🔌New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Agera Energy LLC🔌

Agera Energy LLC

October 4, 2019

Agera Energy LLC, a retail electricity and natural gas provider to commercial, industrial and residential customers filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company blames, among other things, mismanagement and poor strategy for the run-up to its financial problems: too many low margin fixed contracts in an environment that calls for variable contracts proved to be an albatross. Nevertheless, in September ‘18, sponsor Eli Global LLC agreed to pursue a turnaround plan including any and all capital infusions that might be necessary.

But then the hammer dropped. New management discovered “material balance sheet issues, which led to a restatement of the Debtors’ financials. Specifically, as of August 31, 2018, there was approximately $39 million of over stated receivables, of which $37 million related to unbilled receivables. As a result of the foregoing discovery, the Debtors suddenly found themselves in breach of the Senior Lien Supply Agreement’s $16 million Tangible Net Worth covenant.” WHOOPS.

Thereafter, the company and its lenders operated pursuant to a series of forbearance agreements while Eli Global LLC made millions of dollars of capital contributions. Until they didn’t. In May, Eli Global indicated that it was no longer in a position to inject capital into the business — and it still had $21mm in commitments from that point forward. Without the capital, the company was unable to satisfy, among other things, renewable portfolio standards it is subject to.* This dominoed into a separate liability for the company of approximately $72mm and a slate of enforcement actions from the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission and the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission that threatened the debtors’ ability to sell electricity or natural gas in those states. Consequently, the debtors initiated a strategic alternatives review process which, naturally, included a marketing process for the sale of the debtors. The company now has Exelon Generation Company LLC lined up as a stalking horse purchaser (for the debtors’ contracts) for $24.75mm.

*RPS laws require a certain portion of a state’s electricity consumption to be generated from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, or hydroelectric.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: $161.6mm Senior Lien Supply Agreement and Senior Lien ISDA Master Agreement (BP Energy), $35mm Second lien Revolving Credit Facility (Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery (Timothy Walsh, Darren Azman, Ravi Vohra, Debra Harrison)

    • Independent Manager: Stephen Gray

    • Financial Advisor: GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC

    • Investment Banker: Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC & Stifel Nicolaus & Co. Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Stretto (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Lender: BP Energy Company

      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Arsalan Muhammad, Kathryn Shurin)

    • Stalking Horse Bidder: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

      • Legal: McGuireWoods LLP (Cecil Martin III)

    • Platinum Partners

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC (Melanie Cyganowski, Eric Weinick)

10/7/19 #42

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jones Energy Inc.⛽️

Jones Energy Inc.

April 14, 2019

Austin-based independent oil and natural gas E&P company, Jones Energy Inc., filed a prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy to restructure its $1.009b of debt ($450mm senior secured first lien notes and $559mm unsecured notes across two tranches). In case you didn’t realize, oil and gas exploration and production is a capital intensive business.

The company operates primarily in the Anadarko Basin in Oklahoma and Texas. Its territory is the aggregation of acreage accumulated over the years, including the 2009 purchase of Crusader Energy Group Inc. out of bankruptcy for $240.5mm in cash.

We’re not going to belabor the point as to why this company is in bankruptcy: the narrative is no different than most other oil and gas companies that have found their way into bankruptcy court over the last several years. Indeed, this chart about sums things up nicely:

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.29.01 PM.png

It’s really just a miracle that it didn’t file sooner. Why hadn’t it? Per the company:

…the Debtors consummated a series of liquidity enhancing transactions, including equity raises, debt repurchases, strategic acquisitions, non-core asset sales, and modifications of their operations to reduce their workforce and drilling activities. This included a Company-wide headcount reduction in 2016 resulting in the termination of approximately 30% of the Debtors’ total workforce, as well as halting drilling activity spanning several months during the worst of the historic commodity downturn.

But…well…the debt. As in, there’s too much of it.

Screen Shot 2019-04-05 at 2.56.24 PM.png

And debt service costs were too damn high. In turn, the company’s securities traded too damn low:

Source: Disclosure Statement

Source: Disclosure Statement

What’s more interesting here is the process that unfolded. In February 2018, the company issued $450mm of 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes. The proceeds were used to repay the company’s senior secured reserve-based facility and eliminate the restrictive covenants contained therein. The company also hoped to use the proceeds to repurchase some of its senior unsecured notes at a meaningful discount to par. In a rare — yet increasingly common — show of unity, however, the company’s unsecured lenders thwarted these efforts by binding together pursuant to a “cooperation agreement” and telling the company to take its pathetic offer and pound sand. (PETITION Note: its amazing what lenders can achieve if they can solve for a collective action problem). This initiated a process that ultimately led to the transaction commemorated in the company’s announces restructuring support agreement.

So what now? The senior secured lenders will equitize their debt and come out with 96% of the common stock in the reorganized entity. Holders of unsecured debt will get 4% equity and warrants (exercisable for up to a 15% ownership stake in the reorganized company), both subject to dilution by equity issued to management under a “Management Incentive Plan.” The company has a commitment for $20mm of exit financing lined up (with the option for replacement financing of up to $150mm).

