🥾New Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Filing & CCAA - The Aldo Group Inc.🥾

The Aldo Group Inc.

May 7, 2020

Retail pain doesn’t respect borders. Canada-based The Aldo Group Inc. and eight (8) affiliated companies (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware seeking relief under chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in support of a CCAA filing in Canada.

Aldo is a shoe retailer with stores in more than 100 countries. The Group notes roughly 3,000 points of sale with 700 directly owned stores and the remainder as franchises. There are 289 stores in Canada and 429 in the US.

In terms of funded debt, the Aldo Canada has CDN$140mm outstanding. Of that amount, Aldo US is an obligor on a CDN$100mm piece. Both entities are also co-borrowers on a CDN$300mm unsecured syndicated loan. Both the Aldo Canada and Aldo US have significant outstanding amounts to trade creditors including landlords who haven’t been paid for April or May.

Operating performance has been dogsh*t long before COVID hit the scene. Per the debtors:

Over the past few years, the Aldo Corporate Group has declined in profitability and regularly reported losses. For instance, for the twelve month period ending February 1, 2020, Aldo Canada posted a net loss from operations of approximately CDN$74,800,000 and Aldo U.S. posted a net loss of approximately USD$52,800,000. Taking into consideration yearend write-offs of amounts due from subsidiaries and affiliated and write-offs of future tax benefits that were recorded as an asset, Aldo Canada posted a net loss of approximately CDN$170,300,000 and Aldo U.S. posted a net loss of approximately USD$97,300,000.

Pre-COVID, the debtors were attempting an operational restructuring designed to de-emphasize brick-and-mortar stores and prop up e-commerce, wholesale and franchise channels. You know, like, the old playbook. They were also seeking to refinance the credit facility with an ABL. The “transformation” was allegedly on track when the pandemic struck precipitating an immediate liquidity crunch. Hence, the filing.

The debtors will use the filing to evaluate its store profitability, shed leases and contracts and restructure the unsecured loans both in Canada and the US.

It seems pretty safe to say that a good number of those US stores will join the retail garbage bin much to the chagrin of landlords.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Peter Ivanick, Lynn Holbert, Alex Sher, Baraka Nasari) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Eric Schwartz, Matthew Harvey, Paige Topper)

    • Canadian Monitor: Ernst & Young Inc.

    • Investment Banker: Greenhill & Co. Canada Ltd.

    • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Largest Unsecured Creditor: Bank of Montreal

      • Legal: Chapman and Cutler LLP (Stephen Tetro, Aaron Krieger) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward, Morgan Patterson)

🚢 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Speedcast International Limited 🚢

Speedcast International Limited

April 22, 2020

This is a fun one.

Speedcast International Limited, a publicly-traded Australian company headquartered in Houston and 32 affiliates (the “debtors”) filed rare freefall bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Texas earlier this week. In a week where another 4.4mm people filed for unemployment, one thing seems abundantly clear: the Texas’ bankruptcy courts are going to need help. While Delaware has also been extremely busy, both the Northern District and Southern District of Texas are seeing rock solid bankruptcy flow these days. If the judges got volume bonuses, they’d be rolling in it.

Who’s the big loser? Well, with all of these bankruptcy hearings conducted telephonically, we reckon it’s the city of Houston. In normal times, there’d be a steady stream of suits flushing through the local economy there: staying at the hotels, eating at the restaurants, drinking at the bars. Brutal. But we digress. 🤔

One thing the restructuring industry gives us is an open window into how one domino can topple over others. For instance, the energy and cruise industries are clearly effed currently and so it stands to reason that service providers to those industries would also feel pain. This is where Speedcast comes in: it is a provider of information technology services and (largely satellite-dependent) communications solutions (i.e., cybersecurity, content solutions, data and voice apps, IoT, network systems) to customers in the cruise, energy, government and commercial maritime businesses. They plug a hole: they offer telecom services to users in remote parts around the world, “primarily where there is limited or no terrestrial network.” Picture some evildoer in some decked out yacht-lair somewhere plotting to take over the world Austin Powers-style. He is probably leveraging Speedcast for IT solutions (PETITION Note: we’re just painting a picture folks; we’re not suggesting that the company merely deals with shady-a$$ mofos. Don’t @ us.). The business is truly international in scope.

Putting aside yacht-loving villains, Speedcast has high profile clients. Carnival Corp. ($CCL), for instance, contracted with Speedcast in December 2018 — long before any of Carnival’s customers contracted with the coronavirus. Cruisers streaming reports about their horrific cruise-going experiences likely used Speedcast product to get the word out. 😬 This was a growing business segment. Revenue increased by $36.5mm from fiscal year 2018 to 2019.

Likewise, the debtors’ energy business had also been growing. The debtors provide “high-bandwidth remote communication services to all segments of the global energy industry, including companies involved in drilling and exploration, floating production storage, offloading, offshore service, general service, engineering, and construction.” Revenue there increased from $158.3mm in FY18 to $164.5mm. We’re pretty sure we know which direction that number is heading in FY20.

Similarly, the debtors’ other business segments — Enterprise & Emerging Markets and Government — demonstrated growth between ‘18 and ‘19. All in, this is a $722.3mm revenue business. Unfortunately, it also had net losses of $459.8mm in FY19. So, yeah. There’s that. The debtors’ rapid expansion over the years apparently didn’t lead to immediate synergistic realization and the debtors suffered from margin compression, revenue declines from specific business lines, and other ails that affected performance and liquidity.

While there have been operational issues for some time now, those were just jabs. COVID-19 and the attendant global shutdown body slammed the company. The debtors note:

Further, the lasting and distressed market conditions in the maritime and oil and gas industries, and the recent and dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have impacted all players in the global marketplace. The Company has been particularly hard hit by these adverse market conditions. The outsized impact on the Company’s Maritime Business and Energy Business customers has manifested in a dramatic reduction in cash receipts. This macroeconomic downturn, along with the above-mentioned headwinds that contributed to the lower than expected FY19 financial results, made clear that the Company would not satisfy the Net Leverage Covenant under the Credit Agreement.

Right. The debt. $689.1mm of it, to be exact (exclusive of financing arrangements) — of which approximately $590mm is a term loan. With a capital structure this simple, one would think that this is a case that is ripe for a prearranged deal memorialized via a pre-petition restructuring support agreement. But no. There isn’t one here. Why not?

The term lenders argue that the debtors engaged them too late in the game. Therefore, there wasn’t enough time to conduct due diligence on the business, they say. Surely quarantine ain’t helping matters on that front. Nor is the fact that the company is international in nature.

And so this is a traditional freefall balance sheet and operational restructuring — something you don’t really see much of anymore. This case looks headed towards either a sale — which we’re guessing is the term lenders preferred outcome (par plus accrued baby!) — or a plan that would equitize the term lenders and put the go-forward financing needs of the debtors on the shoulders of the term lenders. A plan would preserve the debtors’ net operating losses which, as noted above, could be meaningful.

