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Sometimes distressed investing returns get upended by practical realities. The question is: were those realities accounted for in the underwriting?
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Jason Mudrick of Mudrick Capital was on Bloomberg TV on Friday and...
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There’s been a lot of news circling around Blackboard Inc. these days. Even children aren’t out of bounds for the distressed vultures, it seems.
Blackboard is a provider of enterprise tech software solutions to the education industry (as well as the government and some businesses); it peddles, among other things, a “learning management system,” virtual classrooms, education analytics (i.e., test scores), and marketing and recruiting services. It is meant to be a one-stop shop for educational providers’ needs.
Back in July of 2011, Providence Equity Partners (“PEP”) took the Nasdaq-listed company private in an all-cash transaction valued at...
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At the Wharton Distressed Investing Conference in late February, Marathon Capital Management’s Bruce Richards said that his firm was delaying fundraising new capital. He noted that while he fully expects the cycle to turn and, consequently, that there’ll be a plentiful amount of distressed opportunities, he doesn’t want to mis-time the raise in such a way that his lock-up will expire midway through the investment horizon.
It seems others are of the view that now is the time. Per The Financial Times:
A growing number of US hedge funds specialising in distressed debt are raising money in anticipation that the next economic downturn will punish companies that have borrowed record amounts since the financial crisis.
Mudrick Capital, for instance, is reportedly raising a second fund that will have a five-year lockup and only charge fees upon capital investment. The fundraising goal is December 1. Carry the 1, add the 5, and that effectively means that he’ll have through 2024 to invest.
Marathon Capital had better hope there are still LPs out there looking to fund the asset class. More from FT:
Mudrick Capital is not the only fund preparing for an eventual downturn in a US economy where growth is accelerating this quarter. Strategic Value Partners in May raised almost $3bn to pounce on distressed bonds and loans, while Sheru Chowdhry, formerly co-portfolio manager of the Paulson Credit Opportunities fund, launched DSC Meridian Capital at the start of June.
In total, seven distressed debt funds have raised money this year, with a record average size of $2.2bn, according to data from Preqin. The largest is the GSO Capital Solutions Fund III, which closed in April after drumming up $7.4bn in the fourth-biggest distressed debt fundraising ever.
With tariffs, a trade war, rising interest rates, ramifications relating to tax deductibility in Tax Reform, secular pressures, auto loan delinquencies and more, many people seem to think a downturn is on the horizon. The question is when? Someone is bound to get the timing right.
Man this dog series (and John Wick referencing) is fun. With regard to Petsmart Inc., we previously we wrote:
The company financed the purchase with a two-part debt offering of (a) $1.35 billion of ‘25 8.875% senior secured notes and (b) $650 million of ‘25 5.875% unsecured notes. Rounding out the capital structure is a $750 million ABL, a $4.3 billion cov-lite first-lien term loan and $1.9 billion cov-lite ‘23 senior unsecured notes. Let us help you out here: 1+2+3+4 = $8.2 billion in debt. The equity sponsors, BC Partners, GIC, Longview Asset Management, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and StepStone Group, helped by writing a $1.35 billion new equity check.
That capital structure refresher is important…
Taking a page out of J.Crew’s asset-stripping, litigation-inducing, bird-flip-to-senior-lenders-activating playbook, Petsmart this week announced that it moved a 16.5% stake in Chewy.com (a/k/a the savior) to an unrestricted subsidiary — unironically using a sponsor dividend mechanic for the transaction; it also dividended 20% of the equity in Chewy.com to its parent company, Argos Holdings, an entity controlled by private equity firm BC Partners. Consequently, Chewy.com is no longer a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petsmart. Moreover, per The Financial Times,
“Chewy will no longer guarantee PetSmart's debt, according to Xtract Research, though the remaining 63.5 per cent of the shares will still be pledged to secure term loans and senior bonds.”
We love financial shenanigans that weaken lender collateral packages to the apparent benefit of junior creditors and private equity sponsors. Particularly when they’re done so quickly after the original transaction!
How did the market react? Well, per Bloomberg, initially:
PetSmart’s bonds rallied as the move of the online vendor’s assets was seen as less aggressive than what bondholders had originally priced in, according to the people, who said the initial buyers of the notes have unloaded the positions. Investors sold PetSmart’s debt last year on fears it would sell or spin off as much as 100 percent of the Chewy equity to the private equity owner, removing it from the pool of assets they have recourse to as bondholders.
Haha, right. So instead of getting potentially 100% effed, bondholders only got 33% effed. Can you say: Credit positive!? This is what makes the distressed world just so unmistakably poetic and nasty at the same time: everything is largely a function of…well…you guessed it: asset price and asset value. With the par guys out and buyers at distressed levels in, “credit positive” is entirely relative.
Anyway, more from Bloomberg,
The company’s management said that said they will continue to actively monitor the capital structure and potentially pursue additional strategic opportunities to extend debt maturities, reduce overall leverage and invest in the business, according to the people. Management didn’t have a question and answer portion at the end of the call.
Of course not. Why would they? The first question would be “By ‘reduce overall leverage’ does that mean issuing new bonds secured by the newly siphoned off equity of (valuable?) IP in exchange for the cov-lite unsecured notes?” Even Eli Manning couldn’t so obviously telegraph his next move (The Financial Times, citing Covenant Review, cites some other options here).
This bit is great:
Petsmart’s transfer of assets to an unrestricted subsidiary was not surprising given what J. Crew was able to do with its transfer of intellectual property under its loan documents, James Wallick of Xtract Research said in an interview. The move is “symptomatic” of the current market for loans and bonds, where agreements “are so flexible that you can do a transaction such as this.”
Hahaha. Man people love to gripe about the capital markets these days. Said another way,
Mmmm hmmm. Yield, baby, yield.
Fast casual is supposed to be a bright spot for restaurants. But as the segment has grown in recent years, there are bound to be winners and losers. Zoe’s Kitchen Inc., a fast casual Mediterranean food chain with 250 locations in 20 states ($ZOES), is increasingly looking like the latter.
Last week the company reported sh*tty earnings. Comp restaurant sales declined by 2.3% despite rising prices pushed on to the consumer. The decline is attributable to the usual array of externalities (e.g., weather) but also location cannibalization. Apparently, the company’s growth strategy is pulling consumers from previously established locations. Moreover, the company noted “inflationary pressures in produce and freight costs, that are expected to impact cost of goods sold for the balance of the year.” Wages also increased 3.3%, an acceleration from the 2.9% realized in Q4 ‘17. Accordingly, adjusted EBITDA decreased 30.9%. The net loss for the quarter was $3.6mm or -$0.19/share. The company lowered guidance. The stock tumbled.
