đŸ”„Amazon is a BeastđŸ”„

The "Amazon Effect" Takes More Victims

Scott Galloway likes to say that mere announcements from Amazon Inc. ($AMZN) can result in billions of dollars of wiped-out market capitalization. Upon this week’s announcement that Amazon has purchased Boston-based online pharmacy startup Pillpack for $1 billion — beating out Walmart ($WMT) in the process — his statement proved correct. Check this out:

Screen Shot 2018-07-01 at 9.20.31 AM.png

We like to make fun of the Amazon narrative because we’re of the view that it’s overplayed — particularly in restructuring circles — and reflects a failure to understand broader macro trends (like the direct-to-consumer invasion noted below). Still, the market reaction to this purchase reflects the undeniable power of the “Amazon Effect” and we’d be remiss not to acknowledge as much. This purchase will likely be a turning point for pharmacies for sure; perhaps also, farther down the line, for benefits managers and pharmaceutical manufacturers. It also may provide Amazon with meaningful cross-pollination opportunities with its payments business — a subject that nobody seems to be talking about (more on this below).

Putting aside the losers for now, there are a variety of winners. First, obviously, are Pillpack’s founders, TJ Parker and Elliot Cohen. They stand to make a ton of money. Also its investors — Accel Partners, Atlas Venture, CRV, Founder Collective, Menlo Ventures, Sherpa Ventures and Techstars — at an 8x return, at least. Oh, and Nas apparently. And then there is Amazon itself. Pillpack isn’t a massive revenue generator ($100mm in ‘17) and it isn’t a big company (1k employees) but it packs a big punch: licenses to ship drugs in 50 sates. With this purchase, Amazon just hurdled over a significant regulatory quagmire.

So what is Pillpack? Per Wired (by way of Ben Thompson):

PillPack is trying to solve the problem of drug adherence by simplifying your medicine cabinet. Medication arrives in the mail presorted into clear plastic packets, each marked in a large font with vital information: day, time, pills inside, dosages. These are ordered chronologically in a roll that slots into the dispenser. Let’s say you need to take four different pills in the morning and two others in the afternoon every day: Those pills would be sorted into two tear-off packets: one marked 8am, followed immediately by the 2pm packet.

Put another way, Pillpack specializes in the convenience of getting you your medications directly with a design and user-experience focus to boot. The latter helps ensure that you’re taking the proper levels of medication at the right time.

Still, there are some limitations. Per The Wall Street Journal:

Amazon will be limited in what it can do, especially to start. PillPack’s specialty—packaging a month’s supply of pills for chronic-disease patients—is a small part of the overall market. It has said it has tens of thousands of customers versus Amazon’s hundreds of millions.

Current limitations notwithstanding, Thompson notes how much Pillpack’s service aligns with Amazon:

Amazon, particularly for Prime customers, is seeking to be the retailer of habit. That is, just as a chronic condition patient may need to order drugs every month, Amazon wants to be the source of monthly purchases of household supplies, and anything else one might want to buy along the way.

Like all aggregators, Amazon wins by providing a superior user experience, particularly when it comes to delivering the efficient frontier of price and selection. To that end, moving into pharmaceuticals via a company predicated on delivering a superior user experience makes total sense.

Thompson notes further:

The benefit Amazon will provide to PillPack, on the other hand, is primarily about dramatically decreasing the customer acquisition costs for a solution that is far better for consumers; to put it another way, Amazon will make a whole lot more people aware of a much more customer-friendly solution. Frankly, I have a hard time seeing why that is problematic.

To be sure, Amazon will benefit beyond its unique ability to supercharge PillPack’s customer acquisition numbers: just as Walgreen and CVS’s pharmacies draw customers to their traditional retail stores, PillPack’s focus on regular ordering fits in well with Amazon’s desire to be at the center of its customers day-to-day lives. This works in two directions: first, that Amazon now has a direct connection to a an ongoing transaction, and second, that would-be Amazon customers are dissuaded from visiting a retail pharmacy and, inevitably, buying something else along the way. This was a point I made in Amazon’s New Customer:

This, though, is why groceries is a strategic hole: not only is it the largest retail category, it is the most persistent opportunity for other retailers to gain access to Prime members and remind them there are alternatives.

