🚀New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy - Vector Launch Inc.🚀

Vector Launch Inc.

December 13, 2019

🚀Another Example of the Tech Hype Machine Getting a Fast and Furious Reality Check (Short “Founder Friendly?”; Long #BustedTech)🚀

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We’ve been rather bored with energy and retail distress these days and so we looked on with great interest when Arizona-based Vector Launch Inc. and its subsidiary, Garvey Spacecraft Corporation, filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Sure, sure, it’s not a big name like McDermott International ($MDR) — the excitement there awaits us in ‘20 — but it’s meaningful nonetheless. Why? Because Sand Hill Road is known for its moonshots. And they often come crashing down to earth. Just not usually in bankruptcy court.

Yet this one did. Vector, a space technology company that was producing rockets and satellite computing technology, has an interesting history. Founded in 2016 by two of the original team members behind Elon Musk’s SpaceX, the company shared Mr. Musk’s vision and penchant for exaggeration. The company launched in 2016 and, in retrospect, the laudatory coverage of the ambition is laughable. Here’s Techcrunch:

With small rockets carrying single 20-40 kg payloads launching weekly or even every few days, the company can be flexible with both prices and timetables. Such small satellites are a growing business: 175 were launched in 2015 alone, and there’s plenty of room to grow. It’ll still be expensive, of course, and you won’t be able to just buy a Thursday afternoon express ticket to low earth orbit — yet.

Customers will, however, reap other benefits. There are less restrictions on space: no more having to package your satellite or craft into a launch container so it fits into a slot inside a crowded space bus. Less of a wait between build and launch means hardware can be finalized weeks, not years, in advance — and expensive satellites aren’t sitting in warehouses waiting for their turn to go live and get that sweet return on investment.

Sounds dope AF, we admit. Even more exciting, Techcrunch reported that Vector hoped to make its first real flights in 2017. At the time, it had raised government grant money (DOD and NASA) and a small amount of angel money. Straight out of the Musk playbook: fund your company and get rich off of the government teat. Brilliant.

But you don’t get government money without pedigreed founders and highfalutin promises to change the world (literally via rockets). Just imagine how that package looks to the outside investment community.

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Investors are knocking down the front door looking to get in, he said, though he declined to name any. Perhaps they smell profitability: Vector’s business plan has it cash positive after just a few launches.

Oof. That bit looks REALLLLLLY REALLLLLY bad now, huh? It gets worse.

Here are some of the things that subsequently transpired:

  • The company finalized an agreement to conduct 21 launches for Finland-based Iceye’s commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite constellation. 👍

  • Quartz published a flattering piece about the shift to smaller rockets, giving heavy prominence to Vector. 👍

  • The company won $2.5mm worth of contracts from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and NASA. 👍

  • The company announced a Tucson headquarters and manufacturing plant, celebrating the potential creation of 200 jobs with the hope of reaching as many as 500; the “direct economic impact of the facility could be $290 million over five years” (citing $2.5mm in contracts and revenue in ‘16 and $160mm-worth of signed contracts for launches “once the plant starts producing rockets…”). 👍

  • Vector announced “an agreement with York Space Systems, an aerospace company specializing in small and medium class spacecraft, to conduct six satellite launches from 2019 through 2022 with the option for 14 additional launches”; the contract was reportedly worth a staggering $60mm. 👍

These guys were rockin’ and rollin'.

But, wait, there’s more!

  • After several more government grants and a number of angel infusions, the company finally raised a $21mm Series A round in June 2017 — which included money from vaunted Silicon Valley venture capital firm, Sequoia Capital (as well as Shasta Ventures and Lightspeed).

  • By August of 2017, the hype machine was in full effect. Here is a CNBC piece championing the company’s first completed “mission.” Around the same time, Techcrunch, The Los Angeles Times and Ars Technica all wrote about the promise of small rockets. Size doesn’t matter, they said!!

  • By October 2018, the company was back fundraising; it secured a $70mm Series B raise from Kodem Growth PartnersMorgan Stanley Alternative Investment Partners and participation from its existing trio of VC firms. Now nothing and nobody could get in these guys’ way!!!!!

Well, except Sequoia Capital.

Per the company’s CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY PAPERS(!!!!):

“In early August 2019, a member of Vector’s board of directors…appointed by Sequoia…abruptly resigned and informed Vector that Sequoia had decided to no longer support Vector via funding for future operations. Almost immediately after the…resignation, the Debtors’ CEO resigned. The fallout from Sequoia’s decision and the CEO’s resignation spooked the investor community and doomed the Debtors’ efforts to raise additional capital.”