Before you get too excited, note that this is a debt-light company: it currently has a ‘22 $50mm revolving credit facility with JPMorganChase Bank NA, of which $16.5mm is outstanding (with $3.7mm of cash on hand, net debt is only $12.8mm). It also, believe it or not, has covenants — leverage and interest coverage, among others — and the company is in compliance as of April 16, 2018. It also plans to continue its expansion: in the sixteen weeks ended 4/16/18, the company opened 11 company-owned restaurants with a plan to open approximately 25 (inclusive) over the course of fiscal year ‘18. That said, it does intend to rationalize existing locations (and expects some impairment charges as a result), cut G&A and take other operational performance improvement measures to combat its negative trends. There’s a potential opportunity here for low-to-middle-market FAs and real estate advisors.
For our part, we found this bit intriguing (unedited):
We are definitely seen more competitive intrusion, more square footage growth in some of those smaller kind of mid to kind of large markets where we've been there for some time now that's a little bit of what we're seeing in those markets.
We've also seen more competitive catering competition as every ones ramped up catering. And also the value and discounting as we spoke to in the call, in the prepared remarks we've seen that $10 check with that single user kind of moving around and we think that's so from the new competition square footage growth, the value and discounting and then the delivery interruption, we've seen or felt that in many of our markets.
There’s a lot to unpack there. Clearly competition, as we noted upfront, is increasing in the $10-check size cohort of fast casual. Catering is always a competitive business for restaurants like this too. But, the point that really got out attention was that about delivery. The company says pointedly, “We also believe that disruption from delivery and discounting has created headwinds.” The company further states,
Digital comps were 26% positive in Q1 as we leverage improvements from last year's investments in web and mobile platforms to build greater convenience for our guests. Early in Q2, we relaunched and upgraded our loyalty program, which is expected to help drive traffic by making it easier and clearer for our guest to earn and redeem rewards. Delivery sales grew in both our non-catering and catering businesses by 155%. And we have a clear plan to build out the channel for more profitable growth in 2018.
The impact of mobile food ordering and the need for delivery cannot be overstated. Companies need to act fast to activate delivery capabilities that makes sense to a mobile consumer who, more and more, goes to Postmates, Caviar, UberEats and other food delivery services for discovery. This is precisely why Shake Shack ($SHAK) is now on Postmates and Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. ($CMG) is now available on Doordash. Others, like privately-owned Panera Bread are taking a step farther by building out its own delivery infrastructure in an attempt to own all its data and deliver without owing a cut to a middleman. Query whether this is far too much dependence on the likelihood of people to go directly to Panera’s app when they’re hungry…?
It sounds like the Zoe folks are increasing their focus on delivery. The question is whether they can execute fast enough to offset in-store dining declines. And whether they can do it on their own.
CVC and Leonard Green & Partners have filed for a $100 million IPO of portfolio company, BJ’s Wholesale Club Holdings Inc. With Costco ($COST) killing it of late and the IPO marking champing at the bit for more new issues, this reeks of (sound capitalistic) opportunism. BJ’s has 215 locations nation-wide; it generated net income of $50 million on total sales of $12.8 billion for fiscal 2017. The company highlights that new implementations "delivered results rapidly, evidenced by positive and accelerating comparable club sales over the last two quarters and net income growth of over 109% and Adjusted EBITDA growth of 31% in aggregate over the last two fiscal years."
The BJ’s story is an interesting one for private equity. Take a look at these numbers from the company’s S-1 filing:
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In “The Latest and Greatest on Guitar Center,” we cast some shade on the guitar retailer’s amend-and-extend transaction. We wrote,
On Monday, Guitar Center — with the help of bankers UBS and Houlihan Lokey and the consent of Ares — launched an exchange offer and consent solicitation related to its unsecured notes. The offer is to swap the existing $325 million 9.625% notes for $325 million of 5% cash/8% PIK notes due 2022 (along with with some warrants). Per the company’s press release, $299 million worth of holders have already agreed (92% of the issuance). This swap would save the company $13,812,500 a year in interest expense AND have the effect of pushing out the maturity for three years. Gotta love the capital markets these days.
In tandem, the company is proposing to offer $635 million of new 9.5% senior secured notes due 2021. The use of proceeds of these new notes would be to redeem the $615 million 6.5% senior secured notes due 2019. With this piece of the transaction, the company will be taking on an additional $20.35 million of annual interest expense.
Finally, the company will also refinance the $375 million ABL, extending the maturity out by 5 years.
So, if you made it this far, here’s the upshot: if these transactions are successful, the company will have availed itself of a few years to turn itself around by pushing out its debt maturities. But, it will have eliminated ZERO INTEREST EXPENSE in the aggregate. Said another way: this is a band-aid, not a solution.
All of which means that the company needs to hope and pray some rock God hits the scene and reinvigorates the market for guitars in the next two years. We’ll take the under.
As it turns out, the company ultimately downsized the amount of 5% cash/8% PIK notes due 2022 from $325 million to $318 million which will, naturally, have the affect of...to read this rest of this a$$-kicking commentary, you must be a Member...
On Wednesday, we concluded the “DO. NOT. MESS. WITH. DAISY. CHAPTER 2 (Short Pet Retailers 2.0) 🔫🔫” about Petsmart Inc., with the following statement:
“With 1600 stores, the company isn’t light with its footprint and same store sales and pricing power are on the decline. Still, the company’s liquidity profile remains relatively intact and its services businesses apparently still drive foot traffic. Which is not to say that the situation doesn’t continue to bear watching — particularly if Chewy.com’s customer-acquisition-costs continue to skyrocket, overall brick-and-mortar trends continue to move downward, and the likes of Target ($T), Walmart ($WMT) and Amazon ($AMZN) continue to siphon off market share. A failure to stem the decline could add more stress to the situation.”
Well, guess what: industry trends are continuing to decline. Last week Petco Holdings announced dogsh*t earnings (oh man, we’ve been waiting all week for that…SO GOOD) and, suffice it to say, its (and Petsmart’s) bonds made fresh lows on the news.
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On this day exactly one year ago, Recode first reported that Petsmart acquired Chewy.com for $3.35 billion — the “largest e-commerce acquisition ever.” Venture capitalists — and the founders — of course, rejoiced. This was an a$$-kicking exit — particularly for a company that, at the time, was only six years old. The reported amount of venture funding topped out at $451 million, a massive sum, but sufficiently low enough for the VCs to make a substantial return. Recode wrote,
“The deal is a huge one by any standard — bigger than Walmart’s $3.3 billion deal for Jet.com last year — and especially for a retail company like PetSmart, which was itself valued at only $8.7 billion when private equity investors took it over in 2015.