Hopefully the company will have better luck without the albatross of so much debt hanging over it.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge TBD)

  • Capital Structure: $450mm 9.25% ‘23 senior secured first lien notes (UMB Bank NA), $559mm 6.75% ‘22 and 9.25% ‘23 unsecured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Christopher Marcus, Brian Schartz, Anthony Grossi, Ana Rotman, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Mark McKane, Brett Newman, Kevin Chang) & (local) Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)

    • Independent Directors: Tara Lewis, L. Spencer Wells

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Ryan Omohundro)

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC (Daniel Aronson)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Noteholders

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Evan Fleck, Michael Price) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Eric English, Genevieve Graham)

      • Financial Advisor: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of Crossover Holders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Benjamin Schak) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charlie Beckham, Kelli Norfleet)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Metalmark Capital LLC

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (Andrew Geppert, David Meyer, Jessica Peet, Michael Garza)

Updated 4/15/19 2:05 CT

New Chapter Bankruptcy Filing - SAS Healthcare Inc.

SAS Healthcare Inc. 

January 31, 2019

Dallas/Fort Worth-based mental health facilities operator filed for bankruptcy last week in the Northern District of Texas. The more we read about these healthcare bankruptcies, the less and less assured we feel about healthcare generally. Holy sh*t a lot of them have hair on them. 

Here, the debtors operate three mental health treatment facilities — in Arlington, Dallas, and Fort Worth. Therein, the debtors provided — and we mean, "provided" — in-patient and out-patient mental health care to children, adolescents and adults struggling with substance abuse and addiction, mental health disorders and behavioral and psychological disorders. Why the past tense? Because thanks to an investigation by the Tarrant County District Attorney and subsequent indictments, the debtors ceased operations in December 2018. 

The debtors —owned in in equal 1/3 parts by three individuals — has $8.26mm in secured debt (Ciera Bank), a $503k drawn secured revolving line of credit with Ciera Bank, a $4.3mm secured term loan with Southside Bank (exclusive of another $3mm in unpaid principal and interest), a $5.6mm construction loan with Southside Bank (exclusive of another $4.3mm in unpaid principal and accrued interest); a $850k secured loan with Southside, a $400k second lien secured bridge note with REP Perimeter Holdings LLC, and $1.325mm subordinated secured note from the owners. 

Back to those closures. The grand jury investigation led to a lot of negative publicity which, in turn, led to an abrupt end in patient referrals from the two largest referral sources. The end effect? Decimated revenue. The company secured its bridge loan and performed operational triage but the second indictment proved to be a death knell. Without ongoing operations and with all of that debt, the debtors had to file for chapter 11 to trigger the automatic stay and buy itself time to conduct a marketing and sale process to sell their assets to stalking horse purchaser and prepetition lender, REP Perimeter Holdings LLC. 

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Mullin) 

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Jarom Yates, Matt Ferris)

    • Financial Advisor: Phoenix Management Services LLC (Brian Gleason)

    • Investment Banker: Raymond James & Associates Inc. (Michael Pokrassa)

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Senior Care Centers LLC

Senior Care Centers LLC

December 4, 2018

Ok, we take it back. We’ve been saying how healthcare distress was overhyped in the beginning of the year and now a mini-wave of healthcare-related bankruptcy filings has hit dockets across the country. It’s cool: we don’t take it personally.

Here, Senior Care Centers LLC and its bazillion affiliated debtors, filed for bankruptcy in the Northern District of Texas. The debtors are one of the largest skilling nursing services providers in the US, providing care for approximately 9k patients in Texas and Louisiana. They operate 97 skilled nursing facilities, 9 assisted living facilities and 6 hospice facilities. The company notes:

Like much of the healthcare sector, the operators of skilled nursing facilities (“SNFs”) are and have been experiencing significant challenges and financial distress in recent years. The challenges faced by the Debtors are similar to those experienced by other SNF operators and widespread within the skilled nursing industry. The Debtors faced increasing financial pressure in 2017 and 2018 cause by, among other things, declining reimbursement rates, difficulties in collecting accounts receivable, declining census, and occupancy rates, increasing lease obligations, tightening terms with various trade creditors, and a significantly reduced working capital loan facility. All of these factors have combined to negatively impact the Debtors’ operations.

Getting more specific, the company adds:

Since 2017, the Company experienced significant liquidity constraints caused by, among other things: (a) increasing rent and “above-market” leases with various Landlords; (b) declining performance within the current portfolio for a variety of industry-wide developments; (c) tightening terms with various trade creditors; and (d) declining census. The Company has struggled to respond to liquidity issues for several months. In July of 2018, Administrative Agent began establishing Borrowing Base reserves, resulting in reduced availability under the Credit Facility.

The immediate cause for the filing of these Chapter 11 Cases was due to liquidity issues resulting from reduced Borrowing Base availability. This problem was compounded when certain of the Debtors’ landlords issued termination and/or default notices (the “Landlord Notices”).

Certain vendors demanded modification to payment terms, which restricted or eliminated the Company’s trade credit. Moreover, relationships with current and prospective Employees and Patients have been affected by the uncertainty. For example, several recent candidates have rescinded their offers to join the Company and expressed concern regarding the Company’s financial stability.

That story should sound wildly familiar by now.

Of significance, however, is the company’s relationship with Sabra Health Care REIT Inc. ($SBRA), which is one of the major landlords who issued termination/default notices (over which there is some dispute as to whether they were subsequently withdrawn). Sabra owns CCP which is the debtors’ second lien lender. More importantly, Sabra is the landlord on approximately 40 of the debtors’ facilities. The debtors owe Sabra $31.78mm in unpaid rent, common area maintenance charges and taxes.