The debtors and the ad hoc lenders did nail down a commitment for a multiple-draw super-priority senior secured term loan DIP which includes a $90mm new money portion ($35mm on an interim basis) and a $90mm roll-up ($35mm on an interim basis). Judge Isgur took some exception to the interim roll-up portion of the proposed facility but the debtors and the lenders were hand-in-hand saying that — particularly under the circumstances today — the interim roll-up was necessary and appropriate because the lenders need a “big incentive” to lend and “the lenders’ capital providers are getting squeezed themselves.” 🤔 (PETITION Note: The DIP market sounds vicious — though some of that, here, is attributable to the nature of the assets. Delta Airlines can place senior secured notes right now at around 7% because, well … duh … planes!). Judge Isgur did caution however that he wants no part of professionals throwing this interim roll-up in his face as precedent in an upcoming case (Um, we’ll see how that plays out…this financing environment ain’t exactly reversing overnight). While the ad hoc lenders are clearly in pole position for the DIP commitment, they’re syndicating the loan now (which would obviously affect the roll-up too). The DIP will push the professionals towards a path forward over the next couple of weeks and the hope is for a result to be consummated within six months.

Interestingly, the largest single unsecured creditor is an entity that suffers from its own issues and has reportedly hired bankruptcy professionals for advice: Intelsat SA is owed $44mm. In late March, Intelsat terminated their contract with the debtors in a pretty savage leverage play. We talk about leverage a lot in PETITION. There’s balance sheet leverage and then there is situational leverage. Intelsat flexed its muscles and exercised the latter. In exchange it got critical vendor designation, acknowledgement of the full amount of their pre-petition claim and mutual releases. Significantly, the debtors stressed the importance of the relationship, noting that the IT services were needed more than ever as vessels sail adjusted routes due to COVID (read: boats are circling around because governments won’t let passengers disembark).

We should know within a few weeks what a deal may look like here.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $87.7mm RCF, $591.4mm Term Loan, $10.6mm LOC

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Gary Holtzer, Alfredo Perez, David Griffiths, Brenda Funk, Martha Martir, Kelly DiBlasi, Stephanie Morrison, Paul Genender, Amanda Pennington Prugh, Jake Rutherford) & Herbert Smith Freehills LLP

    • Independent Director: Stephe Wilks, Grant Scott Ferguson, Michael Martin Malone, Peter Jackson, Carol Flaton, David Mack)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: FTI Consulting Inc. (Michael Healy)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company Co. (Paul Rathborne, Adam Waldman)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Lenders

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, David Schiff, Jonah Peppiatt, Jarret Erickson) & Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. Inc.

    • DIP Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Steven Messina, George Howard, Albert Hogan III, David Wagener)

    • Large Creditor: Intelsat SA

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Edward Sassower, Steven Serajeddini, Anthony Grossi) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Large Creditor: Inmarsat Global Limited

      • Legal: Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Michael Dockterman) & Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (Jason Boland, Bob Bruner)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (S. Lee Whitesell, John Beck, David Simonds, Ron Silverman, Michael Hefter) & Husch Blackwell LLP (Randall Rios, Timothy Million)

🛰New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - OneWeb Global Limited🛰

OneWeb Global Limited

March 27, 2020

We have been complaining for months about how bankruptcy was getting boring. There are only so many retail, oil and gas, biopharma or mass tort cases to write about before things start to get really … and we mean REALLY … monotonous. And so a shout out to Softbank’s Masa Son: as always, you’ve supplied some much needed novelty to the mix! Amidst countless stories of one Softbank portfolio company after another getting a new directive, fresh discipline or retraded on deals (cough, WeWork), portfolio company OneWeb Global Limited and eighteen affiliates (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy.

As far as Softbank investments go, the debtors are SOOOOOOOO on brand. It is almost literally a “moonshot,” an uber-ambitious project aiming to deploy “the world’s first global satellite communications network to deliver high-throughput, high-speed, low-latency Internet connectivity services, having an ability of channeling 50 megabits per second, with a latency of less than 50 millisecond, and capable of connecting everywhere, to everyone.” Since 2012, the debtors have been developing a low-Earth orbit satellite constellation system and associated ground infrastructure “capable of delivering communication services for use by consumers, businesses, governmental entities, and institutions, including schools, hospitals, and other end-users whether on the ground, in the air, or at sea.” This means they have started mass producing small satellites, acquiring various authorizations and spectrum icenses (i.e., the use of Ku-band and Ka-band radio-frequency spectrum on a global basis) and domestic market access/services authorizations; they have also completed three launches of 70 satellites in the last year. “OneWeb was well on its way to growing its constellation to 648 satellites with the goal of beginning customer service demonstrations in late 2020 and providing full global commercial coverage by late 2021 or early 2022.” Right. Just like Uber Inc. ($UBER) is delivering autonomous cars and WeWork is sustainably spreading its community-first mission across the world. You have to hand it to Masa Son: the man has some vision. Some entrepreneurial spirit. Eventually, though, there has to be money to support the ambition.

Right. So, about the money. The debtors have raised a lot of it — no surprise considering the capital intensive nature of the business. The raises include:

  • A $500mm equity raise backed by Airbus Group Inc. Hughes Network Systems LLC, Intelsat Corporation, Qualcomm Incorporated and Virgin Group Ltd.

  • A $1.2b equity raise, $1b of which came from Softbank Group Corp. and the other $200mm from existing investors.

  • A $408mm note issuance to Softbank as administrative and collateral agent.

  • A $1.56b senior note issuance (and corresponding warrant issue) secured by substantially all of the debtors’ assets including share pledges and rights to radiofrequency authorizations. This issuance rolled-up the $408mm note.

In total, the debtors has over $1.73b in funded debt outstanding as of the petition date on top of the $1.7b of equity raised.

And yet it is in bankruptcy first and foremost because of liquidity issues. As a development stage company, it is what the venture capitalists would call “pre-revenue.” Worse than that, development is time-consuming and expensive and the build out of the debtors’ systems “exhausted [their] existing equity and debt financing.” Again, this is Softbank: massive cash burn is part of its playbook. We’ve all seen this movie before. There’s always tons of money until — poof! — suddenly there’s not. Since 2019, the debtors have been seeking investments from existing and new investors but nobody would bite. It seems that investors hesitated to throw good money after bad; it is also safe to presume that, by this point, a certain level of post-WeWork-fiasco Softbank taint burdened the process. Investors are leery of lighting good money on fire after bad.

Toss in COVID-19 and we’ve got ourselves a combustible situation. Per the debtors:

OneWeb had been hopeful to achieve an out of court solution to its deteriorating liquidity position. After several due diligence meetings during the first and second weeks of March 2020, the Company believed that it was going to be able to secure a long-term funding arrangement from existing shareholders. However, on March 12, 2020, as the markets began to feel the impact of COVID-19, OneWeb was notified that its current investors would not commit to a long term solution. On March 16, 2020, OneWeb entered into a term sheet for bridge financing to be consummated by March 26, 2020. On March 21, 2020, the Company was notified that the bridge financing offer was unavailable. Unfortunately, the anticipated funding opportunities OneWeb pursued were significantly and precipitously impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting shuttering of the global economy. OneWeb, in an effort to preserve liquidity during these difficult social, political, and economic times, began shutting down nonessential aspects of its business in order to preserve the value of its existing assets.

