Subscriptions ⬆️. Ownership ⬇️.

We’re old enough to remember when talking heads pontificated about how the “sharing economy” was going to end ownership. There was an AirBnB or Uber for everything: musical instruments, handyman tools, you name it. Let some other sucker spend the money for a static instrument that will be used once a year: you can be the smarter one by just renting those things from them. Extra benefit: not as much need for storage!

Only, most of those businesses failed. SHOCKINGLY, people realized that the lack of predictability and poor unit economics involved in such a as-demanded-on-demand model simply didn’t work. After tens if not hundreds of millions of lost venture capital flushed down the drain, you don’t hear much about X for X companies anymore.

Instead, all you hear about are subscriptions. Here is Amanda Mull taking stock of the rise of the subscription economy for The Atlantic:

Today, things that can routinely show up at your doorstep include: misshapen vegetables, personalized vitamin cocktails, dog toys, a vast wardrobe of clothing and accessories, and even a sofa. In a consumer market of disposable fast fashion and cheap assemble-at-home furniture, the idea of wasting less while getting to use nicer, higher-quality things for a monthly fee is a compelling sell.

(PETITION Note: this must be precisely what the private equity owners of Petsmart Inc. must be thinking as they pave the path towards a IPO).

Ms. Mull continues:

A subscription, at its base, is simply a schedule of recurring fees that gives consumers continual access to goods or services. A car lease is a subscription, but so is your gym membership and the way you use Microsoft Office. Subscription creep dates to at least 2007, when Amazon launched Subscribe & Save, a service that lets shoppers pre-authorize periodic charges for thousands of consumable goods, such as sandwich bags or face wash (or toilet paper), usually at a slight discount over individual purchases. Then, in 2010, came Birchbox, which provides women with miniature portions of beauty products on a monthly basis for $15. At its peak, the company was valued at more than $500 million.

Both Amazon’s and Birchbox’s models have been widely copied, and their success underscores the appeal of subscriptions to businesses and consumers alike, according to Utpal Dholakia, a marketing professor at Rice University. “The pain of payment and the friction of how a person is going to pay is totally gone,” he says. Consumers receive things they need or want without having to make any decisions, and that creates more stable and predictable revenue streams for the businesses they patronize.

Subscriptions, though, are not just relegated to, say, dog food, toilet paper, and your favorite a$$-kicking newsletter about disruption from the vantage point of the disrupted. In this time of greater job mobility, people relish more flexibility.

🥑#BustedTech: Munchery Filed for Bankruptcy.🥑

Short VC-Backed Hyper-Growth

We've previously discussed the process of an assignment for the benefit of creditors and posited that, as the private markets increasingly become the public markets, (later stage) "startups" will be more likely to file for chapter 11 than go the ABC route. Our conclusion was based primarily on three factors: (a) a number of these startups would have highly-developed and potentially valuable intellectual property and data, (b) more venture-backed companies have "venture debt" than the market generally recognizes, and (iii) parties involved, whether that's the lenders or the VCs, would want releases with respect to any failure and subsequent chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Given continuing low — and as of this week, lower — yields and a system awash in capital looking for alternative sources of yield (read: venture capital), there's been a dearth of high profile startup failures of late. And, so, technically, we've been wrong. 

Yet, on February 28th, Munchery Inc. filed for bankruptcy in the Northern District of California (we previously noted the failure here and again here in a broader discussion of what we dubbed, “The Toys R Us Effect”). Munchery was a once-high-flying "tech" company founded in 2011 with the intent of providing freshly prepared meals to consumers. It made and fulfilled orders placed on its own app and also had a meal kit subcription business where customers received weekly kits with recipes and ingredients. Its greatest creation, however, might be its shockingly self-aware first day declaration — a piece of work that functions as a crash course for entrepreneurs on the evolution and subsequent trials and tribulations of a failing startup. 

