⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.⛽️

Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc.

Colorado-based Nine Point Energy Holdings Inc. (along with three affiliates, the “debtors”) is and independent oil and gas exploration and production company focused on the Williston Basin in North Dakota and Montana. It is the successor to Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation, which filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2016 and confirmed a plan in March 2017. Four years later, it’s back in bankruptcy court. 😬

Followers of E&P bankruptcies have become accustomed to disputes relating to E&P companies and their midstream gathering, transportation and processing providers. Here, Caliber Midstream Partners LP was the debtors’ largest midstream services provider — “was” being the operative word after the debtors terminated the long-term midstream services agreements on the eve of bankruptcy. The story, however, doesn’t end there.

The debtors are willing to enter into a new arrangement with Caliber going forward. It’s unclear how the new arrangement might differ from the existing arrangement because redaction, redaction, redaction. The economic terms of the contract have not been disclosed. 🤔

And so here we are with another potential “running with the land” scenario. If you’re unfamiliar with what this is, you clearly haven’t been paying attention to E&P bankruptcy cases. Just Google it and you’ll pull up probably 8928394829248929 law firm articles on the topic. As this will be a major driver in the case, it probably makes sense to refresh your recollection.

Why are the debtors in bankruptcy? All of the usual reasons, e.g., the big drop in oil prices thanks to COVID-19 and Russia/OPEC. Nothing really new there.

So what does this filing achieve? For starters, it will give the debtors an opportunity to address the Caliber contracts. Moreover, it will avail the debtors of a DIP facility from their pre-petition lenders in the amount of ~$72mm — $18mm in new money and $54mm on a rollup basis (exclusive of an additional $16.1mm roll-up to account for pre-petition secured swap obligations)(8% interest with 2% commitment fee). Finally, the pre-petition-cum-DIP-lenders have agreed to serve as the stalking horse purchaser of the debtors’ assets with a credit bid floor of $250mm.


Date: March 15, 2021

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

Capital Structure: $256.9mm credit facility, $16.1mm swap obligations

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (Richard Levy, Caroline Reckler, Jonathan Gordon, George Davis, Nacif Taousse, Alistair Fatheazam, Jonathan Weichselbaum, Andrew Sorkin, Heather Waller, Amanda Rose Stanzione, Elizabeth Morris, Sohom Datta) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Michael Nestor, Kara Hammond Coyle, Ashley Jacobs, Jacob Morton)

  • Board of Directors: Patrick Bartels Jr., Dominic Spencer, Frederic Brace, Gary Begeman, Alan Dawes

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (John Castellano)

  • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners LP (John Cesarz)

  • Claims Agent: Stretto (Click here for free docket access)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Pre-petition & DIP Agent: AB Private Credit Investors LLC

    • Legal: Proskauer Rose LLP (Charles Dale, David Hillman, Michael Mervis, Megan Volin, Paul Possinger, Jordan Sazant) & Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Kerri Mumford, Matthew Pierce)

  • Ad Hoc Group of Equityholders: Shenkman Capital Management, JP Morgan Securities LLC, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Chambers Energy Capital

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Jeffrey Pawlitz, Matthew Dunn, Mark Stancil) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (John Knight, Amanda Steele, David Queroli)

  • Midstream Counterparty: Caliber Measurement Services LLC, Caliber Midstream Fresh Water Partners LLC, and Caliber North Dakota LLC

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Alfredo Perez, Brenda Funk, Tristan Sierra, Edward Soto, Lauren Alexander) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Curtis Miller, Taylor Haga, Nader Amer)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - RGN-Group Holdings LLC (d/b/a Regus)

RGN-Group Holdings LLC

We have yet to really see it run through the system but there’s no doubt in our minds that there is a commercial real estate and commercial mortgage-backed security massacre on the horizon. The hospitality sector, in particular, ought to be on the receiving end of a pretty harsh shellacking. More on this in a future edition of PETITION.

For now, the most high profile CRE activity we’ve seen thus far is the trickle of Regus locations that have filed for bankruptcy. Regus is an on-demand and co-working company with 1000 locations across the United States and Canada. Set up as special purpose entities with individual leases, the structure is such that IWG Plc f/k/a Regus Corporation (OTCMKTS: $IWGFF) serves as both ultimate parent and lender but isn’t a guarantor or obligor under any of the downstream leases.* This non-recourse structure allows for individual Regus locations to plop into bankruptcy — all with an eye towards working out lease concessions or turning over — without taking down the entirety of the enterprise.**

The first outpost, RGN-Columbus IV LLC, filed for bankruptcy in Delaware back on July 30. Since then, sixteen additional Regus affiliates have filed with the most recent ones descending upon Delaware last week: RGN-Philadelphia IX LLC, RGN-Chevy Chase I LLC, RGN-Los Angeles XXV LLC, RGN-San Jose IX LLC, RGN-New York XXXIX and RGN-Denver XVI LLC. All of the cases filed under Subchapter V of chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code (though, thanks to the addition of more locations, the case has been re-designated under Chapter 11).***

The description of the overall business model is precious:

IWG’s business model begins with entry into long-term non-residential real property leases (each, a “Lease”) with property owners (each, a “Landlord”) that provide the Company unoccupied office space (the “Centers”). Based on significant market research on potential client needs in local markets and the unique requirements of their existing clients, IWG engineers each of the Centers to meet the architectural style, service, space, and amenity needs of those individuals, companies, and organizations who will contract for use of subportions of the Centers. IWG markets its Centers under an umbrella of different brand names, each tailored to appeal to different types of clients and those clients’ specialized needs. These clients (the “Occupants”) enter into short-term licenses (each, an “Occupancy Agreement”) to use portions of the Centers, which are customizable as to duration, configuration, services, and amenities. When operating successfully, a Center’s Occupants’ license payments (“Occupancy Fees”) will exceed the combined cost of the underlying long-term lease, management cost, and operating expenses of the Center. (emphasis added)

It’s the “when operating successfully” part that always bewildered watchers of the co-working business model generally. After all, it was easy to see the mass expansion of co-working spaces amidst the longest bull run in market history. Indeed, Regus apparently had “Good first half performance overall given COVID-19 impact in Q2.” The question was: what happens in a downturn? The answer? You start to see the model when it operates unsuccessfully. In this scenario, occupancy rates dip lower than expected. Prior geographic expansion begins to look irresponsible. Pricing declines to attract new sales and renewals. And current occupants begin to stretch their payables.**** In total, it ain’t pretty. By way of example, take a look at some of the numbers:*****

Source: PETITION, Chapter 11 Petitions

Source: PETITION, Chapter 11 Petitions

But while the operating performance of those select locations may be ugly AF, the structure bakes in this possibility and isolates the cancer. Aside from the landlords, the locations have virtually no creditors.

  • Each debtor location is an obligor pursuant to a senior secured loan agreement with Regus making for an intercompany obligation. There’s no other funded debt.

  • The debtors are otherwise subject to a management agreement with non-debtor Regus Management Group LLC (“RMG”) pursuant to which each debtor is obligated to reimburse RMG for gross expenses incurred directly by RMG in performing management services plug a 5.5% vig on gross revenues.

  • The debtors are also subject to an equipment lease agreement with debtor RGN-Group Holdings LLC. Under this agreement the debtors are obligated for the original cost of fixtures, furniture and equipment plus a margin fee.

  • As if those agreements didn’t siphon off enough revenue, the debtors are also subject to franchise agreements pursuant to which the debtors have the right to operate an IWG business format in their respective locations and use certain business support services, advice and IT in exchange for a monthly 12% vig on gross revenue.

Given most of the debtors’ obligations are intercompany in nature, what did Regus do? It tried to stick it to its landlords. Duh.

Like so many other companies navigating these troubled times, the Company instituted a variety of comprehensive actions to reduce costs and improve cash flow and liquidity, including the deferral of rent payments and engagement with Landlords to negotiate forbearances, temporary accommodations, and, where possible, permanent modifications to the various Leases to bring them in line with the COVID-19-adjusted market realities so as to permit the Company to continue operating Centers at those respective locations despite the uncertainty when the pandemic will subside and when (and indeed, whether) the U.S. will return to something resembling the pre-pandemic “business as usual.”

Certain landlords, of course, played ball. That helped lessen Regus’ funding burden in the US. But, of course, others didn’t. Indeed, various landlords sent default/eviction notices. Hence the aforementioned bankruptcy filings:

…the Debtors commenced their Chapter 11 Cases to prevent the forfeiture of the Lease Holder Debtors’ Leases, and to preserve all Debtors’ ability to operate their respective businesses—thereby, importantly, protecting the Occupants of the Lease Holder Debtors’ Centers from any disruption to their businesses. I expect that the “breathing spell” from Landlords’ collection efforts that will be afforded by the chapter 11 process will allow the Debtors, and the Company more broadly, to more fully explore the possibility of restructuring their various contractual obligations in order to put the Company’s North American portfolio on a surer footing going forward, so as to allow the Debtors to emerge from this process stronger and more viable than when they went in. If these restructuring efforts prove unsuccessful, the Lease Holder Debtors intend to utilize the procedures available to them under the Bankruptcy Code to (i) orderly wind down the operation of the applicable Centers (including, to the extent necessary, the removal of the FF&E from the leased premises, and to the extent possible, transition of the Occupants to other locations), (ii) liquidate the amounts due to the Landlords under their respective Leases and guarantees, as well as amounts due to the Debtors’ affiliates under their respective agreements, and (iii) to make distributions to creditors in accordance with their respective priorities under the Bankruptcy Code and applicable law.

Said another way: this is gonna be a landlord/tenant battle. Regus has offered to provide $17.5mm of DIP financing to give the debtors time to negotiate with their landlords. To the extent those negotiations (continue to) fail, the debtors will no doubt begin to reject leases left and right.

*****

They likely won’t be alone. Per The Wall Street Journal:

The world’s biggest coworking companies are starting to close money-losing locations across the globe, signaling an end to years of expansion in what had been one of real estate’s hottest sectors.

The retreat reflects an effort to slash costs at a time when the coronavirus is reducing demand for office space, and perhaps for years to come. It also shows how bigger coworking firms, in a race to sign as many leases as possible and grab market share, overexpanded and became saddled with debt and expensive leases.

The share of coworking spaces that have closed is still small. In the first half of the year, closures accounted for just 1.5% of the space occupied by flexible-office companies in the 20 biggest U.S. markets, according to CBRE Group Inc.

Knotel, for instance, seems to be making a habit of getting sued for unpaid rent. Query whether we’re at the tip of the iceberg for co-working distress.


*Other debtor entities, however, like RGN-Group Holdings LLC, RGN-National Business Centers LLC and H Work LLC do sometimes act as guarantors. Hence their bankruptcy filings. RGN-Group Holdings LLC isn’t a lease holder; rather, it owns all of the furniture, fixtures, equipment and other personal property and leases it all fo the respective SPE centers across the US pursuant to Equipment Lease Agreements.

**The nuance of this structure was constantly lost in the furor over WeWork back when WeWork was a thing that people actually cared about. Since we’re on the topic of WeWork, we suppose we ought to explain the video above. WeWork’s eccentric founder, Adam Neumann, was on record saying that he thought WeWork would thrive during a downturn due to its flexible structure — a point that has obviously been disproven by what’s transpired over the past few months. That said, and to be fair, he clearly didn’t have “social distancing” in mind when he hypothesized that result.

***We wrote about Subchapter V last month in the context of Desigual’s bankruptcy filing. We said:

Luckily for a lot of businesses, the Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA and a/k/a Subchapter V) went into effect in February. Coupled with amended provisions in the CARES Act, the SBRA will make it easier for a lot of smaller businesses to restructure because:

It established a higher threshold ($7.5mm vs. $2.7mm) to qualify which means more businesses will be able to leverage the streamlined SBRA process to restructure. Previously, businesses over that cap couldn’t utilize Subchapter V which made any shot at reorganization via bankruptcy far too expensive for smaller businesses. The only alternative was dissolution and liquidation.

Debtors under SBRA can spread a payment plan for creditors over 3-5 years. Debtors get the benefit of the payments spread out over time and creditors can potentially recover more. Aiding this is the fact that admin expenses also get paid over time and debts are not discharged until all plan payments are fulfilled.

A plan must be filed within 90 days. The shorter time frame also contains cost.

A trustee must be appointed and effectively takes the place of a UCC which may only be formed on showing of cause.

Companies are taking advantage of this.

****It probably stands to reason that various client programs the debtors typically depend upon are less likely to generate results under this scenario. The debtors nevertheless filed a motion seeking to continue these programs. They include (a) rebate programs for occupants who spend over a certain annual amount, (b) occupancy agreement promotions such as discounts, reduced rent costs, one or more months of free rent, etc., and (c) occupant referral fees. Suffice it to say, occupants likely aren’t referring in many other occupants during COVID. Consequently, the debtors ultimately withdrew this motion. All of this brings up another criticism of WeWork: what, exactly, is a co-working space’s moat? As justification for these programs, the debtors say:

The Lease Holders operate in a very competitive and dynamic market and with many competitors for the same customers. The loss of one or more Occupants could significantly impact the Debtors’ profitability, and therefore, the Client Programs require timely coordination on the part of the Lease Holders to ensure the maximum generation of customer agreement profits and brand awareness during this restructuring.

Case and point.

*****These numbers are YTD for the period ended June 30, 2020.


For more commentary and analysis about distressed investing, restructuring and/or bankruptcy, please visit us here.


Dates:

RGN-Columbus IV LLC (July 30, 2020)

RGN-Chapel Hill II LLC (August 2, 2020)

RGN-Chicago XVI LLC (August 3, 2020)

RGN-Fort Lauderdale III LLC (August 8, 2020)

RGN-Group Holdings LLC (August 17, 2020)

H Work, LLC (August 17, 2020)

RGN-National Business Centers LLC (August 17, 2020)

RGN-Lehi LLC (August 27, 2020)

RGN-Lehi II LLC (August 27, 2020)

RGN Atlanta XXXV LLC (August 29, 2020)

RGN-Arlington VI LLC (August 30, 2020)

RGN-Chevy Chase I LLC (September 2, 2020)

RGN-Philadelphia IX LLC (September 2, 2020)

RGN-Denver XVI LLC (September 3, 2020)

RGN-New York XXXIX (September 3, 2020)

RGN-Los Angeles XXV LLC (September 3, 2020)

RGN-San Jose IX LLC (September 4, 2020)

Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Shannon)

Capital Structure: N/A

Company Professionals:

  • Legal: Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP (James Conlan, Mike Gustafson, Patrick Jackson, Ian Bambrick, Jay Jaffe)

  • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

  • Restructuring Advisor/Chief Restructuring Officer: Duff & Phelps LLC (James Feltman)

  • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (Click here for free docket access)

  • Subschapter V Trustee: Gibbons PC (Natasha Songonuga)

Other Parties in Interest:

  • Regus Corporation, Regus Management Group, LLC and Franchise International GmbH

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, James Hughes Jr., Joseph Barry, Justin Duda, Ryan Hart)

  • Starwood Capital Group

    • White & Case LLP (Harrison Denman, John Ramirez) & Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Christopher Samis, Aaron Stulman)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN)

Jason Industries Inc.

June 24, 2020

Wisconsin-based Jason Industries Inc. ($JASN) and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) filed a long-anticipated (prepackaged) chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New York on Wednesday — the latest in a line of manufacturers (e.g., Pyxus International Inc., Libbey Glass Inc., Exide Holdings Inc., Pace Industries LLC) to wind its way into bankruptcy court.

The company is an amalgam of decades of growth by acquisition: it launched its components and seating businesses with acquisitions in ‘93 and ‘95, respectively. Everything appeared to be hunky-dory heading into the Great Financial Crisis when things took a turn for the worse.