Consequently, the debtors laid off 90% of their workforce and halted development. With the consensual use of Softbank’s cash collateral, the debtors filed chapter 11 “to provide them with the necessary breathing space to wait-out the current instability of the financial markets as they respond to COVID-19 pandemic and to adequately market and monetize their assets.

Given the volatility currently in the market, there’s no telling how long they’ll have to wait.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, William Schumacher, Andrew Leblanc, Tyson Lomazow, Lauren Doyle)

    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Softbank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP (Gary Lee, Todd Goren)

    • Collateral Agent: GLAS

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Jonathan Levine)

    • EchoStar Operating LLC and Hughes Network Systems LLC

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Harrison Denman, John Ramirez)

    • Airbus DS Satnet LLC and Airbus Group Proj B.V.

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Ronald Silverman, Christopher Bryant, M. Hampton Foushee, Craig Ulman)

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Blackhawk Mining LLC🌑

Blackhawk Mining LLC

July 19, 2019

What are we averaging? Like, one coal bankruptcy a month at this point? MAGA!!

This week Blackhawk Mining LLC filed prepackaged Chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware, the effect of which will be the elimination of approximately $650mm of debt from the company’s balance sheet. Unlike other recent bankruptcies, i.e., the absolute and utter train wreck that is the Blackjewel LLC bankruptcy, this case actually has financing and employees aren’t getting left out in the lurch. So, coal country can at least take a deep breath. Small victories!

Before we get into the mechanics of how this deleveraging will work, it’s important to note some of the company’s history. Blackhawk represents opportunism at its best. Founded in 2010 as a strategic vehicle to acquire coal reserves, active mining operations and logistical infrastructure located primarily in the Appalachian Basin, the privately-owned coal producer hit the ground running. Initially the company started with Kentucky thermal coal assets (PETITION Note: thermal coal’s end use is the production of electricity; in contrast, metallurgical coal’s prime use is for the production of steel). It then quickly moved to diversify its product offering with a variety of acquisitions. In 2014, it acquired three mining complexes in the bankruptcy of James River Coal Company (which served as the company’s entry into the production of met coal). Thereafter, in 2015, the company purchased six mining complexes in the bankruptcy of Patriot Coal Company (which has since filed for bankruptcy a second time). This acquisition lofted the company into the highest echelon of US-based met coal production (PETITION Note: met coal drives 76% of the company’s $1.09b in revenue today). The company now operates 19 active underground and 6 active surface mines at 10 active mining complexes in West Virginia and Kentucky. The company has 2,800 employees. 

Naturally, this rapid growth begs some obvious questions: what was the thesis behind all of these acquisitions and how the hell were they financed? 

The investments were a play on an improved met coal market. And, to some degree, this play has proven to be right. Per the company: 

“The Company’s strategic growth proved to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it significantly increased the Company’s position in the metallurgical coal market at a time when asset prices were depressed relative to today’s prices. The Company continues to benefit from this position in the current market. The price of high volatile A metallurgical coal has risen from $75 per ton to an average of $188 per ton over the last two years, providing a significant tailwind for the Company. On the other hand, the pricing environment for metallurgical coal did not improve until late 2016, and the debt attendant to the Company’s acquisition strategy in 2015 placed a strain on the Company’s ability to maintain its then-existing production profile while continuing to reinvest in the business. During this time, to defer expenses, the Company permanently closed over 10 coal mines (with over 5 million tons of productive capacity), idled the Triad complex, and depleted inventories of spare equipment, parts, and components. Furthermore, once the coal markets began to improve, the Company was forced to make elevated capital expenditures and bear unanticipated increases in costs—for example, employment costs rose approximately 25% between 2016 and 2018—to remain competitive. The confluence of these factors eventually made the Company’s financial position untenable.”

Longs and shorts require the same thing: good timing. 

Alas, the answer to the second question also leads us to the very predicament the company finds itself in today. The company has $1.09b in debt split across, among other things, an ABL facility (’22 $85mm, MidCap Financial LLC), a first lien term loan facility (’22 $639mm, Cantor Fitzgerald Securities), a second lien term loan facility (’21 $318mm, Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC), and $16mm legacy unsecured note issued to a “Patriot Trust” as part of the Patriot Coal asset acquisition. More on this Trust below.

But this is not the first time the company moved to address its capital structure. In a bankruptcy-avoiding move in 2017, the company — on the heals of looming amortization and interest payments on its first and second lien debt — negotiated an out-of-court consensual restructuring with its lenders pursuant to which it kicked the can down the road on the amortization payments to its first lien lenders and deferred cash interest payments to its second lien lenders. If you’re asking yourself, why would the lenders agree to these terms, the answer is, as always, driven by money (and some hopes and prayers). For their part, the first lien lenders obtained covenant amendments, juiced interest rates and an increased principal balance owed while the second lien lenders obtained an interest rate increase. Certain first and second lien lenders also got equity units, board seats and additional voting rights. These terms — onerous in their own way — were a roll of the dice that the environment for met coal would continue to improve and the company could grow into its capital structure. Clearly, that hope proved to be misplaced. 

Indeed, this is the quintessential kick-the-can-down-the-road situation. By spring 2019, Blackhawk again faced a $16mm mandatory amortization payment and $20mm in interest payments due under the first lien term loan. 

Now the first lien lenders will swap their debt for 71% of the reorganized equity and a $225mm new term loan and the second lien lenders will get 29% of the new equity. The “will-met-coal-recover-to-such-a-point-where-the-value-of-the-company-extends-beyond-the-debt?” option play for those second lien lenders has expired. The company seeks to have its plan confirmed by the end of August. The cases will be financed by a $235mm DIP of which $50mm is new money and the remainder will rollup $100mm in first lien term loan claims and $85mm in ABL claims (and ultimately convert to a $90mm exit facility). 

Some other quick notes:

  • Kirkland & Ellis LLP represents the company after pushing Latham & Watkins LLP out in a move that would make Littlefinger proud. This is becoming an ongoing trend: as previously reported, K&E also gave das boot to Latham in Forever21. A war is brewing folks. 

  • The Patriot Trust will get $500k per a settlement baked into the plan. On a $16mm claim. The “Patriot Trust” refers to the liquidating trust that was established in connection with the Patriot Coal Corporation chapter 11 cases, previously filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. Marinate on that for a second: the creditors in that case fought long and hard to have some sort of recovery, won a $16mm claim and now have to settle for $500k. There’s nothing like getting screwed over multiple times in bankruptcy. 

  • But then there’s management: the CEO gets a nice cushy settlement that includes a $500k payment, a seat on the reorganized board of managers (and, presumably, whatever fee comes with that), and a one-year consulting contract. He waives his right to severance. If we had to venture a guess, Mr. Potter will soon find his way onto K&E’s list of “independent” directors for service in other distressed situations too. That list seems to be growing like a weed. 