A similar argument could be made for prescription drugs: their acquisition is one of the most consistent and predictable ways by which potential customers exist outside of the Amazon ecosystem. It makes a lot of sense for Amazon to reduce the inclination to ever go elsewhere.

It seems that Amazon is doing that lately for virtually everything. Consistently, further expansion beyond just chronic-disease patients seems inevitable. Margin exists elsewhere in the medical chain too and, well, Jeff Bezos once famously said “Your margin is my opportunity.” David Frankel of Founder Collective writes:

The story of the last five years has been that of bricks and mortar retailers frantically trying to play catch-up with Amazon. By acquiring PillPack, Amazon is now firmly attacking another quarter trillion dollars of TAM. Bezos is a tenacious competitor and has just added the most compelling consumer pharmacy to enter the game since CVS was founded in 1963.

TJ Parker understands the pharma business in his bones, has impeccable product sensibilities, and now has the backing of the most successful retail entrepreneur in history.

Expect some real healthcare reform ahead.

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Screen Shot 2018-07-01 at 9.22.25 AM.png

No wonder those stocks all sh*t the bed. That all sounds downright horrifying for those on the receiving end.

*****

Recall weeks back when we noted this slide in Mary Meeker’s “Internet Trends” presentation:

Screen Shot 2018-07-01 at 9.23.24 AM.png

Healthcare spending continues to rise which, no doubt, includes the cost of medication — a hot button issue of price that even Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have agreed on. This purchase dovetails nicely with Amazon’s overall health ambitions. Per the New York Times:

But Mr. Buck and others said Amazon might have a new opportunity. A growing number of Americans are without health insurance or have such high deductibles that they may be better off bargain shopping on their own. He estimated that 25 million Americans fell into that category.

Until now, he said, PillPack has not aggressively competed on price. With Amazon in charge, “how about they start posting prices that are really, really aggressive?” Mr. Buck said.

As Pillpack increases its scale, Amazon will be able to exert more leverage in the space. This could have the affect of compressing (certain) pharmaceutical prices. To get there, Amazon will undoubtedly seize the opportunity to subsume Pillpack/pharma into Amazon Prime, providing Members discounts on medicine much like it provides Whole Foods shoppers discounts on bananas.

There is other opportunity to expand the user base as well. People are looking to save money on healthcare as much as possible. With cash back rewards, Amazon can offer additional discounts if consumers were to carry and use the Amazon Prime Rewards Visa Signature Card — which already offers 5% back on Amazon.com and WholeFoods purchases (plus money back elsewhere too). Pillpack too? We could envision a scenario where people scrap their current plastic to ensure that they’re getting discounts off of one of the most rapidly rising expenditures out there. Said another way, as more and more consumer staples like food and medicine are offered by Amazon, Amazon will be able to entice Pillpack customers with further card-related discounts. And grow a significant amount of revenue by way of its card offering. No doubt this is part of the plan. And don’t forget the data that they would compile to boot.

Per Forbes shortly after Amazon launched its Amazon Prime Rewards Visa Signature Card,

Given that Amazon credit card holders spend the highest on its platform, the company is looking at ways to expand its credit card consumer base. CIRP estimates that approximately 15% of Amazon’s U.S. customers have any one of Amazon’s credit cards, representing approximately 21 million customers. However, growth of its card base has not kept pace with its growing Prime membership. In June 2016, it was estimated that Amazon has around 63 million Prime members. Assuming that only Prime members have an Amazon credit card, it would mean that only a third of its Prime customers have one of its credit cards. According to a survey by Morgan Stanley, Amazon Prime members spend about 4.6 times more money on its platform than non-prime members. Its credit card holders spend even greater amounts than what Prime members spend. By enticing its prime customers to own its credit cards, Amazon will be encouraging them to spend more on its platform. Its latest card is aimed at attracting Prime customers by offering deals not only on Amazon.com but on other shopping destinations as well. This can lead to higher spending by existing Prime customers and help convert the fence sitters into Prime memberships.