And so this isn’t the company’s first rodeo in distress. Back in ‘08-’09, the company engaged in a recapitalization transaction supported by Falcon Investment Advisors LLC and Hamilton Lane Advisors; it persevered through the downturn and ultimately sold to a special-purpose-acquisition-company (Quinpairo Acquisition Corp.) in 2014 for $538.6mm. The acquisition was financed through a combination of (i) the $172.5mm raised by the SPAC in its ‘13 IPO, (ii) rollover equity from the aforementioned sponsors (and management), and (iii) $420mm of first and second lien debt. Stick a pin in that last number: it comes back to haunt the debtors. 👻

In the years since, the company streamlined its operations — selling off assets (i.e., its fiber solutions business and a metal components business) and consolidating around two primary business segments. Through their industrial segment, the debtors manufacture a bunch of stuff used for industrial and infrastructure applications; and through their engineered components segment, the debtors manufacture (a) motorcycle seats, (b) operator seats for construction, agriculture, law and turf care and other industrial equipment markets, and (c) seating for the power sports market. Said another way, the company is heavily indexed to the automotive, heavy truck, steel and construction markets. Powered by approximately 700 employees in the US, the company did $338mm in net sales in 2019.

And that is part of the problem. $338mm in net sales represented an 8.2% ($30.1mm) dropoff from 2018. Adjusted EBITDA declined from $36.7mm in ‘18 to $24.8mm in ‘19. Both segments have been underperforming for years. The question is why?

The debtors cite a dramatic dropoff in demand in ‘19. They note:

This reduction was largely caused by reduced end market demand in key industries across the portfolio, specifically, weak economic conditions in Europe and Asia, lower industrial production in North America, and softening end market demand from OEM customers. For example, since as early as the first quarter of 2019, the Company has experienced reduced OEM build and channel inventory destocking. These problems were exacerbated by the operational disruption and demand reduction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequently, the debtors busted out the standard playbook to try and manage liquidity (while parallel-tracking a fruitless pre-petition sale and marketing effort). They (a) intensified focus on growing market segments, (b) reduced capital investment in non-core businesses, (c) cut/furloughed labor and instituted pay reductions for execs and other employees (and eliminated a 401(k) match program), (d) closed plants and manufacturing facilities and deferred rent payments or negotiated reduced rent at leased properties, (e) accelerated the consolidation of plants acquired in a recent acquisition, and (f) invested in automation at their facilities to reduce future operating costs (read: replace expensive human beings) and expand margins. Still, the debtors struggled.

…the pandemic’s impact on orders and revenues, combined with preexisting fixed costs and debt service requirements, have constrained available working capital, reduced profitability and cash flow, and significantly impaired the Company’s ability to adequately finance operations.

Which gets us back to the capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-07-17 at 9.16.29 AM.png

Given where EBITDA numbers were coming in, this thing’s leverage ratio was through the roof. More to the point, the debtors deferred a March 31 second lien interest payment and had been operating under a series of forbearance agreements ever since. Luckily, the capital structure isn’t all-too-complicated and lends itself well to a prepackaged bankruptcy. And so here we are with a restructuring support agreement and proposed prepackaged plan which will effectively turn the company over to the first lien term lenders and, but for some warrants, wipe out the second lien term lenders. Here’s how the above capital structure breaks down:

Source: PETITION LLC

Source: PETITION LLC

A couple of notable features here:

  • Drop it Likes its Hot. There’s a “first lien put option” baked into the plan pursuant to which any first lien term lender who doesn’t want to own equity or the junior converts can “put” its pro rata share of that equity/converts to a first lien lender, Pelican Loan Advisors III LLC (or lenders as the case may be), which has agreed to backstop this baby. Pelican is managed by Monomoy Capital Partners.

  • F*ck You Pay Me. Those first lien lenders who consented to forbearances all of those months are about to get paaaaaaayyyyyyyyydd. They’ll receive a pro rated share of and interest in $10mm worth of open market purchases by the debtors of first lien credit agreement claims held by consenting first lien lenders AND a forbearance fee equal to 4.00% of the principal amount of the first lien credit agreement loans held by the consenting lenders as of a date certain. The open market purchases were, presumably, accomplished prior to the filing with 2% of the fee already paid and the remaining 2% to be paid-in-kind on the earlier of the termination date of the RSA or the plan effective date.

  • It’s a Trap! Warrants are technically going to be issued to the first lien term lenders and “gifted” to the second lien lenders. But only if they vote to accept the plan. Given the midpoint total enterprise value of $200mm and resultant deficiency claim, this is a nice absolute priority rule workaround. As reflected in the graphic above, the allowed deficiency claim of $64.9mm is obviously impaired and will get a big fat 🍩.

And so this is what the capital structure will look upon emergence:

Screen Shot 2020-07-17 at 9.17.35 AM.png

The first lien lenders have consented to the use of their cash collateral to fund the cases.*

* ⚡️July 15, 2020 Update: The Second Lien Ad Hoc Committee, however, filed a limited objection to the cash collateral motion on the basis that a final order should (a) limit any credit bid to their collateral (noting that a material amount of assets — including 35% of the equity in foreign subs — are excluded from the first lien lenders’ collateral package, and (b) require a finding that there’s diminution of value of the first lien lenders’ collateral such that they, despite providing no new financing, ought to be granted a superpriority lien on previously unencumbered assets. The Committee also previewed objections it will have to the plan of reorganization. For a purportedly “prepackaged” chapter 11, this one looks like it could be more contentious than most. A final hearing on the cash collateral motion is set for July 22, 2020.⚡️


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Company Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Emily Geier, Laura Krucks, Dan Latona, Jake Gordon, Yates French)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Rebecca Roof)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company LLC (Zul Jamal)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Large equityholder: Wynnefield Capital Management LLC

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Creditors (Credit Suisse Asset Management LLC, Voya CLO Ltd., American Money Management Corp., First Eagle Alternative Credit LLC, Angel Island Capital Services LLC, Monomoy Capital Partners LP, Z Capital Partners LLC)

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Ryan Preston Dahl, Alexander Welch)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • First Lien Agent: The Bank of New York Mellon

    • Second Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP (John Ashmead, Gregg Bateman)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Second Lien Lenders: Corre Partners Management LLC, Newport Global Advisors

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Steve Pohl, Shari Dwoskin, Kenneth Aulet)

      • Financial Advisor: DC Advisory LLC

Update July 17, 2020

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Aldrich Pump LLC

Aldrich Pump LLC

June 18, 2020

Another day, another asbestos-sparked bankruptcy. Man. These things have legs. Aldrich Pump LLC and Murray Boiler LLC are recently formed LLCs spun out of a recent reorganization of Trane Technologies plc, a publicly-traded manufacturer of climate solutions for buildings, homes and transportation (and, via a subsidiary, successor by merger to Ingersoll-Rand Company).

While the debtors don’t mine or use asbestos in manufacturing products, they made industrial products that, in some cases, used asbestos-containing components manufactured and designed by third parties. As a result, the debtors’ have been subject to asbestos litigation going as far back as 1982. Year over year, the debtors now face “thousands upon thousands” of asbestos-related claims. The bankruptcy cases are meant to “…permanently, globally and fairly resolve the asbestos claims….” Here comes another 524(g) trust y’all.

  • Jurisdiction: W.D. of North Carolina (Judge Whitley)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Jones Day LLP (Gregory Gordon, Brad Erens, David Torborg, James Jones, Mark Cody, Caitlin Cahow, Genna Ghaul) & Rayburn Cooper & Durham PA

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Carrianne Basler)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Tuesday Morning Corporation ($TUES)

Tuesday Morning Corporation

May 27, 2020

Dallas-based Tuesday Morning Corporation ($TUES) is 80% open now — just in time to start closing 230 of its brick-and-mortar locations (132 in a first phase and 100 more in a follow-up phase) and commence liquidations sales while in bankruptcy. This, in a nutshell, ladies and gentlemen, sums up the plight of retail today.

If you tune in to CNBC or Bloomberg, one could be forgiven for thinking that a retailer like TUES might actually do relatively well during shelter-in times. It specializes in upscale home furnishings, textiles and housewares for crying out loud. According to the talking heads, everyone is spending time at home judging the inadequacy of their living accommodations — a process that ought to serve as a real boost to home furnishing specialists ((e.g., Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH)) and home improvement companies ((e.g., Home Depot Inc. ($HD) and Lowe’s Companies Inc. ($LOW)). Not so much for TUES, apparently: the total lack of online presence and the company’s 100% reliance on in-store sales certainly didn’t help matters. The pandemic and related fallout “…resulted in a near-total cessation of new revenue beginning in March 2020.” Repeat: Near. Total. Cessation. Yikes.

Indeed, the debtors’ website serves a very limited purpose: it has a store locator. One literally cannot transact on the site. That said, there does appear to be pent up demand: the company reports that since re-opening its stores on April 24, comp store sales for the reopened stores have been approximately 10% higher than the same period in fiscal ‘19. Perhaps people DID, in fact, identify a lot of things they wanted to remedy at home! And they’re clamoring for that “treasure hunt” experience, y’all!!

What’s somewhat sad about that is, looking at the debtors’ list of top 40 unsecured trade creditors, nearly every vendor they do business with is US-based. In fact, the debtors source 80% of their inventory from US vendors. These store closures and the attendant loss of volume will cascade through the economy. Sigh.

Anyway, we previously wrote about the company in February upon the company’s Q2 ‘20 earnings report. We noted:

Quick coverage of this Dallas-based off-price retailer because, well, it’s performing like dogsh*t. The company reported Q2 ‘20 numbers last week. They. Were. Not. Good.

Nope. Like, not at all. Here are some highlights:

- A 4.1% decrease in net sales YOY driven primarily by a 3% decrease in comp store sales;

- A 3.7% decrease in the size of the average ticket, offset only somewhat by a 0.7% increase in customer transactions (read: more people buying less stuff — not exactly a testament to inventory quality);

- Declining gross margin (down 1.9%);

- Operating income down $5.2mm for the Q and $6.3mm for the 1H of fiscal ‘20;

- Cash is burning, down $6.5mm from June 2019.

The company blamed this piss poor performance on the shortened holiday calendar (how predictable) and uber-competition within that period that resulted in heavy promotions.

We further noted that the company had 175 leases rolling off in the next 12 months and, therefore, “…this is more a lease story than a bankruptcy story.” Whoops. Our crystal ball didn’t pick up on COVID-19. We further noted:

The company has no maturities prior to 2024 and has significant room under its $180mm revolving credit facility ($91.4mm of availability). Still, this thing needs its performance to turn around or it will be dancing with several other distressed retailers soon enough.

“Soon enough” came quicker than we anticipated.

The problem is that not only did the shut-down completely shut the revenue spigot, it also led the debtors to default, as of March 2020, under their revolving credit facility (“RCF”). The RCF Credit Agreement had a provision prohibiting the debtors from “suspend[ing] the operation of its business in the ordinary course of business.” Ever since, they have been in a state of continued negotiation and forbearance with their RCF enders, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA ($JPM), Wells Fargo Bank NA ($WFC), and Bank of America NA ($BAC).

That negotiation has borne fruit. The debtors obtained a DIP financing commitment of $100mm which will consist of some new money as well as a “gradual” roll-up of pre-petition funded debt ($47.9mm + $8.8mm LOCs). The debtors will pay a 2% upfront fee, a 0.5% unused commitment fee and customary letter of credit fees. “The interest rate under the DIP Documents is, either (at the Debtors’ option), (a) a 3 month LIBO Rate (2.0% floor) + 3.00% per annum or (b) CBFR (2.0% floor) + 2.0% per annum, payable on each applicable Interest Payment Date, in cash, provided that no Interest Period may extend beyond the Maturity Date.”

So what now? The debtors main assets are their inventory, a Dallas distribution center and corporate office, and equipment; they also have upwards of $100mm in net operating losses. There isn’t a lot of debt on balance sheet: this is not an example of a private equity firm coming in and dividending all of the value out of the enterprise. Rather, the crux of this case in the near-term will be, as we noted back in February, about the rejection of hundreds of leases and the stream-lining of the debtors’ footprint to a leaner operation. The crux longer-term, however, will be whether there’s any reason for this business to exist. Will the lenders enter into an exit facility? Will there be a plan of reorganization that will allow the debtors to emerge as reorganized debtors? Will there be a sale of substantially all of the assets? The chapter 11 bankruptcy process will be used to hopefully find answers to these questions.

  • Jurisdiction: N.D. of TX (Judge Hale)

  • Capital Structure: $47.9mm funded RCF + $8.8mm LOCs

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Haynes and Boone LLP (Ian Peck, Stephen Pezanosky, Jarom Yates)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Barry Folse, Ray Adams, Wilmer Cerda, JR Bryant)

    • Investment Banker: Stifel Nicolaus & Co. Inc. & Stifel Nicolaus-Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC (James Doak)

    • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC

    • Liquidation Consultant: Great American Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads LLP (Edward Schnitzer, Gilbert Saydah Jr., David Banker) & Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr PC (Kevin Lippman, Deborah Parry)

💊 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Akorn Inc. ($AKRX) 💊

Akorn Inc.

May 20, 2020

Akorn Inc. ($AKRX), a specialty pharmaceutical company based in Illinois that develops, manufactures and markets generic and branded prescription pharmaceuticals, finally filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Why “finally?” Well, back in January 2019 the company, in conjunction with an announcement of new executive and board appointments, noted that restructuring professionals (Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, PJT Partners LP and AlixPartners LLP)* were assisting with the formulation of a business plan and discussions with stakeholders. In December 2019, the publicly-traded company acknowledged in an SEC filing that bankruptcy was on the table, sending the stock into a 33% freefall. Subsequently, in February 2020, the company announced in connection with its Q4 and annual earnings that it had reached an agreement with its lenders to execute a sale of the business “potentially using Chapter 11 protection.” A sale, however, could not generate sufficient value to cover the outstanding funded indebtedness under the company’s term loan credit agreement. Shortly thereafter in March, the company defaulted under said agreement and the company and its lenders pivoted to discussions about a credit bid with an ad hoc group of term lenders serving as stalking horse purchaser of the assets in chapter 11. Alas, here we are. The company and 16 affiliates (the “debtors”) “FINALLY” find themselves in court with recently inked asset purchase and restructuring support agreements in tow. The debtors will use the bankruptcy process to further their sale process and market test bids against the term lenders’ proposed $1.05b credit bid; they hope to have an auction in the beginning of August with a mid/late-August sale hearing.

The sale process, however, is not where the excitement is here.

We are now in an age — post COVID-19 — where M&A deals falling apart is becoming commonplace news and debates about force majeure and “material adverse effect” rage on in the news and, eventually, in the courts. In that respect, Akorn was ahead of the curve.

In April 2017, Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG ($FSNUY), a massive German healthcare company, announced a proposed merger with Akorn shareholders set up to receive $34/share — a sizable premium to the then prevailing stock price in the high-20s. (PETITION Note: for purposes of comparison, the stock was trading at $1.26/share on the aforementioned announcement of annual earnings). Akorn shareholders approved the merger but then the business began to suffer. Per the debtors:

…Akorn began to experience a steep and sustained drop-off in financial performance drive by a variety of factors, including, among other things: consolidation of buyer power leading to price reductions; the FDA’s expedition of its review and approval process for generic drugs, leading to increased competition and resultant additional price and volume erosion; and legislative attempts to reduce drug prices.

