New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Avadim Health Inc.

North Carolina-based Avadim Health Inc. and four affiliates (together, the “debtors”) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware over the Memorial Day holiday. The “vertically integrated healthcare and wellness company” intends to “expeditiously complete a third-party sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets” to their pre-petition secured lenders (Hayfin Services LLP), who have agreed not only to serve as stalking horse purchaser but DIP lenders.

Historically, the debtors have sold topical products like pre-saturated towelettes, foaming, spray and other products B2B to acute care hospitals, nursing homes, and long-term care facilities. In 2016, nine years after their founding, the debtors expanded to B2C, unleashing their products in over 47k pharmacy locations and later adding its own website and an Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) presence to the mix. Between ‘17 and ‘19, the debtors’ annual net revenues popped from $10.8mm to $45.8mm.

On the liability side of the ledger, the debtors historically used debt, private placements of equity, convertible notes and revenues to fund ops. The capital structure includes:

  • $79.6mm term loan;

  • $22mm senior secured notes;

  • $6.4mm 6% unsecured convertible notes; and

  • $2.01mm 1% unsecured PPP loan due 4/22.

The company also owes $4.8mm pursuant to a settlement agreement tied to a patent dispute.

Remember those rising revenues? Yeah, well, that’s all fine and good unless it’s entirely offset by significant selling and marketing expenses and excess inventory build-up because not as many institutions want your product than you modeled out. This bit is brutal:

The Company’s sales related expenses resulted in limited free cash flow to fund other operating expenses, debt service, and investment in new products. In particular, the Company ramped up significant media/marketing expenditures and built up inventory in anticipation of its previously planned early 2020 IPO; however, that IPO never materialized.

Oh, wait, it gets worse:

Notwithstanding spending tens of millions of dollars over the past decade to build the Company’s brand, the Company has been unsuccessful in reaching profitability.

Ok, sorry, folks, but when we think of “brand” we think of LVMH, the parent company of luxury brands like Dior, Louis Vuitton, and Tiffany. In other words, a company with a market cap over 320b Euro which, earlier this month, made Bernard Arnault the richest person in the world (yes, over Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk). We DON’T think of “Theraworx Protect” (the debtors’ immune health line), Theraworx Protect U-Pak (the urinary health line) or Combat One (for soldier and first responder readiness). And we DEFINITELY don’t think of a company that lost $49.5mm $34.8mm and $53.6mm in ‘18, ‘19 and ‘20 respectively.

Apparently neither does the market. The IPO failed. Thereafter, the company initiated a strategic alternatives review that came up empty (with marketing taking place from March ‘20 through October ‘20 … poor timing). This is when the army of restructuring pros got involved, including independent directors on a “Restructuring Committee,” a CRO and some bankers for good measure. All roads, however, led back to the pre-petition secured lenders owed more than $102mm in principal amounts under the term loan and the secured notes. Apparently nobody else wanted to hop aboard a ship that (a) “[o]ver the past few years … [has] been perpetually distressed, constantly facing liquidity crunches and incurring defaults under the [term loan]” and (b) had to enter into “seven amendments to their [term loan] since June 2019, increasing the principal amount available to the Debtors, expanding interest obligations owed to the lenders, and extending maturities.

So, uh, why would anyone else want to get in on this?!?

As noted above, they don’t. The pre-petition lenders, on the other hand, are in a solid position to make a grab for valuable tax attributes and net operating losses!

MIDAVA HOLDINGS 3, INC. is the new entity formed by the pre-petition lenders to serve as stalking horse. The proposed DIP is $7.156mm at L+12%.

The debtors are represented by Chapman and Cutler LLP (Larry Halperin, Joon Hong) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns) as legal counsel, Carl Marks Advisors (Keith Daniels) as financial advisor and CRO, SSG Capital Advisors LLC as banker and Omni Agent Solutions as claims agent. Hayfin is represented by Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius, Rachael Foust) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Cavid Queroli).

The first day hearing is scheduled for later this morning at 11am ET.


Date: May 31, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Goldblatt)

Capital Structure: see above

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Chapman and Cutler LLP (Larry Halperin, Joon Hong) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, David Bertenthal, Timothy Cairns)

  • Board of Directors: Dewey Andrew, Linda McGoldrick, Charles Owen III, Steven Panagos, Karan Rai, James Rosati, Stephen Woody

  • Financial Advisor/CRO: Carl Marks Advisors (Keith Daniels)

  • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

  • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Term Loan Agent: Hayfin Services LLP

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius, Rachael Foust) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Cavid Queroli)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.⛽️

Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.

Colorado-based Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc. (along with three affiliates, the “debtors”) is and independent oil and gas exploration and production company focused on the Williston Basin in North Dakota and Montana. It is the successor to Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation, which filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2016 and confirmed a plan in March 2017. Four years later, it’s back in bankruptcy court. 😬

Followers of E&P bankruptcies have become accustomed to disputes relating to E&P companies and their midstream gathering, transportation and processing providers. Here, Caliber Midstream Partners LP was the debtors’ largest midstream services provider — “was” being the operative word after the debtors terminated the long-term midstream services agreements on the eve of bankruptcy. The story, however, doesn’t end there.

The debtors are willing to enter into a new arrangement with Caliber going forward. It’s unclear how the new arrangement might differ from the existing arrangement because redaction, redaction, redaction. The economic terms of the contract have not been disclosed. 🤔

And so here we are with another potential “running with the land” scenario. If you’re unfamiliar with what this is, you clearly haven’t been paying attention to E&P bankruptcy cases. Just Google it and you’ll pull up probably 8928394829248929 law firm articles on the topic. As this will be a major driver in the case, it probably makes sense to refresh your recollection.

Why are the debtors in bankruptcy? All of the usual reasons, e.g., the big drop in oil prices thanks to COVID-19 and Russia/OPEC. Nothing really new there.

So what does this filing achieve? For starters, it will give the debtors an opportunity to address the Caliber contracts. Moreover, it will avail the debtors of a DIP facility from their pre-petition lenders in the amount of ~$72mm — $18mm in new money and $54mm on a rollup basis (exclusive of an additional $16.1mm roll-up to account for pre-petition secured swap obligations)(8% interest with 2% commitment fee). Finally, the pre-petition-cum-DIP-lenders have agreed to serve as the stalking horse purchaser of the debtors’ assets with a credit bid floor of $250mm.


Date: March 15, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

Capital Structure: $256.9mm credit facility, $16.1mm swap obligations

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Caroline Reckler, Jonathan Gordon, George Davis, Nacif Taousse, Alistair Fatheazam, Jonathan Weichselbaum, Andrew Sorkin, Heather Waller, Amanda Rose Stanzione, Elizabeth Morris, Sohom Datta) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle, Ashley Jacobs, Jacob Morton)

  • Board of Directors: Patrick Bartels Jr., Dominic Spencer, Frederic Brace, Gary Begeman, Alan Dawes

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (John Castellano)

  • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (John Cesarz)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition & DIP Agent: AB Private Credit Investors LLC

    • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Charles Dale, David Hillman, Michael Mervis, Megan Volin, Paul Possinger, Jordan Sazant) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford, Matthew Pierce)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Equityholders: Shenkman Capital Management, JP Morgan Securities LLC, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Chambers Energy Capital

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Jeffrey Pawlitz, Matthew Dunn, Mark Stancil) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

  • Midstream Counterparty: Caliber Measurement Services LLC, Caliber Midstream Fresh Water Partners LLC, and Caliber North Dakota LLC

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk, Tristan Sierra, Edward Soto, Lauren Alexander) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Curtis Miller, Taylor Haga, Nader Amer)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Golden Eagle Entertainment $ENT

Golden Eagle Entertainment

July 22, 2020

Suffice it to say, high correlation to the airline and cruiseline industries is a credit negative these days. A few months ago Speedcast — a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses — discovered this the hard way and free fell into bankruptcy court. There’s still no resolution of that case. Similarly, Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. ($ENT), a business that generates revenue by (i) licensing and managing media and entertainment content and providing related services to customers in the airline, maritime and other “away-from-home” nontheatrical markets, and (ii) providing satellite-based Internet access and other connectivity solutions to airlines, cruise ships and other markets, couldn’t avoid trouble once COVID-19 shutdown its core end users. No monthly recurring revenue model can save a company when its clients are effectively closed for business AND there’s $855.6mm of funded debt to service. Not to state the obvious.

Things may get worse before they get better. The company’s largest customer is Southwest Airlines Co. ($LUV) (21% of overall revenue) and it has a pretty bearish take on …

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  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $85mm RCF, $503.3mm TL, $188.7mm second lien notes, $82.5mm unsecured convertible notes.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Madeleine Parish, Ted Dillman, Helena Tseregounis, Nicholas Messana, Eric Leon) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond, Betsy Feldman)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition First Lien Admin Agent & DIP Agent: Citibank NA

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Bryan Podzius)

    • Ad Hoc DIP & First Lien Lender Group: Apollo Global Management, L.P., Eaton Vance Management, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management, Carlyle Investment Management LLC, Mudrick Capital Management, BlackRock Financial Management, Inc.

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Scott Greenberg, Michael Cohen, Jason Goldstein) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, TImothy Cairns)

    • Second Lien Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

    • Second Lien Noteholders: Searchlight Capital Partners LP

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Michael Turkel, Irene Blumberg, Elizabeth Sacksteder) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro)

    • Southwest Airlines Inc.

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Paul Heath, Robert Kimball, Matthew Struble) & Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP (Lucian Murley)

    • AT&T Corp.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Brian Lohan) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Brett Turlington)

    • Terry Steiner International

      • Legal: Loeb & Loeb LLP (Daniel Besikof, Geneva Shi)

    • Telesat International Limited

      • Legal: Hodgson Russ LLP (Garry Graber)

    • Nantahala Capital Management LLC

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Arthur Steinberg, Scott Davidson) & The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner, Jason Gibson)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Briggs & Stratton Corporation ($BGG)

Briggs & Stratton Corporation

July 20, 2020

You may not know of Briggs & Stratton Corporation ($BGG) but it’s likely that you’ve used one of its products. Its small gasoline engines are used in outdoor power equipment like lawn mowers, and it designs, manufactures and markets power generation, pressure washer, lawn and garden, turf care and job site products. Its engines even power go-karts! It offers a variety of different brands and its products are in 100 countries around the world.

