☠️Judge Isgur Doesn't Dig the DeathTrap☠️

Texas Judge Signals a Potentially Worse Outcome for $WPG Common

Screen Shot 2021-07-15 at 11.41.02 AM.png

Maybe, just not the way this ⬆️ schmo means….

For those of you who are new to us, Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) is an owner, developer and manager of retail real estate, including enclosed and open air malls. Set up as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”), the company’s portfolio includes 102 shopping centers across the US, totaling 52mm square feet. You can find a whole bunch of previous coverage on it here…

…but the general upshot is that even pre-COVID-19, this sucker was struggling. Ultimately the pandemic was the icing on the cake and, well, here we are talking about a chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

The bankruptcy case is predicated upon an equitization transaction pursuant to which the WPG debtors will equitize a slug of unsecured notes and hand the holders of that debt the keys to the kingdom in the form of equity in the post-bankruptcy reorganized WPG entity to its pre-petition lender and plan sponsor, SVP Global. That said, the WPG debtors leave the door slightly ajar for a buyer to come in a la Hertz and make a play for the company. As of now, there hasn’t been a whole lot of noise about someone actually coming in and doing so. And so the WPG debtors are moving forward in an effort to expeditiously exit chapter 11 and focus on the future. Of course, to exit chapter 11, the WPG debtors will need to send out a disclosure statement and solicit votes on their proposed plan of reorganization and, thereafter, get bankruptcy court approval of the process and result.

On Monday, July 12, 2021, the Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) debtors held a status conference and conditional disclosure statement approval hearing before Judge Isgur in the Southern District of Texas and it’s probably fair to say that it didn’t go the way the debtors had anticipated. We’re not sure they were expecting to hear phrases like “non-confirmable plan,” “unduly coerced,” and “really hard call coming up.” Yet they did.

Source: GIPHY

Source: GIPHY

Without getting too into the weeds of the bankruptcy code, suffice it to say that most observers of bankruptcy situations are familiar with the “absolute priority rule” which spells out whether and how creditors are entitled to recoveries from a debtor’s estate. It is this provision in the bankruptcy code — 🙄 fine, we’ll cite it … section 1129(b)(2)🙄 — that requires that claims of a senior class of creditors be paid in full before any junior class of creditors may receive or retain any property in satisfaction of its claims. More plainly, secured creditors must get paid in full before unsecured creditors get paid a dime and so forth and so on down the capital structure such that unsecured creditors ought to get paid in full before stockholders get a penny. Similarly, preferred stockholders are senior in line to common stockholders.

And that’s where the rubber meets the road because usually — and we emphasize usually — stockholders don’t get f*ck all in bankruptcy. Recently, however, they have. And now “The Hertz Effect” looms large over other pandemic-era bankruptcies because, as the WPG debtors acknowledged out of the gate, it is awfully hard to value some of these businesses in light of potentially long-lasting pandemic-induced effects. The over-arching question here is: does WPG have equity value? And, if not, should equity be getting any sort of recovery whatsoever?

On the first question, the WPG debtors are clearly proceeding as if they don’t think so. The WPG debtors gave absolute no indication that any White Knight was close to galloping into bankruptcy court with a higher or better offer that takes out SVP Global and allows for value to flow through the capital structure.

Recognizing all of these factors and in a commendable attempt to avoid a big fight down the road, the WPG debtors here conjured up a scheme whereby both preferred and common shareholders are eligible for a recovery anyway — a “gift” of sorts, from the senior impaired consenting class. That eligibility, however, is contingent upon a multi-level “death trap” provision — a blatant quid pro quo where the prefs and common will only get something if they go along with SVP Global, the debtors, and the proposed equitization transaction by voting “yes” on the plan of reorganization.

Source: Primo GIF

Source: Primo GIF

A preferred shareholder took issue with this coercive tactic this week and found a sympathetic ear in Judge Isgur. Here are the scenarios at issue:

  • The preferred shareholders vote no on the plan. In this case, both the preferred shareholder class (Class 10) and the common shareholder class (Class 11) get bupkis. It doesn’t matter what the common do in that scenario.

  • If, however, the preferred shareholders vote yes on the plan and the common vote note no, the preferred will get either $40mm in cash or approximately 6% equity (subject to other caveats and dilution mechanisms).

  • If the preferred shareholders vote yes on the plan AND the common vote yes, the two classes will split the proposed “gift” recovery and each get $20mm in cash or approximately 3% equity.

It’s that last bit that concerned Judge Isgur. Notwithstanding the WPG debtors’ argument that anything either of these classes get is a “gift” in the equitization scenario, he suggested that the bankruptcy code may nevertheless preclude the last option because it fails to take into account the preferred shareholders’ liquidation preference over and above common equity. As he put it: the prefs either vote no and get nothing (lose) or vote yes and forfeit their liquidation preference and provide common with some sort of return (lose again). He indicated difficulty squaring that with Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2)(C)(i) which, he argued, protects the liquidation preference before common is entitled to anything. The question then becomes: does that apply to a gift? This is where that “really hard call” statement comes in.

All of which begs the question: what does this mean for WPG common stockholders? Well, it ain’t good. Any WPG common shareholder who was of the view that there was a strong chance that they’d see some recovery may want to pay closer attention. It was clear that, as we initially took “pen to paper” here after market close on July 12, this already-ugly-AF chart may get a bit uglier if this issue doesn’t get sorted out (PETITION Note: even without this latest controversy, the stock appeared to be priced generously for some inexplicable reason. Markets be like 🤷‍♀️.).