Almost exactly a year later — after all kinds of shady-a$$ sh*t including anonymous letters alleging data integrity and regulatory deficiencies at Akron facilities and sustained poor financial performance — Fresenius was like “we out.” Lawsuits ensued with Akorn seeking to enforce the merger and Fresenius parrying with “material adverse effect” defenses. The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with Fresenius.

This is America so lawsuits beget lawsuits and Fresenius’ announcement that the merger was at risk spawned (i) federal class action litigation against Akron and certain of its present and former directors and officers and (ii) federal and state law derivative litigation. Akorn ultimately settled the class action litigation but four groups of hedge funds opted out and continue to pursue claims against Akorn. Meanwhile, Akorn lost its appeal of the Delaware Chancery Court decision and a decision on Fresenius’ claims for damages remain reserved. Fresenius has at least a $74mm claim.

This litigation overhang — coupled with the debtors’ $861.7mm in term loans (emanating out of strategic acquisitions in 2014) — is what drives this bankruptcy. The debtors believe that, upon resolution of these issues, it is well-positioned to thrive. They had $682mm revenue in ‘19 and $124mm of adjusted EBITDA. In Q1 ‘20, the company achieved adjusted EBITDA of $59mm (PETITION Note: “adjusted” being an operative word here). Large wholesale distributors like AmerisourceBergen Corporation ($ABC), Cardinal Health Inc. ($CAH), and McKesson Corporation ($MCK) are large customers. The U.S. healthcare system is shifting towards generics and big brand-name pharmaceuticals are rolling off-patent and “driving generic opportunities.” Pre-petition efforts to find a buyer who shares the debtors’ optimism, however, proved unfruitful.

Armed with a $30mm DIP commitment from certain of the term lenders in the ad hoc group, the debtors will swiftly determine whether the prospect of owning these assets “free and clear” will generate any higher or better offers.

*Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in its quest for 32,892,239% restructuring market share, ultimately displaced Cravath.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Owens)

  • Capital Structure: $861.7mm ‘21 Term Loans (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Patrick Nash, Nicole Greenblatt, Gregory Pesce, Christopher Hayes) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Amanda Steele, Zachary Shapiro, Brett Haywood)

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners LP (Mark Buschmann)

    • Claims Agent: KCC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Term Loan & DIP Agent ($30mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders

      • Legal: Gibson Dunn & Crutcher (Scott Greenberg, Steven Domanowski, Jeremy Evans, Michael J. Cohen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady)

      • Financial Advisor: Greenhill & Co. LLC (Neil Augustine)

    • Large equityholders: Blackrock Inc., The Vanguard Group, Akorn Holdings LP, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - J.C. Penney Company Inc. ($JCP)

J.C. Penney Company Inc.

May 15, 2020

Let’s be clear about something right off the bat. Encino Man, Captain America and Austin Powers could all suddenly surface from being entombed in ice for decades and even THEY wouldn’t be surprised that Texas-based J.C. Penney Company Inc. (and 17 affiliates, the “debtors”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

There are a couple of ways to look at this one.

First, there’s the debtors’ way. Not one to squander a solid opportunity, the debtors dive under “COVID Cover”:

Before the pandemic, the Company had a substantial liquidity cushion, was improving its operations, and was proactively engaging with creditors to deleverage its capital structure and extend its debt maturities to build a healthier balance sheet. Unfortunately, that progress was wiped out with the onset of COVID-19. And now, the Company is unable to maintain its upward trajectory through its “Plan for Renewal.” Moreover, following the temporary shutdown of its 846 brick-and-mortar stores, the Company is unable to responsibly pay the upcoming debt service on its over-burdened capital structure.

The debtors note that since Jill Soltau became CEO on October 2, 2018, the debtors have been off to the races with their “Plan for Renewal” strategy. This strategy was focused on getting back to JCP’s fundamentals. It emphasized (a) offering compelling merchandise, (b) delivering an engaging experience, (c) driving traffic online and to stores (including providing buy online, pickup in store or curbside pickup — the latest in retail technology that literally everyone is doing), (d) fueling growth, and (e) developing a results-minded culture. The debtors are quick to point out that all of this smoky verbiage is leading to “meaningful progress” — something they define as “…having just achieved comparable store sales improvement in six of eight merchandise divisions in the second half of 2019 over the first half, and successfully meeting or exceeding guidance on all key financial objectives for the 2019 fiscal year.” The debtors further highlight:

The five financial objectives were: (a) Comparable stores sales were expected to be down between 7-8% (stores sales were down 7.7%); (b) adjusted comparable store sales, which excludes the impact of the Company’s exit from major appliances and in-store furniture categories were expected to be down in a range of 5-6% (adjusted comparable store sales down 5.6%); (c) cost of goods sold, as a rate of net sales was expected to decrease 150-200 basis points (decreased approximately 210 basis points over prior year, which resulted in improved gross margin); (d) adjusted EBITDA was $583 million (a 2.6% improvement over prior year); and (e) free cash flow for fiscal year 2019 was $145 million, beating the target of positive.

Not exactly the highest bar in certain respects but, sure, progress nonetheless we suppose. The debtors point out, on multiple occasions, that prior to COVID-19, its “…projections showed sufficient liquidity to maintain operations without any restructuring transaction.” Maintain being the operative word. Everyone knows the company is in the midst of a slow death.

To prolong life, the focus has been on and remains on high-margin goods (which explains the company getting out of low-margin furniture and appliances and a renewed focus on private label), reducing inventory, and developing a new look for JCP’s stores which, interestingly, appears to focus on the “experiential” element that everyone has ballyhooed over the last several years which is now, in a COVID world, somewhat tenuous.

Which gets us to the way the market has looked at this. The numbers paint an ugly picture. Total revenues went from $12.87b in fiscal year ‘18 to $12b in ‘19. Gross margin also declined from 36% to 34%. In the LTM as of 2/1/20 (pre-COVID), revenue was looking like $11.1b. Curious. But, yeah, sure COGs decreased as has SG&A. People still aren’t walking through the doors and buying sh*t though. A fact reflected by the stock price which has done nothing aside from slowly slide downward since new management onboarded:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 10.14.19 AM.png

All of this performance has also obviously called into question the debtors’ ability to grow into its capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 11.54.57 AM.png

Here’s a more detailed look at the breakdown of unsecured funded debt:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.57.22 PM.png

And yet, prior to COVID, the debt stack has more or less held up. Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘23 5.875% $500mm senior secured first lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.01.41 PM.png

Here is the chart for JCP’s ‘25 8.624% $400mm second lien notes from the date of new management’s start to today:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.04.49 PM.png

And here is our absolute favorite: JCP’s ‘97 7.625% $500mm senior unsecured notes:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.06.37 PM.png

The fact that these notes were in the 20s mere months ago is mind-boggling.

We talk a lot about how bankruptcy filings are a way to tell a story. And, here, the debtors, while not trying to hide their stretched balance sheet nor the pains of brick-and-mortar department stores with a 846-store footprint, are certainly trying to spin a positive story about management and the new strategic direction — all while highlighting that there are pockets of value here. For instance, of those 846 stores, 387 of them are owned, including 110 operating on ground leases. The private brand portfolio — acquired over decades — represents 46% of total merchandise sales. The debtors also own six of their 11 distribution centers and warehouses.

With that in mind, prior to COVID, management and their advisors were trying to be proactive about the balance sheet — primarily the term loans and first lien secured notes maturing in 2023. In Q3 ‘19, the debtors engaged with their first lien noteholders, term lenders and second lien noteholders on proposals that would, among other things, address those maturities, promote liquidity, and reduce interest expense. According to the debtors, they came close. A distressed investor was poised to purchase more than $750mm of the term loans and, in connection with a new $360mm FILO facility, launch the first step of a broader process that would have kicked maturities out a few years. In exchange, the debtors would lien up unencumbered collateral (real estate). Enter COVID. The deal went up in smoke.

There’s a new “deal” in its stead. A restructuring support agreement filed along with the bankruptcy papers contemplates a new post-reorg operating company (“New JCP”) and a new REIT which will issue new common stock and new interests, respectively. Beyond that, not much is clear from the filing: the term sheet has a ton of blanks in it:

Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.42.42 PM.png
Screen Shot 2020-05-16 at 12.42.53 PM.png

There’s clearly a lot of work to do here. There’s also the “Market Test” element which entails, among other things, running new financing processes, pursuing potential sale/leaseback transactions, and pursuing a sale of the all or part of the debtors’ assets. If the debtors don’t have a business plan by July 14 and binding commitments for third-party financing by August 15, the debtors are required to immediately cease pursuing a plan and must instead pursue a 363 of all of their assets. Said another way, if the economy continues to decline, consumer spending doesn’t recover, and credit markets tighten up, there’s a very good chance that JCP could liquidate. Remember: retail sales sunk to a record low in April. Is that peak pain? Or will things get worse as the unemployment rate takes root? Will people shop at JC Penney if they even shop at all? There are numerous challenges here.

The debtors will use cash collateral for now and later seek approval of a $900mm DIP credit facility of which $450mm will be new money (L+11.75% continues the trend of expensive retail DIPs). It matures in 180 days, giving the debtors 6 months to get this all done.

*****

A few more notes as there are definitely clear winners and losers here.

Let’s start with the losers:

  1. The Malls. It’s one thing when one department store files for bankruptcy and sheds stores. It’s an entirely different story when several of them go bankrupt at the same time and shed stores. This is going to be a bloodbath. Already, the debtors have a motion on file seeking to reject 20 leases.

  2. Nike Inc. ($NKE) & Adidas ($ADDYY). Perhaps they’re covered by 503(b)(9) status or maybe they can slickster their way into critical vendor status (all for which the debtors seek $15.1mm on an interim basis and $49.6mm on a final basis). Regardless, showing up among the top creditors in both the Stage Stores Inc. bankruptcy and now the J.C. Penney bankruptcy makes for a horrible week.

  3. The Geniuses Who Invested in JCP Debt that Matures in 2097. As CNBC’s Michael Santoli noted, “This JC Penney issue fell only 77 years short of maturing money-good.

  4. Bill Ackman & Ron Johnson. This.

And here are the winners:

  1. The New York Times. Imperfect as it may be, their digitalization efforts allow us all to read and marvel about the life of James Cash Penney, a name that so befitting of a Quentin Tarantino movie that you can easily imagine JC chillin with Jack Dalton on some crazy Hollywood adventure. We read it with sadness as he boasts of the Golden Rule and profit-sharing. Profits alone would be nice, let alone sharing.

  2. Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Seriously. These guys are smoking it and have just OWNED retail. In the past eight days alone the firm has filed Stage Stores Inc., Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC and now JCP. It’s a department store hat trick. Zoom out from retail and add in Ultra Petroleum Corp. and Intelsat SA and these folks are lucky they’re working from home. They can’t afford to waste any billable minutes on a commute at this point.

  3. Management. They’re getting what they paid for AND, consequently, they’re getting paid. No doubt Kirkland marched in there months ago and pitched/promised management that they’d secure lucrative pay packages for them if hired and … BOOM! $7.5mm to four members of management!


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Jones)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Christopher Marcus, Aparna Yenamandra, Rebecca Blake Chaikin, Allyson Smith Weinhouse, Jake William Gordon) & Jackson Walker LLP (Matthew Cavenaugh, Jennifer Wertz, Kristhy Peguero, Veronica Polnick)

    • OpCo (JC Penney Corporation Inc.) Independent Directors: Alan Carr, Steven Panagos

      • Legal: Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (Steven Reisman)

    • PropCo (JCP Real Estate Holdings LLC & JC Penney Properties LLC) Independent Directors: William Transier, Heather Summerfield

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (James Mesterharm, Deb Reiger-Paganis)

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co. LLC (David Kurtz, Christian Tempke, Michael Weitz)

    • Store Closing Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

    • Real Estate Consultants: B. Riley Real Estate LLC & Cushman & Wakefield US Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: GLAS USA LLC

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer

    • RCF Agent: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Otterbourg PC & Bracewell LLP (William Wood)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners (Mo Meghli)

    • TL Agent: JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

    • Indenture Trustee: Wilmington Trust NA

    • Ad Hoc Group of Certain Term Loan Lenders & First Lien Noteholders & DIP Lenders (H/2 Capital Partners, Ares Capital Management, Silver Point Capital, KKR, Whitebox Advisors, Sculptor Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Apollo, Owl Creek Asset Management LP, Sixth Street Partners)

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Andrew Leblanc, Thomas Kreller, Brian Kinney) & Porter Hedges LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey (Saul Burian)

    • Second Lien Noteholders (GoldenTree Asset Management, Carlson, Contrarian Capital Management LLC, Littlejohn & Co.)

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kris Hansen) & Haynes and Boone LLP (Kelli Norfleet, Charles Beckham)

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore Group LLC (Roopesh Shah)

    • Large equityholder: BlackRock Inc. (13.85%)

👕 New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew) 👕

Chinos Holdings Inc. (J.Crew)

May 4, 2020

If you’re looking for a snapshot of the pre-trade war and pre-COVID US economy look no farther than J.Crew’s list of top 30 unsecured creditors attached to its chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the one hand there is the LONG list of sourcers, manufacturers and other middlemen who form the crux of J.Crew’s sh*tty product line: this includes, among others, 12 Hong Kong-based, three India-based, three South Korea-based, two Taiwan-based, and two Vietnam-based companies. In total, 87% of their product is sourced in Asia (45% from mainland China and 16% from Vietnam). On the other hand, there are the US-based companies. There’s Deloitte Consulting — owed a vicious $22.7mm — the poster child here for the services-dependent US economy. There’s the United Parcel Services Inc. ($UPS)…okay, whatever. You’ve gotta ship product. We get that. And then there’s Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as the debtors’ pre-petition term loan agent, and Eaton Vance Management as a debtholder and litigant. Because nothing says the US-of-f*cking-A like debt and debtholder driven litigation. ‘Merica! F*ck Yeah!!

Chinos Holdings Inc. (aka J.Crew) and seventeen affiliated debtors (the “debtors”) filed for bankruptcy early Monday morning with a prearranged deal that is dramatically different from the deal the debtors (and especially the lenders) thought they had at the tail end of 2019. That’s right: while the debtors have obviously had fundamental issues for years, it was on the brink of a transaction that would have kept it out of court. Call it “The Petsmart Effect.” (PETITION Note: long story but after some savage asset-stripping the Chewy IPO basically dug out Petsmart from underneath its massive debt load; J.Crew’s ‘19 deal intended to do the same by separating out the various businesses from the Chino’s holding company and using Madewell IPO proceeds to fund payments to lenders).

Here is the debtors’ capital structure. It is key to understanding what (i) the 2019 deal was supposed to accomplish and (ii) the ownership of J.Crew will look like going forward:

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.38.16 PM.png

Late last year, the debtors and their lenders entered into a Transaction Support Agreement (“TSA”) with certain pre-petition lenders and their equity sponsors, TPG Capital LP and Leonard Green & Partners LP, that would have (a) swapped the $1.33b of term loans for $420mm of new term loans + cash and (b) left general unsecured creditors unimpaired (100% recovery of amounts owed). As noted above, the cash needed to make (a) and (b) happen would have come from a much-ballyhooed IPO of Madewell Inc.

Then COVID-19 happened.

Suffice it to say, IPO’ing a brick-and-mortar based retailer — even if there were any kind of IPO window — is a tall order when there’s, like, a pandemic shutting down all brick-and-mortar business. Indeed, the debtors indicate that they expect a $900mm revenue decline due to COVID. That’s the equivalent of taking Madewell — which earned $602m of revenue in ‘19 after $614mm in ‘18 — and blowing it to smithereens. Only then to go back and blow up the remnants a second time for good measure.* Source of funds exit stage left!