  • Knighthead Capital Management LLC and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP are the primary holders of first lien paper and now, therefore, own the company. Your country’s steel production, powered by hedge funds! They will each have representation on the board of managers and the ability to jointly appoint an “independent” director. 


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Stephen Hessler, Christopher Hayes, Derek Hunter, Barack Echols) & (local) Potter Anderson Corroon LLP (Christopher Swamis, L. Katherine Good) 

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Marc Puntus)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Midcap Funding IV Trust

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Deborah Staudinger)

    • Prepetition & DIP Term Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

      • Legal: Herrick Feinstein LLP (Eric Stabler, Steven Smith)

    • Second Lien Term Loan Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Alex Cota, Gabriel Sasson)

    • Consenting Term Lenders: Knighthead Capital Management LLC, Solus Alternative Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Dylan Consla, Daniel Meyer)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick, Ned Schodek)

🏠New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Stearns Holdings LLC🏠

Stearns Holdings LLC

July 9, 2019

Hallelujah! Something is going on out in the world aside from the #retailapocalypse and distressed oil and gas. Here, Blackstone Capital Partners-owned Stearns Holdings LLC and six affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) have filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York because of…drumroll please…rising interest rates. That’s right: the FED has claimed a victim. Stephen Moore and Judy Shelton must be smirking their faces off.

The debtors are a private mortgage company in the business of originating residential mortgages; it is the 20th largest mortgage lender in the US, operating in 50 states. We’ll delve more deeply into the business model down below but, for now, suffice it to say that the debtors generate revenue by producing mortgages and then selling them to government-sponsored enterprises such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. There are a ton of steps that have to happen between origination and sale and, suffice it further to say, that requires a f*ck ton of debt to get done. That said, on a basic level, to originate loans, the debtors require favorable interest rates which, in turn, lower the cost of residential home purchases, and increases market demand and sales activity for homes.

Except, there’s been an itsy bitsy teeny weeny problem. Interest rates have been going up. Per the debtors:

The mortgage origination business is significantly impacted by interest rate trends. In mid-2016, the 10-year Treasury was 1.60%. Following the U.S. presidential election, it rose to a range of 2.30% to 2.45% and maintained that range throughout 2017. The 10-year Treasury rate increased to over 3.0% for most of 2018. The rise in rates during this time period reduced the overall size of the mortgage market, increasing competition and significantly reducing market revenues.

Said another way: mortgage rates are pegged off the 10-year treasury rate and rising rates chilled the housing market. With buyers running for the hills, originators can’t pump supply. Hence, diminished revenues. And diminished revenues are particularly problematic when you have high-interest debt with an impending maturity.

This is where the business model really comes into play. Here’s a diagram illustrating how this all works:

Source: First Day Declaration, PETITION

Source: First Day Declaration, PETITION

The warehouse lenders got nervous when, over the course of 2017/18, mortgage volumes declined while, at the same time, the debtors were obligated to pay down the senior secured notes; they, rightfully, grew concerned that the debtors wouldn’t have the liquidity available to repurchase the originated mortgages within the 30 day window. Consequently, the debtors engaged PIMCO in discussions about the pending maturity of the notes. Over a period of several months, however, those discussions proved unproductive.

The warehouse lenders grew skittish. Per the debtors:

Warehouse lenders began reducing advance rates, increasing required collateral accounts and increasing liquidity covenants, further contracting available working capital necessary to operate the business. Eventually, two of the warehouse lenders advised the Debtors that they were prepared to wind down their respective warehouse facilities unless the Debtors and PIMCO agreed in principle to a deleveraging transaction by June 7, 2019. That did not happen. As a result, one warehouse lender terminated its facility effective June 28, 2019 and a second advised that it will no longer allow new advances effective July 15, 2019. The Debtors feared that these actions would trigger other warehouse lenders to take similar actions, significantly impacting the Debtors’ ability to fund loans and restricting liquidity, thereby jeopardizing the Debtors’ ability to operate their franchise as a going concern.

On the precipice of disaster, the debtors offered the keys to PIMCO in exchange for forgiveness of the debt. PIMCO rebuffed them. Subsequently, Blackstone made PIMCO a cents-on-the-dollar cash-out offer on the basis that the offer would exceed liquidation value of the enterprise and PIMCO again declined. At this point there’s a lot of he said, she said about what was offered and reneged upon to the point that it ought to suffice merely to say that the debtors, Blackstone and PIMCO probably aren’t all sharing a Hamptons house together this summer.

So, where did they end up?

The debtors have filed a plan of reorganization with Blackstone as plan sponsor. Blackstone agreed to inject $60mm of new equity into the business — all of which, notably, is earmarked to cash out the notes in their entirety (clearly at at discount — read: below par — for PIMCO and the other noteholders). The debtors also propose to subject Blackstone’s offer to a 30-day competitive bidding process, provided that (a) bids are in cash (credit bids will not be allowed) and (b) all obligations to the GSEs and other investors are honored.

To fund the cases the debtors have obtained a commitment from Blackstone for $35mm in DIP financing. They also sourced proposals from warehouse lenders prepetition and have obtained commitments for $1.5b in warehouse financing from Barclays Bank PLC and Nomura Corporate Funding Americas LLC (guaranteed, on a limited basis, by Blackstone). In other words, Blackstone is ALL IN here: with the DIP financing, the limited guarantee and the equity check, they are placing a stake in the ground when it comes to mortgage origination.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Chapman)

  • Capital Structure: $184mm 9.375% ‘20 senior secured notes (Wilmington Trust Association NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Jay Goffman, Mark McDermott, Shana Elberg, Evan Hill, Edward Mahaney-Walter)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Robert Campagna)

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Jamie O’Connell)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

    • Board of Directors: David Schneider, William Cary, Glenn Stearns, Nadim El Gabbani, Chinh Chu, Jason Roswig, Chris Mitchell

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust Association NA

      • Legal: Alston & Bird LLP (Jason Solomon)

    • Major Noteholder: Pacific Investment Management Company LLC

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Bennett Spiegel, Stacey Rosenberg)

    • Blackstone Capital Partners VI-NQ/NF LP

      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Elisha Graff, Jamie Fell)

    • Barclays Bank PC

      • Legal: Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Peter Partee Sr., Brian Clarke)

    • Nomura Corporate Funding Americas LLC

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Mark Shinderman, Lauren Doyle) & Alston & Bird LLP (Karen Gelernt)

    • Fannie Mae

      • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Stephen Warren)

    • Freddie Mac

      • Legal: McKool Smith PC (Paul Moak)

7/9/19 #30

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Achaogen Inc.

Achaogen Inc.

April 15, 2019

Biopharma is where it’s at!!