The company has a rich history. In Wisconsin circa 1908, inventor Stephen Briggs and investor Harold Stratton co-founded what, two years later, would be an auto and auto parts manufacturer incorporated as Briggs & Stratton. The two men added small gasoline engines to their product suite, powering early washing machines and reel mowers. The company went public in 1928. For decades thereafter, the business ventured into agricultural and military applications (producing generators for the WWII effort), ultimately revolutionizing the first lightweight aluminum engine in 1953. The post-War suburbian boom helped fuel the company’s growth in the 50s and 60s. Lots of lawns to mow! The company has iterated a lot since then: it no longer produces auto components, for instance. The core business is currently focused around two segments: engines (primarily sold to OEMs of lawn and garden equipment) and products (i.e., outdoor power equipment, job site products, etc.).

Unfortunately, a rich history doesn’t insulate companies from distress — a lesson that many long-standing companies have learned lately as the bankruptcy bin fills to the brim with companies with 100+ year histories (see, also, BJ Services LLC, Brooks Brothers Group, RTW Retailwinds, Congoleum Corporation). Alas, the company and four affiliates (the “debtors”) also could not avoid chapter 11, filing early Monday in the Eastern District of Missouri, and citing (i) cautious ordering patterns from channel partners, (ii) weather, (iii) Sears’ demise and bankruptcy (bankruptcy dominos!!), (iv) consumer preference shifts, and (v) China, for its troubles. With approximately $200mm of notes maturing at year end (Dec) and a springing maturity of 9/15/20 if the notes are still outstanding by then, the debtors, to top things off, faced real challenges related to the balance sheet.

Because of all of the aforementioned factors, the debtors implemented a “strategic repositioning plan” that included shutting plants, laying off workers, suspending employee benefits (including underfunded and unfunded pensions), lowering capital and discretionary spending, eliminating a shareholder dividend and suspending a share repurchase program. COVID-19, as we’ve seen over and over again, got in the way of these efforts. “The preliminary estimate of the sales decline caused by the pandemic for the fiscal fourth quarter was $157 million and for the fiscal year was $197 million.” 😬

The good news is that the debtors have a buyer in the wings. Bucephalus Buyer LLC, a dramatically-named affiliate of KPS Capital Partners LP entered into a stalking horse purchase agreement with the debtors pursuant to which it would buy the debtors’ assets and equity interests in non-debtor subsidiaries for $550m in cash plus the assumption of certain liabilities. To fund this process (and take out the ABL in full), the debtors obtained (i) a commitment from prepetition ABL lender, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, for a $412.5mm DIP ABL (L+3.5%), (ii) a commitment from KPS for a $265mm DIP Term Loan facility (L+7%) and (iii) consent to use the ABL lenders’ cash collateral. The DIP agreement mandates that a qualified sale order be entered by the bankruptcy court no later than September 24, 2020 (subject to caveats that would push the date out to December 31, 2020).

  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Missouri (Judge Schermer)

  • Capital Structure: $260.4mm North American ABL, $53mm LOCs, $12.4mm Swiss ABL (JP Morgan Chase Bank NA), 202.7mm unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Debora Hoehne, Martha Martir, Andrew Citron, Edward Soto, Janiel Jodi-Ann Myers, Lauren Alexander, Corey Berman) & Carmody MacDonald PC (Robert Eggmann, Christopher Lawhorn, Danielle Suberi, Thomas Riske, Lindsay Leible Combs, Angela Drumm)

    • Financial Advisor: EY (Jeffrey Ficks)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. (Reid Snellenbarger, Jeffrey Lewis)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition & DIP Agent ($677.5mm): JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Peter Knight, Jonathan Gordon)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser ($550mm): Bucephalus Buyer, LLC (KPS Capital Partners LP)

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Chad Husnick, Gregory Pesce, Claire Stephens, Guy Macarol) & Armstrong Teasdale LLP (Richard Engel)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Imperial Capital LLC

🧀 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - CEC Entertainment Inc. 🧀

CEC Entertainment Inc.

June 24, 2020

For our rundown, please go here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $1.089b funded debt ($760mm TL, $108 RCF, $6mm LOC, $215.7mm notes)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Alfredo Perez, Andrew Citron, Rachael Foust, Scott Bowling)

    • Board of Directors: David McKillips, Andrew Jhawar, Naveen Shahani, Allen Weiss, Peter Brown, Paul Aronzon

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Chad Coben)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • PE Sponsor: Queso Holdings Inc./AP VIII CEC Holdings, L.P. (Apollo)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP

    • First Lien Credit Agreement Agent: Credit Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Eli Vonnegut) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders: American Money Management Corp, Arbour Lane Capital Management, Arena Capital Advisors LLC, Ares Management LLC, Bank of Montreal, BlueMountain Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, Catalur Capital Management LP, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse AG, Deutsche Bank New York, Fidelity Management & Research Co., Fortress Investment Group LLC, GS Capital Partners LP, Hill Path Capital, Indaba Capital Fund LP, ICG Debt Advisors, Jefferies Financ LLC, J.H. Lane Partners Master Fund LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, MSD Capital LP, MSD Partners LP, Octagon Credit Investors LLC, Par Four Investment Management LLC, RFG-Clover LLC, Second Lien LLC, UBS AG, Wazee Street Capital Management, Western Asset Management Company LLC, WhiteStar Asset Management, ZAIS Group LLC

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Jason Rubin, Marty Brimmage Jr., Lacy Lawrence)

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Kurt Gwynne, Jason Angelo)

    • Ad Hoc Group of ‘22 8% Senior Noteholders (Longfellow Investment Management Co. LLC, Prudential Financial Inc., Resource Credit Income Fund, Westchester Capital Management)

      • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Matthew Warren, Lindsey Henrikson, Michael Rupe)

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Wilmington Trust NA, The Coca-Cola Company, National Retail Properties, Performance Food Group, Washington Prime Group, NCR Corporation, Index Promotions

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Jason Adams, Lauren Schlussel & Womble Bond Dickinson LLP (Matthew Ward)

7/17/20 Dkt. 352.

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-07-17 at 9.16.29 AM.png

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

  • Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

  • F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

  • It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

Screen Shot 2020-07-17 at 9.17.35 AM.png

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

      • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

New Chapter 33 Bankruptcy Filing - NorthEast Gas Generation LLC

NorthEast Gas Generation LLC

June 18, 2020

Texas-based NorthEast Gas Generation LLC (along with three affiliates, the “debtors”), an indirect subsidiary of non-debtors Talen Energy Corporation and NorthEast Gas Generation Holdings LLC (f/k/a MACH Gen LLC), filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. This is the third chapter 11 in six years. You could be excused for thinking that, after two prior rodeos, the balance sheet would be pretty light. Alas, that is not the case. The debtors have $585.2mm of funded indebtedness split between a $554.7mm first lien credit facility and a much smaller $30.5mm second lien credit facility (PETITION Note: there are also LOCs of $23.2mm). Behind all of that is approximately $10.5mm of trade debt.

Low natural gas prices have persisted, unfortunately, and that has placed downward pressure on electric energy prices. Moreover, supply continues to outpace demand thanks to energy saving tech, alternatives, and more. Apparently global warming ain’t helping either: a warmer-than-normal winter reduced home heating levels. All of these factors affected the debtors’ ability to generate revenue and service their debt. The bankruptcy filed was tripped by the urgent need for liquidity and the ability to enter into a DIP financing agreement. This critical funding will bridge the debtors to some sort of transaction that will “allow them to effectuate an orderly restructuring process in chapter 11, pursuant to which the Debtors anticipate consummating a transaction that will transfer, sell, or otherwise convey substantially all of the Debtors’ assets to the First Lien Secured Parties or their designee.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: $585.2mm

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Dan DeFranceschi, Jason Madron, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Admin Agent & DIP Lenders: CLMG Corp. & Beal Bank USA & Beal Bank SSB

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Philip Abelson, Elizabeth Feld, Rashida Adams) & Fox Rothschild LLP (Jeffrey Schlerf)

    • Talen Energy Supply LLC

      • Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matt Barr, Bryan Podzius, Alexander Welch, Ronit Berkovich & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Taylor Haga)

💪 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - 24 Hour Fitness Inc. 💪

24 Hour Fitness Inc.

June 15, 2020

California-based 24 Hour Fitness Inc. (along with ten affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware after it became apparent that it’s hard to sustain a fitness business when, as a practical matter, you’re really 0 Hour Fitness Inc. When you have 3.4mm customers across 445 (leased) locations across the United States, it’s awfully hard for a business that typically does $1.5b in revenue and $191 in adjusted EBITDA to make money when a pandemic rips through the nation and shuts down business entirely. This, ladies and gentlemen, like the few airlines who have filed for bankruptcy to date, is as pure-play a COVID-19 story as they come these days.

Now, that’s to not to suggest that everything was copacetic prior to the quarantine. The business had some pimples on it. The debtors’ CRO cites the selling/operating model’s negative impact on financial performance. But the biggest and scariest pimples are the debtors’ balance sheet and lease portfolio. The former includes $1.4b of funded debt; the latter, 445 locations leased across the country, of which 135 have already been deemed unnecessary and are the subject of a first day executory contract rejection motion (PETITION Note: the debtors denote this as “a first wave.”). When revenues stop coming into the coffers, these tremendous amounts become quite an overhang and a liquidity drain.

The filing, among other things, helps solve for the liquidity issue. The debtors have obtained a commitment for a $250mm new-money senior secured DIP facility from an ad hoc group of lenders. While there is no restructuring support agreement in place here, the ad hoc group is comprised of 63.3% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the prepetition credit facility and approximately 73.9% of the face amount of the $500mm in senior unsecured notes. In other words, there’s a solid amount of support here but not enough yet to command the senior class of debt.

