core”)(Blake Saunders) came on as ibanker to pursue strategic interest while Buchbinder & Co. LLC (“Buchbinder”) came on to attract special situations investors. Per Ms. Badan, “The goal was to find a home for these great brands and their talented and creative employees, ideally by buyers who would value their heritage and unique potential.” The papers don’t explicitly say this but we gather that Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (“Willkie”) was also in the mix at this point advising the company.
Things, as recently as just a few weeks ago, appeared to be heading in the right direction: the company received seven indications of interest by mid-December and all signs pointed towards some kind of transaction that would generate sufficient proceeds to pay off the $6.3mm owed to Avid by early ‘26. Contemporaneously, Ms. Badan and her team were “…engaged in herculean efforts to drive holiday sales over the Thanksgiving holiday and subsequent Black Friday / Cyber Monday weekend to ensure it would have funding to support the duration of its promising sale process,” providing Avid with weekly updates in the process. “On Friday, December 12, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. (ET), the Company had what appeared to be, by any objective observer, a productive meeting with Avid, who acknowledged the progress being made and strategy around next steps to maximize value with the different bidders.”
It appears that Avid was not an objective observer. Three days later, with no warning to the company, Avid swept the debtor’s cash (satisfying all but $411k of its exposure) — leaving employees high and dry and necessitating a $1,505,000 secured bridge loan from TCG just to ensure that taxes were paid (and to bridge to this filing).*
This gets us to the next group of we should all feel sorry for: employees. Per Ms. Badan:
“Avid’s actions had significant and far-reaching consequences, necessitating the immediate termination of the majority of the Debtor’s employees during the holidays with no notice, while asking the Debtor’s few remaining employees to work around the clock to keep the Company in business. The Debtor went from operating in the ordinary course with six IOIs in hand and a capital commitment from TCG on December 12, 2025, to a $0 account balance at Avid and lack of clarity on the remaining committed capital by December 15, 2025.”
Among those suddenly unjobbed by Avid’s actions is Buchbinder (no longer in the mix) and Willkie (now a top unsecured creditor, 😬).
The company needed a Christmas miracle.
Perhaps it found one.
In the immediate aftermath of Avid’s actions, Core worked the phones and one of the parties that’d originally submitted an IOI — America’s Test Kitchen, LP (owned by Marquee Brands LLC) — engaged with an actionable proposal through its wholly-owned sub F52 LLC. Recall that the company was reportedly valued at $100mm at the time of the TCG transaction and juxtapose that against F52 LLC’s offer of $6.5mm (plus certain assumed liabilities),** which subsumes a $3.42mm DIP (to be credit bid, $1.92mm interim, $411k of which will take out Avid).*** YCST dove into this dumpster fire on December 22, 2025. Repeat: December 22, 2025.****
Well, sh*t, we don’t even need gifs: Ms. Badan’s words candidly capture this would-be 35-day sale:
“This was an ugly process and a consuming, painful period for the Company and its employees. It was not a position the Company expected to find itself in given the robust sale process it was in the midst of pursuing. Being blunt, the process proposed to be consummated through this chapter 11 case is far from perfect, but is the only path forward that maximizes value for the Debtor’s constituents and preserves the Debtor’s business as a going concern given the situation Avid has put the Debtor in. Absent F52’s agreement to provide the DIP Financing and willingness to enter into the transaction reflected in the Stalking Horse Agreement—which the Debtor and F52 have worked around the clock to negotiate and document over the past week amid the holidays—the Debtor already would have filed for chapter 7 (or an alternative liquidation proceeding), to the detriment of all constituencies.”
Like we said. Dripping. With. Regret.
A motion to shorten notice in connection with bid procedures is already on the docket (to be heard on January 12, 2026). We’re going to assume that the debtor’s proposed timeline will hold because it literally cannot afford it not to.
The New Years Eve day first day hearing was uneventful — a nice break from what sounds like a hellish stretch leading up to it. A second day hearing is scheduled for January 22, 2026 at 10:30am.
