💰How are the Investment Banks Doing?(Long Chapter 15s?)💰

On Sunday, we wrote about the stellar earnings reports from Evercore Inc. ($EVR) and Houlihan Lokey ($HLI). Are they outliers?

Apparently…no.

PJT Partners Inc. ($PJT) reported earnings this week and they, too, knocked it out of the park. The firm reported a 28% increase in revenues YOY ($167mm) and a 35% increase in advisory revenue ($133mm). These guys are killing it. Regarding the restructuring team, CEO Paul Taubman said:

Revenues grew significantly in the second quarter compared to the prior year and are ahead of last year’s levels for the six-month period. Our Restructuring business maintained its leadership position, ranking Number One in US and global completed restructurings for the first half of 2019. Our outlook for the full year remains essentially unchanged, notwithstanding near record low interest rates, historically low default rates and extremely benign credit conditions, we expect restructuring revenues for the full year to be flat to only modestly down. Despite this muted macro backdrop, we are working on an increased number of Restructuring mandates, which should serve us well entering 2020.

In addition to pounding his chest, Mr. Taubman provided some market commentary as well — particularly with respect to the notion that all of the “dry powder” in the market will impact M&A and distressed situations and Europe:

---

TIRED OF GETTING ONLY PART OF THE STORY? US TOO! CLICK HERE AND SUBSCRIBE TO GET UNLIMITED ACCESS TO OUR PREMIUM CONTENT! (YOU WON’T REGRET IT)

💰How are the Investment Banks Doing?(Long Increasing Fees?)💰

Evercore Inc. ($EVR) reported earnings this week and, well, inflation exists somewhere. The company increased adjusted revenue by 18% YOY to $535.8mm. Net income increased by nearly $18mm. The bank reported a decline in the number and dollar volume of its deals but…BUT…numbers nevertheless improved thanks to a strong move in investment banking advisory fees (up 22% YOY). With 81 earned fees of $1mm or more compared to 85 last year, the company appears to be adding clients and raising fees. Because the bank doesn’t delineate restructuring revenues separate and apart from other advisory services, it’s unclear to what degree restructuring is adding or detracting from performance — from either a deal volume or fee perspective. 

Houlihan Lokey ($HLI) also reported earnings; it notched a 14% revenue increase YOY ($250mm) and a 44% net income increase. Financial restructuring revenues increased 57%! Surprisingly, however, the bank noted that “[r]evenue increased primarily as a result of an increase in the number of closed transactions, partially offset by a reduction in the average transaction fee.” Curious. 

---

THIS IS A SUBSCRIBER’S POST, TO READ MORE OF THIS ARTICLE, CLICK HERE AND SUBSCRIBE TO OUR @$$KICKING NEWSLETTER (DISRUPT THE COMPETITION WITH PETITION)

💰The United States Trustee (Long Perverse Incentives).💰

The Wall Street Journal reports that the UST fund is approximately 75% short of its funding goal for the year.* Currently, the fund gets fed by quarterly fees paid by bankrupt companies with over $1mm in operating expenses. As with all things bankruptcy, the new federal law mandating the fee increase has a number of holes in it. Consequently, various cases implicating the law are winding their way through the courts.

---

THIS IS A MEMBERS-ONLY ARTICLE, TO READ THE REST, CLICK HERE. (YOU AND YOUR BOSS WON’T REGRET IT)

🏦How are the Investment Banks Doing? Part II.🏦

You didn’t think we’d just stop at Evercore and Greenhill, did you?

Moelis & Company ($MC) recently reported “disappointing” financial results reflecting a dramatic decline in M&A activity in Q1, which affected revenues significantly. Reported revenue was $138mm, down 37%. “This compares to the overall M&A market in which the number of global M&A completions greater than $100 million declined 18% during the same period. The decline in revenues was primarily driven by fewer transaction completions.” Restructuring activity “declined slightly.” MC guided towards softness in the first half of the year with a relatively stronger second half.

Some key takeaways:

• Brexit and a number of shaky elections in Europe are having some effect on M&A activity in Europe.

• Expected continued chill of cross-border M&A that involves China due to “underlying weariness” of “significant Chinese ownership of American companies.”

• The melt down in late Q4 certainly affected M&A chatter in the C-suite as people are cautious about price volatility.