And those numbers are dated. Amazon Prime now has 100mm members. Imagine if they could all get discounts on their meds. đŸ’°đŸ’„đŸ’°đŸ’„

All of which begs the question: who gets hurt and who benefits (other than Visa ($V)) from this potential secondary effect? đŸ€”

Is Brookstone Headed for Chapter 22?

Go to Brookstone’s website for “Gift Ideas” and “Cool Gadgets” and then tell us you have any doubt. We especially liked the pop-up asking us to sign up for promotional materials one second after landing; we didn’t even get a chance to see what the company sells before it was selling us on a flooded email inbox. Someone please hire them a designer.

On Friday, Reuters reported that...

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đŸ’©Will KKR Pay Toys R Us' Severance?đŸ’©

Optimism Remains in Toys R Us Situation

Surprisingly.

You’d think that every person on the planet would be sufficiently jaded by anything Toys R Us at this point. Apparently not everyone. And, oddly, the optimism seems to come from someone typically critical/skeptical of private equity


Yesterday Axios’ Dan Primack’s lead piece asked, â€œShould the former private equity owners of Toys "R" Us pay around $70 million in severance to the company's 33,000 laid-off employees?” The question seems to stem from reports that limited partners (i.e., pension funds) are questioning what took place with the Toys investment. We noted this on Sunday:

đŸ”„Elsewhere in private equity, maybe there’ll be backlash emanating out of Toys R Us?? The Minnesota State Board of Investment voted to halt investments in KKR pending a review of the bigbox toy retailer. đŸ”„

With this as background, Primack wrote:

This is not an academic question. It's become the subject of some public pension investment committee meetings, prompted by a lobbying campaign by left-leaning nonprofit advocacy groups, and has gotten the private equity industry's attention.

  • The basic argument: Bain Capital, KKR and Vornado killed Toys "R" Us by saddling it with too much debt, while taking out fees along the way. It's only fair that they help folks who are without work because of private equity's mismanagement, particularly when PE firms are so rich and many of the employees were living paycheck-to-paycheck.

  • The legal argument: There is none. The private equity firms no longer own Toys "R" Us, and a bankruptcy court judge threw out the severance package because employees weren't high enough in the creditor stack.

We’re old enough to remember when mass shootings got private equity’s attention too. They promised to divest. They didn’t. And then Vegas happened. And then Florida happened. And then Bank of America ($BAC) swore off lending to gun companies only to, uh, lend to Remington Outdoor Company.

We’re old enough to remember people like Warren Buffett say that they should pay more in taxes. That his secretary has a higher effective tax rate than he does. But, to our knowledge, he didn’t exactly voluntarily write a billion dollar check to the U.S. Treasury.

Likewise, neither will KKR write a severance check to employees. No frikken way in hell. Why? Because there is no compulsion to do so. The legal argument? He’s right, “[t]here is none.” So, yeah, good luck with that.

And so the above is really where the piece should stop. A nice little moral high ground piece about how employees and vendors got effed, it is what is, now on to tariffs, Petsmart’s asset stripping “mystery,” Harley Davidson’s ($HOG) war with President Trump or Moviepass owner Helios & Matheson’s ($HMNY) stock hitting a record low.

But Primack also points out,

Finally, the pro-severance folks are a bit liberal (no pun intended) with their math. They argue the PE firms took out $464 million, by adding up advisory fees ($185m), expenses ($8m), transaction fees ($128m) and interest on debt held by the sponsors ($143m). Yes, we were first to point out how the general partners may have gotten back more than they put in. But some of those fees were shared with LPs — including the now-aghast public pensions — while the interest was held in CLOs that had their own investors. In other words, PE "profit" was much smaller than claimed (although, on the flip side, you could argue the firms collected management fees on Toys-related capital that ended up being set on fire... again, it's complicated). (emphasis added)

Right. We’re sure the Minnesota State Board of Investment is cutting a check as we speak.

Sadly Primack didn’t stop there; he continued,

PE firms do have moral obligations to portfolio company employees. You break it, you own it (even if you technically broke it while owning it, which caused someone else to own it).

Um, ok, sure.