San Francisco-based Achaogen Inc. ($AKAO) is the latest in a slate of biopharma debtors who have found their way into bankruptcy court — here, the District of Delaware. Achaogen is focused on “the development and commercialization of innovative antibiotic treatments against multi-drug resistant gram-negative infections.” To date, its operations have been centered around the discovery, development and commercialization of products, making it as far as clinical trials in certain instances. As if inspired by the fact that its filing came on the heels of the much-anticipated Game of Thrones (final) Season 8 premiere, the company colorfully notes its primary purpose:

Achaogen designed its lead product, ZEMDRI® (plazomicin), to fight what the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) calls a “nightmare bacteria” and has listed as the highest category threat of “urgent.” ZEMDRI can be used to treat patients who have limited or no alternative treatment options from infections with these nightmare bacteria. Even with its current financial situation, Achaogen continues to commercialize ZEMDRI, in part because Achaogen believes that ZEMDRI can save lives for patients who may literally have no alternative.

Nightmare bacteria!! Sheesh that’s chilling.

Even more chilling is the company’s discussion of gram-negative bacteria — found “everywhere, in virtually all environments on Earth that support life.” These bacteria are becoming increasingly resistant to common antibiotics. Achaogen calls this “a global crisis…we take for granted.” The company’s core (patented) product, ZEMDRI, is designed to “retain its effectiveness in killing these more resistant bacteria.” While ZEMDRI received FDA approval for IV-treatment of patients with complicated urinary tract infections in July 2018, the FDA rejected ZEMDRI for treatment of patients with bloodstream infections, citing a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness.

What does the company have going for it? Again, as of July 2018, it has a commercially viable product in the United States. It also has global commercialization rights. And patent protect in the US through approximately 2031 or 2032. It sells to either specialty distributors or physician-owned infusion centers. It has agreements with Hovione Limited and Pfizer for the manufacturing of its product. Finally, it has another product in development, C-Scape, which is an oral antibiotic for treatment of patients suffering from urinary tract infections caused by a particular bacteria.

So, what’s the issue? As PETITION readers have come to learn, the development and manufacture of biopharma products is a time and capital intensive process. Indeed, the company has an accumulated deficit of $559.4mm as of December 31, 2018. This bit is especially puzzling given the company’s position that the world confronts a “global crisis”:

In the past year, there has been a dramatic downturn in the availability of financing from both the debt and equity markets for companies in the anti-infective field, based in part on the withdrawal from the space by certain large pharmaceutical companies. For example, Novartis recently announced that it is shutting down its antibacterial and antiviral research, which was followed by similar moves from Eli Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb and AstraZeneca.3 Allergan has also recently announced its intention to divest its anti-infective business, consisting of three commercialized products. This “big pharma flight” from antiinfective research, development and commercialization has created significant challenges for early-stage biotech companies seeking to develop and commercialize novel and much needed drugs in this sector, as opportunities for partnerships, joint R&D relationships, and merger/acquisition transactions have diminished. This sector-wide trend has negatively affected not just Achaogen but many of its competitors. Achaogen, however, has been especially impacted because it has reached the point in its life cycle where it needs substantial capital infusion to drive commercialization of its recently FDA approved drug, ZEMDRI.

Look: we don’t take everything debtors say as gospel. After all, first day pleadings are an opportunity to frame the story and set the tone of a case. But if the company is right about what it’s saying and nobody appears to give two sh*ts, well, color us a wee bit concerned. Why isn’t anybody talking about this?

Anyway, in February 2018, the company entered into a loan and security agreement with Silicon Valley Bank for $50mm. The original agreement provided SVB with a security interest in virtually all of the company’s assets — including proceeds of intellectual property — but not a security interest in the IP itself. $15mm remains outstanding under the loan. In November 2018, the company retained Evercore Group LLP to run a strategic sale process but no viable purchaser emerged. It’s not worth saving the world unless you can make some dinero, we suppose.

After engaging in various liquidity maximization efforts (including job cuts), fundraising initiatives (including an insufficient equity raise), and licensing discussions with entities abroad, the company ultimately decided that nothing would generate enough liquidity for the company to avoid chapter 11. The company notes, “although Achaogen’s out-of-court sale process did not yield any acceptable bids, many parties had expressed interest in bidding at any potential 363 auction sale, where it could pursue the Assets free and clear of existing liabilities.” The company, therefore, filed for chapter 11 to pursue a new sale process; it has no stalking horse bidder teed up. To market its assets, the company has replaced Evercore with Cassel Salpeter & Co. LLC.

In support of the bankruptcy case, SVB committed to provide the company with a $25mm DIP credit facility of which $10mm is new money and $15mm is a roll-up of the aforementioned pre-petition debt. In exchange, SVB now gets a security interest in the company’s IP.

The company’s unsecured debt is comprised of lease obligations, minimum purchase requirements under its manufacturing contract, a success fee tied to the company’s FDA approval, and $18.7mm of trade debt. New Enterprise Associates Inc., a reputed Silicon Valley venture capital firm, is the company’s largest equity holder with approximately 10.76% of the company’s shares. Prior to its 2014 IPO, the company had raised $152.1mm starting with its Series A round in August 2004: it IPO’d at a valuation of $200.4mm, having issued 6.9mm shares at $12/share to the public. It’s equity is likely worth f*ck all. Well, not exactly: we suppose this isn’t ENTIRELY “f*ck all”:

Screen Shot 2019-04-15 at 2.48.04 PM.png

But it’s pretty darn close. Now the issue is what price the IP will fetch in a bankruptcy sale process. It will have to be tens of millions of dollars for NEA to have any sort of recovery.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

  • Capital Structure: $15mm secured debt (Silicon Valley Bank)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Erin Brady, Richard Wynne, Christopher Bryant, John Beck) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Andrew Remming, Matthew Talmo, Paige Topper)

    • Financial Advisor: Meru LLC

    • Investment Banker: Cassel Salpeter & Co., LLC

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Professionals:

    • Prepetition & DIP Lender ($25mm): Silicon Valley Bank

      • Legal: Morrison & Foerster LLP ( Alexander Rheaume, Todd Goren, Benjamin Butterfield, David Ephraim) & (local) Ashby & Geddes PA (Gregory Taylor, Stacy Newman)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Hovione Limited, EsteveQuimica SA, Solar Capital Ltd.,. Crystal BioScience, World Courier)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - All American Oil & Gas Inc.

All American Oil & Gas Inc.

November 12, 2018

San Antonio-based independent oil company All American Oil & Gas Inc. (“AAOG”) and its two affiliated companies, Western Power & Steam Inc. (“WPS”) and Kern River Holding Inc. (“KRH”) filed for bankruptcy earlier this week in the Western District of Texas. WPS is a power company that sells power to the likes of Pacific Gas & Electric — a company that, as we’ve previously noted, is having problems of its own (which only appear to be getting worse) — and provides electricity and steam to KRH to aid KRH’s efforts to extract oil.

The enterprise is reportedly cash flow positive, with approximately $25mm in EBITDA in 217 and higher EBITDA projected for 2018. So what gives?