But Chewy.com has been one of the fastest-growing e-commerce sites on the planet, registering nearly $900 million in revenue last year, in what was only its fifth year in operation. The company had been a potential IPO candidate for this year or next, but was taken out by its brick-and-mortar competitor before that. It was not profitable last year.”
Recode continued,
“The deal seems like the type of bet-the-company acquisition by a traditional retailer that commerce-focused venture capitalists have been betting on for some time. While Walmart’s acquisition of Jet.com was a huge deal by e-commerce standards, it represented just a fraction of Walmart’s market value.”
Toss of the dice notwithstanding, most talking heads seemed to think that the acquisition made “strategic sense.” Nevertheless, Recode’s sentiment was more prescient than they likely suspected — mostly due to the havoc it has wreaked to Petsmart’s cap stack.
The company financed the purchase with a two-part debt offering of (a) $1.35 billion of ‘25 8.875% senior secured notes and (b) $650 million of ‘25 5.875% unsecured notes. Rounding out the capital structure is a $750 million ABL, a $4.3 billion cov-lite first-lien term loan and $1.9 billion cov-lite ‘23 senior unsecured notes. Let us help you out here: 1+2+3+4 = $8.2 billion in debt. The equity sponsors, BC Partners, GIC, Longview Asset Management, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and StepStone Group, helped by writing a $1.35 billion new equity check. So, what did all of this financing lead to?
One year later, CEO Michael Massey is gone and hasn’t been replaced. More recently, Ryan Cohen, the CEO and co-founder of Chewy.com has departed. Blue Buffalo Pet Products Inc., which reportedly accounted for 11-12% of PetSmart’s sales, opted to supply its food products to mass-market retailers like Target ($T) and Kroger ($KR). The notes backing the Chewy.com deal are trading (and have basically, since issuance, traded) at distressed levels. Petsmart’s EBITDA showed a 34% YOY decline in Q3. And, worse even (for investors anyway), the bondholders are increasingly concerned about asset stripping to the benefit of the company’s private equity sponsors. S&P Global Ratings downgraded the company in December. It stated,
“The downgrade reflects our view that the capital structure is unsustainable at current levels of EBITDA, although we do not see a default scenario over the next year given liquidity and cash generation. Such underperformance came from the company's rapid e-commerce growth that generated higher losses, and unanticipated negative same-store sales at its physical stores. As Chewy aggressively expands its customer base, we believe operating losses will widen because the company has not yet garnered the size and scale to offset the unprofitable business volume from new customers.”
Financial performance and ratios were a big consideration: margin is compressed, in turn negatively affecting the company’s interest coverage ratio and leverage ratio (approximately 8.5x).
Moody’s Investor Service also issued a downgrade in January. It wrote,
“We still believe the acquisition of Chewy has the potential of being transformative for PetSmart as it will exponentially increase its online penetration which was previously very modest. However, as Chewy continues to grow its topline aggressively and incur increasing customer acquisition costs we expect its operating losses to increase. More importantly, the increasingly competitive business environment particularly from e-commerce and mass retailers has led to increased promotional activity which has negatively impacted PetSmart's top line and margins. We expect this trend to continue in 2018.”
Bloomberg adds,
“Buying Chewy.com was supposed to be a coup for PetSmart Inc. For debt investors who funded the deal, it’s been more like a dog.”
See what they did there?
With 1600 stores, the company isn’t light with its footprint and same store sales and pricing power are on the decline. Still, the company’s liquidity profile remains relatively intact and its services businesses apparently still drive foot traffic. Which is not to say that the situation doesn’t continue to bear watching — particularly if Chewy.com’s customer-acquisition-costs continue to skyrocket, overall brick-and-mortar trends continue to move downward, and the likes of Target ($T), Walmart ($WMT) and Amazon ($AMZN) continue to siphon off market share. A failure to stem the decline could add more stress to the situation.
*****
💥We’ll discuss Petco Holdings in “DO. NOT. MESS. WITH. DAISY. CHAPTER 3 of 3 (Short Pet Retailers 2.0) 🔫🔫🔫” in our Members’-only briefing on Sunday.💥
We have covered a lot of ground since our inception and, for the most part, the path has been trodden with depressing stories of disruption and destruction. The root causes of that run the gamut - from (i) Amazon ($AMZN) and other new-age retail possibilities (e.g., resale and DTC DNVBs) to (ii) busted PE deals to (iii) fraud and mismanagement. Through it all, nothing has really gotten us too fired up — not the hypocrisy surrounding Bank of America’s ($BAC) loan to Remington Outdoor or the hubris around Toys R Us. But, once you start effing with our dogs’ diets, that’s when we have to start getting all-John-Wick up in this mofo.
Enter PFS Holding Corp., otherwise known as Phillips Pet Food & Supplies (“PFS”). PFS is a distributor of pet foods, grooming products and other useless over-priced pet gear. It is private equity-owned (sponsor: Thomas H. Lee Partners) and has $450+ million of LBO-vintage debt spread out across a recently-refinanced $90 million revolving credit facility (pushed to 2024 from January 2019), a cov-lite ‘21 $280 million term loan, and a cov-lite ‘22 $110 million second lien term loan.
The company recently got some breathing room with a freshly refi’d revolver but still has some issues. While quarterly sales increased in Q4 from $293 million to $327 million, gross margins were down — a reflection of price compression. EBITDA was roughly $62 million on a consolidated adjusted basis clocking the company in at right around a 7.4x leverage ratio. The ‘21 and ‘22 term loans both trade at distressed levels, reflecting the market’s view of the company’s ability to pay the loan in full at maturity. Upon information and belief, the new revolver includes a 90-day springing maturity which means that the company is effed if it is unable to refi out the term loan prior to its maturity (which, admittedly, seems lightyears away from now).
All in, S&P Global Ratings appears to think that the Force is weak with this one; it issued a corporate downgrade and a term loan downgrade of the company on April 10, 2018. Why? Well, S&P doesn’t pull any punches:
“The downgrade reflects our view that, absent significantly favorable changes in the company’s circumstances, the company will seek a debt restructuring in the next six to 12 months, particularly given very low trading levels on its second-lien debt, between 30 and 40 cents on the dollar. It also reflects our view that cash flow will not be sufficient to support debt service and maintain sufficient cash interest coverage, resulting in an unsustainable capital structure. We forecast adjusted leverage in the mid-teens. PFS recently lost a substantial portion of business with one of its largest customers, which we believe represented over half of the company’s EBITDA. Management implemented several cost savings initiatives last year, but we do not believe savings achieved will be sufficient to offset this dramatic profit loss. Further, we expect the company will continue to be pressured by a secular decline in the independent pet retail market, which we view as PFS’ core customer base. Independent pet shops continue to lose market share to e-commerce and national pet retailers, as consumer adoption of e-commerce for pet products purchases grows.”