Interestingly, Sabra’s own commentary about the debtors’ situation probably didn’t help matters much. On its Q3 earnings call on November 6, Sabra said a number of things about the debtors’ inability to pay rent, a potential sale of the debtors, its efforts to obtain financing, and management’s skittishness about any go-forward transaction that would endanger their jobs. On that last point, Sabra indicated that it was discussing go-forward options directly with the debtors’ board as a result. The debtors’ various constituents could obvious see/hear these comments and react accordingly.

But the Sabra commentary also demonstrates how difficult the current environment is for SNFs right now. Some big takeaways from their earnings call:

  • It is reducing its exposure to Texas, its largest state, “which also happen to be the one state where there is an oversupply of skilled nursing beds in a number of markets due to new product. And Texas also has one of the weakest Medicaid systems in the country.” (PETITION Note: scour the Googles for other SNFs highly indexed to Texas for future distressed/bankruptcy candidates).

  • Skilled operators (read: private equity) are in acquisition mode and, therefore, pricing is high even for product that isn’t of the highest quality. (PETITION Note: “too much money chasing too few deals.” This should, theoretically, bode well for the debtors’ proposed sale, if so). Sabra’s CEO Rick Matros said, “we're not seeing much good skill product and I really believe that that's a function of the skilled operators are buying everything all of us are selling, but they're not putting reasonable assets on the market because everybody sees the light at the end of the tunnel both in terms of the demographic in terms of decreasing supply and in terms of the positive benefits of PDPM reimbursements system that’s going go into effect next October.

  • Smaller SNFs will succumb to bankruptcy. Matros added, “My guess is over the course of the next year particularly with the mom-and-pops, we'll probably see more products come to market as a number of the smaller providers determine that they don't have the wherewithal or the desire to go through the transition that is going to be required to go through to be successful post-PDPM.

In other words, there should be a healthy amount of M&A and distressed activity in the near future in the SNF space.

Anyway, back to the debtors: they hope to use the automatic stay provided by the filing to transition underperforming facilities to new operators in coordination with its landlords and sell their profitable facilities. They will use cash collateral to fund the cases.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of Texas (Judge Houser)

  • Funded Capital Structure: $33.06mm RCF, $9.53mm HUD RCF, $4.3mm CCP (second lien) Loan   

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Polsnielli PC (Jeremy Johnson, Trey Monsour, Stephen Astringer, Nicholas Griebel)

    • Conflicts Legal: Huntons Andrews Kurth LLP

    • CRO & Financial Advisor: Newbridge Management LLC (Kevin O’Halloran) & BDO USA LLP

    • Communications Consultants: Sitrick and Company

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large Creditor: Sabra Health Care Reit, Inc.

    • Sponsor: Silver Star Investments LLC

    • Admin Agent & Lender: CIBC Bank USA

      • Legal: Duane Morris LLP (John Weiss, Rosanne Ciambrone) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Matthew Ferris)

⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Fairway Energy LP⛽️

Fairway Energy LP

November 26, 2018

Belligerent week for companies attached to the oil and gas space (see also Waypoint Leasing). Here, Houston-based Fairway Energy LP, which, interestingly (and somewhat oddly), is 28%-owned by the President and Fellows of Harvard College (🤔), is a storage provider for third-party companies engaged in the production, distribution and marketing of crude oil; it is also now in bankruptcy down in the District of Delaware.

Specifically, the company provides undersurface salt cavern storage, storage that has been utilized since the 40s because of its “extremely low risk of leakage through self-sealing under cavern operating pressures.” The company began construction on its 10-million barrel underground storage facility (the “Facility”) in 2015 (rough timing); yet, it has exclusive rights to store in the facility and has otherwise secured the necessary leases to operate in its geographic location. It is also connected to customers via owned and third-party pipeline systems, which enable to the company to take inbound capacity from the (hot) Permian Basin, the Eagle Ford Shale Basin, and Canada/Midcontinent. The pipelines also connect to hubs that connect to “downstream” infrastructure, i.e., refiners, etc.

To get off the ground, the company had a $390mm equity infusion and $80mm in term loans from Riverstone Credit Partners LP. The company has been operating off of credit agreement amendments now for months, however, given operational and market issues that impeded their use of the Facility and hampered liquidity. Per the company:

For the nine (9) months ended September 30, 2018, Fairway had an operating loss of $38,600,000 (before interest, expense, and other income). Fairway’s financial performance has been negatively affected by (i) reduced and delayed demand for its services, (ii) cost overruns on the Facility, (iii) commercial restrictions on accessing the Facility by existing pipeline connections, and (iv) general market conditions that undermine the demand for crude oil storage.

In other words, a perfect storm posing all sorts of headwinds. These winds, it seems, chilled any potential buyer interest in the Facility: pre-petition efforts to find a buyer, including a stalking horse buyer, proved futile. It seems all of the hopeful and flowery language deployed by the company’s professionals in the First Day Declaration about the usefulness of the Facility isn’t a sentiment shared by any prospective purchasers. Was this whole project a solution in search of a problem? Via the bankruptcy sale process, we’ll soon find out. So, will Riverstone (which is also providing a $20mm DIP credit facility) and the writers of the $390mm of equity checks (read: Harvard).

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware

  • Capital Structure: $94mm debt     

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Patrick Hughes, Martha Wyrick, Kelsey Zottnick) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Edmon Morton, Kenneth Enos, Elizabeth Justison)

    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Gary Barton, Kevin Larin)

    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co./Simmons & Company International

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative Agent under Secured Term Loan Credit Agreement & DIP Lender/Agent: Riverstone Credit Partners LP

      • Legal: White & Case LLP (David Turetsky, Andrew Zatz) & (local) Fox Rothschild LLP (Jeffrey Schlerf)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Cafe Holdings Corp.