The post-COVID deal is obviously much different. The term lenders aren’t getting a paydown from Madewell proceeds any longer; rather, they are effectively getting Madewell itself by converting their term loan claims and secured note claims into approximately 82% of the reorganized equity. Some other highlights:

  • Those term loan holders who are members of the Ad Hoc Committee will backstop a $400mm DIP credit facility (50% minimum commitment) that will convert into $400mm of new term loans post-effective date. The entire plan is premised upon a $1.75b enterprise value which is…uh…interesting. Is it modest considering it represents a $1b haircut off the original take-private enterprise value nine years ago? Or is it ambitious considering the company’s obvious struggles, its limited brand equity, the recession, brick-and-mortar’s continued decline, Madewell’s deceleration, and so forth and so on? Time will tell.

  • Syndication of the DIP will be available to holders of term loans and IPCo Notes (more on these below), provided, however, that they are accredited institutional investors.

  • The extra juice for putting in for a DIP allocation is that, again, they convert to new term loans and, for their trouble, lenders of the new term loans will get 15% additional reorganized equity plus warrants. So an institution that’s in it to win it and has a full-on crush for Madewell (and the ghost of JCrew-past) will get a substantial chunk of the post-reorg equity (subject to dilution).

Query whether, if asked a mere six months ago, they were interested in owning this enterprise, the term lenders would’ve said ‘yes.’ Call us crazy but we suspect not. 😎

General unsecured creditors’ new deal ain’t so hot in comparison either. They went from being unimpaired to getting a $50mm pool with a 50% cap on claims. That is to say, maybe…maybe…they’ll get 50 cents on the dollar.

That is, unless they’re one of the debtors’ 140 landlords owed, in the aggregate, approximately $23mm in monthly lease obligations.** The debtors propose to treat them differently from other unsecured creditors and give them a “death trap” option: if they accept the TSA’s terms and get access to a $3mm pool or reject and get only $1mm with a 50% cap on claims. We can’t imagine this will sit well. We imagine that the debtors choice of venue selection has something to do with this proposed course of action. 🤔

We’re not going to get into the asset stripping transaction at the heart of the IPCo Note issuance. This has been widely-covered (and litigated) but we suspect it may get a new breath of life here (only to be squashed again, more likely than not). In anticipation thereof, the debtors have appointed special committees to investigate the validity of any claims related to the transaction. They may want to take up any dividends to their sponsors while they’re at it.

The debtors hope to have this deal wrapped up in a bow within 130 days. We cannot even imagine what the retail landscape will look like that far from now but, suffice it to say, the ratings agencies aren’t exactly painting a calming picture.

*****

*Curiously, there are some discrepancies here in the numbers. In the first day papers, the debtors indicate that 2018 revenue for Madewell was $529.2mm. With $602mm in ‘19 revenue, one certainly walks away with the picture that Madewell is a source of growth (13.8%) while the J.Crew side of the business continues to decline (-4%). This graph is included in the First Day Declaration:

Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

The Madewell S-1, however, indicates that 2018 revenue was $614mm.

Screen Shot 2020-05-04 at 3.58.35 PM.png

With $268mm of the ‘18 revenue coming in the first half, this would imply that second half ‘18 revenue was $346mm. With ‘19 revenue coming in at $602mm and $333mm attributable to 1H, this would indicate that the business is declining rather than growing. In the second half, in particular, revenue for fiscal ‘19 was $269mm, a precipitous dropoff from $333mm in ‘18. Even if you take the full year fiscal year ‘18 numbers from the first day declaration (529.2 - 268) you get $261mm of second half growth in ‘18 compared to the $269mm in ‘19. While this would reflect some growth, it doesn’t exactly move the needle. This is cause for concern.

**To make matters worse for landlords, the debtors are also seeking authority to shirk post-petition rent obligations for 60 days while they evaluate whether to shed their leases. We get that the debtors were nearing a deal that COVID threw into flux, but this bit is puzzling: “Beginning in early April 2020, after several weeks of government mandated store closures and uncertainty as to the duration and resulting impact of the pandemic, the Debtors began to evaluate their lease portfolio to, among other things, quantify and realize the potential for lease savings.” Beginning in early April!?!?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $311mm ABL (Bank of America NA), $1.34b ‘21 term loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $347.6 IPCo Notes (U.S. Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Ray Schrock, Ryan Preston Dahl, Candace Arthur, Daniel Gwen) & Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP (Tyler Brown, Henry P Long III, Nathan Kramer)

    • JCrew Opco Special Committee: D.J. (Jan) Baker, Chat Leat, Richard Feintuch, Seth Farbman

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Lazard Freres & Co.

    • Real Estate Advisor: Hilco Real Estate LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (Kevin Simard, G. Mark Edgarton) & McGuireWoods LLP (Douglas Foley, Sarah Boehm)

    • Pre-petition Term Loan & DIP Agent ($400mm): Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Seward & Kissel LLP

    • Ad Hoc Committee

      • Legal: Milbank LLP (Dennis Dunne, Samuel Khalil, Andrew LeBlanc, Matthew Brod) & Tavenner & Beran PLC (Lynn Tavenner, Paula Beran, David Tabakin)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Large common and Series B preferred stock holders: TPG Capital LP (55% and 66.2%) & Leonard Green & Partners LP (20.7% and 24.8%)

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Basta, Jacob Adlerstein, Eugene Park, Irene Blumberg) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge Jr., Corey Booker)

    • Large Series A preferred stock holders: Anchorage Capital Group LLC (25.6%), GSO Capital Partners LP (26.1%), Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (15.5%)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - LSC Communications Inc.

LSC Communications Inc.

April 13, 2020

Chicago-based LSC Communications Inc. ($LSC) and 21 affiliated debtors (the “debtors”), a provider of traditional and digital print products, print-related services and office products, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. The company is the result of a 2016 spinoff from R.R. Donnelley & Sons and though it subsequently diversified its business into logistics, it still deals with old-school categories like print magazines, catalogs, books, directories, various other print-related services, and office products. In fact, it is one of the largest printers of books in the US. All of which is to say that the debtors were ripe for disruption.

Nothing about this ought to be surprising to people who have been paying attention to the retail and media landscape over the last decade. Nevertheless, it is painful to read:

Although the Company is a market leader in the printing and printing related services industries, the Company’s product and service offerings have been adversely impacted by a number of long-term economic trends. Digital migration has substantially impacted print production volume, in particular with respect to printed magazines as advertising spending continues to move away from print to electronic media. Catalogs have experienced volume reductions as retailers and direct marketers allocate more of their spending to online advertising and marketing campaigns and some traditional retailers and director marketers go out of business in the face of increased competition from online retailers. The Company saw an unprecedented drop in demand for magazines and catalogs in 2019, with the faster pace of decline in demand primarily due to the accelerating movement from printed platforms to digital platforms.

Thanks Facebook Inc. ($FB). Clearly all of the Restoration Hardware Inc. ($RH) catalogues in the world couldn’t offset the shift of advertising away from print media and soften this blow.

And then there’s this:

Demand for printed educational textbooks within the college market has been adversely impacted by electronic substitution and other trends such as textbook rental programs and free open source e-textbooks. The K-12 educational sector has seen an increased focus on e-textbooks and e-learning programs, but there has been inconsistent adoption of these new technologies across school systems. Consumer demand for e-books in trade and mass market has impacted overall print book volume, although e-book adoption rates have stabilized and industry-wide print book volume has been growing in recent years.

Apropos to the brief discussion above about Mary Meeker’s presentation, we’ve got news for these guys: these trends away from printed textbooks are going to gather steam post-COVID. And while we’re happy to see an uptick in physical book production, it’s unclear whether that is a short-term trend or a longer-term rebound. Someone is going to have to get comfortable betting on the latter. More on this in a moment.

As if the secular trends weren’t bad enough, the debtors’ attempt to consolidate with Quad/Graphics Inc. ($QUAD) (synergies!) in late 2018 met with resistance. The DOJ filed a civil antitrust lawsuit seeking to block the proposed merger and ultimately the parties agreed to terminate the merger. While LSC received a reverse termination fee that exceeded the amount of transaction costs, the proposed merger (i) hindered the debtors’ ability to make much-needed operational fixes (i.e., plant consolidation and footprint optimization), (ii) affected new business development efforts and strained existing customer relationships, and (iii) created uncertainty among the employee ranks that, in some respects, sparked attrition.

All of the above led to an internal restructuring. The debtors set their sights on nine plant closures and footprint reductions — primarily in magazines and catalog manufacturing; they also renegotiated a number of unprofitable customer contracts. Bear in mind: all of this was pre-COVID. Matters can only have gotten worse.

What does all of this look like from a financial perspective? The debtors filed their annual report in early March and the numbers don’t lie:

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

LSC Annual Report 3/2/20

Net sales declined 13% and while there was a corresponding decline in the cost of sales, SG&A remained constant and restructuring costs ballooned.* The magazines/catalogues/logistics segment declined 7.3%. The book segment fell 3.6%. Office products were a rare bright spot up 8.1% (PETITION Note: this is a relatively small portion of the debtors’ business and we’ll see how that plays out going forward given that there may be a huge shift there).

Due to this piss poor operating performance, the debtors tripped their consolidated leverage ratio and minimum interest ratio covenants in their credit agreement. That’s right: you didn’t think this story would be complete without a significantly over-levered balance sheet, did you?

The company has $972mm of total funded indebtedness broken out among a revolver ($249mm + $50.8mm in outstanding letters of credit), a term loan ($221.9mm) and senior secured notes ($450mm at 8.75%). The term loan requires quarterly principal payments of $10.625mm. While the entire capital structure is secured by an “equal first-priority" ranking with respect to the collateral, the revolver has a “first-out” priority and is entitled first to any proceeds from the collateral while the term loan and the senior secured notes enjoy pari passu status. This is where the rubber meets the road: that’s a lot of parties to get to agree on a transaction.

Before it could agree to anything, however, the debtors needed time and therefore entered into a widely reported forbearance in early March. S&P Global Ratings promptly slapped a downgrade on the company saying that it believed a debt restructuring was likely within 90 days. What a genius call!! While all of this was happening, the debtors continued to deteriorate:

During its March discussions with creditors, the Debtors began to see a significant decrease in their available liquidity, driven in part by the long-term industry trends discussed above and made acute by the severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Which begs the question: what is the value of this business? Cleary nobody can agree on that: there is no restructuring support agreement here. Instead, there appears to be an arms-locked resignation that a parallel-path is needed to (i) nail down some DIP financing to shore up liquidity ($100mm at L+6.75%) and buy time, (ii) continue to discuss a balance sheet restructuring, AND (iii) simultaneously market test the business via a strategic marketing process. A lot of people will need to wait and see how this plays out, primarily pensioners owed over $50mm and various trade creditors including the bankruptcy-familiar RR Donnelley & Sons Co. ($RRD), Eastman Kodak Company ($KODK) and Verso Paper Holding LLC.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Lane)

  • Capital Structure: $249mm funded RCF (plus $50.8mm LOCs), $221.9mm funded TL (Bank of America NA), $450mm ‘23 8.75% senior secured notes (Wells Fargo Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Andrew Dietderich, Brian Glueckstein, Alexa Kranzley, Christian Jensen) & Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent ($100mm): Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Moore & Van Allen PLLC (David Eades, Charles R. Rayburn III, Zachary Smith)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Term Lenders: Bardin Hill Investment Partners LP, Eaton Vance Management, HG Vora Capital Management, LLC, Marathon Asset Management, Shenkman Capital Management, Sound Point Capital Management LP, and Summit Partners Credit Advisors, L.P.

      • Legal: Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (Michael Messersmith, Sarah Gryll, Lucas Barrett)

    • Ad Hoc Group of Secured Noteholders: Capital Research and Management Company, Manulife Investment Management, Atlas FRM LLC, TD Asset Management Inc.

      • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Andrew Rosenberg, Alice Eaton, Claudia Tobler)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Frank Merola, Brett Lawrence, Erez Gilad, Harold Olsen, Gabriel Sasson)

🍿New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.🍿

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc.

February 18, 2020

VIP Cinema Holdings Inc. and four affiliates (the “debtors”) filed prepackaged chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the District of Delaware; they are manufacturers of luxury seating products for movie theaters. Here’s the problem: end user customers stopped ordering their stuff. Yup, that’s right, there’s a finite market for luxury seating in movie theaters. Who knew?

Here are some of the problems this company confronted:

  • They made chairs that were too good. That’s right. Too good. The chairs had a longer lifecycle than the company likely wanted. Either that or people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • Movie theaters slowed down their renovation activities and construction of new locations. Perhaps people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • Movie theaters reduced capital investment — mostly because they haven’t exactly performed very well themselves and have their own debt and equityholders to contend with. Also, people are engaging in too much Netflixing and chilling and not enough movie-going.

  • They conquered the total addressable market, securing 70% market share with little to no room to grow thanks to all of the foregoing bulletpoints.

Are we being too flip about $NFLX? Well, don’t take our word for it. Here’s the company explaining one of the reasons why it’s in trouble:

“Continued proliferation of online streaming services and alternative viewing experiences, which has led to declining movie attendance, a poor outlook sentiment for the overall U.S. movie theatre industry and particularly put significant pressure on the stock price of AMC, a key customer for the Company.”

Because of all of the foregoing factors, the debtors triggered an event of default under their first lien credit agreement and have been in a state of forbearance with their lenders ever since — all with the hope of negotiating an out-of-court restructuring transaction.

That hope was extinguished when Odeon reduced seating orders, napalming everyone’s financial models upon which the proposed out-of-court transaction was premised. Now we’re in prepackaged bankruptcy territory with a restructuring support agreement that will shed $178mm of debt and infuses the company with a $33mm DIP credit facility — of which $13mm is new money and $20mm is a roll-up of prepetition debt. Here is the pre-petition capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-02-18 at 8.52.34 PM.png

The liquidity is highly necessary. The debtors are burning cash like Rick Dalton burns interlopers bursting into his Hollywood Hills mansion. The debtors filed for bankruptcy with just $1mm in liquidity remaining.

Speaking of burning cash, that’s pretty much what you can say about the $200-or-so-million that previously went into these debtors. The restructuring support agreement will (a) convert first lien loans to preferred and common equity, (b) donut the second lien claims, and (c) donut the general unsecured claimants (unless they opt-in to a release, in which case they’ll get $5k). Critical to everything is the fact that HIG Capital LLC, the existing shareholder in the company, will write a new-money check of $7mm and enter in a management services agreement with the reorganized newco. In exchange for this investment, HIG will get preferred equity and 51% of the common equity.* Everyone is going to be holding their breath for the next 6 weeks, hoping that no other large chains cancel or downsize orders. If that happens, this deal could blow up.

*Suffering PTSD from the last-minute collapse of the out-of-court deal, HIG also negotiated the ability to walk if the debtors have less than $1.5mm of available unrestricted cash on the “Exit Date.”


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Walrath)

  • Capital Structure: see above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Ropes & Gray LLP (Gregg Galardi, Christine Pirro Schwarzman) & Bayard PA (Erin Fay, Daniel Brogan, Gregory Flasser)

    • Independent Director: Michael Foreman

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Stephen Spitzer)

    • Investment Banker: UBS Securities LLC

    • Claims Agent: Omni Agent Solutions Inc. (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • First Lien Agent: Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB

      • Legal: Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (Andrew Goldman, Benjamin Loveland) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Adam Shpeen) & Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP (Robert Dehney, Joseph Barsalona II, Tamara Mann, Andrew Workman)

      • Financial Advisor: M-III Partners LP

    • Second Lien Agent & Second Lien Lenders: Oaktree Fund Administration LLC

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Jayme Goldstein, Daniel Ginsburg, Joanne Lau) and Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Matthew Lunn, Edmon Morton, Betsy Feldman)

    • Sponsor: HIG Capital LLC & HIG Middle Market LBO Fund II LP

      • Legal: McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Brooks Gruemmer, Jay Kapp)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Pier 1 Imports Inc. ($PIR)

Pier 1 Imports Inc.