There’s a lot there. But, first, who writes these dry-as-all-hell reports? If any of you has a connection at S&P, consider putting us in touch. We could really spice these reports up.
Here’s our take:
“The downgrade reflects the fact that this business is turning into garbage. The company was hyper-correlated to one buyer, is over-levered and is, in real-time, succumbing to the cascading pressures of e-commerce and Amazon. In the age of the internet, nobody needs a distribution middleman. Particularly at scale. The lost customer reflects that. Godspeed, PFS.”
Just saved like 1,382,222 words.
S&P further predicts a double-digit sales decline and negative free cash flow in 2018 and 2019, “with debt service and operating expenses funded largely with asset-backed loan (ABL) borrowings.” Slap a mid 5s multiple on this sucker and it looks like the first lien term loan holders will eventually be the owners of a shiny not-so-new pet food distributor! Dogs everywhere lament.
In the past 10 years, the share of U.S. adults living without a spouse or partner has climbed to 42%, up from 39% in 2007, when the Census Bureau began collecting detailed data on cohabitation.
Two important demographic trends have influenced this phenomenon. The share of adults who are married has fallen, while the share living with a romantic partner has grown. However, the increase in cohabitation has not been large enough to offset the decline in marriage, giving way to the rise in the number of “unpartnered” Americans.
Maybe the rise in co-habitation among romantic partners and the decline in marriage has something to do with the decline of importance of religion. Note this chart:
That said, the decline seems to have more to do with millennial attitudes towards religion AND the institution of marriage than anything else.
What does this have to do with any of you? Well, it seems that attitudes towards marriage are creating some retail distress. In June, Alfred Angelo filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy — much to the chagrin of countless brides-to-be who were left uncertain as to the delivery status of their ordered gowns. Take cover…insert peak Bridezilla.
David’s Bridal Inc. swooped in and tried to save the day. Because HOT DAMN retail is cold today. Customer acquisition needs to come from somewhere. And David’s Bridal needs all the help it can get.
The Conshohocken Pennyslvania-based retailer is the largest American bridal-store chain, specializing in wedding dresses, prom gowns, and other formal wear. The company has approximately 300 stores nationally (and declining). It also has approximately $1 billion of debt hanging over its balance sheet like an albatross. Upon information and belief (because the company is private), the capital structure includes a $125 million revolving credit facility, an approximately $500 million term loan due October 2019, and $270 million of unsecured notes due October 2020. The notes are trading at roughly half of par value, reflecting distress and a negative outlook on the possibility of full payment. Justifiably so. With EBITDA at roughly $19 million a quarter, the company appears 9.5x+ leveraged. And you thought YOUR wedding dress was expensive.
Why so much debt you ask? Well, c’mon now. Surely you’ve been reading us long enough to know the answer: private equity, of course. The company was taken private in a 2012 leveraged buyout by Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. (Petition Note: Callback to that Law360 article where private equity lawyers and bankers alleged that PE firms take too much flack…HAHAHA).
In light of recent trends and the debt, Moody’s recently downgraded David’s Bridal to “negative,” noting:
"‘In our view, this is a reflection of the intense competition in the sector and casualization of both gowns and bridesmaids dresses," Raya Sokolyanska, a Moody's analyst, wrote in a note to investors.”
Competition? You’ve got that right. H&M is all over this space too — grasping at straws to salvage its own languishing prospects.
Consequently, Reuters reported that the company is in talks with Evercore Group LLC ($EVR) to help it address its balance sheet. If hired, we think it would be hilarious if Evercore included this Marketwatch article entitled, “5 brides share their financial wedding regrets” in its pitch to lenders. Choice bit,
“Clare Redway, a marketing director based in Brooklyn who married in June 2016 said she wishes she spent more on the wedding dress, or at least found a more unique one. ‘I just got mine on sale at David’s Bridal,’ she said.”
That ought to stir up some concessions.
Earlier this week, Moody’s Default and Ratings Analytics team forecasted that the US’ trailing 12-month high-yield default rate will sink to 2% — from its February 2018 3.6% level — by February 2019. That is not a good sign for restructuring professionals itching for an uptick in activity.
FitchRatings chimed in as well, noting that underwriting standards underscore that the leveraged debt market is in the later stages of the credit cycle. But, it added,
“Aggressive documentation terms now prevalent could challenge recoveries in the next downturn. However, a surge in refinancing activity since 2016 should increase time between the credit cycle's bottom and peak in default rates. Looser documentation, such as the prevalence of covenant-lite (cov-lite) loans, should also lower the risk of technical default while enabling issuers to access additional funding via secured debt and unrestricted subsidiary provisions.” (emphasis ours)
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A few weeks back, we wrote this in “👞UGGs & E-Comm Trample Birkenstock👞,”
“Mere days away from a Nine West bankruptcy filing, we can’t help but to think about how quickly the retail landscape is changing and the impact of brands. Why? Presumably, Nine West will file, close the majority of - if not all of - its brick-and-mortar stores and transfer its brand IP to its creditors (or a new buyer). For whatever its brand is worth. We suppose the company’s lenders - likely to receive the company’s IP in a debt-for-equity swap, will soon find out. We suspect ‘not a hell of a whole lot’.”
Now we know: $123 million. (Frankly more than we expected.)
Consistent with the micro-brands discussion above, we also wrote,
“Saving the most relevant to Nine West for last,
Sales at U.S. shoe stores in February 2017 fell 5.2%, the biggest year-over-year tumble since 2009. Online-only players like Allbirds, Jack Erwin, and M.Gemi have gained nearly 15 percentage points of share over five years.
Yes, the very same Allbirds that is so popular that it is apparently creating wool shortages. Query whether this factor will be featured in Nine West’s First Day Declaration with such specificity. Likely not.”
Now we know this too: definitely not.
But Nine West Holdings Inc., the well-known footwear retailer, has, indeed, finally filed for bankruptcy. The company will sell the intellectual property and working capital behind its Nine West and Bandolino brands to Authentic Brands Group for approximately $200 million (inclusive of the above-stated $123 million allocation to IP, subject to adjustment) and reorganize around its One Jeanswear Group, The Jewelry Group, the Kasper Group, and Anne Klein business segments. The company has a restructuring support agreement (“RSA”) in hand with 78% of its secured term lenders and 89% of its unsecured term loan lenders to support this dual-process. The upshot of the RSA is that the holders of the $300 million unsecured term loan facility will own the equity in the reorganized entity focused on the above-stated four brands. The case will be funded by a $247.5 DIP ABL which will take out the prepetition facility and a $50mm new money dual-draw term loan funded by the commitment parties under the RSA (which helps justify the equity they’ll get).