Cafe Holdings Corp.

November 15, 2018

Source: Fatz.com

Source: Fatz.com

Anyone interested in a game of hot potato?

Cafe Holdings Corp. is a privately-owned chain of fast casual dining restaurants called Fatz Cafe. Fatz Cafe has 38 locations across 5 states and, as you can surely note from the image above, has an abundance of potato options on its menu. And it, in this scenario, is the hot potato.

The company filed for bankruptcy in the District of South Carolina earlier this week — exhibiting yet another sign, as PETITION has discussed at length previously, that casual dining is a really tough space right now. The company, itself, acknowledges:

Over the past several years, casual dining chains have experienced strong headwinds due to a combination of shifting consumer tastes and preferences, growth in labor and commodity costs, increased competition, and unfavorable lease terms. Indeed, a number of national and regional restaurant chains – including Real Mex Restaurants, certain Applebee’s franchisees, Ignite Restaurant Group, Macaroni Grill, Garden Fresh, Bertucci’s, and Logan’s – have buckled under these secular pressures and were forced to restructure their balance sheets and operations through a chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The company blames its unsustainable $30mm capital structure, “industry-wide challenges, trade market changes and challenges, underperforming strategic initiatives, and unsatisfactory business performance.” All of this is despite efforts to run the typical distressed restaurant playbook: install new management, refinance debt, restructure leases, shutter underperforming locations, deploy overhead rationalization, innovate around new product and promotional strategies, update the menu, invest in tech, renegotiate with vendors, etc. PETITION Note: nothing in the standard playbook can do anything about the fact that there are just far too many dining options available to consumers today. Period. The company’s consolidated adjusted network-wide EBITDA for the 12 months ended September 2018 and the fiscal year ended 2017 were approximately ($635,087) and $1.40 million, respectively.

And so the company turned to the next page in the playbook: a marketed sale. Yet, despite outreach to more than 200 parties, including both potential financial and strategic partners, the company didn’t generate any bids. Then comes the hot potato:

Unfortunately, after months of effort and outreach to more than 200 parties, including both potential financial and strategic purchasers, the Company was not able to obtain any bids for the Fatz assets. Moreover, the Company’s then first lien lender, Madison Capital Funding LLC (“Madison”), informed the Company that it did not wish to offer financing or serve as a stalking horse bidder in a chapter 11 sale process, and ultimately sold its debt position to Shrayne Capital, LLC (“Shrayne”). After further diligence, ultimately Shrayne decided it also did not wish to serve as a stalking horse bidder in a chapter 11 sale process and, in turn, sold its position to Atalaya Capital Management, LP and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Atalaya”), who agreed to provide debtor in possession financing and to serve as a stalking horse bidder in a section 363 sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets.

You have to think that Atalaya Capital Management got that first lien paper at a meaningful discount to face value. Indeed, Shrayne only owned the paper for 5 weeks and then ran for the hills. Atalaya will provide the company with a $3.2mm DIP and, though the company has not filed its bidding procedures or stalking horse asset purchase agreement, presumably credit bid its debt to own the company out of Chapter 11. Now, for the uninitiated, the bankruptcy code permits a creditor to “credit bid” its debt, which is basically, as payment, exchanging a claim for the assets. A creditor can do that to the full extent of the claim, regardless of the the price said creditor paid for that claim. In other words, Atalaya may have paid Shrayne $0.01 for the first lien paper but because the face value of the first lien paper is $9.7mm, Atalaya can, but doesn’t have to, “bid” up to $9.7mm of that claim (like a coupon, in effect) for the company. Alternatively, it can provide the $3.2mm DIP credit facility and just credit bid that amount. There are a number of ways that this can be structured. Suffice it to say that Atalaya will need to infuse the business with capital if it wants it to have a fighting chance but it is under no obligation to cover and pay down the full extent of the debt. Indeed, the junior lenders and the ~63.5% equityholder, Milestone Partners III LP I and II, can effectively kiss their investments goodbye.

Opportunistic players who love feasting on the restaurant space will continue to have an abundance of opportunities like this one.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of South Carolina

  • Capital Structure: $9.7mm first lien (Atalaya Capital Management), $2mm second lien, $17.5mm mezzanine unsecured loan, $1.9mm unsecured subordinated note

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Ian Peck, J. Fraser Murphy, David Staab) and (local) McNair Law Firm PA (Michael Weaver, Robin Stanton, Weyman Carter)

    • Financial Advisor: Loughlin Management Partners & Co.

    • Investment Banker: Duff & Phelps LLC (Vin Batra)

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano & Company Inc. (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

Updated 11/17/18

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Republic Metals Refining Corporation

Source: Pexels.com

Source: Pexels.com

November 2, 2018

Republic Metals Refining Corporation (and affiliates), a Miami-based family-owned refiner of gold and silver, filed for bankruptcy to run an orderly sale process of their assets and operations. Last spring, the debtors discovered “a significant discrepancy” in their inventory accounting that, ultimately, led to summer-time default notices from their various senior lenders. The lenders, however, were mostly kept at bay until the filing because the debtors appeared, on multiple occasions, to be close to a going concern sale.

Close. But no cigar.