February 17, 2020

Fort Worth, Texas-based Pier 1 Imports Inc. and seven affiliates (the “debtors”) have fulfilled their obvious destiny and finally fallen into bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Virginia. Contemporaneously, the debtors filed a CCAA proceeding in Canada to effectuate the closure of all Canadian operations. Color us pessimistic but we’re not feeling so great about the debtors’ go-forward chances in the US either.

We’ve covered the debtors ad nauseum in previous editions of PETITIONHere — supported by an ode to “Anchorman” — we described the debtors’ recent HORRIFIC financial performance and noted how a bankruptcy would be sure to confuse a peanut gallery accustomed to spouting regular (and sometimes inaccurate) hot takes about how private equity is killing retail.* We wrote:

The reaction to this surely-imminent bankruptcy (and, if we had a casino near us, liquidation) is going to be interesting. It is sure to flummox the “Private Equity is Killing Retail” camp because, well, it’s not PE-backed. Similarly it’ll confuse the “You Shouldn’t Put So Much Debt on Retail” cohort because, well, there really isn’t that much debt on the company’s balance sheet. Chuckling in the corner will be “The US is Over-Stored” team … And “The Millennials Aren’t Buying Homes and Furnishing Them With Chinese-Made Tchotchkes” gang (thanks a ton, Marie Kondo) … And the “Management Has Blown Chunks, The Assortment Sucks” bunch … And, finally, “The Amazon Effect” squad….

Over the weekend, The New York Times ran a piece from Austan Goolsbee, an economics professor at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, that — no disrespect to the professor — says many of the same things PETITION has been saying for a LONG LONG time. That is, “The Amazon Effect” is overstated. He argues that “three major economic forces have had an even bigger impact on brick-and-mortar retail than the internet has”: (1) big box stores, (2) income inequality, and (3) the preference shift away from goods towards services. It’s fair to say that these three forces affected the debtors in a big big way.**

Surely, e-commerce has a lot to do with it too. As one PETITION advisor said about the debtors’ wares yesterday:

“You can just order that sh*t online. You don’t need to try it on.”

It’s a fair point.

Another fair point that Mr. Goolsbee omits from his analysis is the role of management. It’s safe to say that the US is suffering from an epidemic of retail ineptitude.

And like the coronavirus, it keeps spreading from one retailer to the next.***

But we digress.

The business has clearly suffered:

From fiscal years 2014 to 2018, the company’s net income dropped from $108 million to about $11.6 million and in fiscal year 2019 Pier 1 experienced a $198.8 million loss.

So, what’s the upshot here? The debtors announced a plan support agreement and intend to use the chapter 11 bankruptcy process to (a) continue to shutter the previously announced ~450 stores (read: get ready for a lot of lease rejections) and (b) pursue a sale pursuant to a chapter 11 plan of reorganization of what remains of the debtors’ business. Frankly, this was masterful messaging: the announcement relating to a plan support agreement and potential plan of…wait for it…”reorganization”(!) head-faked the entire market into thinking this thing might actually be salvageable. That’s where the fine print comes in.

The debtors have dubbed this an “all weather” chapter 11 plan because it provides for either a sale or the equitization of the term loan at the term lenders’ election. This begs the question: will Pathlight Capital LP want to own this thing?🤔 This bit was eye-catching:

“To be clear, the term loan lenders have made no decision at this point, but instead support the process as outlined in the plan support agreement.”

Yeah, we bet they do. Qualified bids will be due on or before March 23 and the lenders have until March 27 to make their election. Which way will the winds blow?

Note that “the process” isn’t currently supported by a stalking horse purchaser. 🤔

Note further that the debtors are required under the DIP to distribute informational packages and solicitations for sale of the debtors’ assets on a liquidation basis to liquidators by March 9.🤔 🤔

It looks like we’ll know the answer very soon.

To finance the cases, the debtors obtained a committed for a $256mm DIP credit facility. The facility includes a $200mm revolving loan commitment and a $15mm first in last out term loan, each provided 50/50 by Bank of America N.A. and Wells Fargo National Association, and a $41.2mm term loan from Pathlight. This was the pre-petition capital structure:

Screen Shot 2020-02-18 at 11.39.07 AM.png

The DIP effectively just rolls up much of the pre-petition debt. There is no new money. The messaging here, then, is also critical: the DIP facility ought to provide customers, vendors and employees comfort that there is access to liquidity if needed. Cash collateral usage, however, is the main driver here: the debtors believe that operating cash flow will suffice to handle working capital needs and bankruptcy expenses.

To summarize, we have another distressed retailer that is scratching and clawing to live. They’ve taken all of the usual steps to extend runway: cost cuts, footprint minimalization, new management. Bankruptcy is a last-ditch effort to survive: the debtors take pains to try and convince some prospective buyer that there is life left in the debtors’ brick-and-mortar business:

The remaining go-forward stores achieved superior sales and customer metrics in the last twelve months compared to the closing stores, including approximately 15% greater sales per square foot on average.

And if that doesn’t do it, there’s the argument that there’s an e-commerce play here. The debtors similarly go to great lengths to state OVER AND OVER AGAIN that e-commerce represents 27% of total sales. They’re practically screaming, “Look at me, look at me! We can be interesting to you [Insert Authentic Brands Group here]!

Pathlight is sure as hell hoping someone bites.


*Kirkland & Ellis…uh…we mean, the “debtors” appear to agree, stating, in reference to private equity, that “[t]oo many pundits have sought to point in too many wrong directions,” citing pieces in RetailDive and The Wall Street Journal. THAT ladies and gentlemen, is client advocacy!

**It’s also fair to say that Professor Goolsbee does his readers a disservice by neglecting the overall picture which, no doubt, also includes over-expansion, too much retail per capita, private equity and over-levered balance sheets. These cowboys are closing 400+ stores for a reason.

Of course, long time PETITION readers know that we’ve been arguing for a LOOOOONG time that the “perfect storm” hitting retail is a confluence of factors that cannot just be lazily summarized as “private equity” or “The Amazon Effect.” It’s good to see that the folks at Kirkland & Ellis agree:

In the face of the longest bull run in U.S. history (close to 3,000 days and counting), a myriad of factors have collectively changed the ways in which consumers and retailers interact—creating for retailers what is tantamount to a perfect storm—and directly contributing to the struggles retailers face in a shifting marketplace.5

Then it’s as if they lifted this footnote straight out of previous PETITION briefings:

Screen Shot 2020-02-18 at 1.39.17 PM.png

***Not to cast aspersions, but the resume of the current PIR CEO is…uh…interesting: prior experience includes FullBeauty Brands, HHGregg, and Marsh Supermarkets. Any of those names sound familiar to bankruptcy professionals?


  • Jurisdiction: E.D. of Virginia (Judge Huennekens)

  • Capital Structure: $140mm RCF + $47.3mm LOC, $189mm Term Loan (Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB), $9.9mm industrial revenue bonds

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Emily Geier, AnnElyse Scarlett Gains, Joshua Altman) & Kutak Rock LLP (Michael Condyles, Peter Barrett, Jeremy Williams, Brian Richardson)

    • Canadian Legal: Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP

    • Independent Directors: Steven Panagos & Pamela Corrie

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP (Holly Etlin)

    • Investment Banker: Guggenheim Securities LLC (Durc Savini)

    • Real Estate Advisor: A&G Realty Partners LLC

    • Liquidation Consultant: Gordon Brothers Retail Partners LLC

      • Legal: Riemer & Braunstein LLP (Steven Fox, Anthony Stumbo)

    • Claims Agent: Epiq Corporate Restructuring LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP ABL Agent: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, and Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

    • DIP ABL Term Agent: Pathlight Capital LP

      • Legal: Choate Hall & Stewart LLP (John Ventola, Jonathan Marshall) and Troutman Sanders LLP (Andrew Buxbaum)

    • Ad Hoc Term Lender Group: Eaton Vance Management, Insight North America LLC, Marathon Asset Management LP, MJX Asset Management LLC, Whitebox Advisors LLC, ZAIS Group LLP

      • Legal: Brown Rudnick LLP (Robert Startk, Uchechi Egeonuigwe, Steven Pohl, Sharon Dwoskin) & Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP (Christopher Jones, Vernon Inge, Corey Booker)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • Large Equityholders: Charles Schwab Investment Management, Dimensional Fund Advisors LLP

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Bhati & Company, Synergy Home Furnishings LLC, United Parcel Services Inc., Brixmor Operating Partnership LP, Brookfield Property REIT Inc.

      • Legal: Foley & Lardner LLP (Erika Morabito, Brittany Nelson, Timothy Mohan) & Cole Schotz PC (Seth Van Aalten)

      • Financial Advisor: Province Inc. (Paul Huygens, Sanjuro Kietlinski, Walter Bowser, Paul Navid, Shane Payne, Courtney Clement)

🐟New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy & CCAA Filing - Bumble Bee Parent Inc.🐟

Bumble Bee Parent Inc.

November 21, 2019

Tuna fish went from playing a role in the founding of one of the world’s largest private equity firms (Blackstone) to, in the case of Bumble Bee Parent Inc. and its affiliated debtors, another private-equity-backed (Lion Capital LLP) bankruptcy. Bumble Bee is the company behind “shelf-stable seafood” brands Bumble Bee, Brunswick, Sweet Sue, Snow’s Beach Cliff and Wild Selections (as well as a Canadian brand). It has been on a wild ride since 2017.

The bankruptcy narrative is that a plea agreement with the United States Department of Justice related to criminal charges of alleged price-fixing led to burdensome financial obligations by way of (a) a $25mm criminal fine) and (b) defense costs associated with an onslaught of subsequent civil lawsuits from direct and indirect purchasers of products claiming damages arising out of the alleged price-fixing. This overhang ultimately led to the debtors arriving at, but not quite tripping, an event of default with their term lenders in Q4 ‘18. The debtors have been operating under a series of short-term limited waivers ever since as they sought to explore strategic alternatives.

They have one. The debtors have a stalking horse purchase agreement with affiliates of FCF Co. Ltd.for the sale of substantially all of the Company’s assets at a total implied enterprise value of up to $930.6 million, comprised of $275 million of cash, assumption of the remaining $17 million of the DOJ Fine, and the roll-over of up to $638.6 million in outstanding term loan indebtedness.” This sale will preserve the business as a going concern, preserve jobs, and provide an ongoing business partner to vendors and customers who consider the debtors to be partners.

Debtor first day bankruptcy papers are typically replete with spin and these papers are no different. In fact, necessarily so, they read like an offering memorandum. The papers discuss how the debtors provide “nutricious foods” that are “well-positioned to address a number of important consumer preferences and food trends, including shifts toward protein-rich, low-fat/low-calorie, and high Omega-3 fatty acid diets and trends towards eating multiple small or ‘snack-sized’ portions per day rather than the traditional three-square meals per day, and an overall increase in ‘snacking.’” They have the #1 or #2 market share in the shelf-stable seafood category and 41% of the US share of sales of canned albacore tuna. They also hold “approximately 13% of the U.S. share of sales of canned “light meat” tuna, approximately 12% of the share of sales in tuna pouches, approximately 71% of the U.S. share of sales in ready-to-eat tuna meals, approximately 40% of the U.S. share of sales in sardines, and approximately 16% of the U.S. share of sales in salmon.” It helps that they’re sold at virtually every major bigbox retailer, wholesale club, and grocery store. In 2018, the company had net sales of approximately $933m and adjusted EBITDA of $112.3m and the debtors’ U.S.-based operations contributed $722.2m of net sales and adjusted EBITDA of $86.3m. This is big business.

Putting aside its recent brush with the law, it also faces big market challenges. Questions persist about the safety and viability of shelf-stable seafood, particularly tuna. Indeed, there are headwinds. One sign of this may be that the Company’s overall Adjusted EBITDA has declined by approximately 20% from 2015 to 2018. We assume that, here, the EBITDA is adjusted to ex-out litigation costs.

And then there is this bonkers Wall Street Journal piece noting that consumption of canned tuna has fallen steadily compared with fresh and frozen fish. “Per capita consumption of canned tuna has dropped 42% in the three decades through 2016, according to the latest data available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. And the downturn has continued, with sales of the fish slumping 4% by volume from 2013 to October 2018, data from market-research firm IRI show.


This bit is off the charts: “In a country focused on convenience, canned tuna isn’t cutting it with consumers. Many can’t be bothered to open and drain the cans, or fetch utensils and dishes to eat the tuna. “A lot of millennials don’t even own can openers,” said Andy Mecs, vice president of marketing and innovation for Pittsburgh-based StarKist, a subsidiary of South Korea’s Dongwon Group.” To address this trend, the debtors have made forays into the fresh fish category. Otherwise, these challenges will play out another day. With a different owner.

A few more bankruptcy-specific points:

  1. The debtors prevailed over a fee objection by the United States Trustee relating to interim access to $40mm of a proposed $80mm DIP term loan facility and immediate access to a $200mm DIP ABL. It seems that Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, as counsel to DIP term lender Brookfield Principal Credit LLC had to give the UST a lesson in reverse-Seinfeld Logic. With lending, it is about “taking the reservation” rather than holding or using the reservation: once a debtor obtains a commitment to funds, those funds are committed and technically cannot be allocated elsewhere. The lenders argue, therefore, that fees are warranted upfront.

  2. Critical vendor motions can sometimes be controversial because, naturally, everyone wants to jump the line with critical vendor designation. To get it, however, pursuant to standards set many many years ago, there’s a multi-prong test that must be satisfied. In a nutshell, the critical vendor payments are needed to prevent disruption of a debtors’ business, among other things. Here, the buyer, FCF Co Ltd., seeks critical vendor status to the tune of $51mm (out of a $77mm critical vendor ask). Some other creditors were like “Mmmmmm???” and insisted that the Judge postpone any interim payments until an official committee of unsecured creditors could be appointed. Despite protests from FCF’s counsel, Weil for the DIP lender, and the debtors, Judge Silverstein declined to rule on the motion at the hearing, highlighting the unusual nature of a prospective buyer seeking status. If they want the business, will they really walk away?

Despite these first day fireworks, this should be a relatively smooth one.

One last question it poses is this: will this be just the first of a clump of tuna-related bankruptcies? 🤔

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP (Alan Kornberg, Kelly Cornish, Claudia Tobler, Christopher Hopkins, Rich Ramirez, Aidan Synnot) & (local) Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Pauline Morgan, Ryan Bartley, Ashley Jacobs, Elizabeth Justison, Jared Kochenash)

    • Board of Directors: Scott Vogel, Steve Panagos

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Houlihan Lokey Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • ABL Agent & DIP Agent: Wells Fargo Capital Finance LLC

      • Legal: Paul Hastings LLP (Andrew Tenzer, Michael Comerford, Peter Burke) & Womble Bond Dickinson US LLP (Matthew Ward, Morgan Patterson)

    • Term Loan Agent & Term Loan DIP Agent: Brookfield Principal Credit LLC

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, David Griffiths, Debora Hoehne, Yehudah Buchweitz) & Richards Layton & Finger PA (Paul Heath, Zachary Shapiro, Brendan Schlauch)

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🎦New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Deluxe Entertainment Services Group Inc.🎦

Deluxe Entertainment Services Group Inc.

October 3, 2019

Summary to come.