Luckily, the debtors gave themselves a form of pre-DIP. Wait. Huh? What are we referring to?

…the Debtors were obliged to close all of their fitness clubs nationwide on March 16, 2020, in response to this national emergency. As a result, the Debtors were no longer able to generate new sources of revenue (by winning new members) and, on or about April 15, 2020, the Debtors suspended billing on account of monthly membership dues.fn

In the footnote, the debtors note:

To date, litigation has been commenced in connection with the Debtors’ monthly billing on a post-March 16 basis, notwithstanding, among other things, the Debtors’ rights under their various membership agreements. The Debtors reserve all rights, claims, and defenses in this regard.

Uh, apparently, 0 Hour Fitness Inc. = 30 Days of Payment Inc. We’ll see whether this short-term liquidity grab created long term customer retention issues.*

Moreover, the fact that they apparently laid off thousands of employees via conference call probably won’t amount to a whole lot of goodwill. Just sayin’.

Now it’s wait and see. The debtors have reopened approximately 20 locations in Texas and hope to have the majority of their other non-rejected clubs open by the end of June. We’ll see if the uptick in COVID cases in certain states throws a wrench in that plan. To combat any COVID-related perception risk, the debtors are instituting some new measures:

…the Debtors have taken an innovative approach to the reopening of their clubs, instituting market-leading strategies to keep their members and employees safe, including an app-based reservation system to ensure that their clubs remain in compliance with applicable social distancing guidelines, a touchless check-in system to limit members’ and employees’ contact with surfaces, and cleaning schedules that ensure that entire clubs are sanitized every hour. (emphasis added)

Gosh. We see sh*t like this — the airlines are also making similar statements about newly implemented cleanliness standards — and it really makes us wonder: what the bloody hell were these cesspools doing pre-COVID?!?!? Clearly not enough.

And, yet, otherwise, we have some sympathy for these businesses. This is a brand new paradigm. The debtors indicate that they’re implementing a reservation-based system where people are locked into an hour-max workout after which the gym will be closed for 30 minutes for a “deep clean.” That is not exactly a seamless and frictionless user experience. Moreover, what kind of chemicals are going to be dumped all over the facility every 60 minutes? These are tough issues.

As far as social distancing:

…the Debtors are utilizing space in their clubs in creative ways in order to continue to offer members a range of amenities and services. For example, the Debtors are utilizing their basketball courts to hold group exercise classes, including by relocating stationary bike equipment to continue to offer indoor cycling classes, so that members and equipment can be properly spaced to comply with social distancing guidelines.

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

No offense but does THIS really worth going to the gym for? You can use apps for a fraction of the cost and do this at home…mask-less.

So what now?

The DIP financing will buy the debtors some time to evaluate new trends. Will those people who paid for a month when the gym was closed come back? Will the news about employee treatment effect the “brand”? Will all of those people who bought home gyms or learned to run need to go to a gym? The re-opening notwithstanding, all of these questions will directly impact valuation. Indeed, how do you value this business with so many massive question marks? Well, luckily, we have the debt to get a sense of what that answer might be. And considering that, at the time of this writing, the term loan is bid in the high 20s and the unsecured notes are bid around 3 — that’s right, 3 — it’s pretty clear who is getting (generally) wiped out in this scenario and where the market thinks the value breaks.

*Honestly, this was a dirty move but from the debtors’ perspective, it also totally makes sense.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $95.2mm ‘23 RCF, $835.1mm ‘25 Term Loan, $500mm 8% ‘22 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Kevin Bostel, Kyle Satterfield, Ramsey Scofield, Jackson Que Alldredge, Jacob Mezei, Alexander Cohen, Sarah Schnorrenberg) & Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Laura Davis Jones, Timothy Cairns, Peter Keane)

    • Directors: Marc Beilinson, Stephen Hare, Roland Smith

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Daniel Hugo)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Tyler Cowan)

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (John Rapisardi, Adam Rogoff, Daniel Shamah, Diana Perez, Adam Haberkorn) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Mark Collins, Michael Merchant, David Queroli)

    • Prepetition Agent: Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc.

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Alfred Xue)

    • DIP Agent: Wilmington Trust

      • Legal: Covington & Burling (Ronald Hewitt)

    • Senior Notes Indenture Trustee: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Luke Sizemore, Mark Eckard)

    • Large equityholders: AEA, Fitness Capital Partners LP, 2411967 Ontario Limited

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Unit Corporation ($UNT)⛽️

Unit Corporation

May 22, 2020

Oklahoma is where a lot of the action is at. Unit Corporation ($UNT) is a publicly-traded Tulsa-based holding company that, through three operating segments, offers (i) oil and gas exploration and production, (ii) contract drilling and (iii) midstream services. Like every other oil and gas company under the sun, this one has too much funded debt. $789mm to be exact, split between a $139mm RBL facility and $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes. And like every other oil and gas company under the sun, it cannot sustain its capital structure. For months now, the debtors have been the bankruptcy equivalent of deadbeats — bouncing from one standstill agreement to the next so as not to get hit with a meaningful on-schedule redetermination liability that they wouldn’t be able to satisfy (PETITION Note: this is particularly relevant because they had already been hit by a “wildcard” or “off-schedule” redetermination in January, knocking their borrowing base down $75mm. Instant liability! Yay!!). On brand, the debtors likewise couldn’t afford their semi-annual May 15 interest payment.

Why the bankruptcy now? Well, you’ve seen this movie many times already in the last month or so. You’ve got a starring role for Vladimir Putin. And a starring role for MBS. And you’ve got a few plagues for added drama: first, plummeting commodity prices and then a global pandemic. These factors negatively impacted liquidity and sparked a number of strategic processes including (a) the sale of 50% ownership in Superior Pipeline Company to SP Investor Holdings LLC for $300mm in spring of 2018 and (b) an attempted up-tier exchange of the subordinated notes into newly issued 10% senior secured notes and 7% junior notes. The debtors, however, were unable to successfully obtain the requisite number of tenders. Not only would the exchange have extended the debtors’ maturity profile and eliminated short-and-medium term refi risk, it would have removed the danger that the debtors would trigger a springing maturity in their RBL. Oh well.

Luckily the debtors got themselves an agreement with 70% of the subordinated noteholders and the RBL lenders on the terms of a consensual financial restructuring transaction — like, as the shotclock was about to go off (read: when the standstill agreement expired on May 22, the filing date). The deal includes, among other things, (i) a $36mm new money DIP credit facility, (ii) a debt-for-equity swap by the noteholders for equity in each of reorganized Unit Corp and the upstream and contact drilling opcos, (iii) a new $180mm exit facility from the RBL lenders in exchange for a 5% exit fee paid in post-reorg equity in reorganized Unit Corp. (PETITION Note: apparently the RBL lenders have no interest in owning equity in contact drilling services), and (iv) payment in full in cash or reorganized equity to general unsecured claimants depending upon which entity they have a claim against. Notably, equityholders who do not opt out of releases will receive out-of-the-money warrants exercisable for an aggregate of 12.5% of the interests in the reorganized Unit Corp entity.

We’d be remiss if we didn’t highlight one other aspect of these cases. As is all the rage these days, management got away with an amended incentive structure on the eve of bankruptcy that enriched them all to the tune of $900k. Sweeeeeet. Meanwhile, they spent a good chunk of November ‘19 through April ‘20 sh*tcanning their employees and promising them 4 weeks of severance for every year of service up to 104 weeks. While this is admittedly a pretty rich severance plan, it appears that the restructuring support agreement memorializing the above-referenced transaction proposes to renege on this policy and instead provide merely four to 13 weeks severance to employees. You’ve gotta love these oil and gas execs: they’re wildly proficient at destroying value but still manage to always siphon some off for themselves. It’s awesome.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: $139mm RBL facility (BOKF NA), $650mm in ‘21 subordinated unsecured notes (Wilmington Trust NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Harry Perrin, Paul Heath, Matthew Pyeatt, David Meyer, Lauren Kanzer, Zachary Paiva, Emily Tomlinson)

    • Financial Advisor: Opportune LLP (Gary Pittman)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Bo Yi)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RBL Agent: BOKF NA

      • Legal: Frederic Dorwart Lawyers PLLC (Samuel Ory) & Bracewell LLP (William A. Trey Wood III)

      • Financial Advisor: Huron Consulting Group Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Lauren Tauro)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

🔋New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Exide Holdings Inc.🔋

Exide Holdings Inc.

May 19, 2020

Georgia-based Exide Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”), among the world’s largest producers and recyclers of lead-acid batteries used in cars, boats, golf carts and more, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware earlier this week. The filing sparked an entire industry to ask “is it a Chapter 22 or a Chapter 33?” The answer, depending upon your look-back period, is the latter. The fairer answer is probably the former and even that was 7 years ago with emergence 5 years ago (PETITION Note: the Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust had to make a notice of appearance in these new cases so, there’s that). Going back nearly two decades seems to be an impossible standard to hold any business to but 5-7 years seems much fairer.

Since we’re discussing labels, here’s another one: failure. Per the debtors:

Notwithstanding the Company’s efforts to implement its business plan following its emergence from the 2013 Chapter 11 Case and the support of its new owners and lenders, the Company continued to face liquidity, performance, and operational challenges that were more persistent and widespread than anticipated. Coupled with adverse industry and market factors as well as substantial environmental costs, these challenges have resulted in reduced liquidity.

Sooooo…that sucks. We admit it: we were hoping that this was a disruption story. That Elon Musk and the increasingly large cohort of lithium-ion battery using OEMs pushing out electric vehicles were putting the lead-acid battery manufacturers out to pasture. But that is not a state reason for this chapter 3…uh…chapter 2…uh, whatever the f*ck this is. Rather, the debtors state that their post-emergence liquidity issues stem from (a) mounting environmental remediation costs and litigation, (b) rising production costs (PETITION Note: because the debtors shut two recycling facilities, they are now subject to pricing pressures from outside manufacturers rather than just using their own recycled inputs), (c) operational inefficiencies caused by legacy mixed-use facilities, and (d), of course…wait for it…COVID-19. Duck for COVID-cover folks! The debtors say that the pandemic’s impact on demand for product is the cherry on top.