In the absence of a pre-petition buyer and/or stalking horse bidder, the debtors will now continue their potential sale process or, alternatively, engage in a process to liquidate. The debtors have an agreement with their senior lenders for the consensual use of cash collateral for a short period to attempt a sale, liquidate, and implement a plan for the wind down of the debtors’ estates.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York

  • Capital Structure: $177mm senior debt

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Akerman LLP (Susan Balaschak, Andrea Hartley, Katherine Fackler, John Mitchell, Esther McKean)

    • Financial Advisor: Paladin Management Group LLC (Scott Avila)

    • Investment Banker: SSG Capital Advisors LLC

    • Claims Agent: Donlin Recano (*click on company name above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Senior Lender: ICBC Standard Bank Plc

      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (J. Frasher Murphy, Eli Columbus, Geoffrey Raicht)

    • Senior Lenders: Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., New York Branch, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., Bank Hapoalim B.M., Mitsubishi International Corporation, Techemet Metal Trading LLC, Woodforest National Bank, and Bank Leumi USA.

      • Legal: Luskin Stern & Eisler LLP (Richard Stern, Alex Talesnick)

New Chapter 11 Filing - Red Fork (USA) Investments Inc.

8/7/18

Red Fork (USA) Investments Inc., a Texas-headquartered oil and gas exploration and production company focused on five counties in Oklahoma, filed for bankruptcy after capitulating under the weight of its debt and inability to generate enough revenue to cover it. The company is also the subject of a number of legal actions asserting that the company owned and/or operated saltwater disposal wells that "caused or contributed" to certain earthquakes. Given the costs of the latter and the lack of revenue from E&P initiatives, the company commenced its chapter 11 cases. 

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of Texas 
  • Capital Structure: $119.5mm debt (Guggenheim Corporate Funding LLC)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Dykema Gossett PLLC (Deborah Williamson, Patrick Huffstickler, Jesse Moore)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Independent Board Director: Eugene Davis
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Prepetition Secured Lenders: Guggenheim Corporate Funding LLC
      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Martha Wyrick, Matthew Ferris)

New Chapter 22 Filing - Geokinetics Inc.

Geokinetics Inc.

6/25/18

Just when we thought companies had mysteriously figured out how to stay out of bankruptcy court, alas, a filing!

And just when we thought oil and gas-related distress had ridden off into the proverbial Texan sunset, in walks Houston-based geophysical services provider Geokinetics Inc. into the Southern District of Texas with a plan to sell substantially all of its assets to (one-time bankruptcy candidate) SAE Exploration Inc. for $20mm. Looks like the oil and gas downturn still has some appetite for prey. And it must be tasty prey: this is the second time in four years that this company is in bankruptcy. #Scarlet22. Indeed, this company is so good at bankruptcy that, the first time, it emerged from chapter 11 a full year before it even confirmed its plan!! From paragraph 24 of the First Day Declaration:

"On March 10, 2014, GOK and certain affiliated subsidiaries confirmed a prepackaged chapter 11 plan of reorganization in the District of Delaware. Pursuant to the Plan, GOK equitized over $300 million of debt and paid off its revolving credit facility. On May 10, 2013, GOK and certain affiliated subsidiaries emerged from chapter 11."

And we thought Westworld had mind-bending timelines. Whoops. 

The company blames the prolonged downturn and certain discreet "operational difficulties" that resulted in uncollectable receivables for its bankruptcy. Wanting to jump ship as the iceberg approached, Wells Fargo sought to minimize its exposure but the company and its bankers, Moelis, weren't able to find a suitable secured loan facility to refinance its revolving loan. So Moelis toggled to "strategic alternatives" mode which, seemingly, included dumping this turd on unsuspecting public equity investors as the company -- under the guidance of Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson -- filed a confidential S-1 under the JOBS Act. Sounds a lot like Domo Inc. Or Tintri Inc., for that matter. #HailMary

Obviously the company didn't IPO. Instead, it continued to bleed cash. Ascribe Capital replaced Wells Fargo and funded bridge loans for some time until they were no longer willing to perform triage. The company and its advisors stepped on the gas, lined up the stalking horse bidder, and secured interest in a $15mm DIP credit facility -- from Whitebox Advisors and Highbridge Capital, two funds that are stakeholders in the stalking horse bidder -- and filed for bankruptcy. The proceeds of the DIP will be used, in part, to pay off Ascribe's bridge loans. 

Meanwhile, remember that IPO? It seems the company thought that that was a gigantic waste of time: among the top creditors are Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson LLP and Moelis & Co. ($MO). Savage. 

  • Jurisdiction: S.D of Texas (Judge Jones)
  • Capital Structure: $15.6mm Term Loan A (Ascribe Capital, Wilmington Trust), $6.8mm RCF (Ascribe Capital, Wilmington Trust)
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Porter & Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Joshua Wolfshohl, Aaron Power)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc. 
    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. 
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ascribe Investments LLC
      • Legal: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (Michael Torkin, Bryce Friedman, Randi Lynn Veenstra, Megan Tweed, Sandeep Qusba, Yun Joo Lim) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Martha Wyrick)
    • SAExploration Inc.
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Sarah Link Schultz, Eric Seitz)
    • DIP Lenders: Whitebox Advisors LLC, Highbridge Capital Management LLC
      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Andreas Andromalos, Steven Levine, Jeffrey Jonas, Robert Stark, Kimberly Cohen)

Updated 6/26 6:54 PT

New Chapter 11 Filing - iHeartMedia Inc.

iHeartMedia Inc.