Interestingly, the meal kit business wasn't part of the original business model. This represented the quintessential startup pivot: originally, the company's model was predicated upon co-cooking (another trend we've previously discussed) where professional chefs would leverage Munchery's kitchens (and, presumably, larger scale) to sell their products directly through Munchery's website and mobile apps. Of late, the co-cooking concept — despite some recent notable failures — has continued to gain traction. Apparently, former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick, is very active in this space (see CloudKitchens). 

At the time, "food delivery was in its early stages." But local restaurant delivery has exploded ever since: Grub HubSeamlessDoor DashPostmatesCaviar, and Uber Eats are all over this space now. Similarly, in the meal kit space, Blue Apron inc. ($APRN)PlatedHello Fresh and SunBasket are just four of seemingly gazillions of meal kit services that time-compressed workaholics or parents can order to save time. 

As you can probably imagine, any company worth anything — especially after nearly a decade of operation and tens of millions of venture funding — will have some interesting proprietary technology. Here's the company's description of its tech (apologies in advance for length but it marks the crux of the bankruptcy filing): 

"The team’s early focus was to develop a proprietary technology platform to operate and optimize the entire process of making and delivering fresh food to customers. The technology developed and deployed by the company included: a front-end ecommerce platform, which allowed the company to post items daily and consumers to select, purchase and pay for meals through the company’s website and native apps; the production enterprise resource management (“ERP”) system, which enabled the company to develop and launch new recipes, manage the supply chain for fresh ingredients and supplies, produce the meals through batch cooking, and plate individual meals; the logistics and last-mile platform, which enabled the company to accurately and quickly pack-and-pack individual items and assemble orders using modified hand scanners, distribute orders via a hub-and-spoke system where refrigerated trucks would transport orders to specific zones and hand-off the orders to the assigned drivers; and, a driver app that assisted in managing and routing orders to arrive in the windows specified by customers. All of this was managed through a set of proprietary tracking and administrative tools used by the teams to monitor and mitigate operational issues—and connected to a customer relationship management platform. The team later developed algorithms to optimize the various aspects of the service to scale operations, increase efficiency, and improve the quality of the service. In addition, the company developed over three thousand meal recipes, including descriptions, nutritional information, and photographs. Over the life of the business, the company invested significantly in its technology capabilities, believing that the company’s ability to efficiently scale its operations leveraging technology would be a competitive advantage in the food delivery market."

All of that tech obviously required capital to develop. The company raised $120.7mm in three preferred equity financing rounds between 2013 and 2015. Investors included Menlo VenturesSherpa Capital, and E-Ventures. The company also had $11.8mm in venture debt ($8.4mm Comerica Bank and $3.4mm from TriplePoint Venture Growth BDC Corp.). 

The bankruptcy filing illustrates what happens when investors (the board) lose faith in founders and insist upon rejiggering the business to be operationally focused. First, they bring in a new operator and relegate the founders to other positions. With new management as cover, they then cut costs. Here, the new CEO's "first action" was to RIF 30 people from company HQ. Founders generally don't like to lose control and then see friends blown out, and so here, both founders resigned shortly after the RIF. This, in turn, gives the investors more latitude to bring in skilled operators which is precisely what they did.



🚲Well-Funded Machines Terrorize Sidewalks 🚲

The Rise of the Electric Scooter

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Do y’all remember the segway? It was supposed to revolutionize transportation but it never took off as anything more than the butt of a joke. Why? Look at the above photo. Homeboy can pump as many curls as he needs to but all the bulging biceps in the world won’t make him look bada$$ riding one of those things. Plus, watch the eye level broheim.