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There’s more:

These events could not have been timed more poorly for the Debtors. In addition to preventing the Debtors from attracting new capital, they occurred when the debtors had almost expended all of the capital from their prior capital raises. Indeed, the Debtors’ cash balances barely exceeded their secured debt, which principal amount totaled $11.5 million.

HOLD ON. So, the company lit $70mm of new funding on fire in less than a year and didn’t have enough money to clear its secured debt. And SECURED DEBT? Where was the press release for that?!?!

After evaluating its options, the Board determined that if it did not immediately cease operations, the Debtors would be unable to pay their employees if their secured lenders declared a default and froze the Debtors’ cash (which is precisely what occurred). With no access to capital to fund ongoing business needs and to satisfy the Debtors’ outstanding secured debt, the Board voted to cease operations and to terminate most of the Debtors’ employees and pay all owed wages…

This ain’t exactly WeWork but still. Life comes at you fast: one moment you’re a media darling garnering all kinds of favorable coverage, raising millions upon million of dollars with investors “knocking down the door” and, the next, your pesky venture capitalists are pulling the plug and high-tailing for the exits!

Less than two weeks later, the Debtors’ secured lenders froze the approximately $12 million in cash deposited in the Debtors’ bank accounts as expected. The Debtors’ secured lenders subsequently swept the cash from Debtors’ bank accounts, leaving the Debtors with no cash, a single employee (the acting CEO), and, after assessing fees and other charges, approximately $500k in secured debt. The Debtors’ remaining assets essentially consisted of three leased facilities, transporter-erector launcher, launch vehicle parts (including rocket engines and ground support equipment), satellite computer technology, patents, and other intellectual property.

So much to unpack here.

First, what the hell is a “transporter-erector launcher” and where does Johnny get one?

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Second, at what point did this thing sh*t the bed so badly that it needed to tap a credit facility? That it had to (maybe?) jettison its founder-CEO?? Tap bridge financing???

It turns out that TriplePoint Capital LLC committed to lend the company $15mm back in October 2018 alongside the company’s Series B raise (PETITION Note: this is not in and of itself crazy…many startups take on venture debt in conjunction with a fundraise generally as a safety net; usually they hope NOT to use it because they’ll just go on to their next equity raise). The loan was secured by basically all of the company’s collateral and was structured as two draws in equal $7.5mm installments. With the sweep, TriplePoint ensured that its claim would be minimized: at the time of filing, they are owed $500k.

To bridge to a filing, the company secured a $500k bridge loan from Lockheed Martin Corporation — now the proposed stalking horse purchaser. The company also issued $1.6mm in convertible notes in connection with what it thought would be a Series C raise prior to Sequoia backing out. Whoops.

The big question, then, is why did Sequoia so abruptly quit the board and split?* Why, then, did the CEO, James Cantrell, quit the next day? It sounds like there’s a lot more here to uncover:

Mr. Cantrell subsequently filed a lawsuit against Vector claiming that he was terminated. The Debtors dispute Mr. Cantrell’s claims regarding his departure. Moreover, the Debtors believe they hold claims against Mr. Cantrell that they intend to pursue for the benefit of the Debtors’ creditors.

Some shady-a$$ sh*t must’ve been discovered around August 5. Just as fervently as investors were, at one point, trying to invest in this company, parties in interest were now eager to save themselves. Silicon Valley Bank (over $4mm owed) and TriplePoint issued notices of default and swept the Debtors’ cash (PETITION Note: that’s why they say that possession is half the battle!).

Lockheed is the White Knight here salvaging what’s left of this hot mess. It provided the bridge loan; it will provide a $2.5mm DIP (yay bankruptcy pros getting paid!); and it will purchase the debtors’ GalacticSky assets for $4.25mm. The offer is cash and equity.

Interestingly, despite all of this, optimism abounds here. The debtors note that they hope to pursue the Lockheed sale followed by other sales of assets:

If consummated, the Debtors believe that the proceeds from Sales will provide for payment in full of the Debtors’ secured obligations, administrative expense claims, and priority claims. In addition, the debtors believe there will be sufficient funds for (i) a liquidation trust to pursue the Debtors’ claims against certain parties, including its former CEO and (ii) distributions to general unsecured creditors.

That claim against the former CEO ought to be interesting. Stay tuned.😬

*Axios’ Dan Primack wrote:

Per a source: Sequoia decided to stop investing due to a high burn rate and the company not meeting projections. That decision was followed by two lenders opting against giving Vector new debt lines — something Sequoia didn't instruct, but which Vector nonetheless blames on the VC firm.