Regarding the cause for filing, the company notes the following:
“The unprecedented systemic economic headwinds affecting many brick-and-mortar retailers (including certain of the Debtors’ largest customers) have significantly and adversely impacted the operating performance of the Debtors’ footwear and handbag businesses over the past four years. The Nine West Group (and, prior to its sale, Easy Spirit®), the more global business, faced strong headwinds as the macro retail environment in Asia, the Middle East, and South America became challenged. This was compounded by a difficult department store environment in the United States and the Debtors’ operation of their own unprofitable retail network. The Debtors also faced the specific challenge of addressing issues within their footwear and handbag business, including product quality problems, lack of fashion-forward products, and design missteps. Although the Debtors implemented changes to address these issues, and have shown significant progress over the past several years, the lengthy development cycle and the nature of the business did not allow the time for their operating performance within footwear and handbags to improve.”
Regarding the afore-mentioned “macro trends,” the company further highlights,
“…a general shift away from brick-and-mortar shopping, a shift in consumer demographics away from branded apparel, and changing fashion and style trends. Because a substantial portion of the Debtors’ profits derive from wholesale distribution, the Debtors have been hurt by the decline of many large retailers, such as Sears, Bon-Ton, and Macy’s, which have closed stores across the country and purchased less product for their stores due to decreased consumer traffic. In 2015 and 2016, the Debtors experienced a steep and unanticipated cut back on orders from two of the Debtors’ most significant footwear customers, which led to year over year decreases in revenue of $16 million and $46 million in 2015 and 2016, respectively. These troubles have been somewhat offset by e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and Zappos, but such platforms have not made up for the sales volume lost as a result of brick-and-mortar retail declines.”
No Allbirds mention. Oh well.
But wait! Is that a POSITIVE mention of Amazon ($AMZN) in a chapter 11 filing? We’re perplexed. Seriously, though, that paragraph demonstrates the ripple effect that is cascading throughout the retail industrial complex as we speak. And it’s frightening, actually.
On a positive note, The One Jeanswear Group, The Jewelry Group, the Kasper Group, and Anne Klein business segments, however, have been able to “combat the macro retail challenges” — just not enough to offset the negative operating performance of the other two segments. Hence the bifurcated course here: one part sale, one part reorganization.
But this is the other (cough: real) reason for bankruptcy:
Source: First Day Declaration
Soooooo, yes, don’t tell the gentlemen mentioned in the Law360 story but this is VERY MUCH another trite private equity story. 💤💤 With $1.6 billion of debt saddled on the company after Sycamore Partners Management LP took it private in 2014, the company simply couldn’t make due with its $1.6 billion in net revenue in 2017. Annual interest expense is $113.9 million compared to $88.1 million of adjusted EBITDA in fiscal year 2017. Riiiiight.
A few other observations:
Leases. The company is rejecting 75 leases, 72 of which were brick-and-mortar locations that have already been abandoned and turned over to landlords. Notably, Simon Property Group ($SPG) is the landlord for approximately 35 of those locations. But don’t sweat it: they’re doing just fine.
Liberal Definitions. As Interim CEO, the Alvarez & Marsal LLC Managing Director tasked with this assignment has given whole new meaning to the word “interim.” Per Dictionary.com, the word means “for, during, belonging to, or connected with an intervening period of time; temporary; provisional.” Well, he’s been on this assignment for three years — nearly two as the “interim” CEO. Not particularly “temporary” from our vantage point. P.S. What a hot mess.
Chinese Manufacturing. Putting aside China tariffs for a brief moment, if you're an aspiring shoe brand in search of manufacturing in China and don't know where to start you might want to take a look at the Chapter 11 petitions for both Payless Shoesource and Nine West. A total cheat sheet.
Chinese Manufacturing Part II. If President Trump really wants to flick off China, perhaps he should reconsider his (de minimus) carried interest restrictions and let US private equity firms continue to run rampant all over the shoe industry. If the recent track record is any indication, that will lead to significantly over-levered balance sheets borne out of leveraged buyouts, inevitable bankruptcy, and a top 50 creditor list chock full of Chinese manufacturing firms. Behind $1.6 billion of debt and with a mere $200 million of sale proceeds, there’s no shot in hell they’d see much recovery on their receivables and BOOM! Trade deficit minimized!!
Yield Baby Yield! (Credit Market Commentary). Sycamore’s $120 million equity infusion was $280 million less than the original binding equity commitment Sycamore made in late 2013. Why the reduction? Apparently investors were clamoring so hard for yield, that the company issued more debt to satisfy investor appetite rather than take a larger equity check. Something tells us this is a theme you’ll be reading a lot about in the next three years.
Athleisure & Casual Shoes. The fleeting athleisure trend took quite a bite out of Nine West’s revenue from 2014 to 2016 — $36 million, to be exact. Jeans, however, are apparently making a comeback. Meanwhile, the trend towards casual shoes and away from pumps and other Nine West specialties, also took a big bite out of revenue. Enter casual shoe brand, GREATS, which, like Allbirds, is now opening a store in New York City too. Out with the old, in with the new.
Sycamore Partners & Transparency in Bankruptcy. Callback to this effusive Wall Street Journal piece about the private equity firm: it was published just a few weeks ago. Reconcile it with this statement from the company, “After several years of declines in the Nine West Group business, part of the investment hypothesis behind the 2014 Transaction was that the Nine West® brand could be grown and strong earnings would result.” But “Nine West Group net sales have declined 36.9 percent since fiscal year 2015—from approximately $647.1 million to approximately $408 million in the most recent fiscal year.” This is where bankruptcy can be truly frustrating. In Payless Shoesource, there was considerable drama relating to dividend recapitalizations that the private equity sponsors — Golden Gate Capital Inc. and Blum Capital Advisors — benefited from prior to the company’s bankruptcy. The lawsuit and accompanying expert report against those shops, however, were filed under seal, keeping the public blind as to the tomfoolery that private equity shops undertake in pursuit of an “investment hypothesis.” Here, it appears that Sycamore gave up after two years of declining performance. In the company’s words, “Thus, by late 2016 the Debtors were at a crossroads: they could either make a substantial investment in the Nine West Group business in an effort to turn around declining sales or they could divest from the footwear and handbag business and focus on their historically strong, stable, and profitable business lines.” But don’t worry: of course Sycamore is covered by a proposed release of liability. Classic.