The debtors’ capital structure doesn’t help. Look at this beaut:

With that much funded debt, the debtors’ leverage ratio stands at 9.2x. Debt service averages approximately $26.8mm/year.

So, confronted with all of these factors, the debtors have been engaged in a marketing process since 2018. The continued deterioration of the business, however, ultimately led to a restructuring path and now the debtors intend to use the bankruptcy process to effectuate a sale of (i) the entire business or (ii) the Americas business and/or (iii) the sale of its Europe/Rest-of-World business or (iv) a liquidation (PETITION Note: the debtors fall into chapter 11 largely separated into four main business groups). The Ad Hoc Group has submitted a binding credit bid for the Europe/ROW business group which will serve as a stalking horse bid; they have also committed $15mm in DIP financing to service certain non-debtor affiliates in Europe with an additional $25mm DIP commitment for the administration of the cases coming from Blue Torch Capital LP. The debtors hope to go “effective” by the end of August: this means that everyone has a lot of work to do to try and and locate a buyer for the rest of the debtors’ businesses in the interim.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Sontchi)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Jacqueline Marcus, Sunny Singh, Samuel Mendez, Alyssa Kutner, Jason Hufendick) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceschi, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

    • Independent Directors: Alan Carr, William Transier, Harvey Tepner, Mark Barberio

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Ankura Consulting (Roy Messing)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Daniel Fiorillo, David Morse, Jonathan Helfat)

    • Indenture Trustee

      • Legal: Arent Fox LLP (Andrew Silfen, Jordana Renert)

    • DIP Agent ($40mm): Blue Torch Capital LP

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matthew Bouslog, Michael Farag) & Cole Schotz PC (Norman Pernick, Patrick Reilley)

    • Ad Hoc Group

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alice Belisle Eaton, Robert Britton, Eugene Park, Claudia Tobler, Jacqueline Rubin, Douglas Keeton, David Weiss, David Giller) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Sean Greecher, Andrew Magaziner, Ian Bambrick)

    • Large equityholders: Mackay Shields LLC, AllianceBernstein LLP, D.E. Shaw Galvanic Portfolios LLC, Neuberger Berman Group LLC

    • Exide Creditors’ Liquidating Trust

      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Dane Kane, Konstantinos Katsionis)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.38.16 PM.png

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

  • Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

  • Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

  • The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.58.35 PM.png

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

    • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

    • Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

    • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

🚢 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Speedcast International Limited 🚢

Speedcast International Limited

April 22, 2020

This is a fun one.

Speedcast International Limited, a publicly-traded Australian company headquartered in Houston and 32 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed rare freefall bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas earlier this week. In a week where another 4.4mm people filed for unemployment, one thing seems abundantly clear: the Texas’ bankruptcy courts are going to need help. While Delaware has also been extremely busy, both the Northern District and Southern District of Texas are seeing rock solid bankruptcy flow these days. If the judges got volume bonuses, they’d be rolling in it.

Who’s the big loser? Well, with all of these bankruptcy hearings conducted telephonically, we reckon it’s the city of Houston. In normal times, there’d be a steady stream of suits flushing through the local economy there: staying at the hotels, eating at the restaurants, drinking at the bars. Brutal. But we digress. 🤔

One thing the restructuring industry gives us is an open window into how one domino can topple over others. For instance, the energy and cruise industries are clearly effed currently and so it stands to reason that service providers to those industries would also feel pain. This is where Speedcast comes in: it is a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses. They plug a hole: they offer telecom services to users in remote parts around the world, “primarily where there is limited or no terrestrial network.” Picture some evildoer in some decked out yacht-lair somewhere plotting to take over the world Austin Powers-style. He is probably leveraging Speedcast for IT solutions (PETITION Note: we’re just painting a picture folks; we’re not suggesting that the company merely deals with shady-a$$ mofos. Don’t @ us.). The business is truly international in scope.

Putting aside yacht-loving villains, Speedcast has high profile clients. Carnival Corp. ($CCL), for instance, contracted with Speedcast in December 2018 — long before any of Carnival’s customers contracted with the coronavirus. Cruisers streaming reports about their horrific cruise-going experiences likely used Speedcast product to get the word out. 😬 This was a growing business segment. Revenue increased by $36.5mm from fiscal year 2018 to 2019.

Likewise, the debtors’ energy business had also been growing. The debtors provide “high-bandwidth remote communication services to all segments of the global energy industry, including companies involved in drilling and exploration, floating production storage, offloading, offshore service, general service, engineering, and construction.” Revenue there increased from $158.3mm in FY18 to $164.5mm. We’re pretty sure we know which direction that number is heading in FY20.

Similarly, the debtors’ other business segments — Enterprise & Emerging Markets and Government — demonstrated growth between ‘18 and ‘19. All in, this is a $722.3mm revenue business. Unfortunately, it also had net losses of $459.8mm in FY19. So, yeah. There’s that. The debtors’ rapid expansion over the years apparently didn’t lead to immediate synergistic realization and the debtors suffered from margin compression, revenue declines from specific business lines, and other ails that affected performance and liquidity.

While there have been operational issues for some time now, those were just jabs. COVID-19 and the attendant global shutdown body slammed the company. The debtors note:

Further, the lasting and distressed market conditions in the maritime and oil and gas industries, and the recent and dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted all players in the global marketplace. The Company has been particularly hard hit by these adverse market conditions. The outsized impact on the Company’s Maritime Business and Energy Business customers has manifested in a dramatic reduction in cash receipts. This macroeconomic downturn, along with the above-mentioned headwinds that contributed to the lower than expected FY19 financial results, made clear that the Company would not satisfy the Net Leverage Covenant under the Credit Agreement.

Right. The debt. $689.1mm of it, to be exact (exclusive of financing arrangements) — of which approximately $590mm is a term loan. With a capital structure this simple, one would think that this is a case that is ripe for a prearranged deal memorialized via a pre-petition restructuring support agreement. But no. There isn’t one here. Why not?

The term lenders argue that the debtors engaged them too late in the game. Therefore, there wasn’t enough time to conduct due diligence on the business, they say. Surely quarantine ain’t helping matters on that front. Nor is the fact that the company is international in nature.

And so this is a traditional freefall balance sheet and operational restructuring — something you don’t really see much of anymore. This case looks headed towards either a sale — which we’re guessing is the term lenders preferred outcome (par plus accrued baby!) — or a plan that would equitize the term lenders and put the go-forward financing needs of the debtors on the shoulders of the term lenders. A plan would preserve the debtors’ net operating losses which, as noted above, could be meaningful.

The debtors and the ad hoc lenders did nail down a commitment for a multiple-draw super-priority senior secured term loan DIP which includes a $90mm new money portion ($35mm on an interim basis) and a $90mm roll-up ($35mm on an interim basis). Judge Isgur took some exception to the interim roll-up portion of the proposed facility but the debtors and the lenders were hand-in-hand saying that — particularly under the circumstances today — the interim roll-up was necessary and appropriate because the lenders need a “big incentive” to lend and “the lenders’ capital providers are getting squeezed themselves.” 🤔 (PETITION Note: The DIP market sounds vicious — though some of that, here, is attributable to the nature of the assets. Delta Airlines can place senior secured notes right now at around 7% because, well … duh … planes!). Judge Isgur did caution however that he wants no part of professionals throwing this interim roll-up in his face as precedent in an upcoming case (Um, we’ll see how that plays out…this financing environment ain’t exactly reversing overnight). While the ad hoc lenders are clearly in pole position for the DIP commitment, they’re syndicating the loan now (which would obviously affect the roll-up too). The DIP will push the professionals towards a path forward over the next couple of weeks and the hope is for a result to be consummated within six months.

Interestingly, the largest single unsecured creditor is an entity that suffers from its own issues and has reportedly hired bankruptcy professionals for advice: Intelsat SA is owed $44mm. In late March, Intelsat terminated their contract with the debtors in a pretty savage leverage play. We talk about leverage a lot in PETITION. There’s balance sheet leverage and then there is situational leverage. Intelsat flexed its muscles and exercised the latter. In exchange it got critical vendor designation, acknowledgement of the full amount of their pre-petition claim and mutual releases. Significantly, the debtors stressed the importance of the relationship, noting that the IT services were needed more than ever as vessels sail adjusted routes due to COVID (read: boats are circling around because governments won’t let passengers disembark).

We should know within a few weeks what a deal may look like here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $87.7mm RCF, $591.4mm Term Loan, $10.6mm LOC

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Alfredo Perez, David Griffiths, Brenda Funk, Martha Martir, Kelly DiBlasi, Stephanie Morrison, Paul Genender, Amanda Pennington Prugh, Jake Rutherford) & Herbert Smith Freehills LLP

    • Independent Director: Stephe Wilks, Grant Scott Ferguson, Michael Martin Malone, Peter Jackson, Carol Flaton, David Mack)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company Co. (Paul Rathborne, Adam Waldman)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, David Schiff, Jonah Peppiatt, Jarret Erickson) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Steven Messina, George Howard, Albert Hogan III, David Wagener)

    • Large Creditor: Intelsat SA

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Anthony Grossi) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Large Creditor: Inmarsat Global Limited

      • Legal: Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Michael Dockterman) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (S. Lee Whitesell, John Beck, David Simonds, Ron Silverman, Michael Hefter) & Husch Blackwell LLP (Randall Rios, Timothy Million)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL)⛽️

Whiting Petroleum Corporation

April 1, 2020

Denver-based Whiting Petroleum Corporation ($WLL) and four affiliates (the “debtors”), independent oil-focused upstream exploration and production companies focused primarily on the North Dakota and Rocky Mountain regions, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas. This is a story that requires an understanding of the debtors’ impressively-levered capital structure to understand what’s going on:

  • $1.072b ‘23 RBL Facility (JPMorgan Chase Bank NA)(springing maturity to 12/20 if the ‘21 notes below are not paid in full by 12/20)

  • $189.1mm ‘20 1.25% convertible senior unsecured notes due 2020 (Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.)