Anyway, there is a new mode of transportation that is all the rage. Introducing the dockless electric scooter…

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Busted Tech (All Hail Uber & Lyft)

Rest in Peace, Fasten


Late on Friday, the co-founders of Fasten, a ride-hailing company that proudly boasts of over 5 million rides completed, sent around a note to users that it has been acquired by Vezet Group. If you’ve never lived or worked in Austin or Boston, you probably don’t give a damn about this so you can move on. But, if you did, you’re aware of Fasten - particularly since it was the only real viable ride-hailing option in Austin during a period of time (2016) when Uber and Lyft fought with regulators. That fight was resolved, however, and Uber and Lyft returned to the city less than a year ago. Now Fasten is done for: this acquisition is an IP-sale. Operations in the US will be shut and 35 employees let go. In the dog eat dog world of ride-hailing, it is telling that the winners like Uber are those who survive - regardless of a cash burn in the billions of dollars annually. Move fast(est), burn cash, and break things.

More Retail Dominos Fall

Tax Credits Can't Save Failing Bon-Ton Stores

We're going to stay thematically on-point. If you missed us last week, we recommend that you go back and read our take on the Cenveo bankruptcy. In fact, we owe an apology to some of you: there were about 400 of you who did not get our a$$-kickingness at all due to an inexplicable Mailchimp screw-up. Mailchimp ≠ a$$-kicking (more on this soon). Anyway, here is a link to the entire newsletter.

A quick preface:

Protection of dying industry extends beyond federally-imposed #MAGA (see, e.g., coal, solar tariffs), and trickles down to local communities. Indeed, local-level legislators are looking at tax credits to prop up industry in the wake of, among other things, Appvion’s chapter 11 bankruptcy (and job cuts) and Kimberly-Clark’s reorganization (and mass job cuts). This is familiar: tax incentives to prop up industry aren’t extraordinary. Sheesh, just look at all the governors getting bent in the hope of drawing Jeff Bezos’ attention. The question is, though, how sound is the social contract? How many dying industries can we as taxpayers prop up all at once? We don’t have an answer. But keep reading.


Inside and outside of the startup context, people often ask stupid questions about companies. "How many employees does it have?” That’s a regular one. Or “How many locations?” Also common. “What’s revenue?” Irrelevant on its own. Uber makes a ton of revenue but is still bleeding cash. Netflix has gobs of revenue but is free cash flow negative. Cenveo, as we noted last week, had $1.59 billion of gross revenue in ’17. Now it’s in bankruptcy court. 

What if we told you about a particular business that had 23,000 employees and that those employees had an average tenure of 12 years? That had 256 locations. That owned 22 properties. That made $2.55 billion - yes, BILLION - in revenue in 2017. That would sound like a pretty damn successful company wouldn’t it? 

It’s not. 

We omitted some key data points: like the company’s capital structure and business vertical. 

Here’s the capital structure:

  • a Tranche A revolving credit facility of up to $730mm
  • a Tranche A-1 term facility of up to $150mm

The interest rate on the debt is a formula but, if we understand it correctly, it was no less than 9.5%. Funded debt as of Monday was $339mm under Tranche A (ex-interest), $150mm under Tranche A-1 (ex-interest of $3.9mm), and millions more in letters of credit.  

The company also has $350mm of 8% senior secured notes outstanding (Wells Fargo Bank NA) and due in 2021. Combined with the above debt, that’s a hefty interest expense. Oh, and the company is publicly-traded. Because this particular company is NOT successful - and with equity ranking in “absolutely priority” below debt - we reckon that there are a lot of Moms and Pops eating sh*t right now in their personal accounts. They won’t be the only ones.

The problem is that this company operates in an “increasingly challenging retail environment.” And, therefore, its story  - The Bon-Ton Stores story - is wildly unoriginal. In the company’s words, "Like many other department store and retail companies, the Debtors have been subjected to adverse trends in the retail industry, including consumers’ shift from shopping in brick-and-mortar stores to online retail channels. Bon-Ton, with a significant geographic operating footprint and operating presence, is dependent on store traffic, which has decreased as customers shift increasingly toward online retailers. In addition to competing against online retailers, Bon-Ton faces competition from other established department stores, such as J.C. Penney, Kohl’s and Macy’s.” It's like a zombie cage fight.