3/14/18

iHeartMedia Inc., a leading global media company specializing in radio, outdoor, mobile, social, live media, on-demand entertainment and more, has filed for bankruptcy -- finally succumbing to its $20 billion of debt ($16 billion funded) and $1.4 billion of cash interest in 2017. WOWSERS. The company purports to have "an agreement in principle with the majority of [its] creditors and [its] financial sponsors that reflects widespread support across the capital structure for a comprehensive plan to restructure...$10 billion..." of debt.

The company notes $3.6 billion of revenue and unparalleled monthly reach ((we'll have more to say about this in this Sunday's Members-only newsletter (3/18/18) - this claim deserves an asterisk)). 

Still, as it also notes, the company faces significant headwinds. It states in its First Day Declaration,

"Among other factors, the global economic downturn that began in 2008 resulted in a decline in advertising and marketing spending by the Debtors’ customers, which resulted in a corresponding decline in advertising revenues across the Debtors’ business. Then, as the economy recovered, the Debtors’ industry faced new and intense competition from the rapidly-growing internet and digital advertising industry and the entry of on-demand streaming services, both of which siphoned off the share of advertiser revenues allocated by agencies and brands to broadcast radio. The Debtors have taken various operational steps to stem the negative effect of these trends; among other initiatives, the Debtors have successfully developed emerging platforms including its industry-leading iHeartRadio digital platform and nationally-recognized iHeartRadio-branded live events that are audio and video streamed and televised nationwide."

The company ought to expect these trends to continue.

Large creditors include Cumulus Media Inc. (~$5.6 million...yikes) and Spotify (~$2 million).  

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure:    
Screen Shot 2018-03-15 at 2.28.26 PM.png

 

  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Brian Wolfe, William Guerrieri, Christopher Marcus, Stephen Hackney, Richard U.S. Howell, Benjamin Rhode, AnnElyse Gibbons) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
    • Financial Advisor to the Company: Moelis & Co. 
      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Caroline Reckler, Matthew Warren)
    • Restructuring Advisor to the Company: Alvarez & Marsal LLC
    • Legal for the Independent Directors: Munger Tolles & Olson LLP (Kevin Allred, Seth Goldman, Thomas Walper, John Spiegel)
    • Financial Advisor to the Independent Directors: Perella Weinberg Partners LP
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Large Equity Holders: Bain Capital & Thomas H. Lee Partners
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Christopher Lopez, Gabriel Morgan)
    • Potential Buyer: Liberty Media Corporation & Sirius XM Holdings Inc.
      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Stephen Karotkin, Ray Schrock, Alfredo Perez)
    • Successor Trustee for the 6.875% '18 Senior Notes and 7.25% '27 Senior Notes: Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Thomas Lauria, Jason Zakia, Erin Rosenberg, J. Christopher Shore, Harrison Denman, Michele Meises, Mark Franke, Michael Garza) & Pryor Cashman LLP (Seth Lieberman, Patrick Sibley, Matthew Silverman) & (local) Andrews Kurth Kenyon LLP (Robin Russell, Timothy A. Davidson II, Ashley Harper)
    • Successor Trustee for the 11.25% '21 Priority Guaranty Notes
      • Legal: Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (Eric Wilson, Benjamin Feder, Kristin Elliott)
    • Successor Trustee for the 14.00% Senior Notes due 2021
      • Legal: Norton Rose Fulbright (US) LLP (Jason Boland, Christy Rivera, Marian Baldwin Fuerst)
    • Term Loan/PGN Group
      • Legal: Jones Day (Thomas Howley, Bruce Bennett, Joshua Mester)
    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Loan Lenders
      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Christopher Odell, Hannah Sibiski) 
    • TPG Specialty Lending Inc.
      • Legal: Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Adam Harris, David Hillman, James Bentley) & (local) Jones Walker LLP (Joseph Bain, Laura Ashley) 
    • Special Committees of the Board of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.
      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Matthew Feldman, Paul Shalhoub, Christopher Koenig, Jennifer Jay Hardy)
    • Ad Hoc Committee of 14% Senior Noteholders of iHeart Communications
      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Robert Klyman, Matt Williams, Keith Martorana, Matthew Porcelli) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Aaron Power, Samuel Spiers)
    • 9.00% Priority Guarantee Notes due 2019 Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA
      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Fliman, Brian Wells) & (local) Haynes and Boone, LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Martha Wyrick, Kelsey Zottnick)
    • Citibank N.A.
      • Legal: Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP (Joel Levitin, Richard Stieglitz Jr.) & (local) Locke Lord LLP (Berry Spears)
    • Delaware Trust Company
      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Benjamin Finestone, K. John Shaffer, Monica Tarazi, Victor Noskov)
    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Ira Dizengoff, Philip Dublin, Naomi Moss, Charles Gibbs, Marty Brimmage)