  • $773.6mm ‘21 5.75% senior unsecured notes

  • $408.3mm ‘23 6.25% senior unsecured notes

  • $1b ‘26 6.625% senior unsecured notes

You’ve heard us talk about the capital intensive nature of E&P companies so … yeah … the above $3.443b of debt shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to you. The company is also publicly-traded. The stock performance over the years has been far from stellar:

Screen Shot 2020-04-02 at 10.05.35 AM.png

What’s interesting here is that EVERYONE knows that oil and gas has been a value-destructive sh*t show for years. There’s absolutely ZERO need to belabor the point. Yet. That doesn’t stop the debtors’ CRO from doing precisely that. Here, embedded in the First Day Declaration, is a chart juxtaposing a $100 investment in WLL versus a $100 investment in an S&P 500 index and a Dow Jones U.S. E&P Index:

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We should also add that the spike reflected in the above chart in the 2017 timeframe isn’t on account of some stellar improvement of operating performance; rather, it reflects a November 2017 1-to-4 reverse stock split which inflated the reflected price of the shares. Just to be clear.

Notwithstanding the hellacious performance since 2014, the debtors take pains to paint a positive picture that was thrown into disarray by “drastic and unprecedented global events, including a ‘price war’ between OPEC and Russia and the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic….” In fact, the debtors come in HOT in the introduction to the First Day Declaration:

The Debtors ended 2019 standing on solid ground. While the Debtors had more than $1 billion in unsecured bond debt set to mature prior to December 2020, the Debtors had significant financial flexibility to restructure their capital structure. Most importantly, the Debtors began 2020 with a committed revolving credit facility that provided them with committed financing of up to $1.75 billion—more than enough liquidity to service the Debtors’ 2020 maturities and fund anticipated capital expenditure needs throughout the year. For these reasons, the Debtors secured a “clean” audit report as recently as February 27, 2020.

And to be fair, the debt was doing just fine until the middle of February. Indeed, the unsecured notes didn’t hit distressed levels until right after Valentine’s Day. Check out this freefall:

Who needs open amusement parks when you can just follow that price action?

Already focused on “liability management” (take a drink!) given the looming ‘21 notes maturity and the corresponding RBL springing maturity, the debtors’ retained professionals shifted over to restructuring talks with an ad hoc committee of noteholders. The debtors also drew down $650mm on their revolver to ensure adequate go-forward liquidity (and, cough, avoid the need for a relatively more expensive DIP credit facility). After what sounds like serious deliberation (and opposition from the ad hoc committee), the debtors also opted to forgo the $190mm maturity payment on the convertible notes due April 1.

The debtors filed the case with the framework of a restructuring support agreement (aka a term sheet). That framework would equitize the converts and the unsecured notes, giving them 97% of the equity (for now … debt is also still under consideration). Unsecured claims will be paid in full. Existing equity would receive 3% of post-reorg equity and warrants. Post-reorg management will get 8% of the post-reorg equity. In total, this would amount to the evisceration of over $2b worth of debt. 😬

Speaking of management, a lot of people were up in arms over this bit in the debtors’ Form 8-K filed to announce the bankruptcy filing and term sheet:

Screen Shot 2020-04-02 at 11.58.10 AM.png

That’s right. A nice immediately-payable bonus to management.

We’d love to hear how this ISN’T a subversion of code provisions regarding KEIPS/KERPS. Seriously, write us: petition@petition11.com. Ensure stability huh? Tell us: WHERE THE F*CK ARE THESE GUYS GOING TO GO IN THIS ENVIRONMENT? But at least they’re passing up their (WILDLY WORTHLESS) equity awards and bonus payments. FFS.

Ok, fine. Maybe there were contractual provisions that needed to be taken into account. And maybe the alternative — sh*tcanning management and rejecting the employment contracts — doesn’t fit the construct of leaving an umimpaired class of unsecured creditors. Equity is wildly out-of-the-money and getting a tip here anyway. This, therefore, is just a transfer of value from the noteholders to the management. We have to assume that the noteholders, then, were aware of this before it happened. If not, they should be pissed. And the Directors — who make between $180,000 and $305,000 a year — ought to be questioned by said noteholders about potential breaches of duties.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of TX (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Stephen Hessler, Brian Schartz, Gregory Pesce, Anna Rotman) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Veronica Polnick)

    • CRO: Stein Advisors LLC (Jeffrey Stein)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • RBL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Beslisle Eaton, Michael Turkel, Omid Rahnama) & Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Creditor: Caliber North Dakota LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - RentPath Holdings Inc.

RentPath Holdings Inc.

February 12, 2020

RentPath Holdings Inc. and eleven affiliated entities (the “debtors”), a digital marketing solutions enterprise that links property managers with prospective renters to simplify the residential rental experience, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. The business did $226.7mm of revenue in fiscal 2019 and had EBITDA of $46.8mm.

Where there’s money there’s competition. Where there’s competition, revenue maintenance becomes more challenging. And because of that competition, the debtors were forced to up their marketing spend and promotional activity which dented liquidity. A lack of liquidity presents some really big problems when your annual interest expense is $54.4mm on approximately $700mm of funded debt. For the math challenged, $46.8mm against approximately $700mm of funded debt means that this sucker has a leverage ratio of approximately 15. Or as President Trump would say, “It’s UUUUUUUUUUUGE.” Clearly that is unsustainable AF.

The good news is that the debtors have found themselves a potential buyer, CSGP Holdings LLC, an affiliate of CoStar Group Inc. ($CSGP), which has come forward with a $587.5mm cash bid (plus the assumption of certain liabilities) for the debtors’ assets. The debtors hope to consummate the sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization. To get there and fund the cases in the interim, the debtors obtained a fully-backstopped commitment of $74.1mm in DIP financing from certain members of the crossholder ad hoc committee and other first lien lenders.

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Shannon)

  • Capital Structure: $37.95mm First Lien Revolving Facility, $479.75mm First Lien Term Loan, $170mm Second Lien Term Loan

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, David Griffiths, Andriana Georgallas, Gaby Smith, Alexander Cohen, Kyle Satterfield, Justin Pitcher, Leslie Liberman, Martha Martir, Richard Slack, Amanda Burns Shulak) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFrancheschi, Zachary Shapiro)

    • Independent Director: Marc Beilinson, Dhiren Fonseca

    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company (Zul Jamal)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent & First Lien Agent:

      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Michael Baker, Shekhar Kumar)

    • Successor Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Marie Polito Hofsdal) & Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden, Gregory Taylor)

    • Crossholder Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Evan Fleck, Nelly Almeida, Andrew Harmeyer) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona)

    • Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Philip Dublin, Rachel Biblo Block) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona)

    • Stalking Horse Purchaser: CSGP Holdings LLC (CoStar Group Inc.)

      • Legal: Jones Day (Daniel Moss, Nicholas Morin) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Jeremy Ryan, R. Stephen McNeill)

    • Large Equityholders: Providence Equity & TPG

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer)

🍎New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Lucky's Market Parent Company LLC🍎

Lucky's Market Parent Company LLC

January 27, 2020

In Sunday’s Members’-only a$$-kicking briefing entitled “🔥Like No Other Newsletter🔥,” we took a deeeeeeeeep dive into the Fairway Group Holdings Corp. chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. We relegated to a mere footnote, the following:

*Two more local grocers to watch out for: Lucky’s Market (not PE-backed) and Earthfare (PE-backed). The former announced, on the heals of losing its sponsorship from Kroger Inc., that it would close 32 of 39 stores. The latter is quietly shuttering stores (e.g., Gainesville and Indianapolis). This is telling:

“Stern said Lucky's could potentially be acquired, but he said logical choices like Sprouts Farmers Market and The Fresh Market are also retrenching and not in expansion mode right now.”

The pain in grocery is pervasive.

Lucky’s Market Parent Company LLC be like:

Dirty Dancing.gif

And so the Colorado-based company and 21 affiliated entities filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Because, like, f*ck it: the pain in grocery IS pervasive so it might as well become a chapter 11 debtor like everyone else.

This one swims upstream. The debtors focus on affordable organic and locally-grown produce, naturally raised meats and seafood, and fresh daily prepared foods. Which, we thought, was supposed to be all the rage. “Organic for the 99%” was their mission. They even have private label goods. AND they have a millennial-pleasing “giving” element to their business: 10% of profits from private label sales are reinvested into the local communities they service. They have no unions. And they’re not even private equity owned!! Kroger Inc. ($KR) is the debtors’ secured lender and largest equity holder and, while obviously not PE bros, it seems that maybe(?) Kroger pushed the Colorado-based founders to grow too fast too soon?? In the midst of a number of grocery bankruptcies. In April 2016, they had 17 stores. The Kroger transaction took place at that time and then — BOOM! — a private equity growth mentality appears to have mysteriously overtaken the debtors. By the end of that year, the debtors’ footprint was up to 20 stores; by the end of 2017, it was 26 stores; 33 stores by the end of 2018; and 39 stores by the end of 2019. Florida was a primary focus.

The timing was pretty bad. Per the debtors:

…the Company’s expansion in Florida coincided with, among other things, increased competition in the grocery industry, including expansions from competing chains such as Sprouts Farmers Market, Fresh Thyme Farmers Market and Earth Fare. As a result, notwithstanding the growth in sales, the portfolio of Company stores was unable to achieve sustainable four-wall profitability.

Note the mention of Earth Fare ⬆️. Get ready for Dirty Dancing 2: Havana Nights gifs, people.

There’s more:

Most recently, fiscal year-to-date through January 4, 2020, the Company had approximately $22 million of store operating losses and approximately $100 million net loss. Additionally, fiscal year-to-date through the week ended January 18, 2020, the Company had a 10.6% reduction in comparable store sales versus the prior year-to-date period.

Suffice it to say, that growth strategy diiiiiiiidn’t work out so well.