He continues,

Bottom line: The PE firms should pay at least some of the severance, or figure out some other form of compensation. And I have a sense that they might. Not because of preening public pension staffers or legal obligations, but because it's the right thing to do. Sometimes it's just that simple.

LOL. Riiiiiiight. In the absence of Mr. Primack having an inside track at KKR, it’s just that fantastic (def = “imaginative or fanciful; remote from reality.”).

What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 8. (Long Yield, Baby. Yield)

A. M&A is En Fuego

PwC released an analysis of M&A activity. In summary:

The number of deals north of $5 billion is on pace to double last year’s total, and to date has driven overall deal value up by more than 50%, according to a PwC analysis of Thomson Reuters data. Deals are also getting bigger, with more announced deals of at least $30 billion so far in 2018 than in all of 2017.

Since the start of 2018, one-third of megadeals crossed sector lines, driven largely by an appetite for new technologies. That interest in tech hasn’t been limited to huge transactions, with examples of smaller deals coming in retail, media and printing.

Companies are looking to broaden their customer base....

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Oil & Gas (Short Underwriting & Defaults)

Sometimes distressed investing returns get upended by practical realities. The question is: were those realities accounted for in the underwriting?

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A Trade War With China & Is New York City F*cked? Part IV (#MAGA!)

Each passing day of Washington DC news this week added an additional 10 years of wear and tear to our already downtrodden souls. Sheesh.

To summarizePresident Trump directed the U.S. Trade Representative to identify $200 billion worth of Chinese goods for additional 10% tariffs; he also threatened an additional $200 billion. If this is all a big set up for some profound negotiation that America will “win,” well, generally speaking, you need the other side to return your calls. Apparently China isn’t doing that. Womp womp (speaking of “womp womp,” eff you Corey L.).

Still, U.S. chipmakers are cheering punitive measure against China. Why? Because they’re actively fighting a war with China over attempted intellectual property raids. See, e.g., Micron Technology Inc. ($MU).

According to Bill McBrideMerrill Lynch wrote:

The good news is that we are still many steps away from a full blown global trade war. The bad news is that the tail risks are rising and our work and the literature suggest a major global trade confrontation would likely push the US and the rest of the world to the brink of a recession. So far, the trade actions taken by the Trump White House and trading partners have been relatively modest and in turn have had a limited impact on the economy and financial markets. The next round of $100-$200bn of tariff between US and China may prove more substantial. Further escalation like auto tariffs would lead us to reassess the US economic outlook.

Yikes. Well, if auto stocks were any indication on Friday, that reassessment may be in order:..

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Bankruptcy Cases Suffer from Shrinkage

FTI Consulting Inc. ($FCN) recently released a “data”-driven analysis-cum-marketing-piece* that highlights the apparent rise of “Pre-filings” — otherwise known as prepackaged, prearranged or prenegotiated chapter 11 bankruptcy cases — during the 2015-2017 period. FTI examined 300 emerged cases (via plan of reorganization) from 2011-2017 and concluded that,

“Most restructuring professionals recognize that the average duration of Chapter 11 cases has become shorter in recent years, but the contraction in average case length has been particularly striking since 2015.”

Indeed, FTI points out that


“
nearly 66% of cases that emerged in 2016-2017 were Pre-filings compared to approximately 40% over the previous five years
.”

And:

“Consequently, the average duration of Chapter 11 reorganizations fell by nearly one-half in 2016-2017 compared to 2011-2015, to 235 days from 435 days.”

Sooooo, despite the rise in Pre-filings....

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Education and Tech (Short Cloudless PE-owned Software)

Blackboard Inc. is in Trouble

There’s been a lot of news circling around Blackboard Inc. these days. Even children aren’t out of bounds for the distressed vultures, it seems.

Blackboard is a provider of enterprise tech software solutions to the education industry (as well as the government and some businesses); it peddles, among other things, a “learning management system,” virtual classrooms, education analytics (i.e., test scores), and marketing and recruiting services. It is meant to be a one-stop shop for educational providers’ needs.

Back in July of 2011, Providence Equity Partners (“PEP”) took the Nasdaq-listed company private in an all-cash transaction valued at...