The debtors accuse their successor lender, Kern Cal Oil 7 LLC (“KCO7”), which acquired the company’s secured debt from Alliance-Bernstein, of “not act[ing] as a typical lender,” instead “implement[ing] a predatory ‘loan to own’ strategy.” The debtors note:

Unlike many E&P cases, this bankruptcy filing is not the result of the Company’s poor operational performance, illiquidity, debt maturities or lack of underlying value. Rather, it was precipitated by KCO7’s efforts to exploit its rights under the Credit Agreements to obtain the Debtors’ assets ‘on the cheap,’ and thereby to destroy tens of millions in equity value.

In a dramatic twist, Kern Cal Oil 7 LLC is, according to the debtors, run by two former investment bankers “who were fired allegedly for cause from AAOG’s and KRH’s former investment banker and financial advisor Cappello Capital Corporation” and have an SEC claim filed against them for “breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of confidential information, and fraud, among other allegations.” Salacious.

In October, Kern Oil 7 LLC, under the auspices of attending a constructive meeting relating to potential M&A involving Kern Oil and the debtors, issued a notice of default on the basis of insufficient hedging, a move the debtors claim “was a transparent attempt to intimidate AAOG into handing over the Company to KCO7 for little or no value to its shareholders.” Suffice it to say that there is other dramatic stuff here including the debtors’ inability to put hedges in place, purportedly due to the notice of default, incomplete documentation relating to the change from Alliance-Bernstein to KCO7, and more. KCO7 notified the debtors that default interest now applied and on November 8, the debtors had a scheduled interest payment to make which, given these circumstances, the debtors opted not to make. In turn, the debtors filed for bankruptcy to “protect its going concern enterprise value and to restructure its secured debt.”

To fund their cases, the debtors seek authority to use their pre-petition lenders’ (read: KCO7) cash collateral. That ought to be a fun first day hearing.

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of Texas (Judge King)

  • Capital Structure: $80.1mm ‘19 first lien debt (plus $789k in accrued/unpaid interest)(Kern Cal Oil 7 LLC), $50mm ‘20 second lien debt (plus $10.6mm PIK and $440k accrued/unpaid interest)(Kern Cal Oil 7 LLC)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Richard Wynne, Bennett Spiegel, Erin Brady, Christopher Bryant, John Beck, Sean Feener) & (local) Dykema Gossett PLLC (Deborah Williamson, Patrick Huffstickler, Danielle Rushing)

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey

    • Claims Agent: BMC Group Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Kern Oil 7 LLC

      • Legal: O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Stephen Warren)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - NRG REMA LLC

NRG REMA LLC

October 16, 2018

NRG REMA LLC, an indirect subsidiary of bankruptcy veteran GenOn Energy Inc., has filed for bankruptcy to effectuate a prepackaged plan of reorganization supported by “REMA, the independent directors of GenOn (who are advised by independent advisors), the independent directors of REMA (who are advised by independent advisors), more than 90% of holders of those certain Series C Pass-Through Trust Certificates due 2026, Public Service Enterprise Group and the steering committee of GenOn noteholders.”

We don’t really have much to add so we’ll leave it at that.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, David Seligman, Steven Serajeddini, W. Benjamin Winter, AnnElyse Scarlett Gibbons) & (local) Zack A Clement PLLC

    • Legal to Governance Committee of BOD: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC

    • Investment Banker: Rothschild

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Lease Indenture Trustees and Pass Through Trustee

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Robert Ripin, Alex Sher)

    • Consenting PTC Holders

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Garrison & Wharton LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Elizabeth McColm, Alexander Woolverton)

New Chapter 11 Filing - FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. 

March 31, 2018

#MAGA!!

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. ("FES"), the wholly-owned subsidiary of publicly-traded (non-debtor) FirstEnergy Corp. has filed a "freefall" bankruptcy in the Northern District of Ohio. FES is a provider of "unregulated"-yet-regulated energy-related products and services to retail and wholesale customers primarily in Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. It owns and operates (a) fossil generating facilities (read: coal) in Ohio (three) and Philadelphia (one) through its FirstEnergy Generation subsidiary ("FG") and, (b) 3 nuclear generating facilities (two in Ohio and one in Philadelphia)through its FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation LLC ("NG") subsidiary. 

For those of you who aren't power geeks - and we confess that we are not - this filing gives a pretty solid primer on how United States' power production and distribution works. Or doesn't work - depending on your point of view, we suppose. We summarize some high points here but if you're especially nerdy and want to understand the power industry better, read docket number 55. You can find it via the case name link above. 

A big piece of this bankruptcy filing is the debtors' retail electricity business. Retail sellers of electricity are subject to state-applied "Renewable Portfolio Standards" ("RPS") that requires sellers to obtain a certain percentage or amount of its power supply from renewable energy sources. One way to comply is through the purchase of renewable energy credits ("RECs"). Historically, FES has obtained RECs to comply with the RPS via eight power purchase agreements entered into between 2003-2011 with various wind and solar power producers. But apparently things have changed considerably since then. And FES no longer wants the RECs. 

What's changed? Now FES's actual and projected sales are much lower. Per the company in more detail: 

"The main drivers to the collapse in prices include:
• Lower natural gas prices due to continued improvements in natural gas fracking;
• Excess generating capacity due in part to lower than expected load growth;
• Lower cost of construction for renewable technologies, and/or improved performance (e.g., higher capacity factors); and
• Surplus of RECs."

Also, future market prices and outlook for power and RECs are projected materially lower. RPS mandates are less demanding (#MAGA!!). And the supply of RECs is significantly greater. Said another way: energy disruption. From frackers pushing a rapid expansion in nat gas supplies which, in turn, caused plummeting electricity prices and reduced profits. From regulation and the rise of renewables. From energy efficient electronics. 

Per the company, "While the PPAs made sense to FES at the time they were entered into, a dramatic downturn in the energy market and prices of RECs now renders these contracts extremely burdensome and uneconomic to FES." They're also, according to the debtor, unnecessary: FES is phasing out its retail business and, today, expects to sell less than half of the amount of power this year that it sold in 2013. Consequently, FES seeks to reject those PPAs in bankruptcy.

Which is not the only PPA it seeks to reject. The debtor also seeks to shed its multi-party intercompany PPA pursuant to which it and several other power companies purchase power generated via fossil fuel from the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation ("OVEC"). The debtor alleges that this obligation is priced at above-market rates. And because FES sells very little wholesale power emanating out of the OVEC PPA, it stands to lose approximately $268 million from the deal. Yikes. 

The issue, though, is whether the rejection of the nine PPAs will cause disruption to the continued supply of wholesale electricity or impact the reliability of the transmission grid in the regional transmission organization that governs FES and FG. That generally means YOUR electricity - if you live in the Northeast. Naturally, the debtor argues it won't. The federal government may think otherwise. And this is precisely why the company filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to prevent the feds from hindering -- on the basis of the Federal Power Act -- the company's attempts to reject the PPAs under the federal bankruptcy code. FERC regulates the wholesale power market. It is also why the company has filed a request for assistance from Rick Perry, President Trump's Energy Secretary. This is some real dramatic sh*t folks: a conflict between federal statutes with efforts for executive branch intervention. Someone dial up Daniel Day-Lewis and bring him out of retirement: this could be the next "Lincoln." 