  • Jurisdiction: (Judge Drain)

  • Capital Structure: ⬇️

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  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Jonathan Henes, Jonathan Altman)

    • Board of Directors: Ronald Perelman, Matthew Cantor, Paul Savas

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners Inc. (James Baird)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Existing ABL Agent, Senior Priming Term Loan Agent, Priming Term Loan Agent, and Existing Term Loan Agent: Credit Suisse AG

      • Legal: Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP (Paul Zumbro, George Zobitz, Sarah Rosen) & Norton Rose Fulbright

    • Ad Hoc Committee of the Senior Priming Term Loan,2 the Priming Term Loan, the Existing Term Loan and the DIP Term Facility (see below, as of 10/7/19)

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Kristopher Hansen, Jonathan Canfield, Gabriel Sasson)

      • Financial Advisor: FTI Consulting Inc.

    • MAFCO

      • Legal: Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (Shana Elberg, Mark McDermott)

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⛽️New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC⛽️

Sheridan Holding Company II, LLC

September 15, 2019

Houston-based Sheridan Holding Company II LLC and 8 affiliated debtors filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Southern District of Texas with a nearly-fully-consensual prepackaged plan of reorganization. The plan, once effective, would eliminate approximately $900mm(!) of pre-petition debt. The case is supported by a $100mm DIP credit facility (50% new money).

Why so much debt? While this is an oil and gas story much like scores of other companies we’ve seen march through the bankruptcy court doors, the business model, here, is a bit different than usual. Sheridan II is a “fund”; it invests in a portfolio of working interests in mature onshore producing properties in Texas, New Mexico and Wyoming. Like Matt Damon in “Promised Land,” the debtors scour God’s country in search of properties, acquires working interests in those properties, and then seeks to deploy their special sauce (“application of cost-effective reinvestments, operational improvements, and enhanced recovery programs to the acquired assets”) to eke out product and, ultimately, sell that sh*t at a profit. This, as you might suspect, requires a bunch of capital (and equity from LPs like Warburg Pincus).* Hence the $1.1b of debt on balance sheet. All of this is well (pun intended) and good, provided the commodity environment cooperates. Which, we all know all too well, has not been the case in recent years. Peace out equity. Peace out sub debt.

Interestingly, some of that debt was placed not too long ago. Confronted with the oil and gas downturn, the debtors took the initiative to avoid bankruptcy; they cut off distributions to LPs, took measures to decrease debt, cut opex, capex and SG&A, and engaged in a hedging program. In 2017, the debtors raised $455mm of the subordinated term loan (with PIK interest galore), while also clawing back 50% of distributions previously made to LPs to the tune of $64mm. Everyone needed to have skin in the game. Alas, these measures were insufficient.

Per this plan, that skin is seared. The revolving lenders and term lenders will receive 95% of the common stock in the reorganized entity with the subordinated term lenders getting the remaining 5%. YIKES. The debtors estimate that the subordinated term lenders will recover 2.6% of the amount of their claims under the proposed plan. 2.6% of $514mm = EPIC VALUE DESTRUCTION. Sweeeeeeeeet. Of course, the limited partners are wistfully looking at that 2.6%. Everything is relative.

*****

Some additional notes about this case:

  • The hope to have confirmation in 30 days.

  • The plan includes the ability to “toggle” to a sale pursuant to a plan if a buyer for the assets emerges. These “toggle” plans continue to be all of the rage these days.

  • The debtors note that this was a “hard fought” negotiation. We’ve lost count of how many times professionals pat themselves on the backs by noting that they arrived at a deal, resolving the issues of various constituencies with conflicting interests and positions. First, enough already: this isn’t exactly Fallujah. You’re a bunch of mostly white males (the CEO of the company notwithstanding), sitting around a luxury conference table in a high rise in Manhattan or Houston. Let’s keep some perspective here, people. Second, THIS IS WHAT YOU GET PAID $1000+/hour to do. If you CAN’T get to a deal, then that really says something, particularly in a situation like this where the capital structure isn’t all-too-complex.

  • The bulk of the debtors’ assets were purchased from SandRidge Energy in 2013. This is like bankruptcy hot potato.

  • Independent directors are really becoming a cottage industry. We have to say, if you’re an independent director across dozens of companies, it probably makes sense to keep Quinn Emanuel on retainer. That way, you’re less likely to see them on the opposite side of the table (and when you do, you may at least temper certain bulldog tendencies). Just saying.

Finally, the debtors’ bankruptcy papers provide real insights into what’s happening in the oil and gas industry today — particularly in the Permian Basin. The debtors’ assets mostly rest in the Permian, the purported crown jewel of oil and gas exploration and production. Except, as previously discussed in PETITION, production of oil out of the Permian ain’t worth as much if, say, you can’t move it anywhere. Transportation constraints, while relaxing somewhat, continue to persist. Per the company:

“Prices realized by the Debtors for crude oil produced and sold in the Permian Basin have been further depressed since 2018 due to “price differentials”—the difference in price received for sales of oil in the Permian Basin as compared to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma sales hub or sales of sour crude oil. The differentials are largely attributable to take-away capacity constraints caused by increases in supply exceeding available transportation infrastructure. During 2018, Permian Basin crude oil at times sold at discounts relative to sales at the Cushing, Oklahoma hub of $16 per barrel or more. Price differentials have narrowed as additional take-away capacity has come online, but crude oil still sells in the Permian Basin at a discount relative to Cushing prices.”

So, there’s that teeny weeny problemo.

If you think that’s bad, bear in mind what’s happening with natural gas:

“Similarly, the Henry Hub natural gas spot market price fell from a peak of $5.39 per million British thermal units (“MMBtu”) in January 2014 to $1.73 per MMBtu by March 2016, and remains at approximately $2.62 per MMBtu as of the Petition Date. In 2019, natural gas prices at the Waha hub in West Texas have at times been negative, meaning that the Debtors have at times either had to shut in production or pay purchasers to take the Debtors’ natural gas.”

It’s the natural gas equivalent of negative interest rates. 😜🙈

*All in, this fund raised $1.8b of equity. The Sheridan Group, the manager of the debtors, has raised $4.6b across three funds, completing nine major acquisitions for an aggregate purchase price of $5.7b. Only Sheridan II, however, is a debtor (as of now?).

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $66 RCF (Bank of America NA), $543.1mm Term Loan (Bank of America NA), $514mm ‘22 13.5%/17% PIK Subordinated Term Loans (Wilmington Trust NA) — see below.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Steven Serajeddini, Spencer Winters, Stephen Hackney, Rachael Marie Bazinski, Jaimie Fedell, Casey James McGushin) & Jackson Walker LLP (Elizabeth Freeman, Matthew Cavenaugh)

    • Board of Directors: Alan Carr, Jonathan Foster

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Evercore Group LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Administrative agent and collateral agent under the Sheridan II Term Loan Credit Agreements: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Stephen Piraino, Nathaniel Sokol)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Administrative Agent under the Sheridan II RBL: Bank of America NA

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (William Wallander, Bradley Foxman, Andrew Geppert)

      • Financial Advisor: Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc.

    • Ad Hoc Group of Subordinated Term Loans (Pantheon Ventures US LP, HarbourVest Partners LP)

      • Legal: Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Matthew Barr, Gabriel Morgan, Clifford Carlson)

      • Financial Advisor: PJT Partners LP

    • Limited Partner: Wilberg Pincus LLC

      • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brian Lennon)

Screen Shot 2019-09-18 at 9.34.47 AM.png
Source: First Day Declaration

Source: First Day Declaration

💊New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Purdue Pharma LP 💊

Purdue Pharma LP

September 15, 2019

See here for our writeup.

  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of New York (Judge Drain)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell (Marshall S. Huebner, Benjamin S. Kaminetzky,, Timothy Graulich, Eli J. Vonnegut)

    • Board of Directors: Robert Miller, Kenneth Buckfire, John Dubel, Michael Cola, Anthony Roncalli, Cecil Pickett, F. Peter Boer

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: PJT Partners Inc.

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Committee of AGs in Support of Settlement

      • Legal: Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP (Kenneth Eckstein, Rachael Ringer), Brown Rudnick LLP (David Molton, Steven Pohl), Gilbert LLP (Scott Gilbert, Craig Litherland, Kami Quinn), Otterbourg PC (Melanie Cyganowski, Jennifer Feeney)

    • AG of New York

      • Legal: Pillsbury Winthrop LLP (Andrew Troop)

    • Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: West Boca Medical Center, CVS Caremark D Services LLC, LTS Lohmann Therapy Systems Corporation, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and 4 individuals

      • Legal: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

9/28/19 #135

⛽️New Chapter 11 Filing - Alta Mesa Resources Inc. ($AMR)⛽️

Alta Mesa Resources Inc.

September 11, 2019

Man. We nailed this one. Once Alta Mesa Holdings LP’s borrowing base got redetermined down, it was f*cked.*

As we’ve previously covered, Alta Mesa Resources Inc. is an independent oil and nat gas exploration and production company focused on the Sooner Trend Anadarko Basin Canadian and Kingfisher County (otherwise known as the “STACK”) in Oklahoma. It has an upstream business and, through a non-debtor entity it is now suing in an adversary proceeding (Kingfisher Midstream LLC), a midstream business.

The fact that another oil and gas company is now in bankruptcy** is, frankly, fairly uninteresting: the debtors blame the usual factors for their demise. Depressed oil prices ✅. Over-leverage (here, a $368mm RBL and $509mm in unsecured notes)✅. Liquidity constraints✅. We’ve now seen these story — and those factors — several dozen times this year alone. Like many of its oil and gas predecessors, these debtors, too, will explore a “value-maximizing sale of all or substantially all of the [d]ebtors’ assets” while also looking at a restructuring along with non-debtor affiliates. Par for the course.

What’s most interesting to us on this one — and relatively rare in bankruptcy — is the fact that the company emanated out of a “special purpose acquisition company or “SPAC” for short (these are also known as “blank check” companies). For the uninitiated, SPACs are generally shady-as-sh*t investment vehicles with pseudo-private-equity-like characteristics (including the enrichment of the sponsors) that are offered via IPO to idiot public equity investors who are enamored with putting money behind allegedly successful founders/investors. They have a long and sordid history but, as you might imagine in frothy AF markets like the one we’re currently experiencing, they tend to rise in popularity when people have lots of money to put to work and limited avenues for yield baby yield. According to this “SPAC 101” presentation by the law firm Winston & Strawn LLP, “[i]n 2017, there were 32 SPAC IPOs raising a total of $8.7 billion, the highest total since 2007.” That number rose above $10b in 2018. Some recent prominent examples of SPACs include: (a) the proposed-but-called-off combination of SPAC Leo Holdings Corp. ($LHC) with Chuck E. Cheese, (b) Chamath Palihapitiya’s investment in Richard Branson’s Virgin Galacticspace initiative via his $600mm spac, Social Capital Hedosophia Holdings Corp ($IPOA), and (c) something closer to home for distressed players, Mudrick Capital Acquisition Corporation ($MUDS.U), founded by Jason Mudrick. The latter, despite being 18 month post-close, has yet to deploy its capital (which is notable because, typically, SPACs have a two-year life span before capital must be returned to investors).

In late 2016, Riverstone Investment Group LLC formed its SPAC and commenced an IPO in Q1 ‘17. The IPO generated proceeds of over $1b. These proceeds were placed in a trust account — standard for SPACs — and ultimately used to partially fund the “business combination” that started the sh*tshow that we all now know as Alta Mesa. That transaction closed in February 2018. Public shareholders were now in the mix.

So, how did that work out for them? Well, here we are:

So, yeah. Add this one to the list of failed SPACs. The lawyers sure have: AMR, certain of its current and former directors, Riverstone Investment Group LLC and Riverstone Holdings LLC were named defendants in securities class action lawsuits in both United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas that allege that the defendants “disseminated proxy materials containing materially false or misleading statements in connection with the Business Combination….” The debtors are obviously calling these claims “meritless.”

So, there you have it folks. An inauspicious start has brought us to a suspect penultimate chapter. There is no purchaser in tow, no clear direction for the bankruptcy proceeding, and an adversary proceeding that faces some recent unfavorable precedent (albeit in a different, less favorable, jurisdiction).

We can’t wait to see where this flaming hot mess goes from here.


*We wrote:

PETITION Note: Ruh roh. Just like that, the lenders have put the squeeze on AMH. AMH meet world of hurt. World of hurt, meet AMH.

“As provided under the Alta Mesa RBL, AMH will elect to repay the excess utilization in 5 equal monthly installments of $32.5 million, the first of which will be due in September 2019. As of July 31, 2019, AMH had cash on hand of approximately $79.7 million.”

PETITION Note: HAHAHAHAHA, yeah, sure it will. And we have a bridge to sell you.

Re-engage the bankruptcy countdown. Maybe…MAYBE…some crazy macroeconomic shock will occur and oil prices will shoot up to $1900/barrel. Like, maybe a meteor strikes Earth and annihilates Saudi Arabia, completely wiping it off the map. In that scenario, yeah, sure, AMH is copacetic. 

Interestingly, as we write this, Yemeni Houthi rebels are taking credit for a drone attack that has shut down half of Saudi Arabia’s oil output. Per the WSJ:

The production shutdown amounts to a loss of about five million barrels a day, the people said, roughly 5% of the world’s daily production of crude oil. The kingdom produces 9.8 million barrels a day.

Meteors. Drones. Let’s not split hairs.

**10% of the top 30 creditors features energy companies with prior BK experience including greatest hits like Chaparral Energy LLC, Weatherford US LP (another recent Latham client), and Basic Energy Services LP.


  • Jurisdiction: S.D. of Texas (Judge Isgur)

  • Capital Structure: $368mm RBL (Wells Fargo Bank NA), $509mm 7.785% unsecured notes (US Bank NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP (George Davis, Caroline Reckler, Annemarie Reilly, Brett Neve, Andrew Sorkin) & Porter Hedges LLP (John F. Higgins IV, Eric English, Aaron Power, M. Shane Johnson)

    • Board of Directors: James Hackett (Riverstone), Pierre Lapeyre Jr. (Riverstone), David Leuschen (Riverstone), Donald Dimitrievich (HPS), William McCullen, Sylvia Kerrigan, Donald Sinclair, Jeffrey Tepper, Diana Walters, Patrick Bartels, Marc Beilinson)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Robert Albergotti)

    • Investment Banker: Perella Weinberg Partners (Kevin Cofsky)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Ad Hoc Noteholder Group (Bain Capital Credit LP, Firefly Value Partners LP, Leroy DH LP, PGIM Inc., PPM America Inc.)

      • Legal: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Damian Schaible, Angela Libby, Stephanie Massman & (local) Rapp & Krock PC (Henry Flores, Kenneth Krock)

    • Issuing Lender: Wells Fargo Bank NA

      • Legal: Bracewell LLP (William A. Wood III, Jason G. Cohen)

    • Unsecured Note Indenture Trustee: US Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Ira Herman, James Grogan)

    • Creditor: Kingfisher Midstream LLC

      • Legal: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (Susheel Kirpalani, Patrica Tomasco, Devin va der Hahn)

    • Equity Sponsors: Riverstone Investment Group LLC/HPS Investment Partners LLC

      • Legal: Vinson & Elkins LLP (David Meyer, Michael Garza, Harry Perrin)

    • Equity Sponsor: Bayou City Energy Management LLC

      • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Joshua Sussberg, Gregory Pesce, Anna Rotman)

    • Equity Sponsors: Orbis Investment Management Limited, High Mesa Holdings LP,

🙈New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Avenue Stores LLC🙈

Avenue Stores LLC

August 16, 2019

Retail, retail, retail.

Brutal. Absolutely B.R.U.T.A.L.