Captain Obvious.gif

And so now it’s all being unwound. The debtors began winding down 32 of their 39 stores pre-petition and, obviously, terminated plans for 19 leased but unopened locations.

Screen Shot 2020-01-27 at 7.48.03 PM.png

Absent closure, the debtors note, they’d be on the hook for $30mm in operating losses for fiscal year ‘20. Now they’re selling furniture, fixtures and equipment from, and transferring leases of, 26 stores to third-party purchasers. They have an asset purchase agreement with Aldi for six FL locations while they continue to operate 7 locations while the marketing process progresses.

The debtors will use Kroger’s cash collateral to fund these cases.

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $301.1mm secured loan (Kroger Inc.), $5.9mm New Markets Tax Credit Loan (BBIF Subsidiary CDE 3 LLC, guaranteed by Kroger Inc.)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Polsinelli PC (Christopher Ward, Liz Boydston, Caryn Wang)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Peter J. Solomon

    • Liquidation Consultant: Great American Global Partners LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

    • Independent Director: William Transier

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large Equityholder (55%): Kroger Inc.

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Garrett Fail, Moshe Fink) and Richards Layton & Finger PA (Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - REVA Medical Inc.😷

REVA Medical Inc.

January 14, 2020

Take cover folks: it’s raining med device bankruptcies these days.

San Diego-based REVA Medical Inc. develops bioresorbable polymer technologies for coronary artery disease, peripheral artery disease and embolization therapy. If that sounds technical, you’re right: just like every other med device company that finds its way into bankruptcy. The details of the products go right over our heads but, fortunately, the general themes are the same as far less technical debtors. In a nutshell: the company’s products are highly capital intensive and require access to equity and debt markets.

And, indeed, REVA has accessed those markets. It was publicly-traded on an Australian exchange; it also raised tens of millions ($56.8mm to be exact) by way of convertible notes; and, finally, it had access to a senior secured credit facility that looks like a whole lot like bridge financing to a bankruptcy. Indeed, on January 9, just four days prior to filing, the debtor’s gained access to an additional $4.4mm from Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending Group, L.P. which perfectly teed up a cash collateral motion (which was granted the next day). With all of that debt and “relatively minimal sales,” the debtor “has not yet generated revenue at a level sufficient to support its cost structure.” (PETITION Note: we really hope that forthcoming med device AND biopharma debtors borrow this language because it’s likely universally applicable…they can save themselves the cost of 0.2 billable hours). Compounding matters was the maturity of its first issuance of converts, putting the debtor on the hook for $25.5mm. Ruh roh.

The debtor ran into other issues. For one, the debtor’s distributor, Abbott Laboratories ($ABT), withdrew one of the debtor’s products from the market (“Absorb”) after adverse events and poor clinical trial results. Score one for ethics! Thereafter, the European Society of Cardiology published new guidelines that basically napalmed the debtor’s Absorb saying that it’s not useful/effective and might actually be harmful. Whoops!

But there’s some good news here. The debtor has a deal. The deal will erase $90mm of debt with the senior secured lenders and the holders of convertible notes receiving new equity in the reorganized (read: post-bankruptcy) company. This product will live to see another day with the hope of a major course correction.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $9.7mm senior secured credit facility (Goldman Sachs International), $25mm '14 7.54% convertible notes (matured 11/14/19)(Goldman Sachs International, Senrigan Capital Group), $47.1mm ‘17 8% convertible notes (GSI, Senrigan, Medtronic, Inc., HEC Master Fund LP, J.P. Morgan Securities plc, TIGA Trading Pty Ltd, and Saints Capital Everest LP)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: DLA Piper LLP (Thomas Califano, Stuart Brown, Jamila Willis)

    • Financial Advisor: Ernst & Young LLP

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • 5%+ Equityholders: Senrigan Capital Group, Goldman Sachs International, Robert Stockman, Elliott Associates, L.P, Brookside/Bain, Capital Public Equity, Cerberus Capital Management, JP Morgan, Citicorp Nominees PTY Limited, JP Morgan Nominees Australia Pty Limited, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited –GSCO, HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited

    • Senior Secured Agent: Goldman Sachs International

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (David Griffiths, Kevin Bostel) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Sarah Silveira)

    • Senior Secured Lenders: MS Pace LP, Senrigan Capital Group Limited

    • Elliott Management Corporation

      • Legal: Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Jasmine Ball) & Ashby & Geddes PA (William Bowden)

🐟New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Bumble Bee Parent Inc.🐟

Bumble Bee Parent Inc.

November 21, 2019

Tuna fish went from playing a role in the founding of one of the world’s largest private equity firms (Blackstone) to, in the case of Bumble Bee Parent Inc. and its affiliated debtors, another private-equity-backed (Lion Capital LLP) bankruptcy. Bumble Bee is the company behind “shelf-stable seafood” brands Bumble Bee, Brunswick, Sweet Sue, Snow’s Beach Cliff and Wild Selections (as well as a Canadian brand). It has been on a wild ride since 2017.

The bankruptcy narrative is that a plea agreement with the United States Department of Justice related to criminal charges of alleged price-fixing led to burdensome financial obligations by way of (a) a $25mm criminal fine) and (b) defense costs associated with an onslaught of subsequent civil lawsuits from direct and indirect purchasers of products claiming damages arising out of the alleged price-fixing. This overhang ultimately led to the debtors arriving at, but not quite tripping, an event of default with their term lenders in Q4 ‘18. The debtors have been operating under a series of short-term limited waivers ever since as they sought to explore strategic alternatives.

They have one. The debtors have a stalking horse purchase agreement with affiliates of FCF Co. Ltd.for the sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets at a total implied enterprise value of up to $930.6 million, comprised of $275 million of cash, assumption of the remaining $17 million of the DOJ Fine, and the roll-over of up to $638.6 million in outstanding term loan indebtedness.” This sale will preserve the business as a going concern, preserve jobs, and provide an ongoing business partner to vendors and customers who consider the debtors to be partners.

Debtor first day bankruptcy papers are typically replete with spin and these papers are no different. In fact, necessarily so, they read like an offering memorandum. The papers discuss how the debtors provide “nutricious foods” that are “well-positioned to address a number of important consumer preferences and food trends, including shifts toward protein-rich, low-fat/low-calorie, and high Omega-3 fatty acid diets and trends towards eating multiple small or ‘snack-sized’ portions per day rather than the traditional three-square meals per day, and an overall increase in ‘snacking.’” They have the #1 or #2 market share in the shelf-stable seafood category and 41% of the US share of sales of canned albacore tuna. They also hold “approximately 13% of the U.S. share of sales of canned “light meat” tuna, approximately 12% of the share of sales in tuna pouches, approximately 71% of the U.S. share of sales in ready-to-eat tuna meals, approximately 40% of the U.S. share of sales in sardines, and approximately 16% of the U.S. share of sales in salmon.” It helps that they’re sold at virtually every major bigbox retailer, wholesale club, and grocery store. In 2018, the company had net sales of approximately $933m and adjusted EBITDA of $112.3m and the debtors’ U.S.-based operations contributed $722.2m of net sales and adjusted EBITDA of $86.3m. This is big business.

Putting aside its recent brush with the law, it also faces big market challenges. Questions persist about the safety and viability of shelf-stable seafood, particularly tuna. Indeed, there are headwinds. One sign of this may be that the Company’s overall Adjusted EBITDA has declined by approximately 20% from 2015 to 2018. We assume that, here, the EBITDA is adjusted to ex-out litigation costs.

And then there is this bonkers Wall Street Journal piece noting that consumption of canned tuna has fallen steadily compared with fresh and frozen fish. “Per capita consumption of canned tuna has dropped 42% in the three decades through 2016, according to the latest data available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. And the downturn has continued, with sales of the fish slumping 4% by volume from 2013 to October 2018, data from market-research firm IRI show.


This bit is off the charts: “In a country focused on convenience, canned tuna isn’t cutting it with consumers. Many can’t be bothered to open and drain the cans, or fetch utensils and dishes to eat the tuna. “A lot of millennials don’t even own can openers,” said Andy Mecs, vice president of marketing and innovation for Pittsburgh-based StarKist, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Dongwon Group.” To address this trend, the debtors have made forays into the fresh fish category. Otherwise, these challenges will play out another day. With a different owner.

A few more bankruptcy-specific points:

  1. The debtors prevailed over a fee objection by the United States Trustee relating to interim access to $40mm of a proposed $80mm DIP term loan facility and immediate access to a $200mm DIP ABL. It seems that Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, as counsel to DIP term lender Brookfield Principal Credit LLC had to give the UST a lesson in reverse-Seinfeld Logic. With lending, it is about “taking the reservation” rather than holding or using the reservation: once a debtor obtains a commitment to funds, those funds are committed and technically cannot be allocated elsewhere. The lenders argue, therefore, that fees are warranted upfront.

  2. Critical vendor motions can sometimes be controversial because, naturally, everyone wants to jump the line with critical vendor designation. To get it, however, pursuant to standards set many many years ago, there’s a multi-prong test that must be satisfied. In a nutshell, the critical vendor payments are needed to prevent disruption of a debtors’ business, among other things. Here, the buyer, FCF Co Ltd., seeks critical vendor status to the tune of $51mm (out of a $77mm critical vendor ask). Some other creditors were like “Mmmmmm???” and insisted that the Judge postpone any interim payments until an official committee of unsecured creditors could be appointed. Despite protests from FCF’s counsel, Weil for the DIP lender, and the debtors, Judge Silverstein declined to rule on the motion at the hearing, highlighting the unusual nature of a prospective buyer seeking status. If they want the business, will they really walk away?

Despite these first day fireworks, this should be a relatively smooth one.