Updated 3/30/18

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - A'GACI LLC

A'GACI LLC

  • 1/9/17 Recap: Texas-based fast-fashion retailer of women's apparel and accessories filed for bankruptcy because, well, retail retail retail. Happy New Year, everyone! The company's "target demographic is confident women who are comfortable with their appearance and enjoy showcasing their look." Hmmm. From that description, we would have expected graphics of models that aren't just a size 0 (see below), but we digress. The 76-store company specializes in clearance pricing discounts to ship merchandise quickly and innovate with the trends; it did $136.2mm of gross sales in the fiscal period ended 11/25. 9.4% of that was e-commerce. The company blames its bankruptcy filing on (i) "unsuccessful brick and mortar expansion efforts," (ii) the move to online shopping, (iii) difficulty with merchandising and inventory management, and (iv) weather. On that last point, 24 stores were at least temporarily closed due to hurricanes in '17 (in Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico, with two stores in PR still closed), resulting in a $7.2mm EBITDA hit for the year. The company pursued a number of operational initiatives pre-petition including rent-concession negotiations with landlords. The landlords apparently wouldn't play ball. Now twelve of them will see their leases rejected: the company has already vacated the premises effective 1/8. And a liquidation agent has been hired. In total, "at least 49 underperforming brick and mortar store locations" may be closed.  Contemporaneously with the lease review and liquidation process, the company will attempt a refinancing or sale of the company while enjoying the "breathing spell" afforded by bankruptcy. The company intends to use cash collateral to finance the case.    
  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of Texas 
  • Capital Structure: $10mm '18 RCF (JPMorgan Chase Bank NA), $4.265mm TL (Bank of America NA)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Ian Peck, David Staab)
    • Financial Advisor: Berkeley Research Group LLC
    • Investment Banker: SSG Advisors LLC 
    • Real Estate Agent: A&G Realty Partners LLC
    • Liquidation Agent: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

New Chapter 11 Filing - Expro Holdings US Inc.

Expro Holdings US Inc.

  • 12/18/17 Recap: Servicer to offshore, deepwater and other "technically challenging environments" filed a prepackaged bankruptcy to eliminate its entire $1.4b of debt (and attendant interest expense) via equity conversion in a balance sheet deleveraging transaction. Why did it file for bankruptcy? Private equity, of course. In 2008, the company turned down an acquisition offer from Halliburton in favor of a competing bid from a private equity group for $3.2b in cash, the largest LBO in the UK in 2008. Ok, so we're only half serious. Naturally, the oil and gas downturn led to a marked decline in demand for Expro's services. Psst: the PE-infused debt. The senior lenders will get the equity in the reorganized company while mezz loan holders and equity holders will get warrants. The company has lined up a $145mm DIP credit facility.
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $125mm RCF (HSBC Bank USA), $1.261b TL, $18mm Mezz Loan.      
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Alice Eaton, Sarah Harnett, Alexander Woolverton) & Jackson Walker LLP (Patricia Tomasco, Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (Julie Hertzberg, Jay Herriman)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. 
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Mezzanine Facility Agreement Agent: Bank of New York Mellon
    • Credit Agreement Admin Agent: HSBC Bank USA
    • RCF Lenders
      • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders
      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, James McClammy, Christopher Robertson) & (local) Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr., Kelli Norfleet, Kelsey Zottnick)
      • Financial Advisor: Rothschild Inc.
    • Ad Hoc Group of Shareholders (Goldman Sachs, HPS Investment Partners LLC, KKR, Candover/Arle, Park Square)
      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP
      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

New Chapter 11 Filing - FirstRain Inc.

FirstRain, Inc.

  • 6/5/17 Recap: California-based enterprise SaaS company that services Fortune 1000 companies with its software and analytics-driven apps to discover/read/discern/summarize useful insights about other companies/markets filed a prepackaged bankruptcy. The plan contemplates $7.5mm of total consideration including a $4mm DIP credit facility and the plan is to pay the DIP Lender in full, general unsecureds in full and provide the prepetition lender a partial recovery. ESW Capital LLC will own the company on the backend of the restructuring.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)
  • Capital Structure: $5.5mm secured debt (Pacific Western Bank as successor to Square 1 Bank)    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: The Rosner Law Group LLC (Frederick Rosner, Scott James Leonhardt)
    • Investment Banker: Atlas Technology Group LLC
    • Claims Agent: JND Legal Administration (*click on company name above for free docket access)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • DIP Lender: ESW Capital LLC
      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Trevor Hoffman, Arsalan Muhammad) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Derek Abbott, Matthew Talmo)
    • Prepetition Lender: Pacific Western Bank
      • Legal: Levy Small & Lallas (Leo Plotkin) & (local) Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole LLP (William Chipman Jr.) 

Updated 7/18/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - Ignite Restaurant Group

Ignite Restaurant Group

  • 6/6/17 Recap: Publicly-traded ($IRG) Houston-based owner of 112 Joe's Crab Shack locations and 25 Brick House Tavern + Tap locations filed for bankruptcy because people can't tear their eyes off of whatever mobile device they're towing around long enough to sit at a casual dining spot. "The market for casual dining has been deteriorating for some time." No kidding, dudes. That said, someone clearly still believes in the space as the company has lined up a stalking horse bidder to purchase the company in bankruptcy for $50mm and some assumed liabilities (subject to deductions/increases). That "someone" is KRG Acquisitions Co LLC, an affiliate of Kelly Investment Group. Maybe it's the "'I'm relaxed' restaurant experience" that the buyer finds compelling...? (Serious question: is weed legal in Texas yet?). Anyway, good luck with that. 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $30mm RCF & $165mm TL (Credit Suisse AG)     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: King & Spalding LLP (Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Edward Ripley, Elizabeth Dechant)
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal LLC (John Tibus)
    • Investment Banker: Piper Jaffray & Co. (Richard Shinder, Teri Stratton)
    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC 
    • Claims Agent: Garden City Group LLC (*click on company name above for the free docket)
    • Other Parties in Interest:
      • Credit Suisse AG
        • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Keith Simon, David Hammerman, Hugh Murtagh) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins)
      • KRG Acquisition Co LLC 
        • Legal: Goldberg Kohn Ltd. (Randall Klein, Prisca Kim) & (local) Okin Adams LLP (Matthew Okin, Ryan O'Connor)
      • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
        • Legal: Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP (Jeffrey Pomerantz, Bradford Sandler) & (local) Cole Schotz PC (Michael Warner)
      • Potential Buyer: Landry's Inc.
        • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Patrick Hughes, Arsalan Muhammad, Jonathan Pressment, Sarah Jacobson)