Avenue Stores LLC, a speciality women’s plus-size retailer with approximately 2,000 employees across its NJ-based HQ* and 255 leased stores,** is the latest retailer to find its way into bankruptcy court. On Friday, August 16, Avenue Stores LLC filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. Like Dressbarn, another plus-size apparel retailer that’s in the midst of going the way of the dodo, any future iteration of the Avenue “brand” will likely exist only on the interwebs: the company intends to shutter its brick-and-mortar footprint.

What is Avenue? In addition to a select assortment of national brands, Avenue is a seller of (i) mostly “Avenue” private label apparel, (ii) intimates/swimwear and other wares under the “Loralette” brand and (iii) wide-width shoes under the “Cloudwalkers” brand. The company conducts e-commerce via “Avenue.com” and “Loralette.com.” All of this “IP” is the crux of the bankruptcy. More on this below. 

But, first, a digression: when we featured Versa Capital Management LP’s Gregory Segall in a Notice of Appearance segment back in April, we paid short shrift to the challenges of retail. We hadn’t had an investor make an NOA before and so we focused more broadly on the middle market and investing rather than Versa’s foray into retail and its ownership of Avenue Stores LLC. Nevertheless, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we can now see some foreshadowing baked into Mr. Siegel’s answers — in particular, his focus on Avenue’s e-commerce business and the strategic downsizing of the brick-and-mortar footprint. Like many failed retail enterprises before it, the future — both near and long-term — of Avenue Stores is marked by these categorical distinctions. Store sales are approximately 64% of sales with e-commerce at approximately 36% (notably, he cited 33% at the time of the NOA). 

A brand founded in 1987, Avenue has had an up-and-down history. It was spun off out of Limited Brands Inc. and renamed in 1989; it IPO’d in 1992; it was then taken private in 2007. Shortly thereafter, it struggled and filed for bankruptcy in early 2012 and sold as a going-concern to an acquisition entity, Avenue Stores LLC (under a prior name), for “about $32 million.” The sale closed after all of two months in bankruptcy. The holding company that owns 100% of the membership interests in Avenue Stores LLC, the operating company, is 99%-owned by Versa Capital Management. 

Performance for the business has been bad, though the net loss isn’t off the charts like we’ve seen with other recent debtors in chapter 11 cases (or IPO candidates filing S-1s, for that matter). Indeed, the company had negative EBITDA of $886k for the first five months of 2019 on $75.3mm in sales. Nevertheless, the loss was enough for purposes of the debtors’ capital structure. The debtors are party to an asset-backed loan (“ABL”) memorialized by a credit agreement with PNC Bank NA, a lender that, lately, hasn’t been known for suffering fools. The loan is for $45mm with a $6mm first-in-last-out tranche and has a first lien on most of the debtors’ collateral. 

The thing about ABLs is that availability thereunder is subject to what’s called a “borrowing base.” A borrowing base determines how much availability there is out of the overall credit facility. Said another way, the debtors may not always have access to the full facility and therefore can’t just borrow $45mm willy-nilly; they have to comply with certain periodic tests. For instance, the value of the debtors’ inventory and receivables, among other things, must be at a certain level for availability to remain. If the value doesn’t hold up, the banks can close the spigot. If you’re a business with poor sales, slim margins, diminishing asset quality (i.e., apparel inventory), and high cash burn, you’re generally not in very good shape when it comes to these tests. With specs like those, your liquidity is probably already tight. A tightened borrowing base will merely exacerbate the problem.

Lo and behold, PNC declared the debtors in default on July 22; in turn, they imposed default interest on the debtors and initiated daily cash sweeps of the debtors’ bank accounts. Like we said. Suffer. No. Fools.*** The debtors owe $15.2mm on the facility. 

The debtors also have outstanding a subordinated secured note to the tune of $37.8mm. The note pays interest at 15% but is paid in kind.**** The lender on the note is an affiliate of Versa, and per the terms of the note, Versa had continued, at least through April 2019, to fund the business (and letters of credit for the debtors’ benefit) with millions of dollars of capital. 

If this sounds like a hot mess, well, yeah, sure, kudos. You’re clearly paying attention. It’s a dog eat dog world out there. Per the company:

The Debtors operate in an extremely competitive retail environment, facing competition from other specialty-retail stores, including Lane Bryant, Ashley Stewart, and Torrid, and mass-market retailers such as Walmart and Target, many of which are located in close proximity to Avenue stores. In addition to long-standing, traditional competitors within the plussize segment, there has been a recent influx of many other iconic fashion retail brands expanding their range of size offerings into the plus-size range, as well as a proliferation of new entrants targeting this same plus-size fashion market. Due to increased competition, the Debtors have faced significant pressure to maintain market share, which has directly and negatively affected their profitability.

Not that this is anything new. We all know this by now: competition is fierce (Stitch Fix Inc. ($SFIX)Neiman MarcusKohl’s Corporation ($KSS)Macy’s Inc. ($M) and others are now going after it hard), B&M sucks because leases carry higher expenses, store traffic is down, blah blah f*cking blah. The company continues:

…changes in consumer spending habits have necessitated many retailers to increase promotional activities and discounting, leading to thinner profit margins. Onerous brick-and-mortar lease terms and increased operating costs, during a period of downturn in the retail sector and deep discounting, have intensified retail losses.

Interestingly, in the face of surging U.S. retail sales in July,***** the company also notes that “a review of historic customer data indicates that Avenue customers are shopping less frequently than they once were….” They blame this on a “[s]hifts in consumer preferences” and the debtors’ emphasis on “fashion basics.” DING DING DING. No wonder customers are shopping there less frequently. “Basic” is the antithesis of Instagram-based retail these days. Basics can be purchased at any big box retailer; basics are now available via Amazon’s private label. Basics don’t create an influencer and, on the flip side, no influencer will market “basic.” Maybe Avenue could get away with “fashion basics” if it had brand-equity like SUPREME and was perceived as a luxury brand. But far from it. 

Speaking of basic, that pretty much describes the go-forward game plan. We’ll lay it out for you:

  • Engage an independent director to explore strategic alternatives;

  • Engage professionals (Young Conaway is legal and Berkeley Research Group as restructuring advisor and CRO)******;

  • Consider whether there’s going concern value, conclude, like, basically, “nope,” and then hire a consultant******* to solicit bids from liquidators for the B&M piece and an investment banker (Configure Partners) for the IP and e-commerce business; 

  • Issue WARN notices, RIF employees, and start shuttering stores (with intent to file a rejection motion on day 1 of the bankruptcy); 

  • Select a stalking horse bidder for the B&M assets from the pool of interested liquidators (in this case, Gordon Brothers and Hilco Merchant Resources LLC); 

  • Continue to search for a stalking horse bidder for the IP and e-commerce (at filing, there wasn’t one yet); and

  • Secure DIP financing (here, $12mm from PNC) to fund the cases while the B&M liquidation transpires and the banker searches under every rock under an extremely compressed timeframe (by 9/24/19) for that e-commerce/IP buyer.******** 

So we’ll know in the next 60 days what the future is for Avenue.

If there is one.


*Let’s pour one out for NJ. The state’s larger retailers are having a rough go of things lately, see, e.g., Toys R Us. The 2,000 figure is updated to reflect a recent round of layoffs. 

**The debtors are located primarily in shopping malls and shopping centers, doing business in 35 states. They have a distribution center for brick-and-mortar merchandise in Troy, Ohio, and a third-party warehousing facility located in Dallas, Texas, which handles logistics for e-commerce. The Troy center is the subject of a wholly unoriginal PE-backed sale/leaseback transaction. The debtors sold the center for $11.3mm and subsequently entered into a 15-year lease with the buyer, RD Dayton LLC. We mention this because sale/leaseback transactions have been getting hyper-focus these days as a tactic-of-choice by private equity overlords to extract returns out of portfolio companies’ assets with any actual value: real property. If you’re wondering why there is very little asset value left for unsecured creditors in retail cases, sale/leaseback transactions are often a culprit. Here, it’s especially egregious because Avenue doesn’t own ANY of its stores: the entire footprint is leased.

The debtors recently closed the Ohio center and transitioned its inventory to Texas and the company already filed a motion seeking to reject this lease (Docket 15).

***This is not extraordinary. Banks do this all of the time when debtors default. A liquidity starved company is almost always toast (read: bankrupt) once this happens. 

****PIK interest means that the interest accrues in the form of additional notes and is not subject to scheduled cash payments. 

*****Per Reuters:

Retail sales increased 0.7% last month after gaining 0.3% in June, the government said. Economists polled by Reuters had forecast retail sales would rise 0.3% in July. Compared to July last year, retail sales increased 3.4%.

******Something tells us that the likes of FTI, A&M and AlixPartners are happy to cede the liquidating retailer market to Berkeley Research Group. 

*******This is one of the more ingenious things to come out of the restructuring market in recent years. These liquidator agreements are so unintelligible that they might as well be written in Dothraki. Hence the need for an intermediary to break out the secret decoder ring and figure out what is actually being contracted for. We don’t know: if something is so woefully incoherent that it requires a separate consultant just to interpret it, something tells us that obfuscation is a feature not a bug.

********If none is found, the liquidator will also get these assets as part of the agency agreement. 

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure:

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP (Robert Brady, Andrew Magaziner, Ashley Jacobs, Allison Mielke, Betsy Feldman)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: Berkeley Research Group (Robert Duffy)

    • Investment Banker: Configure Partners

    • Liquidators: Gordon Brothers and Hilco Merchant Resources LLC

    • Liquidation Consultant: Malfitano Advisors LLC

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Pre-petition & DIP Agent: PNC Bank NA

      • Legal: Blank Rome LLP (Regina Stango Kelbon)

    • Subordinated Lender: Versa Capital Management LP

      • Legal: Landis Rath & Cobb LLP (Adam Landis, Matthew McGuire)

🌑New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Blackhawk Mining LLC🌑

Blackhawk Mining LLC

July 19, 2019

What are we averaging? Like, one coal bankruptcy a month at this point? MAGA!!

This week Blackhawk Mining LLC filed prepackaged Chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware, the effect of which will be the elimination of approximately $650mm of debt from the company’s balance sheet. Unlike other recent bankruptcies, i.e., the absolute and utter train wreck that is the Blackjewel LLC bankruptcy, this case actually has financing and employees aren’t getting left out in the lurch. So, coal country can at least take a deep breath. Small victories!

Before we get into the mechanics of how this deleveraging will work, it’s important to note some of the company’s history. Blackhawk represents opportunism at its best. Founded in 2010 as a strategic vehicle to acquire coal reserves, active mining operations and logistical infrastructure located primarily in the Appalachian Basin, the privately-owned coal producer hit the ground running. Initially the company started with Kentucky thermal coal assets (PETITION Note: thermal coal’s end use is the production of electricity; in contrast, metallurgical coal’s prime use is for the production of steel). It then quickly moved to diversify its product offering with a variety of acquisitions. In 2014, it acquired three mining complexes in the bankruptcy of James River Coal Company (which served as the company’s entry into the production of met coal). Thereafter, in 2015, the company purchased six mining complexes in the bankruptcy of Patriot Coal Company (which has since filed for bankruptcy a second time). This acquisition lofted the company into the highest echelon of US-based met coal production (PETITION Note: met coal drives 76% of the company’s $1.09b in revenue today). The company now operates 19 active underground and 6 active surface mines at 10 active mining complexes in West Virginia and Kentucky. The company has 2,800 employees. 

Naturally, this rapid growth begs some obvious questions: what was the thesis behind all of these acquisitions and how the hell were they financed? 

The investments were a play on an improved met coal market. And, to some degree, this play has proven to be right. Per the company: 

“The Company’s strategic growth proved to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it significantly increased the Company’s position in the metallurgical coal market at a time when asset prices were depressed relative to today’s prices. The Company continues to benefit from this position in the current market. The price of high volatile A metallurgical coal has risen from $75 per ton to an average of $188 per ton over the last two years, providing a significant tailwind for the Company. On the other hand, the pricing environment for metallurgical coal did not improve until late 2016, and the debt attendant to the Company’s acquisition strategy in 2015 placed a strain on the Company’s ability to maintain its then-existing production profile while continuing to reinvest in the business. During this time, to defer expenses, the Company permanently closed over 10 coal mines (with over 5 million tons of productive capacity), idled the Triad complex, and depleted inventories of spare equipment, parts, and components. Furthermore, once the coal markets began to improve, the Company was forced to make elevated capital expenditures and bear unanticipated increases in costs—for example, employment costs rose approximately 25% between 2016 and 2018—to remain competitive. The confluence of these factors eventually made the Company’s financial position untenable.”

Longs and shorts require the same thing: good timing. 

Alas, the answer to the second question also leads us to the very predicament the company finds itself in today. The company has $1.09b in debt split across, among other things, an ABL facility (’22 $85mm, MidCap Financial LLC), a first lien term loan facility (’22 $639mm, Cantor Fitzgerald Securities), a second lien term loan facility (’21 $318mm, Cortland Capital Markets Services LLC), and $16mm legacy unsecured note issued to a “Patriot Trust” as part of the Patriot Coal asset acquisition. More on this Trust below.

But this is not the first time the company moved to address its capital structure. In a bankruptcy-avoiding move in 2017, the company — on the heals of looming amortization and interest payments on its first and second lien debt — negotiated an out-of-court consensual restructuring with its lenders pursuant to which it kicked the can down the road on the amortization payments to its first lien lenders and deferred cash interest payments to its second lien lenders. If you’re asking yourself, why would the lenders agree to these terms, the answer is, as always, driven by money (and some hopes and prayers). For their part, the first lien lenders obtained covenant amendments, juiced interest rates and an increased principal balance owed while the second lien lenders obtained an interest rate increase. Certain first and second lien lenders also got equity units, board seats and additional voting rights. These terms — onerous in their own way — were a roll of the dice that the environment for met coal would continue to improve and the company could grow into its capital structure. Clearly, that hope proved to be misplaced. 

Indeed, this is the quintessential kick-the-can-down-the-road situation. By spring 2019, Blackhawk again faced a $16mm mandatory amortization payment and $20mm in interest payments due under the first lien term loan. 

Now the first lien lenders will swap their debt for 71% of the reorganized equity and a $225mm new term loan and the second lien lenders will get 29% of the new equity. The “will-met-coal-recover-to-such-a-point-where-the-value-of-the-company-extends-beyond-the-debt?” option play for those second lien lenders has expired. The company seeks to have its plan confirmed by the end of August. The cases will be financed by a $235mm DIP of which $50mm is new money and the remainder will rollup $100mm in first lien term loan claims and $85mm in ABL claims (and ultimately convert to a $90mm exit facility). 

Some other quick notes:

  • Kirkland & Ellis LLP represents the company after pushing Latham & Watkins LLP out in a move that would make Littlefinger proud. This is becoming an ongoing trend: as previously reported, K&E also gave das boot to Latham in Forever21. A war is brewing folks. 

  • The Patriot Trust will get $500k per a settlement baked into the plan. On a $16mm claim. The “Patriot Trust” refers to the liquidating trust that was established in connection with the Patriot Coal Corporation chapter 11 cases, previously filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. Marinate on that for a second: the creditors in that case fought long and hard to have some sort of recovery, won a $16mm claim and now have to settle for $500k. There’s nothing like getting screwed over multiple times in bankruptcy. 

  • But then there’s management: the CEO gets a nice cushy settlement that includes a $500k payment, a seat on the reorganized board of managers (and, presumably, whatever fee comes with that), and a one-year consulting contract. He waives his right to severance. If we had to venture a guess, Mr. Potter will soon find his way onto K&E’s list of “independent” directors for service in other distressed situations too. That list seems to be growing like a weed. 