So, in a nutshell: the company filed for bankruptcy because it needs to leverage the bankruptcy code's debtor-friendly provisions to shed some burdensome contracts - including the PPAs. It also needs to address its cost structure, its over-levered balance sheet (in terms of interest payments and near-term maturities), and lease payments under certain sale-leaseback arrangements related to one of its power facilities. Said another way, this is a full-stop restructuring: both operational and financial in nature. There is a "Process Support Agreement" with various parties in interest which reflects a good faith commitment to cooperate on first day motions, implementation of employee retention and severance programs, and establishing a protocol for the disposition of company assets. Sounds great but it doesn't really promise any certainty given the various claims and regulatory issues. Buckle your seat belts. 

Some additional things of note:

  • "Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!" (Long Don Corleone). Ironically in the week that Westinghouse Electric Corp. emerged out of its own bankruptcy proceeding, it may now find itself back in bankruptcy court for purposes of adjudicating its $2.36 million trade claim.
  • Coal (#MAGA!!). A first order of business is the debtor is seeking to reject its coal transportation agreements with BNSF Railway Company ((owned by Berkshire Hathaway ($BRK.A)) and Norfolk Southern Railway Company ($NSC). Why? It expects to order 200,000 tons of coal less than the 2.5 million tons of coal minimum requirement delineated in the contract. The debtor claims that rejection of the contract will save it $105.6 million over the next 12 months as it replaces rail with barge transportation. 
  • Commodities. The company also seeks to reject certain uranium supply contracts because (i) it already has enough uranium inventory for the rest of 2018 and 2019, (ii) the spot price for uranium has dropped precipitously since entering into the agreements (from $36 and $48 per pound, respectively, to $22 per pound), and (iii) there is "ample supply of uranium available in the market." 
  • Professional Retentions: Two law firms represent the Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034 because George Davis departed O'Melveny & Myers LLP for Latham & Watkins LLP. 
 
  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Ohio (Judge Koschik)
  • Capital Structure: $3.8 billion funded debt     
    • FES

      • $700 million secured revolving credit facility, ~$332 million of '21 6.05% unsecured notes; (c) ~$363 million of '39 6.80% unsecured notes; and (d) $150 million revolving credit note with Allegheny Energy Supply Company, LLC under which $102 million is currently outstanding and is due on April 2, 2018. 

    • FG

      • ~$328 million of secured fixed-rate pollution control revenue notes ("PCNs"); ~$677 million of unsecured fixed-rate PCNs

    • NG

      • ~$285 million of secured PCNs; ~$842 million of unsecured PCNs

  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Lisa Beckerman, Brad Kahn, Scott Alberino, Kate Doorley, David Applebaum, Todd Brecher, Sean O'Donnell, Rachel Presa, Brian Carney, Abid Qureshi, Joseph Sorkin, David Zensky) & (local) Brouse McDowell LPA (Marc Merklin, Kate Bradley, Bridget Franklin) & (conflicts) Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Charles Moore)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Ltd. 
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
    • Special Nuclear Regulatory Counsel: Hogan Lovells US LLP
    • Industry Consultants: ICF International Inc.
    • Special Litigation Counsel: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
    • Tax Consultant: KPMG US LLP
    • Communications Consultant: Sitrick and Company
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Board of Directors of FirstEnergy Corp. 
      • Legal: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP (Stephen Lerner, Peter Morrison, Julia Furlong)
    • Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB
      • Legal: KIlpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, Michael Langford) & (local) McDonald Hopkins LLC (Michael Kaczka, Scott Opincar, Maria Carr)
    • Indenture Trustee: Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A.
    • Indenture Trustee to PCNs: UMB Bank, National Association
    • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of the 6.85% Pass Through Certificates due 2034
      • Legal: O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Latham & Watkins LLP
      • Financial Advisor: Guggenheim Partners LLC
    • Ad Hoc Group of Holders of PCNs issued by FG and NG
      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 
      • Financial Advisor: GLC Advisors & Co.
    • Contract Counterparty: BNSF Railway Company
      • Legal: Whitmer & Eherman LLC (Mary Whitmer, James Ehrman, Robert Stefancin)
    • Non-debtor Parent: FirstEnergy Corp.
      • Legal: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Thomas Wilson)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Orexigen Therapeutics Inc.

Orexigen Therapeutics Inc. 

3/12/18

Orexigen Therapeutics is a publicly-traded ($OREX) biopharmaceutical company with one FDA-approved product - "Contrave" - an adjunct to a reduced-calorie diet and exercise for chronic weight management in certain eligible adults. (Before we continue, please take a minute to appreciate the exquisite creativity these folks deployed with the name, "Contrave." Control + crave = Contrave. We hope they didn't shell out too much cash money to the brand consultants for that one). 

Anyway, the drug could theoretically service the 36.5% of adults the Center for Disease Control & Prevention has identified as obese, a potential market of 91-93 million people in the United States alone. And that number is predicted to rise to 120 million people in the next several years. Yikes: that's 33% of the U.S. population. Apropos, the drug is the number one prescribed weight-loss brand in the US with over 1.8 million prescriptions written to date, subsuming 700,000 patients. The drug is also approved in Europe, South Korea, Canada, Lebanon, and the UAE. 

All of that surface-level success notwithstanding, the company has lost approximately $730 million since its inception. This is primarily because it has been spending the last 16 years burning cash on R&D, clinical studies for FDA approval, recruitment, manufacturing, marketing, etc., both in and outside the U.S. And people wonder why drugs are so expensive. The company believes it could be profitable by 2019 under its existing operating model and revenue forecasts; it enjoys a patent until 2030. 

Obviously the patent is critical because the company, through its banker, attempted a sale prior to the bankruptcy filing but proved unsuccessful. The goal of the bankruptcy filing, therefore, is to effectuate a sale with the benefit of "free and clear" status. While no stalking horse bidder is lined up, The Baupost Group LLC, is leading a group of secured noteholders (including Ecori Capital, Highbridge Capital and UBS O'Connor) to provide a $35 million DIP credit facility and buy the company some time. Will they end up owning it? 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware 
  • Capital Structure: $165mm 0% '20 convertible notes (The Baupost Group LLC), $115mm 2.75% '20 convertible notes ($25 million outstanding, Wilmington Trust NA), $49.6mm 2.75% '20 convertible exchange senior notes ($38.9 million outstanding, US Bank NA) 
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Hogan Lovells LLP (Christopher Donolo, Eric Einhorn, Christopher Bryant, Jon Beck, Sean Feener) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Jose Bibiloni)
    • Financial Advisor: E&Y
    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners 
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Collateral Agent & Prepetition Trustee: U.S. Bank NA
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (James Carr, Benjamin Feder)
    • DIP Lenders
      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Eric Winston)
    • DIP Administrative Agent: Wilmington Trust Company
      • Legal: Arnold & Porter (Tyler Nurnberg)
    • DIP Lender: Highbridge Capital Management LLC
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Stark, Stephen Levine, Uchechi Egeonuigwe) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLC (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, Aaron Stulman)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Elliott Greenleaf PC (Rafael Zahralddin-Aravena, Eric Sutty) & (local) Irell & Manella LLP (Jeffrey Reisner, Michael Strub Jr., Kerri Lyman)

Updated March 30, 2018

New Chapter 11 Filing - Seadrill Ltd.