One last question it poses is this: will this be just the first of a clump of tuna-related bankruptcies? 🤔

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Kelly Cornish, Claudia Tobler, Christopher Hopkins, Rich Ramirez, Aidan Synnot) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Ryan Bartley, Ashley Jacobs, Elizabeth Justison, Jared Kochenash)

    • Board of Directors: Scott Vogel, Steve Panagos

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • ABL Agent & DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Capital Finance LLC

      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Michael Comerford, Peter Burke) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward, Morgan Patterson)

    • Term Loan Agent & Term Loan DIP Agent: Brookfield Principal Credit LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, David Griffiths, Debora Hoehne, Yehudah Buchweitz) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

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⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC⛽️

Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC

September 15, 2019

Houston-based Sheridan Holding Company II LLC and 8 affiliated debtors filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of Texas with a nearly-fully-consensual prepackaged plan of reorganization. The plan, once effective, would eliminate approximately $900mm(!) of pre-petition debt. The case is supported by a $100mm DIP credit facility (50% new money).

Why so much debt? While this is an oil and gas story much like scores of other companies we’ve seen march through the bankruptcy court doors, the business model, here, is a bit different than usual. Sheridan II is a “fund”; it invests in a portfolio of working interests in mature onshore producing properties in Texas, New Mexico and Wyoming. Like Matt Damon in “Promised Land,” the debtors scour God’s country in search of properties, acquires working interests in those properties, and then seeks to deploy their special sauce (“application of cost-effective reinvestments, operational improvements, and enhanced recovery programs to the acquired assets”) to eke out product and, ultimately, sell that sh*t at a profit. This, as you might suspect, requires a bunch of capital (and equity from LPs like Warburg Pincus).* Hence the $1.1b of debt on balance sheet. All of this is well (pun intended) and good, provided the commodity environment cooperates. Which, we all know all too well, has not been the case in recent years. Peace out equity. Peace out sub debt.

Interestingly, some of that debt was placed not too long ago. Confronted with the oil and gas downturn, the debtors took the initiative to avoid bankruptcy; they cut off distributions to LPs, took measures to decrease debt, cut opex, capex and SG&A, and engaged in a hedging program. In 2017, the debtors raised $455mm of the subordinated term loan (with PIK interest galore), while also clawing back 50% of distributions previously made to LPs to the tune of $64mm. Everyone needed to have skin in the game. Alas, these measures were insufficient.

Per this plan, that skin is seared. The revolving lenders and term lenders will receive 95% of the common stock in the reorganized entity with the subordinated term lenders getting the remaining 5%. YIKES. The debtors estimate that the subordinated term lenders will recover 2.6% of the amount of their claims under the proposed plan. 2.6% of $514mm = EPIC VALUE DESTRUCTION. Sweeeeeeeeet. Of course, the limited partners are wistfully looking at that 2.6%. Everything is relative.

*****

Some additional notes about this case:

  • The hope to have confirmation in 30 days.

  • The plan includes the ability to “toggle” to a sale pursuant to a plan if a buyer for the assets emerges. These “toggle” plans continue to be all of the rage these days.

  • The debtors note that this was a “hard fought” negotiation. We’ve lost count of how many times professionals pat themselves on the backs by noting that they arrived at a deal, resolving the issues of various constituencies with conflicting interests and positions. First, enough already: this isn’t exactly Fallujah. You’re a bunch of mostly white males (the CEO of the company notwithstanding), sitting around a luxury conference table in a high rise in Manhattan or Houston. Let’s keep some perspective here, people. Second, THIS IS WHAT YOU GET PAID $1000+/hour to do. If you CAN’T get to a deal, then that really says something, particularly in a situation like this where the capital structure isn’t all-too-complex.

  • The bulk of the debtors’ assets were purchased from SandRidge Energy in 2013. This is like bankruptcy hot potato.

  • Independent directors are really becoming a cottage industry. We have to say, if you’re an independent director across dozens of companies, it probably makes sense to keep Quinn Emanuel on retainer. That way, you’re less likely to see them on the opposite side of the table (and when you do, you may at least temper certain bulldog tendencies). Just saying.

Finally, the debtors’ bankruptcy papers provide real insights into what’s happening in the oil and gas industry today — particularly in the Permian Basin. The debtors’ assets mostly rest in the Permian, the purported crown jewel of oil and gas exploration and production. Except, as previously discussed in PETITION, production of oil out of the Permian ain’t worth as much if, say, you can’t move it anywhere. Transportation constraints, while relaxing somewhat, continue to persist. Per the company:

“Prices realized by the Debtors for crude oil produced and sold in the Permian Basin have been further depressed since 2018 due to “price differentials”—the difference in price received for sales of oil in the Permian Basin as compared to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma sales hub or sales of sour crude oil. The differentials are largely attributable to take-away capacity constraints caused by increases in supply exceeding available transportation infrastructure. During 2018, Permian Basin crude oil at times sold at discounts relative to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma hub of $16 per barrel or more. Price differentials have narrowed as additional take-away capacity has come online, but crude oil still sells in the Permian Basin at a discount relative to Cushing prices.”

So, there’s that teeny weeny problemo.

If you think that’s bad, bear in mind what’s happening with natural gas:

“Similarly, the Henry Hub natural gas spot market price fell from a peak of $5.39 per million British thermal units (“MMBtu”) in January 2014 to $1.73 per MMBtu by March 2016, and remains at approximately $2.62 per MMBtu as of the Petition Date. In 2019, natural gas prices at the Waha hub in West Texas have at times been negative, meaning that the Debtors have at times either had to shut in production or pay purchasers to take the Debtors’ natural gas.”

It’s the natural gas equivalent of negative interest rates. 😜🙈

*All in, this fund raised $1.8b of equity. The Sheridan Group, the manager of the debtors, has raised $4.6b across three funds, completing nine major acquisitions for an aggregate purchase price of $5.7b. Only Sheridan II, however, is a debtor (as of now?).

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $66 RCF (Bank of America NA), $543.1mm Term Loan (Bank of America NA), $514mm ‘22 13.5%/17% PIK Subordinated Term Loans (Wilmington Trust NA) — see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Spencer Winters, Stephen Hackney, Rachael Marie Bazinski, Jaimie Fedell, Casey James McGushin) & Jackson Walker LLP (Elizabeth Freeman, Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Board of Directors: Alan Carr, Jonathan Foster

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative agent and collateral agent under the Sheridan II Term Loan Credit Agreements: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Stephen Piraino, Nathaniel Sokol)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Administrative Agent under the Sheridan II RBL: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman, Andrew Geppert)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of Subordinated Term Loans (Pantheon Ventures US LP, HarbourVest Partners LP)

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Gabriel Morgan, Clifford Carlson)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Limited Partner: Wilberg Pincus LLC

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon)

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Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

🏥New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Insys Therapeutics Inc.🏥

Insys Therapeutics Inc.

June 10, 2019

Within a week of a massive settlement entered into with the United States Department of Justice, Insys Therapeutics Inc. ($INSY) and six affiliates have filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.* The company is a specialty pharmaceutical company that commercializes drugs and drug delivery systems for targeted therapies (read: it manufactures opioids); it has two marked products. These products, if prescribed and used in the right way, aren’t in and of themselves evil (though former management is another story). Subsys is used for cancer patients and is delivered in the (non-invasive) form of an under-the-tongue spray. Syndros is used to treat loss of appetite and anorexia associated with weight loss in people with AIDS as well as nausea and vomiting caused by anti-cancer medicine. Not one to miss out on all the latest fads, the company also apparently has cannabinoid-based formulations in its pipeline. Because, like, to the extent the company wants to pursue a sale, nothing will get investor juices flowing like cannabinoid! Will its marketing get done via Snapchat and its sales conducted via the blockchain? Maybe it ought to package its formulations with fake meat. Lit!!

All in, the company owns 94 worldwide patents and 62 patent applications with expiration dates ranging between 2022 and 2039. In other words, it does have some potentially valuable intellectual property.

The company’s synopsis of why it is now in bankruptcy court reflects the world of opioid producers today:

…the Debtors are facing extensive litigation relating to their SUBSYS® product (“Subsys”), which is a prescription opioid. As of the Petition Date, one or more of the Debtors have been named in approximately one thousand lawsuits, and the Debtors anticipate that additional lawsuits may be commenced in the future. Some of the litigation they are facing is common to all opioid manufacturers, while other claims are based on particular alleged activities of the Debtors’ former executives, many of whom either pleaded guilty to or were convicted after trial of federal criminal activity relating to such activities. The expenses and settlement costs resulting from such litigation have been substantial, consuming large portions of the Debtors’ revenue and liquidity.

At the same time, over the last few years, the Debtors’ revenues from Subsys have been declining rapidly as a result of the increased national scrutiny of prescription of opioids by healthcare professionals, the resulting high-profile political and legal actions taken against manufacturers and distributors of opioids, and the specific news relating to the former executives’ criminal activity. Moreover, although the Debtors have promising products in the pipeline, those products are not yet approved for production, require significant additional investment to bring to market, and are not expected to generate revenue in the near term. As a smaller company than some other opioid manufacturers, with over 90% of its current revenue coming from the sale of opioids, Insys could not withstand the concurrent negative impact of massive litigation costs and significant opioid revenue deterioration. These factors have caused a substantial cash drain on the company to the point where, despite the Debtors’ best efforts, they risk running out of cash in 2019. (emphasis added)

We quoted that bit at length because it captures the risk that all opioid manufacturers face today given what appears to be pervasive sales and prescription practices across the country, subsuming countless companies all seeking sales and profits often in the name of shareholder value. Which is not to say that all companies and company management teams are equal: while the jury is still out in a variety of cases, here, we know that former company management engaged in some shady-a$$ methods to enrich themselves. Per Bloomberg:

In May, Insys founder and former Chief Executive Officer John Kapoor, 75, and four former executives were convicted of engaging in a racketeering conspiracy to bribe doctors to boost off-label prescriptions of Subsys, a fentanyl spray originally intended to treat cancer pain. The executives baited doctors with sham speaker fees, lavish dinners and nightclub outings, and then duped insurers into covering the prescriptions, prosecutors said. Kapoor and the others each face a maximum of 20 years in prison and will be sentenced in September.

A pandemic of addiction in Wyoming, Oklahoma and elsewhere, powered by some corrupt-AF executives and their bottles-and-models loving doctor homies.