Authentic Brands Group. Authentic Brands Group, the prospective buyer of Nine West's IP in bankruptcy, is familiar with distressed brands; it is the proud owner of the Aeropostale and Fredericks of Hollywood brands, two prior bankrupt retailers. Authentic Brands Group is led by a the former CEO of Hilco Consumer Capital Corp and is owned by Leonard Green & Partners. The proposed transaction means that Nine West's brand would be transferred from one private equity firm to another. Kirkland & Ellis LLP represented and defended Sycamore Partners in the Aeropostale case as Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP & the company tried to go after the private equity firm for equitable subordination, among other causes of action. Kirkland prevailed. Leonard Green & Partners portfolio includes David's Bridal, J.Crew, Tourneau and Signet Jewelers (which has an absolutely brutal 1-year chart). On the flip side, it also owns (or owned) a piece of Shake Shack, Soulcycle, and BJ's. The point being that the influence of the private equity firm is pervasive. Not a bad thing. Just saying. Today, more than ever, it seems people should know whose pockets their money is going in to.
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. It’ll be busy going after Sycamore for the 2014 spin-off of Stuart Weitzman®, Kurt Geiger®, and the Jones Apparel Group (which included both the Jones New York® and Kasper® brands) to an affiliated entity for $600 million in cash. Query whether, aside from this transaction, Sycamore also took out management fees and/or dividends more than the initial $120 million equity contribution it made at the time of the transaction. Query, also, whether Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP will be pitching the committee to try and take a second bite at the apple. See #8 above. 🤔🤔
Timing. The company is proposing to have this case out of bankruptcy in five months.
This will be a fun five months.
Let’s start with this SHAMELESS Law360 piece (paywall) which doubles as a promotional puff piece on behalf of the private equity industry. Therein a number of conflicted professionals go on record to say that private equity has taken far too much flack for the demise of retail. The piece is pure comedy…
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Another day, another bankrupt grocer.
Yesterday, March 27 2018, Southeastern Grocers LLC, the Jacksonville Florida-based parent company of grocery chains like Bi-Lo and Winn-Dixie, filed a prepackaged bankruptcy in the District of Delaware. This filing comes mere weeks after Tops Holding II Corporation, another grocer, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York. Brutal.
In its filing papers, Southeastern noted that, as part of the chapter 11 filing, it intends to "close 94 underperforming stores," "emerge from this process likely within the next 90 days," and "continue to thrive with 582 successful stores in operation." Just goes to show what you can do when you aren’t burdened by collective bargaining agreements. In contrast to Tops.
Also unlike Tops, this case appears to be fully consensual. It appears that all relevant parties in interest have agreed that the company will (i) de-lever its balance sheet by nearly $600 million in funded liability (subject to increase to a committed $1.125 billion and exclusive of the junior secured debt described below), (ii) cut its annual interest expense by approximately $40 million, and (iii) swap the unsecured noteholders' debt for equity. The private equity sponsor, Lone Star Funds, will see its existing equity interests cancelled but will maintain upside in the form of five-year warrants that, upon exercise, would amount to 5% of the company.
Financially, the company wasn’t a total hot mess. For the year ended December 2017, the company reflected total revenues of approximately $9,875 million and a net loss of $139 million. Presumably the $40 million cut in interest expense and the shedding of the 94 underperforming stores will help the company return to break-even, if not profitability. If not - and, frankly, in this environment, it very well may be a big "if" - we may be seeing this trifecta of professionals (Weil, Evercore, FTI Consulting) administering another Chapter 22. You know: just like A&P. To help avoid this fate, the company has secured favorable in-bankruptcy terms from its largest creditor, C&S Wholesale Grocers, which obviates the need for a DIP credit facility. C&S has also committed to provide post-chapter 11 credit up to $125 million on a junior secured basis.
Other large creditors include Coca-Cola ($KO) and Pepsi-Cola ($PEP). Given, however, that this is a prepackaged chapter 11, they are likely to paid in full. Indeed, a letter sent to suppliers indicates exactly that:
In addition to its over-levered capital structure, the company has a curious explanation for why it ended up in bankruptcy:
"The food retail industry, including within the Company’s market areas in the southeastern United States, is highly competitive. The Company faces stiff competition across multiple market segments, including from local, regional, national, and international supermarket retailers, convenience stores, retail drug chains, national general merchandisers and discount retailers, membership clubs, warehouse stores and “big box” retailers, and independent and specialty grocers. The Company’s in-store delicatessens and prepared food offerings face competition from restaurants and fast food chains. The Company’s primary competitors include Publix Supermarkets, Inc., Walmart, Inc., Food Lion, LLC, Ingles Markets Inc., Kroger Co., and Amazon."
"Adding to this pressure is the recent growth in consumer demand for a “gourmet” shopping experience, complete with offerings of natural, organic, and gluten-free foods. Some of the Debtors’ competitors have expanded aggressively in marketing a range of natural and organic foods, prepared foods, and quality specialty grocery items. The Debtors have been at a disadvantage to companies that have the financial flexibility to devote greater resources to sourcing, promoting, and selling the most in-demand products."
Sound familiar? Here is what Tops said when it filed for bankruptcy:
"The supermarket industry, including within the Company’s market areas in Upstate New York, Northern Pennsylvania, and Vermont, is highly competitive. The Company faces stiff competition across multiple market segments, including from local, regional, national and international supermarket retailers, convenience stores, retail drug chains, national general merchandisers and discount retailers, membership clubs, warehouse stores and “big box” retailers, and independent and specialty grocers. The Company’s in-store delicatessens and prepared food offerings face competition from restaurants and fast food chains. The Company also faces intense competition from online retail giants such as Amazon."
"Adding to this competitive pressure is the recent growth in consumer demand for a “gourmet” shopping experience, complete with offerings of natural, organic, and gluten-free foods. Some of the Debtors’ competitors have expanded aggressively in marketing a range of natural and organic foods, prepared foods, and quality specialty grocery items. The Debtors have been at a competitive disadvantage to companies that have the financial flexibility to devote greater resources to sourcing, promoting, and selling the most in-demand products."
At least Weil is consistent: we wonder whether they pitch clients now on cost efficiencies they derive from just copying and pasting verbiage from one company's papers into another...? We also wonder whether the billable hours spent drafting the First Day Declaration here are less than they were in Tops. What's your guess?
Anyway, there's more. No "First Day Declaration" is complete without a reference to Amazon ($AMZN). Here, though, the company also notes other competitive threats — including Walmart ($WMT). In "Tops, Toys, Amazon & Owning the Robots," we said the following,
In Bentonville, Arkansas some Walmart Inc. ($WMT) employee is sitting there thinking, “Why does Amazon always get the credit and free publicity? WTF.”
Looks like Weil and the company noticed. And Walmart got their (destructive) credit. Go $WMT!
Other causes for the company's chapter 11 include food deflation of approximately 1.3% ("a drastic difference from the twenty-year average of 2.2% inflation"), and reductions in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (aka food stamps). And Trump wasn’t even in office yet.