More specifically, it continues, "The department store segment of the U.S. retail industry is a highly competitive environment that has evolved significantly in response to new and evolving competitive retail formats, such as the increased prominence of mass merchandisers and increased competition among national chain retailers, specialty retailers and online retailers, as well as the expansion of the internet and, most significantly, the ubiquitous role that mobile technology and social media now play in the retail consumer shopping experience. The Debtors’ results and performance (and that of their competitors) has been significantly impacted by the aforementioned factors in the U.S. retail industry. Presently, numerous business and economic factors affect the retail industry, including the department store sector. These include underemployment and the low labor participation rate, fluctuating consumer confidence, consumer buying habits and slow growth in the U.S. economy and around the globe.” But, but…#MAGA?!?

Given these factors, the company has been engaged in a tug-of-war with its senior creditors for the better part of months. We’ll spare you the back-and-forth but suffice it to say, no concrete long-term plan that would’ve avoided bankruptcy came to pass. Only the retention of a liquidation agent to close 42 stores. And acquisition of a new $725mm credit facility to fund the cases while the company scrambles to find a buyer. Or liquidate.

Remember all of those shiny, positive numbers up above? Um, yeah. 

It gets worse. Though they were ultimately shot down - at least for now - in court yesterday (Feb 6), the bondholders argued “that the best and only available path for the Debtors to maximize value for their creditors in these freewill bankruptcy cases is to conduct an immediate orderly liquidation of the Debtors’ inventory and other assets. The Second Lien Noteholders made this determination after conducting their own due diligence, and following repeated missteps by the Debtors and their various boards and management teams, who proved themselves unwilling and/or unable to adapt to the fierce headwinds facing brick and mortar retailers and in particular, department stores”(emphasis in original). Savage.

Unwilling. Or unable. To adapt. Sadly, this seems to sum up a lot of distressed retailers these days. 

Even sadder, remember those long-tenured 23k employees we mentioned above? Per the company, “[Bon-Ton] has been part of its employees’ and customers’ lives in their communities for years.”

Probably not for much longer. At this point, no tax credits can change that. 

Is New York City F*cked? Part II.

We previously expressed our concern about the New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio's plan for tackling disruption. The gist was that the Mayor's budget fails to take into account the effect of Uber and Lyft on taxi medallion values. To add insult to injury, this American Council for Capital Formation report makes it sound like the City's pension funds are being managed in a way that would make even Bill Ackman look good. Choice quote: "The performance of the New York City Pension Funds over the past decade has not kept pace with what is needed to stay solvent over the long term. Unfortunately, even conservative estimates project unfunded liabilities to be in excess of $56 billion. It is therefore extremely concerning that managers are spending dwindling resources on investments that are socially or politically motivated, rather than based on performance." The report paints a pretty gnarly picture of how New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer has handled pensions, notwithstanding the funds' recent market-based improvement. Distressed investing fans will particularly love this bit: "For example, the New York City pension funds paid $2.1 million in fees to Perry Capital in fiscal 2016, and had $129 million invested in the firm when it shut down its flagship fund in September 2016 after losing money for three consecutive years. The cumulative return of the city’s pension funds’ investments in Perry Capital inception to date was -14 percent, as of September 2016." Riiiiiiiight. 

As we said before, color us concerned.

Is New York City F*cked?

Uber, Lyft, and Political Incompetence: Mayor de Blasio Needs to Get it Together


Maybe New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio ought to subscribe to PETITION. He clearly doesn’t grasp disruption. And other elected officials are calling him out on it.