Asked what happens at MC if the M&A volume remains down, Moelis unabashedly indicated that costs would have to come out of the business, i.e., travel expense and headcount. That must’ve been a bit chilling for MC employees. Sheesh.

---

FIND OUT WHAT PJT PARTNERS HAS TO SAY ABOUT M&A + RX FEES THROUGH SUBSCRIBING TO OUR KICKA$$ NEWSLETTER HERE.

The Curious Case of Jefferies LLC v. Banro Corp.

In many respects the restructuring industry benefits from an information dislocation. Management teams thrust into stressed or distressed territory are dealing with different subgroups of investment banks and law firms than they're accustomed to. The professionals are different, the terminology is different, and the terms of engagement are different. On the flip side, sometimes the terms SHOULD be different, but aren't.

A fee tail is a great example of that. We've seen a variety of investment banker engagement letters that include a one year tail. Boiled down to its simplest form, this generally means that an investment banker is entitled to its fee (or a pre-negotiated portion thereof) if the company consummates a "transaction," as defined, within 12-months of the bankers engagement - regardless of whether THAT banker got the transaction to the finish line.

In the compressed timeline of a distressed issuer, a year is like a decade. Given that, we would argue, as a general matter, that a 12-month tail is absurd in the restructuring context. There are so many externalities that could come into play during that time that might require a change of strategy. A 6-month tail strikes us as far more reasonable. After all, we've heard of instances where a company considered filing for bankruptcy merely to be in position to reject a retention agreement and avoid the potential duplicative and monstrous fee. That's ridiculous. 

Now you're probably expecting us to shred some banker for a specific (ridiculous) provision. We hate to disappoint. Notwithstanding the above, we're actually of the view that tails serve a critical function. Why should an investment banker roll up sleeves and go to bat for a client if the client can cut ties at any moment and transfer all of that work over to an execution banker for a fraction of the cost? 

Jefferies LLC is asking precisely that question. In Jefferies LLC v. Banro Corp. (1:17-cv-05490), Jefferies is asking the New York Southern District Court to enforce the terms of its engagement letter with the once-bankrupt gold-miner, Banro Corp.(and, in turn, Banro is attempting to transfer the litigation to federal court.). Jefferies alleges that it is contractually owed approximately $3.7mm in fees and expenses on account of a $175mm note exchange that is, according to Jefferies, expressly contemplated in its retention. The company purportedly terminated its relationship with Jefferies mere days before announcing that very transaction. Call us crazy but a tail of a few days strikes us as eminently reasonable. Professionals across the board ought to watch this case with great interest.

Reasonability of Fees

We want to apologize for an issue related to last week's newsletter; we failed to recognize that the (Amazon Web Services') link embedded in our feature (apparently) expires with time. Sorry about that. 

The right information could be found all week on our website (hint, hint) and we encourage you all to visit it here. The upshot is that an Iowan judge gave Weil a beating because of redonk fees. But don't take our word for it: the opinion is worth a read if for no reason other than its sheer comedy. We enjoyed where the Court indicates that Weil argued that the fees were reasonable because, well, they're Weil, damn it, and they damn well said the fees were reasonable. 

On the subject of fees and billing, the opinion wasn't nearly as amusing (or bemusing, depending on your POV) as this quote from a Caesars-related story from Q4 '16: "The advisory firms have adopted the attitude that every possible land grab that is is worth chasing. These firms have no capital markets businesses and just outsource the work to JP Morgan and the like. These fees are just a tax on the estate. The creditors are doing most of the work here and these restructuring proposals are really ours [creditors]. But the legal departments of these investment banks are crafty. Debtors have to be more responsible on the front end of an engagement. The problem is that the debtors’ lawyers are completely and utterly conflicted. The bankers are often former restructuring lawyers themselves and they are all just referring each other business. This has become a feeding frenzy." 

In many ways, the problem stems from information dislocation. The buyside appears to be getting sick of WSJ headlines about fees - whether they're in Caesars or Lehman Brothers. And so tighter and tighter DIP budgets are becoming the norm and professionals are increasingly expected to agree, upfront, to some fee concessions. But company management teams aren't nearly as savvy; they don't know where to find out what "market" engagement terms are. Certain resources that track this information are firewalled unless you pay tens of thousands of dollars for access. So, who is going to educate management? Debtor's counsel? If the quote above is any indication - and referrals truly are traded like chips - that may be asking for a lot. And so don't be surprised if there are more activist judges opining on the reasonability of fees going forward.