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Distressed Debt Funds Fundraise (Long Market Timing)

At the Wharton Distressed Investing Conference in late February, Marathon Capital Management’s Bruce Richards said that his firm was delaying fundraising new capital. He noted that while he fully expects the cycle to turn and, consequently, that there’ll be a plentiful amount of distressed opportunities, he doesn’t want to mis-time the raise in such a way that his lock-up will expire midway through the investment horizon.

It seems others are of the view that now is the time. Per The Financial Times:

A growing number of US hedge funds specialising in distressed debt are raising money in anticipation that the next economic downturn will punish companies that have borrowed record amounts since the financial crisis.

Mudrick Capital, for instance, is reportedly raising a second fund that will have a five-year lockup and only charge fees upon capital investment. The fundraising goal is December 1. Carry the 1, add the 5, and that effectively means that he’ll have through 2024 to invest.

Marathon Capital had better hope there are still LPs out there looking to fund the asset class. More from FT:

Mudrick Capital is not the only fund preparing for an eventual downturn in a US economy where growth is accelerating this quarter. Strategic Value Partners in May raised almost $3bn to pounce on distressed bonds and loans, while Sheru Chowdhry, formerly co-portfolio manager of the Paulson Credit Opportunities fund, launched DSC Meridian Capital at the start of June.

In total, seven distressed debt funds have raised money this year, with a record average size of $2.2bn, according to data from Preqin. The largest is the GSO Capital Solutions Fund III, which closed in April after drumming up $7.4bn in the fourth-biggest distressed debt fundraising ever.

With tariffs, a trade war, rising interest rates, ramifications relating to tax deductibility in Tax Reform, secular pressures, auto loan delinquencies and more, many people seem to think a downturn is on the horizon. The question is when? Someone is bound to get the timing right.

#BustedTech (Short Busted IPOs
cough
DOMO)

Tintri Inc., a publicly-traded ($TNTR) Delaware-incorporated and Mountain View California based provider of enterprise cloud and all-flash and hybrid storage systems appears to be on the brink of bankruptcy. There's no way any strategic buyer agrees to buy this thing without a 363 comfort order. 

In an SEC filing filed on Friday, the company noted:

"The company is currently in breach of certain covenants under its credit facilities and likely does not have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations beyond June 30, 2018."

Furthermore, 

"Based on the company’s current cash projections, and regardless of whether its lenders were to choose to accelerate the repayment of the company’s indebtedness under its credit facilities, the company likely does not have sufficient liquidity to continue its operations beyond June 30, 2018. The company continues to evaluate its strategic options, including a sale of the company. Even if the company is able to secure a strategic transaction, there is a significant possibility that the company may file for bankruptcy protection, which could result in a complete loss of shareholders’ investment."

And yesterday the company's CEO resigned from the company. All of this an ignominious end for a company that IPO'd almost exactly a year ago. Check out this chart:

Screen Shot 2018-06-19 at 10.21.47 AM.png

Nothing like a $7 launch, a slight post-IPO uptick, and then a crash and burn. This should be a warning sign for anyone taking a look at Domo â€” another company that looks like it is exploring an IPO for liquidity to stay afloat. But we digress. 

The company's capital structure consists of a $15.4mm '19 revolving credit facility with Silicon Valley Bank, a $50mm '19 facility with TriplePoint Capital LLC, and $25mm of 8% convertible notes. Revenues increased YOY from $86mm in fiscal 2016 to $125.1mm in fiscal 2017 to $125.9mm in fiscal 2018. The net loss, however, also moved up and right: from $101mm to $105.8mm to $157.7mm. The company clearly has a liquidity ("net cash") covenant issue (remember those?). Accordingly, the company fired 20% of its global workforce (~90 people) in March (a follow-on to a 10% reduction in Q3 '17). The venture capital firms that funded the company — Lightspeed Venture Partners among them — appear to be long gone. Silver Lake Group LLC and NEA Management Company LLC, unfortunately, are not; they still own a good amount of the company.