Seadrill Ltd.

  • 9/12/17 Recap: Cash rich offshore oil and gas extraction company with global reach filed a prearranged bankruptcy to effectuate a balance sheet restructuring because...well...it was over-levered AF. The company purports to have a deal with its major creditors with secured creditors kicking the can down the road, and $2.3b worth of unsecured bondholders and other unsecured claims converting into approximately 15% of the post-reorg equity (with participation rights in the new secured notes and equity noted below). The company will get $1.06b of new capital by combination of new secured notes ($860mm) and equity ($200mm). Holders of $NADL stock will get a big fat donut.  
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge David Jones)
  • Capital Structure: A. Lot. Of. Debt. Like $5.7mm of bank debt and $2.3mm of unsecured bonds.
First Day Declaration.

First Day Declaration.

 

  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jayme Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Ross Kwasteniet, Adam Paul, Brian Schartz, Anna Rotman, Jeffrey Zeiger, Anthony Grossi, Spencer Winters) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Rachel Biblo Block)
    • Restructuring Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Ed Mosley)
    • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey (David Hilty, Gavin Kagan, Dimitar Voukadinov, Drew Talarico, David Wang, Brian Keenan, Varun Desai, Daniel McManus) & Morgan Stanley
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Conflicts Committee of Board of Directors of North Atlantic Drilling Limited and to the Conflicts Committee of the Board of Directors of Sevan Drilling Limited
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Jennifer Hardy, Andrew Mordkoff, Derek Osei-Bonsu)
      • Financial Advisor: Baker Tilly Virchow Krause LLP (Susan Seabury)
    • Conflicts Committee of Seadrill Partners LLC
      • Legal: Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Katherine Treistman, Raniero D'Aversa, Laura Metzger, Debra Felder)
    • New Money: Hemen Holding Ltd., Centerbridge Partners LP
      • Legal: Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP (Greg Petrick, Yushan Ng, Nicholas Vislocky) & Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP (Brad Scheler, Jennifer Rodburg, Andrew Minear) & (local) Dykema Cox Smith (Deborah Williamson, Patrick Huffstickler, Aaron Kaufman)
    • Consenting Lender Group
      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Scott Greissman, Philip Abelson, Andrew Katz) & (local) Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP (Robin Russell, Timothy A. Davidson II, Joseph Rovira)
    • Aristeia Capital L.L.C., GLG Partners LP, Saba Capital Management LP and Whitebox Advisors LLC
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Philip Dublin, Ira Dizengoff, David Staber, Abid Qureshi, Sara Brauner)
    • ARCM Master Fund III, Ltd.
      • Legal: Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP (Elizabeth McColm, Andrew Rosenberg, Catherine Goodall)
    • Indenture Trustee: Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
      • Legal: Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Chad Steward, Glenn Siegel, Crystal Axelrod, Rachel Jaffe Mauceri)
    • Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering
      • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Shirley Cho, Bradford Sandler, Steven Golden)
    • Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.,
      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Robin E. Keller, Ronald J. Silverman, Christopher R. Bryant, Michael Shane Johnson) & (local) 
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Nordic Trustee AS, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Computershare Trust Company NA, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co. Ltd., Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., Pentagon Freight Services Inc., Louisiana Machinery Co. LLC)
      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Thomas Moers Mayer, Douglas Mannal, Jennifer Sharret) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner, Benjamin Wallen)

Updated 10/5/17 12:03 pm CT

New Chapter 11 Filing - CGG Holding (US) Inc.

CGG Holding (US) Inc.

  • 6/14/17 Recap: Global geophysical and geoscience company servicing customers primarily in oil and gas E&P is the latest victim of the oil and gas downturn of the past two-or-so years. The company's success is tied heavily to the E&P space and those clients were reluctant to invest in data acquisition projects to identify areas for future production or increased current production; therefore, you can imagine what happened to revenues and what that means when you're looking at a debt-stack as aggressive as this one. Indeed revenues and earnings were cut by 67% from 2012 to 2016. Ad hoc groups of secured lenders and high yield bondholders as well as as certain holders of the converts and certain shareholders of CGG SA, the foreign entity that filed in France and for Chapter 15, have entered into a Lock-up agreement delineating a balance sheet restructuring. The upshot is that the high yield bondholders and converts will own the majority of the equity in the reorganized company. 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Glenn)
  • Capital Structure: $810mm secured debt ($300mm French Revolver of CGG SA - Wilmington Trust (London), $165mm US Revolver - Credit Suisse AG, $342mm US TL - Wilmington Trust NA), $1.6b senior unsecured high yield bonds (The Bank of New York Mellon) and $402.7mm convertible notes (issued by CGG SA).     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Brian Hermann, Lauren Shumejda, Christopher Hopkins) & (Chapter 15 for CGG SA) Linklaters LLP (Margot Schonholz, Robert Trust, Christopher Hunker)
    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Becky Roof, Susan Brown, Brad Hunter, John Creighton, Francisco Echevarria,John Somerville, David Shim)
    • Investment Banker: Morgan Stanley & Lazard (Kenneth Ziman)
      • Legal (Lazard): Sidley Austin LLP (Thomas Labuda Jr., Andrew Propps)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Secured Lender Committee (Och Ziff, Goldman Sachs International, Makuria Investment Management (UK) LLP, T. Rowe Price)
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Kon Asimacopolous, Stephen Hessler, Anthony Grossi, Hannah Crawford)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of High Yield Bonds (Alden Global Capital, Attestor Capital LLP, Boussard & Gavaudan Asset Management LP, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Aurelius Capital Management LP, Third Point LLC)
      • Legal: Wilkie Farr & Gallager LLP (John Longmire, Weston Eguchi)
    • Indenture Trustee for Senior Noteholders: Bank of New York Mellon
      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Christopher Donoho, John Beck)

Updated 7/11/17 6:41 CT

New Filing - Channel Technologies Group LLC

Channel Technologies Group LLC

  • 10/17/16 Recap: Manufacturer of ceramics, transducers and sonar equipment sold to the US Navy and defense contractors like Northrop Grumman, Lockhead Martin and Raytheon files for chapter 11 to address onerous long-term contracts and attempt an expeditious sale of the business.  
  • Jurisdiction: Central District of California
  • Capital Structure: $2.86mm secured debt     
  • Company Professionals:
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Secured Creditor/DIP Lender: Blue Wolf Capital Partners
    • Northrup Grunman
      • Legal: Gibson Dunn (Sam Newman, Daniel Denny)
    • Lockhead Martin
      • Legal: Hogan Lovells LLP (Christopher Donoho, M. Shane Johnson)

Updated 12/30/16.