Case Data:

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Dorsey)

  • Capital Structure: $500k (TriplePoint Capital LLC), $500k (Lockheed Martin)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (Hugh Ray III, Jason Sharp, William Hotze) & Sullivan Hazeltine Allinson LLC (Elihu Allinson Ill)

    • Financial Advisor: Winter Harbor LLC (Shaun Martin)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition Lender ($500k): TriplePoint Capital LLC

      • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Darren Azman, Daniel Thomson) & Bayard PA (Justin Alberto)

    • Prepetition Lender ($500k) & Stalking Horse Purchaser ($2.5mm): Lockheed Martin Corporation

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells LLP (Christopher Donoho, John Beck, Jennifer Lee & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Andrew Remming, Paige Topper)

    • Large Equityholders: Kodem Growth Partners, Sequoia Capital, Shasta Ventures V LP, Lightspeed Venture Partners XI LP, DNX Ventures

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Valcor Engineering Corporation; (ii) Rincon Etal Investments, Inc.; (iii) Expanding TFO I, LP; (iv) M4 Engineering Inc., and (v) Gas Innovations

      • Brown Rudnick LLP (Bennett Silverberg, Kenneth Aulet) & Potter Anderson & Corroon (Christopher Samis, L. Katherine Good, D. Ryan Slaugh)

      • Financial Advisor: Dundon Advisors LLC (Matthew Dundon, Philip Preis)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA - Toys "R" Us Inc.

Toys "R" Us Inc.