Updated 7/17/17 11:23 am CT

New Chapter 22 Filing - Venoco LLC

Venoco LLC

  • 4/17/17 Recap: Denver-based E&P company that FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY LITERALLY 13 MONTHS AGO and emerged 9 months ago filed for bankruptcy again because of "material operational and regulatory setbacks." The prior bankruptcy eliminated nearly $1b of debt and the restructuring was predicated upon various operational objectives. First, the Plains All American Pipleine line 901 going online. Well, that didn't happen. Second, regulatory approval of "the highly anticipated lease line adjustment." Spoiler alert: that didn't happen either. Third, the extension of the lease term by the Beverly Hills Unified School District of an onshore facility beyond its 12/16 expiration date. Any guesses what happened there? Right, nada. And, fourth, an insurer required that the company post an additional $35mm in collateral to support bonds issued by it. You guessed it: the company didn't have the money for that either which, of course, would have effectively terminated operations altogether. Hence, the bankruptcy filing.
  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Bracewell LLP (Robert Burns, Robin Miles, David Riley, Mark Dendinger, Jason Hutt) & (local) Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Marcy McLaughlin)
    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Zolfo Cooper LLC (Bret Fernandes)
    • Investment Banker: Seaport Global Securities LLC
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Board of Directors: Mark DePuy, Gene Davis, Daniel Vogel, Jeffrey Bartlett, Chris Bement, Bill Lockyer
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Significant Shareholders: Apollo Investment Corporation, MAST Capital Management LLC, Candlewood Special Situations Master Fund Ltd.
    • Exxon Mobil Corporation
      • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Charles Beckham, Kelli Norfleet) & (local) Farnan LLP (Michael Farnan)

Updated 4/22/17 

New Chapter 11 Filing - Goodman Networks Inc.

Goodman Networks Inc.

  • 3/13/17 Recap: Frisco Texas-based minority-business-enterprise (MBE) and wireless network and satellite television systems servicer filed a prepackaged chapter 11 case to de-lever its balance sheet by $212.5mm. This is a story, in many respects, about a concentrated revenue base and too much debt. 83% of the company's revenue is attributable to AT&T and "substantial completion of AT&T's 4G network build-out has diminished the associated demand for Goodman's services." Consequently, the company wasn't generating enough revenue to sustain its capital structure. Now, holders of the secured debt will receive cash, $112.5mm of new debt, PIK preferred stock and common stock. To preserve the MBE status, current equity will get PIK preferred stock and 50.1% of the common stock. Query whether that level of retained equity is a lesson to those who invested in this MBE structure. 
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $25mm RCF (MidCap Financial Trust), $325mm '18 12.125 % secured notes (Wells Fargo)
  • Company Professionals: 
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Joshua Sussberg, Joseph Graham, Laura Krucks, Alexander Cross) & (local) Haynes & Boone LLP (Stephen Pezanosky, Kelli Norfleet)
    • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting (John Debus)
    • Investment Banker: June Creek Interests (Andy Jent)
    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien Bondholders (Alden Global, AllianceBernstein Global LP, J.P. Morgan Investment Management Inc., J.P Morgan Chase Bank N.A., Phoenix Investment Advisor LLC, Principal Global Investors LLC, Invesco Senior Secured Management Inc., Sound Point Capital Management LP)
      • Legal: Akin Gump (Michael Stamer, Charles Gibbs, Meredith Lahaie, Sara Brauner)
      • Financial: Greenhill & Co. Inc.
  • Wells Fargo
    • Legal: Reed Smith LLP (Eric Schaffer, Lloyd Lim, Maura Nuno)
  • AT&T Corp.
    • Legal: Sidley Austin LLP (Brian Lohan)

Updated 3/28/17

New Chapter 11 Filing - EMAS Chiyoda Subsea Limited

EMAS Chiyoda Subsea Limited

  • 2/28/17 Recap: Some offshore blood here. The Houston-based deepwater subsea construction service company (which sounds pretty bada$$ btw) suffered from declining revenue and cash flow (read: declining demand), high costs and increasingly limited access to credit. Hence, bankruptcy. With the benefit of a $90mm dual-tranche DIP, the Company will sell its marine base in Texas and otherwise use bankruptcy to restructure the balance sheet.
  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas
  • Capital Structure: $480mm secured debt & $175mm unsecured debt    
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Skadden Arps (George Panagakis, Justin Winerman, Robert Fitzgerald) & (local) Porter Hedges LLP (John Higgins, Joshua Wolfshohl, Eric English, Brandon Tittle)
    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on company name for docket)
  • Other Parties in Interest:
    • Tranche A Lender (Subsea 7 Finance UK PLC)
      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Mark Liscio) & (local) Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Linda Martin)
    • Tranche B Lender (Chiyoda Corp.)
      • Legal: White & Case LLP (Roberto Kampfner) & (local) Haynes & Boone LLP (Charles Beckham Jr.)
    • DNB Bank ASA, Singapore Branch (agent and security trustee)
      • Legal: Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy (Dennis Dunne, Tyson Lomazow, Nelly Almeida) & (local) Haynes & Boone LLP (Bradley Foxman)

Updated 3/26/17