"Isn't cloud storage supposed to be all the rage," you ask? Yeah, sure, but these guys seem to generate product revenue largely from sales of all-flash and hybrid storage systems (and stand-alone software licenses). They're mainly in the "intensely competitive IT infrastructure market," sparring with the likes of Dell EMCIBM and VMware. So, yeah, good luck with that.

Asset Values Soar: Human Asset Values. (Long Inflation)

Asset values have been soaring off into the stratosphere to the point that even Warren Buffett is complaining about a dearth of reasonably-priced opportunities (hence his short dalliance with Uber?). The FED, meanwhile, is keeping tabs on inflation; perhaps the Fed ought to look no farther than the legal world. It is experiencing two forms of inflation this week.

First, Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy announced that it was raising first year associate salaries to $190k and generally all associate salaries between $10k-15k. Choice bit from The American Lawyer:

“Two years have now gone by, and there is cost-of-living increases and inflation,” Edelman said. “We want to signal to the market that we do want the best, and we’re willing to pay for the best, and we think after two years, an additional increase is appropriate.”

Inflation indeed. As one biglaw partner told us a year ago, a clear cut sign of a market top is when biglaw firms raise first year associate salaries. Well, then
let the recession commence!

Indeed, nothing says "good timing" (or income inequality) like a pay raise to know-nothing lawyers at a time when Toys R Us’ fees are front page news and mad-as-hell employees are picketing KKR's offices. Sometimes biglaw can be its own worst enemy. More:

Edelman said the change would not have “a material effect on firm finances,” adding that he didn’t expect partner capital contributions to change.

Right. Because with 500 associates, the extra $5 million in expense will surely be passed on to the clients. Get ready for a fee increase folks. That’s something worth singing about in court even.

Anyway, we’re not hating. After all, Milbank needs to incentivize people to go to law school AND choose them over several other biglaw firms. Why would anyone do that if they can make $40k/month as a social media influencer? Why would anyone do that if they can be “Running a $500,000 Retail Empire by iPhone?” Good and serious question. That is the competition these days.

*****

Second, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP announced that, in an effort to incentivize lawyers to stay, partnership (and, for some, counsel position) will now be offered to lawyers that have been with the firm for a mere 7.5 years. Per the ABA Journal,

Weil, Gotshal & Manges hopes to improve associate retention by cutting the wait for partnership by two years. 

Except, those "partners" will be non-share partners making “fixed income” rather than receiving partner distributions. And, except, further,

Lawyers in the niche counsel category for specialty practices can remain there as long as they stay at the firm. Lawyers in the other category get, at most, three years in the position. During that time, they may be promoted to partner. Those who don’t make it will be transitioned out of the firm.

Hahaha. C’mon. So you’ll basically have 10.5 years to prove that you merit equity partner before they unceremoniously toss you out into the wilderness
uh, sorry
”transitioned.” You know, rather than 9.5 years. But that new title though!! Title inflation!!

Query: where did Weil get that idea from? (Cough, Kirkland & Ellis). What's that saying: imitation is the sincerest form of flattery? We guess they’re waiting 7.5 years before labeling someone a “partner” rather than 6 years so, uh, there’s that. Just what biglaw needs: more lawyers running around with an inflated sense of self.

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On point.

Don’t. Mess. With. Daisy. Chapter 4. (Petsmart: Long Asset-Stripping Shenanigans)

Man this dog series (and John Wick referencing) is fun. With regard to Petsmart Inc., we previously we wrote:

The company financed the purchase with a two-part debt offering of (a) $1.35 billion of ‘25 8.875% senior secured notes and (b) $650 million of ‘25 5.875% unsecured notes. Rounding out the capital structure is a $750 million ABL, a $4.3 billion cov-lite first-lien term loan and $1.9 billion cov-lite ‘23 senior unsecured notes. Let us help you out here: 1+2+3+4 = $8.2 billion in debt. The equity sponsors, BC PartnersGICLongview Asset ManagementCaisse de dĂ©pĂŽt et placement du QuĂ©bec and StepStone Group, helped by writing a $1.35 billion new equity check.