  • 9/19/17 Recap: So. Much. To. Unpack. Here. We've previously discussed the run-up to this massive chapter 11 bankruptcy filing here and here. Still, suffice it to say that, unlike many of the other retailers that have predictably filed for bankruptcy thus far in 2017, this one was different. This one seemingly came out of nowhere - particularly given the proximity to the holiday shopping season. Before we note what this case is, lets briefly cover what it isn't and clear the noise that is pervasive on the likes of Twitter: this is NOT "RIP" Toys "R" Us. We don't get overly sentimental usually but the papers filed with the bankruptcy court were well-written and touching: this is a store, a brand, that means a lot to a lot of people. And it's not going anywhere (the company will have its challenges to assure people that this is the case). This is a financial restructuring not a liquidation: the company simply hasn't been able to evolve while paying $400mm in annual interest expense on over $5b of private equity infused debt. Plain and simple. Yes, there are other challenges (blah blah blah, Amazon), but with that debt overhang, it appears the company hasn't been able to confront them (PETITION side note: an ill-conceived deal with Amazon 18 years ago is mind-blowing when viewed from the perspective of Amazon's long game). With this filing, the company is signaling that the time for short term band-aids to address its capital structure is over. Now, "[t]he time for change, and reinvestment in operations, has come." Decisive. Management isn't messing around anymore. With a reduction in debt, the company will be unshackled and able to focus on "general upkeep and the condition of...stores, [its] inability to provide expedited shipping options, and [its] lack of a subscription-based delivery service." Indeed, the company intends to use a $3.1b debtor-in-possession credit facility to begin investing in modernization immediately.
  • Interesting Facts:
    • Toy Manufacturers: Mattel ($MAT)(approx $136mm), Hasbro ($HAB) (approx $59mm) & Lego (approx $31.5mm) are among the top general unsecured creditors of the company. Mattel and Hasbro's stock traded down quite a bit yesterday on the rampant news of this filing. Query whether any of the $325mm of requested critical vendor money will apply to these companies.
    • The Power of the Media (read: NOT "fake news"): This CNBC piece helped push the company into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy professionals were retained in July (or earlier in the case of Lazard) to pursue capital structure solutions. In August the company engaged with some of its lenders. But then "...a news story published on September 6, 2017, reporting that the Debtors were considering a chapter 11 filing, started a dangerous game of dominos: within a week of its publication, nearly 40 percent of the Company’s domestic and international product vendors refused to ship product without cash on delivery, cash in advance, or, in some cases, payment of all outstanding obligations. Further, many of the credit insurers and factoring parties that support critical Toys “R” Us vendors withdrew support. Given the Company’s historic average of 60-day trade terms, payment of cash on delivery would require the Debtors to immediately obtain a significant amount—over $1.0 billion—of new liquidity." 
    • Revenue. The company generates 40% of its annual revenue during the holiday season.
    • Footprint. The company has approximately 1,697 stores and 257 licensed stores in 38 countries, plus additional e-commerce sites in various countries. The company has been shedding burdensome above-market leases and combining its Babies and Toys shops under one roof; it intends to continue its review of its real estate portfolio. Read: there WILL be store closures.
    • Eff the Competition. Toys has some choice words for its competition embedded in its bankruptcy papers; it accuses Walmart ($WMT) and Target ($TGT)(the "big box retailers") of slashing prices on toys and using toys as a loss leader to get bodies in doors; it further notes that "retailers such as Amazon are not concerned with making a profit at this juncture, rendering their pricing model impossible to compete with..." ($AMZN). Yikes. 
    • Experiential Retail. The company intends to invest in the "shopping experience" which will include (i) interactive spaces with rooms to use for parties, (ii) live product demonstrations put on by trained employees, and (iii) the freedom for employees to remove product from boxes to let kids play with the latest toys. And...wait for it...AUGMENTED REALITY. Boom. Toysrus.ar and Toysrus.ai here we come. 
  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Phillips)
  • Capital Structure: see below     
  • Company Professionals:
    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jamie Sprayragen, Anup Sathy, Edward Sassower, Chad Husnick, Joshua Sussberg, Robert Britton, Emily Geier) & (local) Kutak Rock LLP (Michael A. Condyles, 
      Peter J. Barrett, Jeremy S. Williams) & (Canadian counsel) Goodmans LLP
    • Legal to the Independent Board of Directors: Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
    • Financial Advisor: Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC (Jeffrey Stegenga, Jonathan Goulding, Tom Behnke, Cari Turner, Jim Grover, Arjun Lal, Doug Lewandowski, Bobby Hoernschemeyer, Scott Safron, Kara Harmon, Nick Cherry, Adam Fialkowski)
    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (David Kurtz)
    • Real Estate Consultant: A&G Realty Partners LLC (Andrew Graiser)
    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on company name above for free docket access)
    • Communications Consultant: Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
  • Other Parties in Interest:
  • ABL/FILO DIP Admin Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA
    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Marshall Heubner, Brian Resnick, Eli Vonnegut, Veerle Roovers) & (local) Hunton & Williams LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry (Toby) Long III, Justin Paget)
  • DIP Admin Agent (Toys DE Inc). NexBank SSB & Ad Hoc Group of B-4 Lenders (Angelo Gordon & Co LP; Franklin Mutual Advisors LLC, HPS Investment Partners LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC, Roystone Capital Management LP, and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP)
    • Legal: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (Joshua Feltman, Emil Kleinhaus, Neil Chatani) & (local) McGuireWoods LLP (Dion Hayes, Sarah Bohm, Douglas Foley)
  • Ad Hoc Group of Taj Noteholders.
    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Brian Hermann, Samuel Lovett, Kellie Cairns) & (local) Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Jennifer Wuebker)
  • Steering Committee of B-2 and B-3 Lenders (American Money Management, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, Ellington Management Group LLC, First Trust Advisors L.P., MJX Asset Management LLC, Pacific Coast Bankers Bank, Par-Four Investment Management LLC, Sound Point Capital Management, Taconic Capital Advisors LP).
    • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, D. Tyler Nurnberg, Sarah Gryll, Rosa Evergreen)
  • 12% ’21 Senior Secured Notes Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust, National Association.
    • Legal: Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (Todd Meyers, David Posner, Gianfranco Finizio) & (local) ThompsonMcMullan PC (David Ruby, William Prince IV)
  • Bank of America NA
      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Paul Leake, Shana Elberg, George Howard) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
    • Private Equity Sponsors: Bain Capital Private Equity LP, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ($KKR), and Vornado Realty Trust ($VNO)
  • Large Creditor: Mattel Inc.
    • Legal: Jones Day (Richard Wynne, Erin Brady, Aaron Gober-Sims) & (local) Michael Wilson PLC (Michael Wilson)
  • Large Creditor: LEGO Systems Inc.
    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Kelly DiBlasi) & (local) Walcott Rivers Gates (Cullen Speckhart)
  • Large Creditor: American Greetings Corporation.
    • Legal: Baker & Hosteler LLP (Benjamin Irwin, Eric Goodman)
  • Creditor: River Birch Capital
    • Legal: Andrews Kurth & Kenyon LLP (Paul Silverstein)
  • Creditor: Owl Creek Asset Management
    • Legal: Stroock Stroock & Lavan LLP (Samantha Martin)
  • TRU Trust 2016-TOYS, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2016-TOYS acting through Wells Fargo Bank NA
    • Legal: Dechert LLP (Allan Brilliant, Brian Greer, Stephen Wolpert, Humzah Soofi) & (local) Troutman Sanders LLP (Jonathan Hauser)
  • Trustee: Tru Taj DIP Notes (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)
    • Legal: Porter Hedges LLP (Eric English) & (local) Spotts Fain PC (James Donaldson)
  • Committee of Unsecured Creditors (Mattel Inc., Evenflo Company Inc., Simon Property Group, Euler Hermes North America Insurance Co., Veritiv Operating Company, Huffy Corporation, KIMCO Realty, The Bank of New York Mellon, LEGO Systems Inc.)
First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

First Day Declaration

Updated 10/5/17 11:40 am