  • Knighthead Capital Management LLC and Solus Alternative Asset Management LP are the primary holders of first lien paper and now, therefore, own the company. Your country’s steel production, powered by hedge funds! They will each have representation on the board of managers and the ability to jointly appoint an “independent” director. 


  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure: See above.

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Kirkland & Ellis LLP (James Sprayragen, Ross Kwasteniet, Joseph Graham, Stephen Hessler, Christopher Hayes, Derek Hunter, Barack Echols) & (local) Potter Anderson Corroon LLP (Christopher Swamis, L. Katherine Good) 

    • Financial Advisor: AlixPartners LLP

    • Investment Banker: Centerview Partners (Marc Puntus)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • Prepetition ABL & DIP ABL Agent: Midcap Funding IV Trust

      • Legal: Hogan Lovells US LLP (Deborah Staudinger)

    • Prepetition & DIP Term Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

      • Legal: Herrick Feinstein LLP (Eric Stabler, Steven Smith)

    • Second Lien Term Loan Agent: Cortland Capital Market Services LLC

      • Legal: Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP (Alex Cota, Gabriel Sasson)

    • Consenting Term Lenders: Knighthead Capital Management LLC, Solus Alternative Asset Management LP, Redwood Capital Management LLC

      • Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Brian Resnick, Dylan Consla, Daniel Meyer)

    • Ad Hoc Group of First Lien Lenders

      • Legal: Shearman & Sterling LLP (Fredric Sosnick, Ned Schodek)

New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing -- FTD Companies Inc.

FTD Companies Inc.

June 3, 2019

After the issuance of Illinois-based FTD Companies Inc’s ($FTD) most recent 10-K, everyone and their mother — well, other than maybe United Parcel Service Inc. ($UPS)* — knew that FTD was headed towards a bankruptcy court near you. It arrived.

The company is a floral and gifting company operating primarily within the United States and Canada; it (and its affiliated debtors) specializes in providing floral, specialty foods, gift and related products to consumers (direct-to-consumer), retail florists and other retail locations. The company basks in the glory of its “iconic” “Mercury Man” logo, which it alleges is “one of the most recognized logos in the world.” Seriously? Hyperbole much?🙄

Maybe…not? This, for any sort of history nerd, is actually pretty interesting:

Originally called "Florists' Telegraph Delivery Association," FTD was the world's first flowers-by-wire service and has been a leader in the floral and gifting industry for over a century. The Debtors' story began in 1910 when thirteen American retail florists agreed to exchange orders for out-of-town deliveries by telegraph, thereby eliminating prohibitively lengthy transit times that made sending flowers to friends and relatives in distant locations almost impossible. The idea revolutionized the industry, and soon independent florists all over America were telegraphing and telephoning orders to each other using the FTD network. In 1914, FTD adopted the Roman messenger god as its logo and, in 1929, copyrighted the Mercury Man® logo as the official trademark for FTD.

This company is only slightly younger than Sears (1893). And so this bankruptcy filing is a bigger deal than meets the eye. This company revolutionized flower delivery, regularly innovating and expanding its reach over its decades in business. In 1923, FTD expanded to Britain. In 1946, FTD, FTD Britain and a European clearinghouse established what is now known as Interflora to sell flowers-by-wire around the world. In 1979, the company launched an electronic system to link florists together; and in 1994, it launched its first e-commerce site. In other words, this company always tackled the “innovator’s dilemma” head on, pivoting regularly over time to seize opportunities whenever and wherever they emerged. For quite some time, this was, at least for some time, an impressive operation — seemingly always one step ahead of disruption. WE ALL LIKELY TAKE FOR GRANTED JUST HOW EASY IT IS TO DELIVER FLOWERS THESE DAYS. These guys helped make it all possible. If ever a debtor was in need of a hype man, this company is it. A read of the bankruptcy papers barely gives you a sense for the history and legacy of this company.

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Interestingly, for much of its history, the company was actually a not-for-profit. That’s right: a not-for-profit. Per the company:

For the majority of its existence, FTD operated as a not-for-profit organization run by its member florists. With the florists as its core, the Debtors' legacy business provided a powerful mix of a "local," authentic, and bespoke product, broad geographic range, and a commitment to exacting standards of quality and service. Moreover, the Debtors historically were devoted to creating an optimal product for their florist network, including through investment in innovation and technology and marketing the FTD brand and the floral industry overall. As a result, florists sought out FTD membership, and the FTD brand had (and still has) significant caché in the industry.

Amazing!

So what the hell happened? Well, the blood-sucking capitalists arrived knocking. Now-defunct Perry Capital acquired FTD in 1994 (the same year that the company established its web presence) and converted the company into a for-profit corporation. In 2000, the company IPO’d and in 2008, United Online (now owned by B.Riley Financial $RILY), merged with the company in a $800mm transaction consummated just prior to the financial crisis. Then, in 2013, FTD spun off from United Online, once again becoming a publicly-traded company on the NASDAQ exchange.

Throughout the company’s evolution, it pursued a strategy of dominating the floral market via strategic acquisitions (and, in the process, drew antitrust scrutiny a handful of times). In 2006, it acquired Interflora and in 2014, it acquired Provide Commerce LLC (ProFlowers) in a $430mm cash and equity transaction. The purchase was predicated upon uniting FTD’s B2B “Florist” business (read: FTD-to-retail-florists) and B2C (read: FTD-direct-to-consumer) businesses with Provide Commerce’s B2C model in such a way that would (i) offer customers greater choice, (ii) provide the company with expanded geographic and demographic reach, and (iii) promote cross-selling possibilities. Per the company:

…FTD anticipated that the Provide Acquisition would generate significant cost synergies through efficiencies in combined operations.

Ah, synergies. Is there anything more romantic than the thought of ever-elusive synergies?

The company incurred $120-200mm of debt to finance the transaction.** You know where this is headed. If not, well, please allow the company to spell it out for you:

Though the Provide Business Units have increased the Debtors' revenue (the Provide Business Units currently contribute more than 50% of the Debtors' total revenue) … certain shifts in the market, technological changes, and improvident strategic outcomes in connection with the implementation of the Provide Acquisition combined to (a) frustrate expectations regarding the earnings of the combined entity and (b) impair the Debtors' ability to refinance near-term maturities, which has driven the Debtors' need to commence these chapter 11 cases.

That sure escalated quickly. 😬

Let’s take a moment here, however, to appreciate what the company attempted to do. In the spirit of its long-time legacy of getting out ahead of disruption, the company identified a competitor that was quickly disrupting the floral business. Per the company:

ProFlowers had entered the floral industry as a disruptor by reimagining floral delivery to consumers. Unlike the Debtors' "asset-light" B2B business model, ProFlowers took ownership of the floral inventory and fulfilled orders directly through a company-operated supply chain. By sourcing finished bouquets directly from farms, limiting product selection, pricing strategically into the consumer demand curve, and leveraging analytically-driven direct response marketing to generate large volumes at peak periods (i.e., Valentine's Day and Mother's Day), ProFlowers appealed to a broad market of consumers who wanted an efficient order process coupled with lower cost purchases.

There’s more:

In addition to these potential opportunities, FTD also viewed the Provide Acquisition as the means to strategically position itself for success within a changing industry. At the time of the Provide Acquisition, the disruptive impact of ProFlowers was perceived as a threat to traditional business models within the floral industry (and to the Florist Member Network specifically). FTD was concerned that, if it failed to adapt and embrace shifting industry paradigms, competitors would take advantage and acquire ProFlowers to FTD's detriment. Accordingly, FTD effected the Provide Acquisition.

We clown on companies all of the time for failing to heed the signs of disruption. But, that’s not actually the case here. This company was, seemingly, on its game. Where it failed, however, was with the post-acquisition integration. It’s awfully hard to realize synergies when businesses effectively run as independent entities. Per the company:

In particular, a number of key post-acquisition targets, such as (a) floral brand alignment, (b) necessary technological investments in the combined business (e.g., the consolidation of technology/ecommerce platforms), and (c) the integration of marketing and business teams, have lagged. As a result, both the Provide Commerce and the Debtors' legacy brands suffered from internal friction and suboptimal structures within the Debtors' enterprise.

And while the company failed to integrate Provide Commerce, the industry never stopped evolving. Competitors didn’t just take the acquisition as a sign that they ought to fold up their tents and relinquish the flower industry to FTD. F*ck no. To the contrary, this is where…wait for it…AMAZON INC. ($AMZN) ENTERS THE PICTURE:***

While the Debtors struggled to unify their businesses and implement the Provide Acquisition, the floral industry – and consumer expectations – continued to evolve. Following the example set by ProFlowers, other companies began to deliver farm-sourced fresh bouquets directly to customers, increasing competition in the B2C space. In addition, the expanding influence of e-commerce platforms like Amazon transformed customer expectations, particularly with respect to ease of experience and the fast, free delivery of goods. Given the perishable and delicate nature of the product, delivery and service fees were standard in the floral industry. As e-commerce companies trained consumers to expect free or nominal cost delivery, floral service fees became anathema to many customers.

Well, Amazon AND venture capital-backed floral startups (i.e., The Bouqs Company - $43mm of VC funding) that could absorb losses in the name of customer acquisition.

The company also blames a significant number of trends that we’ve covered here in PETITION for its demise. Like, for instance, increased shipping and online marketing costs (long Facebook Inc. ($FB)), low barriers to entry for other DTC businesses (long Shopify Inc. ($SHOP)), and “the growing presence of grocers and mass merchants providing low-cost floral products and chocolate-dipped strawberries during peak holidays” (long Target Inc., ($T)Walmart Inc. ($WMT)Trader Joe’s, etc.).

Collectively, market pressures contributed to declining sales and decreased order volumes, impairing the B2C businesses' ability to leverage and capitalize on scale.

In other words, (a) chocolate-dipped strawberries have no f*cking moat whatsoever and (b) as with all other things retail, this is a perfect storm story that is best explained by factors beyond just the f*cking “Amazon Effect” (the most obvious one being: a ton of debt).

Consequently, the company has been mired in a year-plus-long process of triage; it tried to cap-ex its way out of problems, but that didn’t work; it brought in new leadership but…well…you see how that turned out; it attempted to “reinvent” its user experience to combat its techie VC-backed upstart competitors with no results; and, it sought to optimize efficiencies. None of this could stem the tide of underperformance, bolster liquidity, and, ultimately, prevent debt covenant issues. The company currently has $149.4mm of secured indebtedness on its balance sheet (comprised of a $57.4mm term loan and $92mm under a revolving credit facility). The company reports approximately $72.4mm of unsecured debt owed to providers of goods and services.

In a strange fit of irony, it was the most romantic holiday of the calendar year that spelled doom for FTD. The company’s Valentine’s Day 2018 was pathetic: aggregate consumer order volume declined 5% and, even when people did use FTD, the average order size fell by 3%.

Valentine’s Day 2019 was no better. The company materially underperformed projections again. In addition to constraining liquidity further, this had the added effect of cooling any interest prospective buyers might have in the company pre-bankruptcy.

So, where are we now?

The crown jewel of the company is the company’s B2B retail business. This segment generated $150.3mm in revenue and $42.7mm in operating income in 2018. Operating margin is approximately 30%. The B2C business (including FTD.com), on the other hand, lost $4.6mm in ‘18 (on $727.9mm of revenue) and had -1% operating margin in 2018. (PETITION Note: while these numbers are in many respects abysmal, its fun to think that if they belonged, sans debt, to one of those VC-backed upstarts, they’s probably be WAY GOOD ENOUGH for the company to IPO in today’s environment…flowers-as-a-service anyone?). Clearly, there is nothing “iconic” about this brand outside of the floral network/community.

Anywho, the company is selling the company for parts. On Mary 31, the company effectuated a sale of Interflora for $59.5mm. On June 2, the company entered into an asset purchase agreement with Nexus Capital Management LP for the purchase of certain FTD assets and the ProFlowers business for $95mm. It also entered into non-binding letters of intent to sell other assets, including Shari’s Berries to Farids & Co. LLC (which is owned by the founder of Edible Arrangements LLC, the gnarliest company we’ve ever encountered when it comes to gifts.).

All of which is to say, R.I.P. FTD. We’ll be sure to send flowers. From Bouqs.

*Why are we picking on UPS? It is listed as the largest unsecured creditor to the tune of $23.2mm. Surely they’ll be clamoring for “critical vendor” status given the core function they provide to FTD’s business.

**At one point the papers say, $120mm, at another $200mm.

***We didn’t actually realize this but, yes, of course you can buy fresh flowers on Amazon.

  • Jurisdiction: D. of Delaware (Judge Silverstein)

  • Capital Structure:

    • Secured Indebtedness:

      • $92mm Revolver

      • $57.4mm Term Loan

    • Unsecured Indebtedness

      • $72.4mm of Various Trade Claims

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Jones Day (Heather Lennox, Brad Erens, Thomas Wilson, Caitlin Cahow) & (local) Richards Layton & Finger PA (Daniel DeFranceshi, Paul Heath, Brett Haywood, Megan Kinney)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (Alan Holtz, Scott Tandberg, Jason Muscovich, Job Chan, Bassaam Fawad, J.C. Chang)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Company & Piper Jaffray Companies

    • Claims Agent: Omni Management Group (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:


😷New Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing - Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc.😷

Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc.

May 20, 2019

We were right and we were wrong. Back in November 2018, in “😬Biopharma is in Pain😬 ,” we snidely wrote, “Do Pills Count as ‘Healthcare’? Short Biopharma” riffing on the common trope that healthcare was a hot spot for restructuring activity.* No, we argued: the activity is really in publicly-traded biopharma companies with little to no sales, too much debt (and usually busted convertible notes) and attractive intellectual property. We went on to predict that Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc. ($SGYP) and Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc. (a subsidiary of Novelion Therapeutics Inc. ($NVLN)) would both file for bankruptcy. Ding ding!!! We were right.** The former filed back in December and, now, the latter is also in bankruptcy court. Of course, with respect to the latter, we also wrote, “[c]ome February — if not sooner — it may be in bankruptcy court.” But let’s not split hairs.***

The company manufactures two approved therapies, JUXTAPID and MYALEPT, that treat rare diseases. On Sunday, we’ll discuss the future of these therapies and what the company seeks to achieve with this restructuring.

*To be fair, the healthcare space has, indeed, picked up in activity since then.

**For what it’s worth, we also predicted that Orchids Paper Products Company ($TIS) would be in bankruptcy soon, writing “This company doesn’t produce enough toilet paper to wipe away this sh*tfest. See you in bankruptcy court.” Three for three: this is precisely why — wait for the shameless plug — you should become a PETITION Member today.

***Maturity of the bridge loan was initially February 15, 2019 but the debtors had a right to extend, which they did.

  • Jurisdiction: Southern District of New York (Judge )

  • Capital Structure: $36.1mm 8% PIK ‘19 secured Novelion Intercompany Loan, $73.8mm Bridge Loan (Highbridge Capital Management LLC and Athyrium Capital Management LP), $304mm 2% unsecured convertible notes (The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA)

  • Professionals:

    • Legal: Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Paul Shalhoub, Andrew Mordkoff)

    • Financial Advisor/CRO: AlixPartners LLP (John Castellano)

    • Investment Banker: Moelis & Co. (Barak Klein)

    • Claims Agent: Prime Clerk LLC (*click on the link above for free docket access)

  • Other Parties in Interest:

    • DIP Agent: Cantor Fitzgerald Securities

    • Ad Hoc Group of Convertible Noteholders

      • Legal: Latham & Watkins LLP & King & Spalding LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Ducera Partners LLC

    • Novelion

      • Legal: Goodwin Proctor LLP & Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

      • Financial Advisor: Evercore