Finally, in addition to the store closures, the company proposes to sell 33 stores pursuant to certain lease sale agreements it executed prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Will this mark the end of grocery bankruptcies for the near term or are there others laying in wait? Email us: petition@petition11.com.
In February, we wrote a mock "First Day Bankruptcy Declaration" for Remington Outdoor Company. We wrote:
Murica!! F*#& Yeah!!
Remington (f/k/a Freedom Group) is "Freedom Built, American Made." Because nothing says freedom like blowing sh*t up. Cue Lynyrd Skynyrd's "Free Bird." Hell, we may even sing it in court now that Toys R Us has made that a thing.
Our company traces its current travails to 2007 when Cerberus Capital Management LP bought Remington for $370mm (cash + assumption of debt) and immediately "loaded" the North Carolina-based company with even more debt. As of today, the company has $950mm of said debt on its balance sheet, including a $150mm asset-backed loan due June '19, a $550mm term loan B due April '19, and 7.875% $250mm 3rd lien notes due '20. Suffice it to say, the capital structure is pretty "jammed." Nothing says America like guns...and leverage.
Shortly after Cerberus purchased the company, Barack Obama became president - a fact, on its own, that many perceived as a real "blowback" to gun ownership. Little did they know. But, then, compounding matters, the Sandy Hook incident occurred and it featured Remington's Bushmaster AR-15-style rifle. Subsequently, speeches were made. Tears were shed. Big pension fund investors like CSTRS got skittish AF. And Cerberus pseudo-committed to selling the company. Many thought that this situation was going to spark "change [you] can believe in," lead to more regulation, and curtail gun sales/ownership. But everyone thought wrong. Tears are no match for lobby dollars. Suckers.
Instead, firearm background checks have risen for at least a decade - a bullish indication for gun sales. In a sick twist of only-in-America fate, Obama's caustic tone towards gunmakers actually helped sell guns. And that is precisely what Remington needed in order to justify its burdensome capital structure and corresponding interest expense. With Hillary Clinton set to win the the election in 2016, Cerberus' convenient inability to sell was set to pay off.
But then that "dum dum" "ramrod" Donald Trump was elected and he enthusiastically and publicly declared that he would "never, ever infringe on the right of the people to keep and bear arms." While that's a great policy as far as we, here, at Remington are concerned, we'd rather him say that to us in private and declare in public that he's going to go door-to-door to confiscate your guns. Boom! Sales through the roof! And money money money money for the PE overlords! Who cares if you can't go see a concert in Las Vegas without fearing for your lives. Yield baby. Daddy needs a new house in Emerald Isle.
Wait? "How would President Trump say he's going to confiscate guns and nevertheless maintain his base?" you ask. Given that he can basically say ANYTHING and maintain his base, we're not too worried about it. #MAGA!! Plus, wink wink nod nod, North Carolina. We'd all have a "barrel" of laughs over that.
So now what? Well, "shoot." We could "burst mode" this thing, and liquidate it but what's the fun in that. After all, we still made net revenue of $603.4mm and have gross profit margins of 20.9%. Yeah, sure, those numbers are both down from $865.1mm and 27.4%, respectively, but, heck, all it'll take is a midterm election to reverse those trends baby.
So, we'd rather "blow up" the capital structure, eliminate $700mm in debt, and start fresh. So, that's what we're going to do. And if you have a problem with it, allow us to remind you that we are armed to the hilt. We've got the lenders putting $145mm of fresh capital into this thing. The ABL lenders will be refinanced-out and the term lenders will get 82.5% of the company and some cash. The third lien noteholders will get the remaining 17.5% of equity, a "brass"-full of cash and some 4-year warrants to capture some upside. You know, in case Trump doesn't win re-election in 2020. Gotta preserve that upside potential. And if anyone DOES have a problem with it...well...let me assure you (looking down at pocket): we're NOT happy to see you.
As it turns out, our (tongue-in-cheek) assessment of the situation wasn't far off. Indeed, increased inventory levels and decreased sales created significant issues for the company's over-levered balance sheet. Earlier this week, we added the following in our synopsis of the company’s bankruptcy filing:
Indeed, our mockery of the change in tone from President Obama to President Trump was spot on: post Trump's election, the company's inventory supply far exceeded demand. The (fictional) threat of the government going house-to-house to collect guns is a major stimulant to demand, apparently. Here is the change in financial performance,
"At the conclusion of 2017, the Debtors had realized approximately $603.4 million in sales and an adjusted EBITDA of $33.6 million. In comparison, in 2015 and 2016, the Debtors had achieved approximately $808.9 million and $865.1 million in sales and $64 million and $119.8 million in adjusted EBITDA, respectively."
Thanks Trump.
We'd be remiss, however, if we didn't also note that NOWHERE in the company's bankruptcy filings does it mention the backlash against guns or the company's involvement in shootings...namely, the one that occurred in Las Vegas.
It’s true. Not a mention. Which is even more amazing when you consider that the bankruptcy filing was made on Sunday, March 25, 2018 — the day after the #MarchforourLives. The company blames the bankruptcy almost entirely on the balance sheet. There is a lot of debt:
$225mm ABL (Bank of America, $114.5mm funded),
$550.5mm term loan (Ankura Trust Company LLC),
$226mm 7.875% Senior Secured Notes due 2020 (Wilmington Trust NA),
$12.5mm secured Huntsville Note
Significantly, the bankruptcy is supposed to dress the situation. Nowhere it the company’s papers did it suggest any non-debt headwinds — like, for instance, regulation. Indeed, the company doesn't seem to expect any regulatory backlash. This is what the company projects in sales for the coming years:
Now no reorganization can occur without financing. So recall this @Axios piece about Bank of America's ($BAC) ongoing re-evaluation of its relationship with gun manufacturers. Axios writes,
Beginning what could become a widespread financial squeeze on gun manufacturers, Bank of America says in a statement to Axios that it is reexamining its relationship with banking clients who make AR-15s.
Riiiiiight. Well, $BAC is the prepetition agent to the company’s asset-backed revolver loan and has agreed to be the agent to the company’s Debtor-in-Possession credit facility too. That facility was approved yesterday by the bankruptcy court. It has taken an allocation of the DIP which rolls into an exit credit facility which means that $BAC intends to have a post-bankruptcy relationship with the company. Note Bank of America's piece here:
Note also Wells Fargo Bank's ($WFC) piece. Now, presumably, the banks will syndicate (some of) their portions out but, well, clearly they have no qualms having exposure to this gun manufacturer.
Finally, we’d be remiss if we didn’t also point out that, according to The Wall Street Journal, JPMorgan Asset Management and Franklin Resources Inc. are among the lender group that will end up owning a meaningful portion of reorganized Remington's equity.