Just recently, Thomas DiNapoli, State Comptroller, released his “Review of the Financial Plan of the City of New York”. Buried within the document is a subtle rebuke of the de Blasio administration’s failure to acknowledge any semblance of reality. Here are some key highlights:

  • The November (Financial) Plan covers a four-year financial plan from 2018–2021. That plan projects a budget gap of $7.1b, a number dismissed as “relatively small as a share of City fund revenues (averaging 3.5 percent).” The gap has tightened in large part due to pension fund over-performance. PETITION Note: Hmmm. Query how long that will last.
  • NYC’s economy has expanded more than at any time since WWII. But job growth is slowing and may slow more given federal tax policies.
  • The FY 2019 budget gap estimate was increased by $360mm to $4.4b because “tax receipts have fallen short of expectations.” “Despite the strength of the City’s economy, non-property tax collections have underperformed. For example, the City had assumed that business tax collections would increase by 9.1 percent in FY 2018, but collections declined instead by 8.9 percent during the first four months of the fiscal year (after declining for two consecutive years). Although the City lowered its forecast by $240 million in FY 2018, the out-year forecasts were left unchanged.” PETITION Note: read that last line again!
  • The Plan anticipates $8.3b of federal funding in FY 2018, accounting for 10% of the City budget. PETITION Note: Right. We’ll see. There is obviously a real question whether the federal government may be counted on to fund the City at the same levels. And federal taxes and home ownership costs are obviously expected to increase for many City residents. “Changes in federal fiscal policies, however, constitute the greatest risk to the City since the Great Recession.”

And then our favorite bit:

  • The City has 1650 taxi medallions to sell but has postponed sales since 2014 with the express acknowledgement that ride-sharing companies like Lyft and Uber are affecting medallion values. “The average sale price for a taxi medallion peaked at $1 million in calendar year 2014, but it was nearly cut in half by 2016. Weakness in market conditions has continued, with the average sale price declining in 2017 to $350,000 as of November 2017.” And, YET, the November Plan assumes the 1650 medallions will be sold at an average price of $728k.

Wait, what? Just last week, First Jersey Credit Union reportedly auctioned off six NYC taxi medallions for a high bid of $186k. And then on Tuesday January 16, five medallions were sold for a total of $875,000. Two additional medallions sold for $189k and $199k, respectively. To quote the previously linked Crain’s New York piece, “When a taxi medallion sold for $241,000 last March, the seemingly rock-bottom price made major news. It turns out, those were the good old days.” And then there is this, “One industry veteran said the auction prices are low, relatively speaking, because these are cash deals at a time when banks are not lending for medallion purchases.” Right, because the banks know that medallions make for crappy collateral and have zero desire to try and catch those falling knives. These are just the latest in a recent trend of distressed medallion sales — many of which have taken place in the bankruptcy courts. This stuff is public information. We’d think that Mayor de Blasio and his administration would be aware of it. Apparently not.

Here’s the problem: either through ignorance (it’s not like others haven’t noticed) or wishful thinking (that, what, Uber AND Lyft will FAIL?), the administration is budgeting on the basis of medallion sales that may never happen. And, even if they do, they are unlikely to fetch the value projected. Per DiNapoli, this error leaves an estimated $731mm shortfall in the budget. This is an astounding level of cluelessness. Even for a politician.

More importantly, if the de Blasio administration can’t see what is occurring right in front of them, how is it to be counted on to address bigger issues coming soon? Like autonomous cars, for instance? “‘Autonomous vehicles will have a significant and fundamental effect on cities and how they’re laid out’”. Color us concerned. If you live in New York, you should be too.

PETITION is a digital media company focused on disruption from the vantage point of the disrupted. We have a kick-a$$ weekly newsletter. You can subscribe HERE and follow us on Twitter HERE.

Automotive (Short the B2B Business Model)

More Signs of Upcoming Auto-Related Distress

Assuming Uber Technologies Inc. can survive its latest self-imposed issues, e.g., an unreported data breach, increased regulatory scrutiny, skittish investors in Softbank and Benchmark Capital, etc.,, it appears to be positioning itself and the automobile industry towards a brand new business model. This week Uber announced its (non-binding) agreement to purchase 24k sport utility vehicles from Volvo Cars to seed a fleet of autonomous cars. Deployment date: 2019. Yes, 2019. Anyway, in addition to the obvious and previously discussed implications for labor, this move might have bigger ramifications: a forced pivot of the automotive business model in the direction of the airline model.