The debtor’s professionals are all noted above (or in the footnotes below). F52 LLC is represented by Moore & Van Allen PLLC (James Langdon) and Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP (William Chipman).
*Behind the secured debt sits a $15mm unsecured term loan owed to Silicon Valley Bank and approximately $8.3mm in trade debt.
**Across the three businesses, Ms. Badan noted that revenue was ~$53.2mm in ‘24.
***The DIP interest rate is 15% PIK. There’s a 6% exit fee that will only apply if F52 LLC isn’t approved as the stalking horse purchaser. TCG has consensually agreed to priming.
****The debtor’s financial advisor, Meru LLC, came on board merely four days before that.
📚Resources📚
We have compiled a list of a$$-kicking resources on the topics of restructuring, tech, finance, investing, and disruption. 💥You can find it here💥.
📤 Notice📤
Kate Lattner (Managing Director) joined Novo Advisors from Stout.
Max Schlan (Partner) joined Thompson Coburn LLP from Gutnicki LLP.
🍾Congratulations to…🍾
Adam Searles on his promotion to Partner & Managing Director at AlixPartners LLP.
Ashim Midha on his promotion to Managing Director at PJT Partners LP.
Dasha Bechade on her promotion to Counsel at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.
Ethan Ross on his promotion to Managing Director at PJT Partners LP.
Evan Maass on his promotion to Managing Director at Centerbridge Partners LP.
Jason Angelo on his promotion to Partner at Reed Smith LLP.
Joe Florczak on his promotion to Counsel at McGuireWoods LLP.
Joshua Gross on his promotion to Partner at Mayer Brown.
Justin Cunningham on his promotion to Special Counsel at Milbank LLP.
Matthew Milana on his promotion to Counsel at Reed Smith LLP.
Mike Papandrea on his promotion to Partner at Lowenstein Sandler LLP.
Nikita Kumar on her promotion to Counsel at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.
Raff Ferraioli on his promotion to Partner at Morrison & Foerster LLP.
Reuben Dizengoff on his promotion to Partner at McDermott Will & Schulte.
Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC (Mark Greenberg) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Office Properties Income Trust chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Berkeley Research Group, LLC (David Galfus) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Buckingham Senior Living Community, Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
Dykema Gossett PLLC (William Hotze, Nicholas Zugaro, Dominique Douglas, Jeffrey Fine) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Buddy Mac Holdings, LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Force Ten Partners, LLC (Adam Meislik) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Lugano Diamonds & Jewelry Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
FTI Consulting, Inc. (Narendra Ganti) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Hansen-Mueller Co. chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
Jefferies LLC (Leon Szlezinger) for securing the investment banker mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Pine Gate Renewables LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Paul Hastings LLP (Kris Hansen, Erez Gilad, Gabriel Sasson, Alexander Bongartz, Charles Persons, Romi Geller, Schlea Thomas) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Luminar Technologies Inc. chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Province LLC (Paul Navid) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Hudson 1701/1706, LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Province LLC (Paul Navid) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Pine Gate Renewables LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Province LLC (Sanjuro Kietlinski) for securing the financial advisor mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Norcold LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
White & Case LLP (Philip Abelson, Gregory Pesce, Samuel Hershey, Brett Bakemeyer, Laura Baccash) and Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Bradford Sandler, Jeffrey Pomerantz, Cia Mackle, Michael Warner, Theodore Heckel) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Pine Gate Renewables LLC chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.
Wiener, Weiss & Madison, P.C. (R. Joseph Naus, Patrick McCune) for securing the legal mandate on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the Diocese of Alexandria chapter 11 bankruptcy case.
NOTE: do you have exciting news to share? Feel free to email us — especially if you’re a firm administrator — with any and all personnel news at petition@petition11.com.
how are you going to to top these headliners and gifs in the rest of 2026 ?
and yes, i know its another year in trump's golden age of grift. maybe a tribute somewhere to the family itself?
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/12/31/us/trump-deals-policy-conflicts-web.html