This week has undoubtedly been painful for employees, vendors, suppliers and fans of Toys R Us. The liquidation of the big box toy retailer is a failure of epic proportions; many creditors will be fighting over the carcass for months to come — both inside and outside of the United States; many employees now have two months to find a new gig; many suppliers need to figure out if and how they’ll be able to manage now that they’re exposure to unpaid receivables has increased. Good thing the company’s CEO is a man-of-the-people who can help cushion the blow.
Hardly. Enter CEO David Brandon and his shameless, out-of-touch attempts to cast blame onto outside parties: “The constituencies who have been beating us up for months will all live to regret what’s happening here.” Wait. Huh?!
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Before we dive into the current status of Guitar Center Inc., let’s first establish that there is almost zero chance ⬆️ this kid ⬆️ ends up playing guitar when he’s older given today’s music trends. Just saying.
As everyone knows, the instrument retailer recently popped up on a variety of retail doom and gloom lists due to its over-levered capital structure and (relatively) near-term maturities. A quick flashback: the company was the target of a $2.1 billion 2007 leveraged buyout by Bain Capital. In a 2014 out-of-court restructuring, Ares Capital Management swapped its debt for equity in the company, effectively eliminating Bain from the equation and removing $500 million of debt and nearly $70 million in annual interest expense. The transaction was accompanied by a refinancing and maturity extension of other parts of the capital structure.
As a consequence of that transaction, the current capital structure stands as follows:
Yes, that’s a total of $1.2 billion of debt. Despite an uptick in pre-holiday sales, the dominant narrative remains that nobody plays guitar anymore. Consequently, there hasn’t been enough revenue coming into the coffers to service this debt. You can blame Yeezy and The Chainsmokers for that. We’ve harped on about the state of music here and, in a separate guest post about Gibson Brands’ struggles, Ted Gavin of Gavin/Solmonese added some additional perspective. Longer-term trends notwithstanding, Guitar Center seeks to live another day on the back of the short-term uptick. To do so, however, it must address that debt.
On Monday, Guitar Center — with the help of bankers UBS and Houlihan Lokey and the consent of Ares — launched an exchange offer and consent solicitation related to its unsecured notes. The offer is to swap the existing $325 million 9.625% notes for $325 million of 5% cash/8% PIK notes due 2022 (along with with some warrants). Per the company’s press release, $299 million worth of holders have already agreed (92% of the issuance). This swap would save the company $13,812,500 a year in interest expense AND have the effect of pushing out the maturity for three years. Gotta love the capital markets these days.
In tandem, the company is proposing to offer $635 million of new 9.5% senior secured notes due 2021. The use of proceeds of these new notes would be to redeem the $615 million 6.5% senior secured notes due 2019. With this piece of the transaction, the company will be taking on an additional $20.35 million of annual interest expense.
Finally, the company will also refinance the $375 million ABL, extending the maturity out by 5 years.
So, if you made it this far, here’s the upshot: if these transactions are successful, the company will have availed itself of a few years to turn itself around by pushing out its debt maturities. But, it will have eliminated ZERO INTEREST EXPENSE in the aggregate. Said another way: this is a band-aid, not a solution.
All of which means that the company needs to hope and pray some rock God hits the scene and reinvigorates the market for guitars in the next two years. We’ll take the under.
The Walking Company. Payless Shoesource. Aerosoles. The bankruptcy court dockets have been replete with third-party sellers of footwear with bursting brick-and-mortar footprints, high leverage, scant consumer data, old stodgy reputations and, realistically speaking, limited brand value. Mere days away from a Nine West bankruptcy filing, we can’t help but to think about how quickly the retail landscape is changing and the impact of brands. Why? Presumably, Nine West will file, close the majority of - if not all of - its brick-and-mortar stores and transfer its brand IP to its creditors (or a new buyer). For whatever its brand is worth. We suppose the company’s lenders - likely to receive the company’s IP in a debt-for-equity swap, will soon find out. We suspect “not a hell of a whole lot”.
Back in December, we snarked about Proctor & Gamble’s efforts to innovate around cheaper razors in the face of competition from digitally-native vertical brands like (now Unilever-owned) Dollar Shave Club and Harry’s. The struggle is real. Per the Financial Times,
In 2016, revenues of the large consumer good companies — from beer to soft drinks, food and household products — grew at their slowest rate since 2009, when the recession took hold. The 207 results for many of those companies that have reported remain weak.
A few weeks ago the Interactive Advertising Bureau released a new study entitled, “The Rise of the 21st Century Brand Economy.” It is well-worth perusing. In fact, we’re a bit late to the game here because we wanted to give it an earnest review. The upshot? Consumption habits are rapidly shifting away from third-party wholesalers like Nine West towards direct-to-consumer relationships. With nimble, oft-outsourced supply chains, DTC e-comm brands are stealing market share from consumer products manufacturers and distributors. In the aggregate, it’s creating real shocks. Some significant themes:
Economic benefits are accruing to firms that create value by tapping into low-barrier-to-entry, capital-flexible, leased or rented supply chains. These include thousands of small firms in all major consumer-facing categories that sell their own branded goods entirely or primarily through their owned-and-operated digital channels.
First-party data relationships are important not for their marketing value independent of other functions, but because they fuel all significant functions of the enterprise, including product development, customer value analysis, and pricing.
An arms race for first-party data is influencing strategy, investment, and marketing strategies among major incumbent brands across all categories.
The significance of these themes cannot be overstated. Putting some numbers around them:
In the razor category, Gillette’s share of the U.S. men's-razors business fell to 54% in 2016, from 70% in 2010. Almost all of that share has shifted to Dollar Shave Club, Harry’s, and several other digital primary sellers.
In pet food, subscription service The Farmers Dog is averaging 40-50% revenue growth monthly, in a U.S. pet food market projected up 4.4% in 2018.
Grocery store revenue growth is projected to be about 1 percent annually through 2022. Over that same period, the market for Meal Kits is expected to grow by a factor of 10x.
Amazon ($AMZN) has meal kits. Walmart ($WMT) just launched meal kits. Albertsons purchased Plated. Meanwhile, the bankruptcy courts have a laundry list of grocers on their dockets.
Saving the most relevant to Nine West for last,
Sales at U.S. shoe stores in February 2017 fell 5.2%, the biggest year-over-year tumble since 2009. Online-only players like Allbirds, Jack Erwin, and M.Gemi have gained nearly 15 percentage points of share over five years.
Yes, the very same Allbirds that is so popular that it is apparently creating wool shortages. Query whether this factor will be featured in Nine West’s First Day Declaration with such specificity. Likely not.