That capital structure refresher is important


Taking a page out of J.Crew’s asset-stripping, litigation-inducing, bird-flip-to-senior-lenders-activating playbook, Petsmart this week announced that it moved a 16.5% stake in Chewy.com (a/k/a the savior) to an unrestricted subsidiary — unironically using a sponsor dividend mechanic for the transaction; it also dividended 20% of the equity in Chewy.com to its parent company, Argos Holdings, an entity controlled by private equity firm BC Partners. Consequently, Chewy.com is no longer a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petsmart. Moreover, per The Financial Times,

“Chewy will no longer guarantee PetSmart's debt, according to Xtract Research, though the remaining 63.5 per cent of the shares will still be pledged to secure term loans and senior bonds.”

We love financial shenanigans that weaken lender collateral packages to the apparent benefit of junior creditors and private equity sponsors. Particularly when they’re done so quickly after the original transaction!

How did the market react? Well, per Bloomberg, initially:

PetSmart’s bonds rallied as the move of the online vendor’s assets was seen as less aggressive than what bondholders had originally priced in, according to the people, who said the initial buyers of the notes have unloaded the positions. Investors sold PetSmart’s debt last year on fears it would sell or spin off as much as 100 percent of the Chewy equity to the private equity owner, removing it from the pool of assets they have recourse to as bondholders.

Haha, right. So instead of getting potentially 100% effed, bondholders only got 33% effed. Can you say: Credit positive!? This is what makes the distressed world just so unmistakably poetic and nasty at the same time: everything is largely a function of
well
you guessed it: asset price and asset value. With the par guys out and buyers at distressed levels in, “credit positive” is entirely relative.

Anyway, more from Bloomberg,

The company’s management said that said they will continue to actively monitor the capital structure and potentially pursue additional strategic opportunities to extend debt maturities, reduce overall leverage and invest in the business, according to the people. Management didn’t have a question and answer portion at the end of the call.

Of course not. Why would they? The first question would be “By ‘reduce overall leverage’ does that mean issuing new bonds secured by the newly siphoned off equity of (valuable?) IP in exchange for the cov-lite unsecured notes?” Even Eli Manning couldn’t so obviously telegraph his next move (The Financial Times, citing Covenant Review, cites some other options here).

This bit is great:

Petsmart’s transfer of assets to an unrestricted subsidiary was not surprising given what J. Crew was able to do with its transfer of intellectual property under its loan documents, James Wallick of Xtract Research said in an interview. The move is “symptomatic” of the current market for loans and bonds, where agreements “are so flexible that you can do a transaction such as this.”

Hahaha. Man people love to gripe about the capital markets these days. Said another way,

Mmmm hmmm. Yield, baby, yield.

L Brands (Long "Misplaced Optimism in Retail")

On Valentine’s Day, in “Misplaced Optimism in Retail: L Brands - What the Holy F*#*?,” we clowned on Leslie Wexner’s aggressive approach to retail and said “tell us that you don’t want to short the sh*t out of the stock.” It was trading at $49.87/share. Now...

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Direct-to-Consumer Food (Short the Butcher Section)

We have spoken a lot about direct-to-consumer digitally native brands having a tremendous — and understated (in restructuring circles) — affect on brick-and-mortar retail. Apparel in particular. PETITION readers are already familiar with Wish, a unicorn shopping platform with a valuation north of $8 billion. It’s secret sauce is allowing consumers to purchase clothes directly from Chinese factories. Imagine all of the middlemen cut out of that equation. No “brand tax” either.

Earlier this week Sequoia Capital China led an investment in Jollychic, a China-based e-commerce startup that lets Middle Eastern shoppers order unbranded products from Chinese factories.

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What to Make of the Credit Cycle. Part 7.

TCW Group recently released its Loan Review through April ‘18 and it is telling. Per the commentary:

CLOs represent nearly 50% of the buyer base for loans and April was a huge month for CLOs to be priced, reset and refinanced. There were 28 new issues and 32 resets and repricings, which set a monthly record for the market. Many CLOs require being reset on the coupon date, which led to April being an extraordinarily high month of issuance.

As of April, the CLO markets have printed $43 billion year-to-date, a 58% increase YOY. And per LCDNews, the markets have printed an additional $10+ billion in May.

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