Not that the memers comprehended that:

On July 13, the market got a bit wiser and the stock fell ~9%:

Interestingly, Judge Isgur — typically a champion for the little guy — insisted that the debtors file a revised disclosure statement that expressly acknowledges the possibility of a judicial finding that the proposed death trap violates the bankruptcy code. With that new language, he conditionally approved the disclosure statement. Ironically, his issue here, though, has the affect of screwing over the little guy, i.e., the common shareholders, and potentially precluding them from obtaining any recovery in the case. So, there’s that.

And so now we’re headed for a fairly vicious game of chicken going into a confirmation hearing. First, it goes without saying that the case is potentially setting up for a pretty rigorous valuation fight — especially if shareholders get organized (PETITION Note: the Office of the United States Trustee is currently soliciting interest in a committee and it sounds like there’s interest). Beyond that, the Judge showed an activist bent here, sparked in part by a preferred shareholder complaining about recovery going to common. Of course, there’s a beggars can’t be choosers element to this in that the WPG debtors could just decide that, given a valuation fight is on tap anyway, it may just make sense to pull a Lucy and rip that death trap option and any recovery right out from under all shareholders. After all, if there’s gonna be war anyway, why bother with dubious gestures for peace?

⚡️Update: Washington Prime Group ($WPG)⚡️

As new retail looks out onto the horizon, old retail struggles to survive.

We’ve been following the beleaguered Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) for years (see here and here). Our last update indicated that WPG’s tenants are struggling to pay rent, which is making it tough on the mall operator to manage its ~$4b of debt. WPG reported Q4 and FY 2020 earnings on March 16, and they were NOT good. For a high level recap:

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  • Revenue down 12% for the quarter and 21% annually, YoY;

  • Adj. EBITDA (EBITDAre) down 22% for the quarter and 33% annually, YoY; margins absolutely CRUSHED; and

  • Comparable NOI down 14% for the quarter and 24% annually, YoY.

Exactly one month earlier, WPG announced it wouldn’t be making its $23.2mm interest payment on its Senior Notes due 2024 and entered into a 30-day grace period. With the grace period set to expire on March 17th and ripen into a full-blown Event of Default, WPG and its lenders needed to get back to the table.

Included in its earnings release was an announcement by WPG that it had entered into a forbearance agreements with “certain beneficial owners of more than 67% of the aggregate principal amount” of the 2024 Senior Notes and with respect to its Credit Agreements. The forbearance period expires “on the earlier of March 31, 2021 and “the occurrence of any of the specified early termination events” including “negotiations of the terms and conditions of a financial restructuring…of the existing debt of, existing equity interests in, and certain other obligations of the Company and certain of its direct and indirect subsidiaries.” WPG warns that a restructuring “may need to be implemented…under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Management provided neither 2021 guidance nor a conference call. And on March 17 S&P downgraded WPG’s issuer credit rating to 'D' from 'CC'. Can’t say we’re surprised.

None of that fundamental weakness stopped the retail speculators from getting into the action.

“Blow up,” sure, but not in the way @ersindemirtas expected. On the day of the ⬆️ prognostication, the stock was trading at $3.39/share. After the earnings report, the stock dipped below $3/share only to pop back 10% and close slightly over $3/share. Maybe because, as this guy ⬇️ astutely points out, things are kinda backwards these days:

On Monday, however, Bloomberg reported that WPG is in the market for a DIP loan:

Guggenheim, the company’s investment bank, has asked prospective lenders to indicate their interest in providing a potential $150 million debtor-in-possession loan, according to one of the people, who asked not to be identified discussing confidential talks. The negotiations are ongoing and the terms could change, the people said.

Which is where the WPG story is these days. It’s not a question of ‘if’ or ‘when.’ It’s a question of ‘how much.’

The stock initially dropped over 12% on the news, regained some ground to end Monday down 7.6% before rallying slightly after the market closed. Because, like, 🤷‍♀️.

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Of course, that small rally didn’t hold. The company got smoked by over 10% in trading on Tuesday:

Source: Yahoo! Finance

Source: Yahoo! Finance

While — ⚡️shocker⚡️ — the market appears to be acting rationally for once, there are, of course, certain participants who appear unfazed.

There’s not much suspense left in this story beyond just how wrong @MaxValue1 will be.

🤪Malls, Malls, Malls (Long Eccentric High-AF CEOs)🤪

Things continue to get worse for certain players in the mall REIT space.

On October 24th, Washington Prime Group Inc. ($WPG) reported earnings and managed to surpass rock bottom expectations. The above-referenced net operating income decrease came from a $4.3mm “negative impact of cotenancy and rental income from 2018 anchor bankruptcies (Bon-Ton Stores, Sears, Toys R Us), and $2.1mm was attributable to 2019 bankruptcies (Charlotte Russe, Gymboree and Payless ShoeSource).” Occupancy decreased 1.1% to 92.9% during Q3 and the company lowered guidance (negative EPS).

S&P Ratings subsequently downgraded WPG from BB to BB- saying:

…despite slight sequential improvement, same-property NOI growth at tier 1 enclosed properties remained extremely negative, declining 8.8% with negative 7.6% releasing spreads over the past year, affected by co-tenancy clauses and additional bankruptcies/liquidations, with some expected redevelopment deliveries delayed. We believe overall metrics are modestly worse when factoring in the company's 14 remaining tier 2 and noncore malls, which we continue to include in our analysis of Washington Prime. Due to third-quarter results, management downwardly revised its publicly stated operating target for same-property NOI growth in 2019.

Washington Prime Group Inc.'s operating performance has continued to deteriorate such that we now view the company's business less favorably, with weaker cash flow, lower EBITDA margins, and diminishing prospects for stabilization in 2020.

Louis Conforti, WPG’s CEO, took to alt rock to explain the company’s negative performance, saying “[t]ake it from the Strokes, one of my all-time favorite bands, it's not hard to explain” before describing the effects of the #retailapocalypse on performance.


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