What do we mean by that? Assuming a great many things (including Uber's ability to successfully deploy its sensors and software with Volvo's hardware, regulatory hurdles, etc.), this could be another blow to the model of individual car ownership, the B2C formula deployed by the OEMs for years. Hyperbole? Maybe, but if people stop buying cars (and borrow money to do so), auto companies will see significant revenue effects. And they'd have to sell more to fleet operators, i.e., Uber, Lyft, etc., much like Boeing ($BA) and Airbus ($AIR) sell to Delta ($DAL), United Airlines ($UA), etc. This could mean fewer cars on the road, all told. Which, as we've previously discussed here and here, could lead to increased pain in the auto supply chain. 

Elsewhere in auto, the Faraday Future dumpster fire is turning into a full-fledged conflagration and looks like a ripe candidate to be voluntaried into bankruptcy.

And, finally, we noted back in February that 3D-printing could have a big impact on a number of industries. Now, apparently, 3D printing is projected to have a spike in activity in 2018. Businesses sourcing it most? Manufacturing, telecom, defense, and, of course, auto. To point, Divergent 3D just raised $65mm Series B financing round to build its car frame business. Curious.

Recent Feedback - The (Hard) Business of Eating

"Excellent narrative on the restaurant industry in Sunday’s Petition. Btw, I really love the snarky tone of the writing – it’s awesome!" - Managing Director, Financial Advisor. 

PETITION Response: Thank you! We love receiving feedback like this; we noted that QSRs were generally doing fine while fast casual was looking a bit shaky and casual dining was looking like total dogsh*t. Insert Restaurant Brands International Inc. ($QSR), owner of Burger King (comps up 3.6%), Tim Hortons (up 0.3%), and Popeyes (down 1.8%). It reported an earnings beat on higher revenues (and then stock traded down). Meanwhile, Chipotle Inc.($CMG) - bloodbath. No queso for you. Meanwhile, if you feel like trusting Uber with even MORE of your data, maybe THIS new credit card (which promotes 4% off UberEATS) is for you. With news that Aldi's move into the US is compressing grocery prices even further, the casual dining space looks primed for a lot more hurt. 

10/31/17 Updated: Not to belabor the point, but this story by The New York Times helps drive home the issue currently in the restaurant space. There are currently 620,000 eating establishments in the United States. 620,000. That is bananas. 

Too many restaurants? Too many brands? You think? It's a shame that so many folks are sinking their livelihoods into these businesses. We expect the chart to the right to show continued downward trends given recent reports of the likes of McDonalds ($MCD) and Shake Shack ($SHAK) automating.

The (Hard) Business of Eating

Long VC Subsidies & Facebook's Copying Skills

Generally speaking, there are four categories in the dining space. First, there are the QSRs (quick service restaurants). Your run-of-the-mill fast food spots fall into this space. For the most part, these guys are doing okay: McDonald's ($MCD) and Wendy's ($WEN), for instance, have both seen great stock performance in the TTM. Second, there's the fast casual space. Competition here is fast and furious covering all manner of ethnicities and varieties. Chipotle ($CMG) and Panera Bread are probably the two best known representatives of this category. The former has gotten SMOKED and the latter got taken private. Generally speaking, there'll be some shakeout here, but the category as a whole has been holding its own. Third, there's the fine dining space. This is a tough space to play in but there are clear cut winners and losers (Le Cirque, see below): not a lot of chains fall in to this category. And, finally, there is the casual dining category. Here is where there's been a ton of shakeout. This past week, for instance, Ruby Tuesday Inc. ($RT) - the ubiquitous casual dining restaurant loosely associated with bad New Jersey strip malls - got bailed out...uh, taken private by NRD Capital at a fraction of its once $30/share price. (There was some assumed debt, too, to be fair). Moreover, Romano's Macaroni Grill filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. In RMG's bankruptcy papers, the company's Chief Restructuring Officer said the following, "The Debtors’ operations and financial performance have been adversely affected by a number of economic factors, but perhaps most notably by an overall downturn for the casual dining industry. The preferences of such customers have shifted to cheaper, faster alternatives. On the other end of the spectrum, there is a trend among younger customers to spend their disposable income at non-chain “experience-driven” restaurants, even if slightly more expensive." No. Bueno. See below for a more in-depth (and slightly repetitive summary) of this particular bankruptcy filing. 