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The debtors filed their bankruptcy cases to (i) trigger the automatic stay, a statutorily imposed injunction that will, for the time being, halt ongoing litigation, (ii) pursue a sale of substantially all of their assets, and (iii) implement procedures designed to estimate categories of claims and impose distribution procedures via a plan of reorganization. Moreover, the debtors hope that a court-supervised proceeding in chapter 11 will provide the structure required to enter into additional settlements with other large groups of claimants.

As for current claims, there are lot (including a variety of professional services claims on account of indemnities and otherwise — a lot of lawyers are likely to have write-offs here). But the company has no funded debt and so the proceeds of any sale will, after professionals are paid, go to general unsecured creditors. First and foremost, the DOJ — on account of its allowed general unsecured claim ($243mm, but capped at a $195mm recovery inclusive of a $5mm prepetition payment). The DOJ will have to contend with, on an equal basis, other federal actions/settlements, state actions, municipal actions, and insurance, personal injury, securities and indemnity claimants. It’s a liability lovefest!

To address these liabilities, the debtors need asset value. To that end, the debtors are looking to establish a global sale process for their IP; they’re also looking at clawing back certain indemnification amounts they’ve paid over the years on behalf of their seemingly corrupt-AF former management; finally, they may pursue claims against their insurers for wrongful denial of coverage. All in, the debtors are seeking to maximize their estates for the purposes of broadening the potential pool for distribution to claimants. We’re all for that objective provided it can be done in a cost effective way — a rare accomplishment, these days, in bankruptcy.

*The stock, which had been trading at $1.31/share at market close on Friday, plummeted 51.45% on Monday upon the news of the bankruptcy filing. This prompted The Wall Street Journal’s Charley Grant to quip, “So much for efficient markets.” He continued:

Why the news took anyone by surprise, however, is more of a mystery. After all, Insys had given investors fair warning, just days after a federal jury convicted five former employees of engaging in a racketeering conspiracy to boost opioid sales. The company said in a report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission that “it may be necessary... to file a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in order to implement a restructuring.”

In case that hint was too subtle, investors got another one last week, when Insys agreed to settle criminal and civil claims with the Justice Department for $225 million.

He forgot to mention another sign. In March we wrote:

Opioids (Long Professional Retentions)Insys Therapeutics Inc. ($INSY) has JMP Securities pursuing a divestiture of its fentanyl sublinqual spray, Subsys. The company revealed this week that Lazard has now also been hired. Per Reuters, a company spokesperson stated:

“We engaged Lazard thereafter to advise us on our capital planning and strategic alternatives across the business. These are two independent efforts.”

What kind of independent effort? Color us suspicious.

“Color us suspicious” was not-so-subtle code for “this f*cker is going to file for bankruptcy, people.” So, to Mr. Grant’s point, it should have been abundantly clear what was going to happen to any market follower actually paying attention.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Gross)

  • Capital Structure: No funded debt.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Ronit Berkovich, Candace Arthur, Olga Peshko, Brenda Funk, Ramsey Scofield, Peter Isakoff ) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Schapiro)

    • Board of Directors: John McKenna, Trudy Vanhove, Rohit Vishnoi, Vaseem Mahboob, Andrew Long, Elizabeth Bohlen

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (Andrew Yearley)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (McKesson Corporation, Infirmary Health Hospitals Inc., Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana, LifePoint Health Inc., Deborah Fuller, Julie Kay, James Starling Jr., Angela Mistrulli-Cantone, Lisa Mencucci)

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Daniel Golden, Mitchell Hurley, Arik Preis) & (local) Bayard PA (Justin Alberto, Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan)

    • MDL Plaintiffs

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (David Molton, Gerard Cicero, Kenneth Aulet, Chelsea Mullarney, Steven Pohl) & Blank Rome LLP (Stanley Tarr, Victoria Guilfoyle) & Gilbert LLP (Scott Gilbert, Craig Litherland, Kami Quinn, Jenna Hudson)

Update 7/7/19 #244

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing -- Fusion Connect Inc.

June 3, 2019

We previously wrote about Fusion Connect Inc. ($FSNN), providers of “Unified Communications-as-a-Service” and “Infrastructure-as-a-Service” in “⛈A Dark "Cloud" on the Horizon⛈.” Therein we marveled at how special Fusion must be…to fail SO SPECTACULARLY in today’s cloud here, cloud there, cloud everywhere, everyone’s gaga for cloud environment. Cloud is SO captivating that it wasn’t until the company filed a piss poor 8-K back in April that a B. Riley FBR ($RILY) analyst FINALLY had an epiphany and declared that the company’s stock ought to be downgraded from “buy” to “neutral” (huh?!?) with a price target of $0.75 — down from $9.75/share. This is despite the fact that the stock hadn’t traded anywhere in the vicinity of $9.75/share in ages — nowhere even close, actually — but whatevs. Clearly, his head was in the cloud(s). This, ladies and gentlemen, demonstrates, in a nutshell, the utter worthlessness of equity analyst reports.🖕

But this isn’t a story about shoddy analyst research. That would be wholly unoriginal. This is a story about synergies and burdensome debt. Because, like, that’s so super original that you won’t read of it again until…well…you scroll below to the next bit of content about FTD!! 🙄

Boiled down to its simplest form, this company is the product of an acquisition strategy (and reverse merger) gone wrong. Like, in a majormajor way. Per the company:

The Company pursued the Birch Merger with a vision of leveraging its existing processes and structures to create synergies between Fusion’s and Birch’s joined customer bases, combine network infrastructure assets to improve operational efficiencies, and ultimately drive material growth in Fusion’s and Birch’s combined annual revenue. In connection with the Birch Merger and MegaPath Merger, the Company incurred $680 million in secured debt(emphasis added)

That reverse merger closed at the end of Q2, 2018. Yet…

Unfortunately, due to underperformance compared to business projections, the Company found itself with limited liquidity and at risk of default under its debt documents by early 2019.

Wait, what? Limited liquidity and risk of default by “early 2019”?!? Who the f*ck diligenced and underwrote this transaction?!? This sitch is so bad, that the company literally didn’t have enough liquidity to make a recent $6.7mm amort payment under the first lien credit agreement and a $300k interest payment on its unsecured debt. This is the company’s pre-petition capital structure:

  • $20mm super senior L+10% June 2019 debt

  • $43.3mm Tranche A Term Loans L+6.0% May 2022 debt

  • $490.9mm Tranche B Term Loans L+8.5% May 2023 debt

  • $39mm Revolving Loans L+6.0% May 2022 debt

  • $85mm Second Lien L+10.5% November 2023 debt

  • $13.3mm Unsecured Debt

Back in April we summed up the situation as follows:

The company’s recent SEC reports constitute a perfect storm of bad news. On April 2, the company filed a Form 8-K indicating that (i) a recently-acquired company had material accounting deficiencies that will affect its financials and, therefore, certain of the company’s prior filings “can no longer be relied upon,” (ii) it won’t be able to file its 10-K, (iii) it failed to make a $7mm interest payment on its Tranche A and Tranche B term loan borrowings due on April 1, 2019, and (iv) due to the accounting errors, the company has tripped various covenants under the first lien credit agreement — including its fixed charge coverage ratio and its total net leverage ratio.

Again, who diligenced the reverse merger?!? 😡

So here we are. In bankruptcy. To what end?

The company is seeking a dual-path restructuring that is all the rage these days: everyone loves to promote optionality that will potentially result in greater value to the estate. In the first instance, the company proposes, as a form of “stalking horse,” a “reorganization transaction” backed by a restructuring support agreement with certain of its lenders. This transaction would slash $300mm of the company’s $665mm of debt and result in the company’s first lien lenders owning the company. That is, unless a buyer emerges out of the woodwork with a compelling purchase price. To promote this possibility, the company is filing a bid procedures motion with the bankruptcy court with the hope of an eventual auction taking place. If a buyer surfaces with mucho dinero, the company will toggle over to a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization. This would obviously be the optimal scenario. Absent that (and maybe even with that), we’ve got a jaw-dropping example of value destruction. “Fail fast,” many in tech say. These cloud bros listened!! Nothing like deep-sixing yourself with a misguided poorly-diligenced acquisition. Bravo!!

The company has secured a commitment for a fully-backstopped $59.5mm DIP that subsumes the $20mm in super senior pre-petition bridge financing recently provided by the first lien lenders. Is this DIP commitment good for general unsecured creditors? Is any of this generally good for unsecured creditors? Probably not.

Major creditors include a who’s who of telecommunications companies, including AT&T Inc. ($T) (first Donald Trump and now THIS…rough week for AT&T), Verizon Communications Inc. ($VZ)XO Communications (owned by VZ), Frontier Communications Corp. ($FTR)(which has its own issues to contend with as it sells assets to sure up its own balance sheet), CenturyLink Inc. ($CTL)Level 3 Communications ($LVLT)Time Warner Inc. ($TWX), and….wait for it…bankrupt Windstream Communications ($WINMQ). Because the hits just keep on coming for Windstream….

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Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Bernstein)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Sunny Singh, Natasha Hwangpo)

    • Board of Directors: Matthew Rosen, Holcombe Green Jr., Marvin Rosen, Holcombe Green III, Michael Del Guidice, Lewis Dickey Jr., Rafe de la Gueronniere, Neil Goldman)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. (Mark Katzenstein)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners (Brent Herlihy, John Singh)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc First Lien Lender Group

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Lender: Credit Suisse Loan Funding LLC

    • DIP Agent, Prepetition Super Senior Agent & Prepetition First Lien Agent: Wilmington Trust NA

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Grylll, Alan Glantz)

    • Prepetition Second Lien Successor Agent: GLAS America LLC & GLAS USA LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Tranche A Term Loan/Revolving Lenders

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Sandeep Qusba, Soogy Lee, Edward Linden)

    • Second Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Charles Dale, Jon English)

    • Large Unsecured Creditor: AT&T

      • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (David Rosenzweig, Francisco Vazquez)

Updated 6/4/19 at 5:42am