Unfortunately, the restaurant world received some other (slightly under-the-radar) bad news this past week: UberEATSUber's food delivery service, reportedly generated 10% of the company's total global bookings in Q2 - which, extrapolated, equates to $3b in gross sales for the year. That's a lot of food delivery to a lot of people sitting at home doing the "Netflix-and-chill" thing instead of the eat-microwaved-mozzarella-sticks-at-the-local-Ruby-Tuesday-thing. Of course, this is attributable to Softbank and other venture capitalists who are subsidizing this money-losing endeavor: UberEATS is unprofitable in 75% of the cities it services. On the other hand, do you know what IS profitable? Facebook ($FB). Yeah, Facebook is profitable. And Facebook is going after this space too; it released its plans to get into the online food ordering business earlier this week. And many suspect that this may be a precursor to a foray into food delivery as well. Why? Perhaps Mark Zuckerberg saw Cowen's prediction that US food delivery would grow 79% in the next several years. Delivery or not, anything that helps make online food ordering easier and more mainstream is an obvious headwind to the casual dining spots. Given that this area is already troubled and many casual dining spots have already fallen victim to bankruptcy, there don't seem to be many indications of a near-term reversal of fortune. Headwinds for the casual dining space correlate to tailwinds for restructuring professionals. Sick? Yeah. Sad? Sure. But true. 

Uber's Carnage: the Rise of Distressed Taxis

New York City Taxi Medallions Selling at Significant Discounts

Uber's Carnage (Distressed Taxis). As taxi medallion owners continue to struggle, Evgeny Friedman's bankrupt taxi companies are establishing "market value" for the New York City taxi medallion - and it's at the low end of a recently established spectrum. The New York Times writes, "In August alone, 12 of the 21 medallion sales were part of foreclosures; the prices of all the sales ranged from $150,000 to $450,000 per medallion." Friedman's medallions sold last week to a hedge fund for $186k/each for a block of 46. As context, medallions were once worth as much as $1.3mm. Considering that there are approximately 13.8k taxis in New York City today, one observer noted that it would take Uber (or Lyft), approximately $2.6b to simply buy out the entirety of the City's fleet at that valuation - a cost of a small percentage of Uber's supposedly sizable market cap. So there you have it: "disruption," quantified.

An Auto Dumpster Fire. Thanks @Uber. ($HTZ)

We've covered the Uber-effect as it relates to taxis - in particular the precipitous decline in the value of tax medallions, requests for bailouts (in New York), and bankruptcies all across the country (most notably in San Francisco). With auto loan delinquencies on the rise and the used car market looking over-supplied, it's time for more blood in the water. Hertz Global Holdings' 52-week high is $53. It now trades at $15 and that is UP from its low of $7. It reports Q1 earning on 5/8 but last quarter was a bloodbath with EBITDA down 85+% y-o-y. Leverage as of last quarter was 7x pre-cash. On a quick glance the Icahn-backed company has plenty of liquidity - including a largely untapped Barclays revolver - but there could be some near-term covenant issues. And with more and more corporate travelers relying on Uber and Lyft, Hertz' management had better pack windbreakers. Meanwhile, auto dealers are looking for creative ways to alleviate their own pain with upstarts like disintermediating the (frustratingly painful) process of purchasing a car. To the extent that anyone is actually purchasing a car. Bueller, Bueller?